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1 Introduction 
1.1  Legal Aid in Asylum Cases: Debates and Criticism on Lawyer 
Conduct 
The way in which asylum lawyers do their work, especially when operating 
within a state’s legal aid system, is a topic of continuous debate.1 Legal aid law-
yers are criticised for not putting in sufficient time and effort in assisting their 
asylum-seeking clients and for ‘cherry picking’ profitable cases, as well as for 
undermining the law and ‘playing the system’ by starting procedure after proce-
dure in so-called ‘hopeless cases’. Doing so excessively burdens the administra-
tive and judicial system as well as the legal aid budget. In these discussions we 
see different, and at times contradictory, ideas about lawyers’ motivations. On 
the one hand, these lawyers are portrayed as ‘fat cat’ lawyers, motivated by their 
own profit, whose alleged excesses are funded by the taxpayer. On the other 
hand, they are depicted as leftist activists, acting zealously for the refugee/mi-
grant cause (while working for minimum fees). This raises the question: can 
both be true at the same time? How do lawyers actually go about assisting their 
asylum seeking clients under the legal aid scheme and why? What motivates 
them and how do they justify their decisions? 
The discussions and criticism about the ways in which asylum legal aid 
lawyers do their work are essentially about how these lawyers deal and should 
deal with the different (and at times competing) interests at stake when assisting 
their asylum seeking clients under the legal aid scheme. In other words, they 
concern the ways in which lawyers approach ‘ethical issues’, which I understand 
to be, in line with Moorhead et al., issues ‘arising when the public interest in the 
administration of justice, the client’s interest and the provider’s interests (in 
profit or survival) are in tension’.2 The discussions thus show what Luban states: 
‘the ethical problems of lawyers are social and political problems for the rest of 
us’.3  
                                                        
1  See e.g. ‘Asieladvocaten “strooien zand in de machine”’, NRC, 20 December, 2001; 
Laemers & De Groot-van Leeuwen (2004); Jacobs et al. (2006); Sillevis Smitt (2012); 
Butter, Laemers & Terlouw (2013); ‘Asylum seeker charities are just playing the system, 
says Woolas’, Guardian, 18 November, 2008; http://www.irr.org.uk/news/asylum-
seekers-wrongly-refused-legal-aid/;  Sanderson & Sommerlad (2011), p.185 ff; Gibbs & 
Hughes-Roberts (2012), p. 20. 
2  Moorhead et al. (2012), p. 7. 
3  Luban (1988), p. xviii. 
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1.2  Ethical Challenges in the Practice Area of Publicly Funded Asylum 
Law 
There are several aspects to the practice area of publicly funded asylum law that, 
in combination, make the work of legal aid lawyers ethically challenging. First 
of all, asylum seeking clients are very much dependent on a lawyer in order to 
be able to realise their rights and secure their interests. Asylum seekers may 
arrive traumatised or with medical problems in a country whose language they 
often do not speak, are unfamiliar with the legal system and, generally, do not 
know what to expect of the asylum procedure and what is expected of them. 
Assisting the client with the legal aspects of his/her case may require the per-
formance of serious ‘emotional labour’ on the side of the lawyer.4 In addition, 
the asylum process is typified by an inequality of the parties involved, i.e. the 
state being a ‘repeat player’ versus the asylum seeker as a ‘one-shotter’.5 Repeat 
players have strategic advantages in the procedure in several ways and the state 
can even be considered the ‘ultimate repeat player’.6 The legal aid lawyer (being 
a repeat player to some extent) is introduced into the asylum process in an at-
tempt to compensate for this inequality in this field which is arguably politically 
contentious and in which decision makers may be unreceptive.7  
Secondly, asylum law can be considered – apart from being politically sen-
sitive – complex and having an, at times, ambiguous character both on a legal 
and a factual level. On a legal level, this area of law is in constant  flux. The 
relatively recent establishment of a Common European Asylum System pro-
duced regulations that have implications for national asylum policies.8 Jurispru-
dential developments on the interpretation of these regulations and whether 
national policies are in line with these regulations are ongoing. In addition, the 
                                                        
4  Westaby (2010). 
5  Galanter (1974). 
6  Ibid. E.g. they develop expertise, have ready access to specialists, the opportunity to 
develop facilitative informal relations with institutions involved overtime and they can 
adopt strategies in order to maximise gain in the long term. And, since the stakes in one 
particular case may not be that high – contrary to the stakes of one-shotters, which can be 
in the case of asylum seekers a matter of life or death – they can afford to play for the 
rules; Niemeijer 2014, p. 90;  see also: Kritzer (2003), p. 362. 
7  In the UK is often spoken about a ‘culture of disbelief’ towards asylum seekers is often 
spoken about which, as has been argued, can also be seen amongst judges see e.g. Web-
ber (2012); Anderson et al. (2014). See also Griffiths (2012); Alcoran (2012). Compare 
Baldinger (2013); Spijkerboer (2014); Appelqvist (2000); Levin (2012). 
8  Between 1999 and 2005, several legislative measures harmonising common minimum 
standards for asylum were adopted, including e.g. the Qualification-, Asylum Proce-
dures- and Reception Conditions Directives, and the Dublin Regulation which deter-
mines which Member State is responsible for examining the asylum application, and 
these have been revised in recent years. 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) plays a prominent role in this 
area of law and its Court has produced a body of case law on asylum related 
matters leading to discussions on whether national policies are in line with the 
ECHR. The applicability of both national and European and international (the 
original Refugee Convention) legal frameworks opens up the debate on whether 
national asylum policies are in line with European and international asylum 
legislation. The judgments of the European courts flowing from these challenges 
may have implications for national policy thereby rendering the content of asy-
lum law uncertain and making it harder to assess the chances of legal success. 
The uncertainty plays on a factual level as well. Whether there is actually a risk 
of persecution of an asylum seeker upon return to his or her country of origin is 
difficult to establish. Moreover, during the asylum procedure this risk may 
change, for example, because the situation in the asylum seeker’s country of 
origin has changed and has become more unsafe. Lastly, the overlap with immi-
gration law and the developments in the client’s personal life may create possi-
ble other routes for legal stay (e.g. based on medical condition or familial rea-
sons). The interconnectedness of asylum with immigration law may thus also 
alter the chances of success, i.e. the eligibility for legal stay in the country in 
which one seeks to obtain asylum.  
Thirdly, there are organisational aspects of both the asylum and the legal aid 
system that determine the legal aid lawyer’s work environment. Asylum proce-
dures can be very lengthy or, conversely, extremely rapid, in which case the 
time limits within which the lawyer must act are short. Especially in the Nether-
lands, the legal aid lawyer’s work is delimited by the institutional setting of the 
asylum procedure.9 Lawyers are appointed by the Legal Aid Board to asylum 
seeking clients in a fixed asylum procedure in which it is to a great extent de-
termined where, when and how long the lawyer can see his or her client as well 
as what, broadly speaking, must be discussed.10 Related to the previous point, 
legal aid lawyers operate within the national legal aid system. This means that 
they are reliant on the legal aid authority for obtaining access to the legal aid 
scheme and, subsequently, for obtaining disbursements and payment; a payment 
that is primarily based on fixed fees and has been subject to funding cuts.11 Asy-
lum legal aid lawyers are thus largely dependent on the state – which is at the 
same time the party they are litigating against – as regards the conditions under 
which they have to work as well as their possibilities to ensure enough earnings 
                                                        
9  Compare Doornbos (2006), p. 237. 
10  See Butter (2014). 
11  Among other things, cuts in legal aid funding and the speed of the asylum process cause 
concerns about the effective provision of legal aid in asylum procedures in Europe. Eu-
ropean Commission (2010); ECRE/ELENA (2010); FRA (2010); UNHCR (2010).  
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in order to be able to sustain a legal aid practice. Previous research and contribu-
tions of lawyers who engaged in discussions on the provision of legal aid in 
asylum cases have shown that this ‘institutional context’, i.e. the (joint setup of 
the) asylum and legal aid system, in which lawyers operate, may cause ethical 
pressures.12 Lawyers describe the difficulties in providing what they consider 
high quality legal assistance under the circumstances in which they have to 
work. 
 
The particulars of asylum seekers as clientele, the politically sensitive, complex 
and sometimes ambiguous nature of asylum law combined with the organisa-
tional aspects of both the asylum and legal aid system (the institutional context) 
in which lawyers operate thus make the practice area of publicly funded asylum 
law an ethically challenging work environment. It presents lawyers with situa-
tions in which the client’s interest, the public interest in the administration of 
justice and the lawyer’s interest in profit or even survival may be in tension. For 
example, the combination of the high stakes for asylum seekers with the fact 
that, when they are eligible for legal aid, they do not have to contribute finan-
cially to the legal assistance they receive, might mean that they want to try every 
possibility (appeal and onward appeals) to have their claim accepted. The legal 
aid lawyer may thus be confronted with vulnerable clients who very much rely 
on their lawyer for realising their rights and securing their interests and are ada-
mant in their wish to start and/or continue a procedure of which the lawyer con-
siders the chances of obtaining legal success to be (close to) zero. While it may 
be in the client’s interest to start such a procedure, this may not be in the public 
interest as it might unnecessarily burden the administrative/judicial system and 
the legal aid system. Or, another example, the lawyer’s interest in profit or sur-
vival may be in tension with both the client’s interest and the public interest in 
having well prepared asylum applications and this may, at times, call for a larger 
time investment than the lawyer can claim under (the fixed fee) legal aid fund-
ing. How do lawyers go about balancing the different and at times competing 
interests at stake in publicly funded asylum cases? 
1.3  Aim, Approach and Research Questions 
The central aim of this study is to explore and understand what I take to mean 
the ‘professional ethics in practice’ of asylum legal aid lawyers, i.e. how lawyers 
as members of the legal profession balance the different interests at stake when 
                                                        
12  E.g. James & Killick (2010; 2012); Terlouw (2011); Sommerlad (2008); Webber (2012); 
Bogaers (2009); Hoftijzer (2003); Koers (2001). 
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assisting their asylum seeking clients under the state’s legal aid scheme. In addi-
tion, the ‘institutional context’ in which lawyers operate seems to be an impor-
tant instigator of ethical pressures and I am particularly interested in exploring 
the role thereof in shaping lawyers’ decisions. By ‘institutional context’ I mean 
the (joint setup) of the asylum and legal aid system, excluding the substantive 
aspects of asylum law. In order to reach these aims, I examine the professional 
decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers in two different institutional con-
texts.  
 
I define professional decision making as the way in which lawyers go about 
making decisions on ethical issues, that is, how they balance the client’s interest, 
the public interest in the administration of justice and the lawyer’s interest in 
profit or survival.13   
 
Professional Decision Making 
 
 
        Client interest  
 
       
                                                                            Decision 
 
          
 
 
Public interest                                                                Lawyer interest    
in the administration of justice                          in profit or survival 
 
This image depicts the situation in which there is no tension between the differ-
ent interests. Ethical issues arise when these interests are in tension. All three 
interests then pull in different directions and lawyers’ actual ethical decisions 
                                                        
13  Following the definition of ‘ethical issue’ by Moorhead et al. (2012), p. 7. Clearly, this 
definition of ethical issues constitutes a simplification as it reduces all the different inter-
ests that may cause tensions to these three interests. However, I would argue, in line with 
Moorhead et al., that these are the three central interests that are always at issue and lie at 
the heart of ethics in legal practice. These are the central interests the professional codes 
of conduct seek to address as well as integrate (especially the first two: client and public) 
while acknowledging that those may be in tension. Moreover, and even more important-
ly, they lie at the core of the debates that prompted this research.
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are situated somewhere in the triangle and  may differ from one situation to 
another.  
 
As the introduction suggests, and will become  clearer in the next chapter, the 
boundaries between the phenomenon under review (professional decision mak-
ing of asylum legal aid lawyers) and the context are not that clear or, in any 
case, the phenomenon under review cannot be understood without taking due 
account of the context within which lawyers operate; therefore, this research 
consists of a multiple case study.14 In using this research strategy, I employ 
qualitative methods and an interpretative approach.15 Interviews with asylum 
legal aid lawyers constitute the core of this research, but in order to obtain a 
better understanding of their professional decision making and the role of the 
institutional context in that regard, I studied lawyers’ professional decision mak-
ing within the wider context in which they operate in two countries (‘cases’): the 
Netherlands and England. The method of interviewing allows for obtaining a 
meaningful understanding (verstehen) of lawyers’ professional decision mak-
ing.16 It is clear that from interviews one cannot make out whether what lawyers 
say they do corresponds to what they actually do. I cannot distil from the inter-
views how they actually conduct themselves in their daily work, but I can obtain 
an understanding of how they think about, motivate and justify their decisions. 
The interpretive method applied in this research does not allow one to reach 
conclusions about the frequency of any phenomenon beyond the analysed sub-
jects. The strength of this method lies – rather than in establishing how often 
something happens –  in its ability to generate a new and better understanding of 
lawyers’ professional ethics in practice, which is what this research purports to 
do. 
 
The question central to this research is: 
 
What does the professional decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers look 
like, how can this be understood and what role does the institutional context 
play in this regard? 
 
                                                        
14  This research strategy consists of an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon 
with its real life context. Yin (2009), p. 18.  
15  As opposed to a positivist approach. An interpretative approach differs from the positiv-
ist approach in three ways: 1) it deals with the meaning attached to behaviour rather than 
focusing on action; 2) it sees reality as being constructed by people rather than there be-
ing an objective reality 'out there'; 3) it relies on qualitative data, rather than the quantita-
tive data often used in positivist sociology. Macionis & Gerber (2010). 
16  Weber (1978), p. 4.  
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The sub questions are: 
• What does the context in which asylum legal aid lawyers operate in the 
Netherlands and England look like?  
• What does asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making in the 
Netherlands and England look like and how can this be understood?  
• What role does the institutional context play in asylum legal aid lawyers’ 
professional decision making?  
1.4  Outline of the Book 
This book is made up of six chapters. The next chapter (chapter 2) contains the 
theoretical and methodological background to this research. In this chapter I 
give a brief overview of the relevant literature, discuss how the literature in-
formed my study continuously in the course of this research, how I conducted 
this research and set out the analytical framework employed for examining law-
yers’ professional decision making. The subsequent chapters contain the two 
case studies of the Netherlands (chapter 3) and England (chapter 4). These chap-
ters examine asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making within, 
respectively, the Dutch and the English context and consist of two main parts. 
The first part describes the context within which these lawyers operate and the 
second part examines their professional decision making within these contexts. 
Chapter 5 combines and contrasts the analyses of both cases. Drawing on both 
analyses, it further examines how the professional decision making of asylum 
legal aid lawyers can be understood and discusses the role of the institutional – 
and professional – context in how the balancing act plays out. In the conclusion 
(chapter 6) I present my main findings, reflect on methodological issues and 
discuss my findings in light of the literature and of the debates discussed in the 
introduction. 
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2 Theoretical and Methodological Background 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter contains the theoretical and methodological background to this 
research. These are discussed in one chapter because they are closely connected 
in this type of interpretive, qualitative research: the methodological choices are 
theoretically informed. I adopt an explorative approach in which theoretical 
notions and existing research are used to gain more insight into the object of 
study (lawyers’ professional ethics in practice, more in particular, their profes-
sional decision making) and to direct the setup of this study, the selection of 
respondents and the analysis. In this chapter I give a brief overview of the rele-
vant literature, discuss how the literature informed my study continuously in the 
course of this research, how I conducted this research and set out the analytical 
framework employed for examining lawyers’ professional decision making. 
2.2  Lawyers’ Professional Ethics in the Literature  
2.2.1  Terminology and the Normative versus the Empirical Debate 
The term ‘professional’ or ‘lawyers’ ethics’ is often used in different ways. It is 
used to indicate the profession’s formally adopted norms as well as to denote 
lawyers’ ethics as a topic of study including the moral dimensions of profes-
sional work more broadly;1 I use it in the latter sense. Likewise, the term ‘pro-
fessionalism’ is often used to cover a similar type of research, but this term is 
also used in overlapping and distinct senses.2 In the scholarly literature on this 
larger topic two main discussions can be discerned: one is normative (which 
professional standards should guide lawyers’ conduct) and the other essentially 
empirical (how do lawyers understand and enact their professional duties within 
the context of their daily work).3 This research is about the latter.  
                                                        
1  See e.g. Boon & Levin (1999), p. 7; Nicolson & Webb (2000), p. 5; Luban (2006), p. 2 
ff. Similarly, views of what constitutes an ethical issue or dilemma may vary, see e.g. 
Lamb (1995). 
2  See e.g. Atkinson (1995); Lansdell (2016). Atkinson, for example, discerns four different 
senses of professionalism: professionalism as description, as explanation, as a locus of 
regulation and as a focus of aspiration (p. 271-276). 
3  Cummings (2011), p. 1-27.  
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The empirical debate on lawyer professionalism in the US, where much of 
this research originated,4 initially centred largely around the question to what ex-
tent legal professional training, rules and codes of conduct (the official profes-
sionalism rhetoric) guide the choices lawyers make in practice.5 Nelson and 
Trubek – who conceptualise professionalism as ‘the process by which ideas 
about the appropriate role of lawyers in society and the proper methods of con-
ducting and organizing the practice of law are constructed’ – proposed an ana-
lytical framework contrasting two ‘arenas’ in which professionalism is con-
strued: the collective arena of bar associations and the workplace arena of law-
yers.6 Subsequent research employed and further developed this analytical 
framework for studying professionalism in practice and explored the forces that 
control or influence lawyers’ decisions.7 In this regard the term ‘ethical decision 
making’ has been employed and it is used as including ‘the ways in which the 
rules and norms of lawyering, individual values, and considerations of justice, 
clients, and practice organizations, shape individual conduct’.8 This definition of 
decision making encompasses the how as well as the why of decision making, 
i.e. the forces that shape it. Even though in examining lawyers’ decision making 
no hard and fast distinction can be made between the two, I would like to allow 
for the conceptual difference. Therefore, I chose to use the term ‘professional 
decision making’ to name the decision making that is the object of this research 
and I define this, as explained in the introduction, as the way in which lawyers 
go about making decisions on ethical issues, i.e. how they balance the client’s 
interest, the public interest in the administration of justice and the lawyer’s in-
terest in profit or survival.9 The studies that focus on explaining the discretion-
ary decisions lawyers make in the course of their work (the why of lawyers’ 
decision making) provide useful insights for this research.  
 
                                                        
4  See e.g. Carlin (1966); Heinz & Laumann (1978, 1982); Abel & Lewis (1988); Wilkins 
(1990); Nelson, Trubek & Solomon (1992). Including a range of empirical studies on 
how lawyers in specific practice areas do their work and deal with their clients, see e.g. 
Rosenthal (1974) on personal injury lawyers; Macaulay (1979) on consumer lawyers; 
Mann (1985) on white collar crime defence lawyers; Sarat & Felstiner (1995) on divorce 
lawyers. As from the 1990s the academic interest also grew in the United Kingdom and 
lawyers’ ethics became an important object of study. See Boon & Levin (1999); Nicolson 
& Webb (2000), p. 3 and references 18 to 22. 
5  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001), p. 4. 
6  Nelson & Trubek (1992), p. 180 ff. 
7  E.g. Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001); Levin & Mather (2012). 
8  Levin & Mather (2012), p. 7. 
9  Following the definition of ‘ethical issue’ by Moorhead et al. (2012), p. 7.  
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2.2.2  Main Accounts for Understanding Lawyer Decision Making 
In their study on the professionalism in practice of US divorce lawyers, Mather, 
McEwen and Maiman give a comprehensive overview of the prevailing ac-
counts in socio-legal research for understanding lawyers’ professional conduct.10 
These accounts include ‘the professional’ (formal codes of professional respon-
sibility), ‘the workplace’ (economic incentives and the work settings in which 
the lawyer operates), ‘the personal’ (personal identity and values), and they ad-
vanced a fourth alternative, a general explanation that draws something from 
each of the three accounts: ‘communities of practice’.11 As this provides a com-
prehensive overview of the main explanatory accounts, I will use it as a basis for 
discussing the different relevant elements as also identified in other and subse-
quent research as well as address and reflect on these accounts in the practice 
area of publicly funded asylum law.  
‘The Professional’ 
This account relies heavily on the impact of the professional rules and organisa-
tion as the key element influencing lawyers’ conduct.12 It represents the original 
ideal of a unified profession in which the members are guided by the rules set by 
the profession. It comprises the whole array of codes of conduct and formal 
rules of professional responsibility and enforcement and monitoring mechanisms 
employed by the profession to ensure compliance. This includes disciplinary 
proceedings and supervisory measures taken by, for example, the president of 
the bar. In the practice area of publicly funded asylum law, the legal aid authori-
ties complement professional organisations (bar associations) in their standard 
setting and monitoring activities for lawyers participating in the legal aid sys-
tem. The legal aid authorities introduce additional standards or facilitate the 
setting up of monitoring activities – such as peer review – and make submission 
to these mechanisms a condition for being allowed to participate in the legal aid 
scheme.13  
It should be noted here that what a professional regime entails and pre-
scribes may differ per country as, across the globe, there is a variety in legal 
                                                        
10  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001).  
11  Ibid., p. 6 ff. 
12  Ibid., p. 6. 
13  In a Dutch study into the quality of legal aid to immigrants in detention the researchers 
identified the lack of monitoring compliance with rules and codes of conduct as one of 
the elements impeding the adequate assistance of clients and argued that the actual com-
pliance with professional rules and obligations could be improved by introducing more 
active monitoring activities. Jacobs et al. (2006), p. 63 ff.  
Such attempts have been made e.g. by introducing peer review. 
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systems, the role of lawyers in society and conceptions of professionalism.14 
Traditionally, a distinction has been made in this regard between common and 
civil law countries.15 Sherr, for example, points within the European context to a 
clear division between civil law countries (e.g. the Netherlands) and common 
law countries (e.g. England) in respect of the approaches to the rules of conduct 
and professional discipline.16 However, there may also be differences between 
common law countries. Even though in common law systems, which have at 
their core the adversarial trial, there is a set of obligations that is generally char-
acterised as the ‘standard conception’ of the lawyer’s role, based on core princi-
ples of partisanship, neutrality and non-accountability, this standard conception 
is mainly developed (and applicable) in the United States.17 The current codes of 
conduct for English lawyers suggest that only an attenuated version of the stan-
dard conception operates in England and Wales, as we will see in more detail in 
chapter 4.18 The standard conception of the lawyer’s role is also referred to in 
the literature as the lawyer being a ‘hired gun’ for the client as opposed to an 
‘officer of the court’. 
Even though, historically, the authority of the profession was thought to 
have significant impact on lawyer conduct, over the years it has been acknowl-
edged that the impact of professional rules and regulation is only one, and cer-
tainly not the most important, factor determining lawyers’ conduct.19 It has been 
argued that professional rules ‘often reveal more about the aspirations of the 
profession than the reality’.20 Moreover, even though the professional rules and 
codes of conduct (the ‘hard law’ of ethics)21 are intended to prescribe the appro-
priate conduct and to guide lawyers in how to deal with the ethical problems 
they come across, they are often indeterminate, leave room for different inter-
pretations according to the situation with which one is confronted and allow for 
different visions of what lawyers’ professional obligations entail.22 The main 
threat to the professional ideal has been (the increase in) commercialisation, as 
was famously identified by the International Bar Association in its ‘Resolution 
                                                        
14  Abel & Lewis (1988, vol. 1), p. 11 ff.  
15  See e.g. Abel & Lewis (1988, vol. 1), p. 13. 
16  Sherr (1998) p. 342. 
17  See e.g. Parker (2004), p. 57; Boon (2014), p. 23-24. Boon explicitly discusses the prin-
ciple of neutrality as part of the standard conception. It requires that lawyers present cas-
es on behalf of unpopular causes or cases they disagree with morally.  
18  Boon (2014), p. 28-30. 
19  See for example Wilkins (1990); Nelson, Trubek & Solomon (1992), p. 15 ff. 
20  Mather & Levin (2012), p. 11. 
21  Luban (2006), p. 6-7.  
22  See e.g. Wilkins (1990); Atkinson (1995); Parker (2004). 
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on Professionalism versus Commercialism’.23 This brings me to the second main 
account for understanding lawyers’ professional decision making: ‘the work-
place’.  
‘The Workplace’ 
This account points to the workplace settings in which lawyers operate as the 
main aspect influencing their conduct.24 It generally covers the practice settings 
(size of the firm) – including whether lawyers mainly represent individual or 
corporate clients – the way in which lawyers are compensated for their work, the 
degree of competition for clients and the organisational settings of different 
work contexts. Nicolson and Webb also refer to this as ‘the business context’.25  
The size of the firm is found to be one of the workplace elements that im-
pacts on how lawyers conduct their work.26 There are differences between, on 
the one hand, the larger and, on the other, the smaller and solo firms in respect 
of not only the division of labour within a firm, the capacity to supervise and 
monitor beginning lawyers, the economic challenges they face, but also as re-
gards the degree of collegial control. A distinction that often, but not always, 
runs parallel to the size of the firm is the one between the clientele, i.e. individ-
ual clients as opposed to corporate clients, and this has been found to play a role 
in the way in which lawyers deal with their ethical obligations.27 Clients in asy-
lum law can be considered lower status clients and are, as pointed out in the 
introduction, particularly reliant on the lawyer for realising their rights, as they 
may be vulnerable ‘one shotters’ and unfamiliar with (the language as well as) 
the legal system in the country in which they apply for asylum.  
As regards several other workplace aspects – i.e. the organisational settings, 
the degree of competition for clients and the way in which lawyers are compen-
sated for their work – this is in the area of publicly funded asylum law largely 
                                                        
23  IBA ‘Resolution on Professionalism versus Commercialism’ adopted by the IBA Council 
in September 2000, available at: http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Default.aspx?q=Profes-
sionalism%20versus%20commercialism%e2%80%99. 
24  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001), p. 7. 
25  Nicolson & Webb (2000), p. 71-82. 
26  See Seron (1996), on the work lives of solo and small-firm attorneys in the Regional 
New York Metropolitan Area.  
27  Carlin (1966); Heinz & Laumann (1978, 1982). Carlin found that the differences in 
clientele matter for how lawyers deal with their ethical obligations; the lower the status 
of the client, the higher the rate of violations of ethical norms (p. 66ff). Compare 
Doornbos & De Groot-van Leeuwen (1997, p. 76 ff) who found that lawyers working in 
solo or small firms have to appear before disciplinary courts and are charged more often 
with violations of professional obligations than their colleagues in large firms (which of-
ten run parallel to the type of clients they represent). At the same time, it must be noted 
that the larger firms often also have a significant influence on norm setting which might 
make it easier for those firms to comply. 
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determined by what I term the ‘institutional context’, i.e. the (joint setup of the) 
asylum and legal aid system. This sets the conditions under which legal aid law-
yers operate, since it determines: the conditions lawyers have to meet in order to 
be allowed to assist asylum applicants under the legal aid scheme; asylum seek-
ers’ eligibility for legal aid and how and by whom this is determined; whether 
the lawyer is appointed or can choose his or her clients; the lawyer’s remunera-
tion; access to facilities and coverage of additional expenses (e.g. interpretation, 
travel costs); and in certain circumstances when and where the lawyer can meet 
with the client. Asylum lawyers are thus largely dependent on the state (in its 
capacity as the legal aid authority) for obtaining access to the legal aid scheme 
and for the conditions under which they have to work and it has been argued that 
this may affect their ‘professionalism’. For example, in England, legal aid pro-
viders compete for contracts with the legal aid authority (in all areas of law, not 
only asylum) in order to supply a certain amount of legal work and once the 
provider is awarded a contract, compliance with the contract conditions is moni-
tored through audits. Sommerlad argued that the conditions imposed and 
mechanisms involved in this franchising lead to a loss of control over the char-
acter of their work and thus affect lawyers’ professionalism.28 This ‘New Public 
Management’29 led to an ‘erosion of the traditional moral authority of legal aid 
lawyers, impoverishing and undermining their autonomy’.30 The ‘decomposition 
of the complex web of interconnecting skills which constitute professional ser-
vice into tick box activities makes this service auditable’ and these contract 
compliance audits – which may bring about retrospective disallowances of fees 
and the loss of the contract – lead lawyers to argue that ‘their primary objective 
had become meeting the requirements of the audit rather than serving the cli-
ents’.31 
The lawyer’s institutional position in the asylum procedure has been a par-
ticular cause of concern in the Dutch context. In the fixed and fast paced asylum 
procedure – which is set up in liaison with the Legal Aid Board that appoints 
lawyers to clients – it is to a large extent determined by the national authorities 
where (in the application centre), when (fixed moments in the eight-day proce-
dure) and approximately how long the lawyer can see his or her client and, more 
or less, what must be discussed. Doornbos found in this respect that the strict 
routine and bureaucratic character of the (previous) Dutch asylum procedure 
                                                        
28  Sommerlad (1995). 
29  NPM draws on practices from the private sector (competition, customer satisfaction, 
efficiency) and utilises them in the public sector. It is the shorthand term used for the 
regulatory programmes introduced in the public sector to rationalise costs and increase 
efficiency.  
30  Sommerlad (2008), p. 182. 
31  Ibid., p. 186. 
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posed a threat to independent legal aid provision.32 Even though the time limits 
have been extended, the character of the fixed procedure is still present. The 
reality that the legal aid provider is in essence ‘captured’ by the institutional 
setting is still considered a potential challenge to the lawyer’s independence.33 
Furthermore, for lawyers participating in a state’s legal aid scheme, the de-
gree of competition is partly determined by the set-up of the legal aid system, 
including whether or not there is a cap on the number of lawyers that are al-
lowed to participate in the scheme. The degree of competition for clients and the 
need to generate business are found to be ‘workplace’ factors affecting lawyers’ 
conduct and leading to difficulties in making ethical choices.34 E.g., if a client is 
not happy with the service, s/he will find another lawyer and that lawyer might 
then act in accordance with the wishes of the client which the first lawyer found 
morally problematic.  
As regards the fee factor, generally, three kinds of fee arrangements can be 
distinguished: the fixed fee, the contingent fee (e.g. ‘no cure no pay’) and the 
hourly fee, which might all give rise to ethical challenges.35 In his theoretical 
appraisal on the economic determinants of lawyer behaviour, Johnson sets out 
different resource policies for lawyers receiving payment from a third party (as 
is the case with lawyers financed by the state to assist asylum seekers) and also 
indicated what the consequences of such policies would be.36 The ‘caseload 
benefit-maximization standard’ method – which resembles the fixed fee per case 
reimbursement of many legal aid systems – that desires to maximise the produc-
tivity of a fixed resource, whether the resource is a specific number of hours or a 
fixed sum of money, to allocate among a large number of clients.37 Johnson ar-
gues that such a policy would result in less time investment by the lawyer and 
possibly even a rejection of cases.38 In the English context, for example, the fear 
has been expressed that the fixed fee in combination with lawyers deciding who 
they accept as clients, affects the cases lawyers take on (the ‘straightforward’ 
cases), which is commonly referred to as ‘cherry picking’.39 Johnson does, how-
ever, acknowledge that other, non-economic, influences may determine lawyers’ 
                                                        
32  Doornbos (2006). Her conclusions relate to the previous Dutch asylum procedure which 
took 48 hours. Now the general procedure lasts eight days but the fixed and bureaucratic 
nature of the procedure has not changed.  
33  See Doornbos et al. (2012), p. 18-19. 
34  E.g. Daniels & Martin (2012); Lamb (1995), p. 222; Levin (2012), p. 104. 
35  See e.g. Moorhead (2011) mainly on contingency and hourly fees. 
36  Johnson (1981), p. 595 ff. 
37  In any case, the Netherlands and England – albeit in different forms – have this system. 
England has a mixed system with fixed fees but also an hourly fee for certain cases and 
appeal procedures. 
38  Johnson (1981), p. 599-600. Compare Jacobs et al. (2006). 
39  Compare James & Killick (2012), p. 9. 
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choices.40 Likewise, empirical studies nuanced the effect of fee arrangements on 
lawyers’ behaviour, in that lawyers cannot be considered agents who are exclu-
sively motivated by economic self-interest and whose efforts in a given case are 
directly and solely affected by the economic incentives of the fee arrangement.41 
This brings me to a third explanatory account: ‘the personal’. 
‘The Personal’ and Professional Ideology 
‘The personal’ sees the lawyer’s personal identity and values as the key forces 
shaping the decisions an individual lawyer makes.42 Personal characteristics 
such as gender, race, religion or class may affect lawyers’ responses to ethical 
problems. Lawyers’ personal values may not always correspond to those laid 
down in the law or, as regards how to behave, in rules of conduct. Since profes-
sional rules of conduct are often ambiguous and can be interpreted in different 
ways, this allows lawyers to emphasise different aspects of their professional 
identity according to their individual characteristics, values and preferences. 
Gender, for instance, has been put forward as a characteristic affecting one’s ap-
proach; it has been argued that women lawyers make different decisions in the 
course of their work to men in that they are more ‘care-oriented’, whereas men 
are more ‘rights-oriented’.43 Also, lawyers’ experience and their degree of spe-
cialisation might affect how they view their role and, as a result, how they carry 
out their work.44  
As regards personal values, Levin and Mather argued that lawyers’ percep-
tions of the legal system and the law’s morality may affect the way lawyers 
approach ethical decisions and that this has received insufficient attention in 
research.45 In the context of asylum law, Appelqvist found in her study on 
Swedish lawyers’ opinions and motives for working in refugee law that lawyers’ 
commitment to asylum cases is verbalised in connection with legal shortcomings 
and the struggle for the protection of the right to seek asylum.46 She found that 
those who had low confidence in and were critical of the asylum determination 
process used their professional skills as strategies of resistance to the injustice 
                                                        
40  Johnson mentions: (suggestions, not exhaustive) professional satisfaction, societal contri-
bution, game psychology and ethical standards and constraints. 
41See e.g. Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek (1985), p. 251-278. 
42  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001), p. 8. 
43  Jack & Crowley Jack (1989). The ethics of rights approach (allegedly adopted principally 
by men) relies on rights, duties, individual autonomy and generally applicable rules. The 
ethics of care approach relies on responsiveness, avoidance of harm and interdependent 
relations (p. 1). 
44  See e.g. Levin & Mather (2012, p. 17) referring to data from a Michigan law alumni sur-
vey 1997-2006. 
45  Ibid., p. 365, 369.  
46  Appelqvist (2000), p. 85. 
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and unfairness they experience. This can be characterised as ‘cause lawyering’.47 
Here the substantive aspects of asylum law (functioning of determining authori-
ties and the restrictive asylum policy) and lawyers’ disapproval thereof played 
an important role in how they went about doing their work. Similarly, within the 
context of immigration law, Levin showed that some US immigration lawyers – 
many of whom believe the system to be unfair – will not turn down clients who 
may be lying, reasoning that it is the job of the government to find out whether 
this is the case.48 In this we see that personal values, including how lawyers 
think about the law and the system within which they are working, as well as 
ideas about the lawyer’s role are important for understanding their decisions. As 
Nelson and Trubek argued, one cannot understand lawyer conduct without pay-
ing attention to professional ideology: ‘Lawyer behavior is in itself oriented 
towards some normative vision, official or otherwise, and is unintelligible with-
out attention to ideals of conduct.’49  
‘Communities of Practice’ and Legal Culture 
Mather, McEwen and Maiman largely developed the ‘communities of practice’ 
account for understanding lawyers’ decision making.50 The concept is used by 
the authors as ‘a way of locating the multiple sources of collegial control that 
impinge on the work of divorce lawyers and that grow out of personal identities, 
workplace settings and professional ideology’.51 In other words, since the differ-
ent accounts did not provide a sufficient explanation, the authors advanced this 
fourth alternative – but also complementary – view for understanding the 
choices lawyers make in the course of their work. They argue that this account 
could be seen as a mediating variable between lawyers’ personal identities, 
workplace settings and professional rules, and their decision making. But what 
exactly is understood by the term? ‘Communities of practice’ encompasses the 
groups of lawyers with whom practitioners interact. This ranges from the bar as 
a whole to lawyers who practise in the same field, from specialised associations 
to colleagues at the firm in which they work. In other words, it covers collegial 
control and reference points which play out within the context of communities 
of practice.52 The actual influence of collegial control may depend on factors 
                                                        
47  The term ‘cause lawyer’ was introduced by Sarat & Scheingold (1998) and indicates law-
yers who commit themselves and their legal skills to their vision of what is morally good. 
48  Levin (2012), p. 87-109. 
49  Nelson & Trubek (1992), p. 182. 
50  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001), p. 10 ff.  
51  Ibid., p. 12. 
52  The concept of collegial control had already been brought forward by Carlin (1966, 
p. 96 ff) as playing a crucial role in restricting or supporting the violation of ethical 
norms.  
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such as the tightness of the organisation of a practice community, the strength of 
members’ identity with the group, the intensity of their socialisation into the 
group, the extent to which their self-interest corresponds with collegial expecta-
tions, the degree to which members of collegial groups share language and ex-
perience, and the availability of ways for establishing and communicating pres-
tige and status within the group.53 In her research on immigration lawyers in the 
US, Levin found that membership of a specialty bar (American Immigration 
Lawyers Association) is important in the construction and understanding of 
acceptable norms of conduct.54 A lack of participation in such professional net-
works and a lack of collegial control may contribute to professional miscon-
duct.55  
Mather, McEwen and Maiman also point in this regard to the relevance of 
‘local legal cultures’. The more general term ‘legal culture’ is most used in the 
context of comparative research and the precise meaning as well as the useful-
ness of the concept has been debated.56 Friedman defines legal culture as refer-
ring to ‘ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institu-
tions, which some public or some part of the public holds’.57 He states that ‘con-
ventions used to classify legal systems into “families” such as the common law 
and the civil law do not distinguish between living, vital aspects of a legal sys-
tem, on the one hand, and legal fossils, on the other’ and that conventional com-
parative law is strongly influenced by the specifics of formal law.58 The study of 
legal culture is about ‘living law’ rather than ‘book law’ and it has been argued 
that this is crucial to any comparative legal research.59 Or, similarly one could 
reason, to any socio-legal study covering different legal systems, such as this 
research; the differences in national legal cultures (apart from the book law, i.e. 
the laws governing the legal profession) may thus be particularly relevant in 
study.  
Friedman further distinguishes between external and internal legal culture.60 
External legal culture refers to the views and attitudes of the general population 
towards law and legal institutions; internal legal culture refers to the views and 
attitudes of those who perform specialised legal tasks, including legal profes-
sionals such as lawyers and judges. Mather, McEwen and Maiman discuss re-
search that shows the importance of ‘local legal cultures’, i.e. the common 
                                                        
53  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001), p. 180.  
54  Levin (2009; 2011). 
55  Doornbos & De Groot-van Leeuwen (2012). 
56  See e.g. Nelken (1997), in particular, Cotterrell (1997); Cotterrell (2006), part 2.  
57  Friedman (1997), p. 34. 
58  Ibid., p. 36. 
59  Ibid., and see e.g. Meintjes van der Walt (2006). 
60  Friedman (1975), p. 223. 
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norms and practices prevailing in a certain local community (e.g. a court) and 
arising from the continuing relationships between the parties, in shaping the 
conduct of lawyers; this can be considered part of the internal legal culture. 
They refer in particular to studies of criminal courts identifying criminal court 
work groups that grow out of continuing relationships between prosecutors, 
defence lawyers and judges.61 Through repeated interaction in common activity, 
these actors establish shared expectations for their conduct. In his classic study 
on criminal justice, Blumberg found that criminal court lawyers’ place in the 
system (or institutional position) affects their conduct.62 He refers to these law-
yers as ‘double agents’: the lawyer is held to a standard of ethical performance 
and has a duty to the client as well as to the court. Blumberg found that the law-
yer’s status is that of an ‘officer of the court’ (as opposed to the ‘hired gun’).63 
In other words, the lawyer has a higher loyalty to the organisation than to the 
client. According to Blumberg, this can be explained by the fact that the law-
yer’s relationship with the client is transient, temporary and often superficial, 
whereas the professional, economic, intellectual and other ties to the various 
elements of the court system are far greater; the lawyer is ‘co-opted’ by the or-
ganisation.64 Another more recent contribution on the position of the criminal 
defence lawyer in court procedures also showed that the institutional position of 
criminal defence lawyers has an important impact on the work they do and the 
choices they make.65 It was found that lawyers felt intimidated and pressured by 
the insider norms (set by the court and the public prosecutor) not to pursue a too 
fervent representation and to adopt a cooperative attitude. Zealous advocacy for 
their clients was considered counterproductive, because this would have a nega-
tive impact on the deals clients would get in the plea bargaining process.  
The institutional position of the asylum legal aid lawyer within the (joint 
setup of the) asylum and legal aid system, i.e. the lawyer’s position within the 
asylum procedure and responsibilities under the legal aid system and the de-
pendent relationship with the legal aid authority stemming from that, as well as 
the continuing relationships with decision makers and judges, can be seen as a 
‘community of practice’ for asylum legal aid lawyers. The views and attitudes of 
these actors who perform these specialised legal tasks in part constitute the in-
                                                        
61  Mather, McEwen & Maiman (2001), p. 11.  
62  Blumberg (1967, 1970), in particular chapters 4 and 5. 
63  A ‘hired gun’ is generally understood as a lawyer who powerfully defends the rights and 
interests of his client and is guided primarily by the client’s wishes and needs. He zeal-
ously represents the client’s interests within the bounds of the law, even though it may 
violate the moral rights of third parties or the interests of the public at large. See e.g. At-
kinson (1995), p. 303-312. 
64  Blumberg (1967), p. 112-113; (1970), p. 19-21. 
65  Martorano Van Cleve (2012). 
CHAPTER 2 
 
20 
 
ternal legal culture within which lawyers operate. The attitude described above 
amongst criminal defence lawyers may also loom in asylum practice as there can 
be tight and continuing relationships between lawyers and decision makers and 
judges. For example, Doornbos found in her study on communication in the 
Dutch asylum procedure that the counsel and information provided by legal aid 
providers in asylum procedures were primarily directed towards ensuring coop-
eration and promoting communication between the applicant and the decision 
makers; she stated that typifying these lawyers as an ‘officer of the court’ (or 
officer of the IND) would go too far, but that only a few lawyers in the research 
acted as a ‘hired gun’ for asylum seekers.66 Likewise, Levin found that concerns 
about maintaining one’s reputation with decision makers and the immigration 
judge was one of the factors influencing US immigration (so not particularly 
asylum) lawyers’ decision making in response to lying clients.67  
2.2.3  Implications for this Study  
This discussion of the literature shows that there are a number of accounts that 
seek to explain lawyers’ conduct and that, in essence, the different forces distin-
guished constantly interact in shaping lawyers’ decisions. It shows that the 
boundaries between the phenomenon under review (lawyers’ professional deci-
sion making) and the context are not that clear or, in any case, the phenomenon 
cannot be understood without taking due account of the context within which 
lawyers operate.68 In order to obtain a better understanding of asylum legal aid 
lawyers’ professional ethics in practice and the role of the institutional context in 
that regard, lawyers’ professional decision making is examined within its 
broader context in two different countries (multiple case study). Conducting a 
multiple case study – rather than restricting the study to an examination of law-
yers’ professional decision making within one context – allows, because of the 
increasing number of potentially relevant variables, for obtaining a broader pic-
ture and a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under review. In 
addition, examining lawyers’ professional decision making within two different 
institutional contexts and contrasting both analyses exposes the role of the insti-
tutional context. 
The case studies consist of a study into the context within which asylum le-
gal aid lawyers operate as well as an examination of their professional decision 
making. The discussion of the literature provides for the contextual elements 
that require consideration when conducting the case studies, provides for the cri-
                                                        
66  Doornbos (2006), p. 236.  
67  Levin (2012), p. 103. 
68  Yin (2009), p. 18. 
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teria on the basis of which to select a varied group of lawyer-respondents (pur-
posive sampling)69 and underlines the importance of considering the national 
legal culture when conducting research covering different countries. More in 
particular, when these are countries belonging to different ‘legal families’, such 
as the Netherlands and England.  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that, in addition to contextual elements, 
the lawyer’s personal values and professional ideology are important for under-
standing their decision making – including their perception of the legal system 
and the law’s morality – and that this is especially so for lawyers practising in 
the area of asylum law. Therefore, I will employ a set of analytical tools cover-
ing four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice for analysing lawyers’ 
professional decision making. In the following sections I explain how I, inform-
ed by the literature, conducted the case studies and set out the analytical frame-
work I employed for analysing lawyers’ professional decision making, i.e. the 
balancing act between the client’s interest, the public interest in the administra-
tion of justice and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival. 
2.3  Multiple Case Study: Selection  
The selection constitutes an information-oriented selection based on a maximum 
variation in respect of particular aspects of the institutional context, in particular, 
the legal aid system.70 After an initial exploration of the national institutional 
contexts, including exploratory interviews with legal aid lawyers operating with-
in these contexts, I selected the cases of the Netherlands and England.71 Taking 
the Netherlands as a starting point for this research, England was selected be-
cause the two countries are, in principle, comparable – and in England there 
have also been continuing discussions on the provision of legal aid in asylum 
cases – but differ on certain key points in the institutional context.  
The two countries are comparable as regards the standard of welfare and de-
velopment, the presence of a legal aid system which seeks to ensure access to 
justice for its inhabitants and a long tradition in the reception of (relatively) 
large numbers of asylum seekers.72 The legal aid systems of the Netherlands and 
England have a basic infrastructure which is comparable: the legal aid provider 
                                                        
69  Boeije (2009), p. 35 ff.  
70  Flyvbjerg (2006), p. 230. 
71  The UK comprises four constituent countries with different regimes. England and Wales 
have the same legal aid regime, but this research will be confined to the England region. 
72  The UK is among the four countries receiving the most asylum applications in Europe, 
and the Netherlands being a smaller country is also in the top ten. UNHCR (2011a), 
UNHCR (2011b). 
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is (or may be paid on legal aid to be) present at every stage of the asylum proce-
dure; providers have to meet a range of requirements before they are allowed to 
provide legal aid in asylum procedures; there are monitoring mechanisms in 
place to monitor their performance; and, in addition to the remuneration for the 
providers, there are, in principle, disbursements available for additional costs, 
such as interpretation and travel expenses.  
The systems of the two countries strongly differ on the following points: 
First, in the Netherlands bar-registered lawyers – after having applied for regis-
tration with the Legal Aid Board – provide legal aid to asylum seekers on a 
case-by-case basis, whereas in England legal aid providers (not necessarily 
‘lawyers’ but regulated and accredited legal advisors) are contracted to supply a 
certain amount of legal work. They are granted a number of ‘new matter starts’, 
i.e. cases they can take on in a certain period. Second, whereas in the Nether-
lands the legal aid provider is appointed to the client in a strictly scheduled asy-
lum procedure, in England s/he is not; the provider can accept the clients s/he 
wants to assist, but has to stay within the number of ‘matter starts’ granted.73 A 
third important diverging point, is that in the Netherlands, the legal aid authority 
decides on the asylum applicant’s eligibility for legal aid,74 while in England it 
is in most cases (i.e. first instance and before the tribunals) the provider who has 
to decide on the client’s eligibility for legal aid. This entails determining: 
1) whether is it an asylum case (scope); 2) the client’s financial eligibility 
(means); and 3) the prospect of the case being successful (merits). The pro-
vider’s decision might then afterwards be checked by the legal aid authority 
during audit. If the decision to grant legal aid is found to be incorrect this may 
lead to retrospective disallowance of the fee. The legal aid provider thus bears 
the financial risk.  
Finally, even though remuneration of legal aid providers is arranged for 
primarily by way of a fixed fee in both countries, there are differences in this 
respect as well. In the Netherlands payment is in principle based only on the 
fixed fee coupled to the stage of the procedure in which the legal aid provider 
acts, whereas in England additional payment and hourly rates are available for 
certain activities. In addition, in England the preparation of certain appeal pro-
cedures is done ‘at risk’. This entails that if permission to appeal is not granted, 
                                                        
73  Save for the detained fast track procedures, which are outside the scope of this research. 
74  At the time of this study, this was the main modus operandi. In the meantime, a so-called 
‘High Trust’ scheme has been gradually introduced in which also a shift is made from the 
initial determination of eligibility by the Legal Aid Board to the legal aid provider, ran-
domly checked afterwards by the Board (http://www.rvr.org/binaries/content/assets/rvr 
org/nieuws/brochure-high-trust---nieuwe-werkwijze.pdf).  
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the lawyer receives no payment for the preparatory work. The table below pro-
vides an overview of the main differences between the two systems.75  
 
Institutional context NL  ENG  
Access to legal aid 
scheme & design  
- Registration with Legal 
Aid Board  
- Provision on a case-by-
case basis 
- Contract with Legal Aid 
Agency  
- Provision in fixed amount 
of cases based on the con-
tract 
Appointment in asylum 
procedure 
- Yes, based on rota system - No 
Application of eligibil-
ity criteria (scope, 
means- and merits 
test) 
- By Legal Aid Board - By legal aid provider 
- Possibility of retrospective 
disallowance of fees 
Remuneration  - Fixed fee (per stage)  - Fixed fee & hourly rates  
- ‘At risk’ phase in onward 
appeal 
2.4  Studying the Contexts 
After the preliminary exploration and selection of the cases, I studied the two 
different contexts in more depth. I looked into the different contextual elements 
deemed relevant based on the literature. The institutional context, i.e. the (joint 
setup of the) asylum and legal aid system, is at play in three of the four explana-
tory accounts discussed: the standard setting and monitoring of ‘the profes-
sional’; the remuneration and other organisational settings (including the law-
yer’s institutional position) of ‘the workplace’; the dependent relationship and 
continuing relationships stemming from the asylum legal aid lawyer’s institu-
tional position creating a ‘community of practice’. In studying the contexts I ex-
amined, in addition to the institutional context, the professional context (i.e. the 
professional regime to which lawyers are subject), the key specifics of substan-
tive asylum law within the different jurisdictions and the firm context within 
which asylum legal aid lawyers operate in the two countries under review.  
This investigation consisted of an examination of the legal framework and 
policy documents underlying the asylum and legal aid systems and the profes-
                                                        
75  This table provides for a simplified overview of the legal aid systems with regard to legal 
aid provided in the regular (non-detained) asylum procedure at the time of the interviews 
(2012-2014). The separate country chapters contain a detailed description. 
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sional regime to which bar-registered lawyers are subject; interviews with sever-
al relevant actors in the field; attendance of a lawyer-client meeting, a gathering 
of asylum legal aid lawyers (NL) and court hearings at the Asylum and Immi-
gration Tribunal, both First Tier and Upper Tribunal (ENG). The interviews 
were held with employees of national legal aid authorities (NL: Legal Aid 
Board: managing director, policy officer, legal coordinators at two application 
centres;76 ENG: Legal Aid Agency: development manager, auditor/development 
officer), individuals involved in the regulation of the legal profession (NL: local 
bar president at the Dutch Bar Association; ENG: regulatory associate and re-
search manager at the Legal Services Board, researcher at the Solicitors Regula-
tion Authority), employees of not-for-profit organisations involved in asylum 
procedures (NL: supervisor of a reception location at Vluchtelingenwerk Neder-
land; ENG: communications & public affairs officer and solicitor at Asylum 
Aid) and judges in asylum cases (NL: district court judge; ENG: First Tier Tri-
bunal judge).77 The interviews were recorded with the permission of the inter-
viewees and most have been transcribed fully; a few interviews were not fully 
transcribed, but a summary with the relevant information was made. I made 
notes of the meetings and court hearings I attended. 
These interviews and attendance at meetings and court hearings allowed for 
obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the functioning in practice of 
the asylum and legal aid system, the professional regime to which lawyers are 
subject as well as the intricacies of providing legal aid in asylum procedures as 
the actors reflected different angles on the work environment, role and perform-
ance of asylum legal aid lawyers.  
2.5  Studying Professional Decision Making 
2.5.1  Interviews 
The core of the two case studies consists of an examination of asylum legal aid 
lawyers’ professional decision making through semi-structured, in-depth inter-
views. As pointed out in the introduction, the method of interviewing allows for 
                                                        
76  When conducting the interviews with the Legal Aid Board legal coordinators, they 
showed me around the application centres. I also visited the central asylum reception lo-
cation where I spoke with an IND official. 
77  The interview with the local bar president was held in the context of a study into the 
quality of legal aid in immigration cases in the Netherlands (Butter, Laemers & Terlouw 
2013). I also drew on some of the other interviews conducted for this study in order to 
better comprehend the Dutch context. In addition, the interviews with Dutch and English 
lawyer respondents involved in norm setting (see below) were used to better understand 
the contexts in which they operate. 
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obtaining a meaningful understanding (verstehen) of lawyers’ professional deci-
sion making.78 It is clear that from interviews one cannot make out whether what 
lawyers say they do corresponds to what they actually do. I cannot distil from 
the interviews how they actually conduct themselves in their daily work, but I 
can obtain an understanding of how they think about, motivate and justify their 
decisions. This allows for obtaining a new and better understanding of lawyers’ 
professional ethics in practice which is what this research purports to do.  
When doing this type of research one must be aware of the possibility of re-
spondents merely giving socially acceptable answers. During an interview re-
spondents may engage in self-censorship or provide set answers hoping to 
please the interviewer or provide a certain self-image.79 However, when respon-
dents are given the chance to recount a concrete case, they often get engaged in 
the telling, recollecting the facts of the case and the sentiments it provoked, and 
forget about self-censorship and self-presentation.80 For this reason, I asked 
during all the interviews for examples of concrete cases or the last time a par-
ticular situation occurred (see more elaboration below on operationalisation). In 
doing so I sought to obtain an understanding of how they decide in concrete 
cases and thus of how the balancing act actually plays out and to obviate receiv-
ing general responses and mere reflections about their role in general or how 
they believe they should act. This approach proved useful as ideal and practice 
did not always coincide and it allowed for probing further into the how and why 
of this discrepancy.  
2.5.2  Selection of Asylum Legal Aid Lawyers 
Asylum Legal Aid Lawyers 
The group of lawyers under review in this study are bar-registered lawyers who 
are authorised under the government’s legal aid scheme to assist and represent 
asylum seekers in the regular asylum procedure.81 In the Netherlands, legal aid 
in asylum procedures is provided by bar-registered lawyers, i.e. lawyers who are 
members of the Dutch Bar Association (Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten). In 
England there are, apart from bar-registered lawyers (solicitors and barristers) 
many other actors who may, if they meet certain conditions, operate under the 
                                                        
78  Weber (1978), p. 4.  
79  Compare Østergaard Møller & Stone (2013), p. 590. 
80  Ibid. 
81  By ‘regular asylum procedure’ I mean the first instance, appeal and onward appeal pro-
cedures in which the content of an asylum application is treated and which is in the coun-
try under review classified as the regular asylum procedure, thereby excluding special 
border, detained or accelerated procedures (e.g. the detained asylum procedure at Schip-
hol airport in the Netherlands and the detained fast track in the UK). When employing 
the term ‘asylum procedure’ I thus refer to the regular asylum procedure. 
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government’s legal aid scheme (see chapter 4). The group of English lawyers 
under review in this research are solicitors, in particular, solicitors working at 
law firms.82 Solicitors are responsible for the bulk of the legal aid work in asy-
lum procedures.83 Solicitors are members of The Law Society and are regulated 
by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Even though both solicitors and non-
solicitors who provide legal aid to asylum seekers employed by law firms are 
subject to the rules of and regulation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, 
non-solicitors have not been subject to the same professional training as solici-
tors regarding legal ethics; they thus differ from Dutch lawyers in that respect 
and are therefore not included. The restriction to solicitors working at law firms 
– as opposed to those employed by NGOs84 – is also made for comparative rea-
sons. Their counterparts in the Netherlands work in firms (or independently) and 
need to make a certain profit in order to sustain their business. Since not-for-
profit organisations often have other sources of income, such as donations, the 
financial situation for those working in these organisations is different in this 
respect. Throughout this study I will use the terms ‘lawyer’, ‘legal aid provider’ 
and ‘solicitor’ (only when discussing English lawyers) to refer to the asylum 
legal aid lawyers under review. These three terms are used interchangeably. 
Selection Criteria 
In an effort to obtain a full image of the range of possible views, motivations 
and aspects that play a role in lawyers’ professional decision making I aimed for 
a large variation in respondents.85 In addition to having respondents operating in 
two different contexts, I selected respondents (22 per country) based on the rele-
vant factors that emerged from the literature discussed above based on which 
prior selection was possible (purposive sampling):86 the size of the firm (solo, 
small to medium and large firms), experience (newcomers, very experienced 
lawyers and those in-between), membership of specialised associations (yes/no) 
and gender (male/female). Furthermore, I aimed for a geographical variation 
within the two countries in order to have a wide variation in respondent lawyers 
working in the more urbanised versus remote areas – which often has implica-
tions for office costs and thus for their economic situation – and working within 
different asylum application centres/access points. In addition, I selected several 
respondents based on the additional criterion that they are in some way involved 
                                                        
82  The sample contains one solicitor who works at a not-for-profit organisation (see annex 
1). 
83  Barristers are instructed by solicitors or accredited caseworkers in certain higher court 
cases, but the latter remain responsible for dealing with the client.  
84  NGOs often employ both solicitors and paralegals and sometimes also barristers. 
85  See e.g. Dinklo (2006), p. 36.  
86  Boeije (2009), p. 35 ff.  
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in norm setting; their accounts further the understanding of the interpretation 
and applicability of the professional norms in practice.87 Annex 1 presents a full 
overview of the sample and provides for an elaborate explanation of the criteria 
and their application when selecting respondents in the Netherlands and Eng-
land.  
Access and Non-Response  
The Dutch Legal Aid Board and the English Legal Aid Agency provided me 
with a list of, respectively, lawyers and firms authorised to provide legal aid to 
asylum seekers in the regular asylum procedure. I received the information from 
the Legal Aid Agency a month after starting the fieldwork and selected a first 
number of respondents by using the ‘find a solicitor’ tool on The Law Society 
website. The LAA information was later used to check the variety in respon-
dents based on the selection criteria and to select the remaining respondents. 
Some of the respondents selected because they were involved in some way in 
norm setting were suggested either by the lawyer respondents or by the inter-
viewed legal aid officials.88 I contacted the lawyers over the phone and/or via e-
mail for an interview. I explained that the research was on the provision of legal 
aid in asylum procedures in the Netherlands and England89 and that I wished to 
interview them about their work and experiences as a lawyer assisting asylum 
seekers within the state’s asylum and legal aid system. Two of the Dutch law-
yers contacted, both sole practitioners, did not want to participate in the re-
search. One explained not wanting to participate due to time constraints, the 
other stated he did not wish to participate in this type of research without giving 
any further explanation. In addition, I was not able to get in touch with one or 
two lawyers I tried to contact. Of the English lawyers approached, about ten 
solicitors explained that they could not participate due to time constraints, one 
explained not being interested and one junior solicitor was not allowed to par-
ticipate by her director because he considered it possibly ethically problematic. 
About eight contacted solicitors did not respond at all to emails or phone calls. 
Furthermore, I contacted several English solicitors who explained that they had 
recently stopped providing legal aid because of financial pressures; they thus no 
longer fit the criteria. 
                                                        
87  These include lawyers who are prominent members of specialised associations in the 
field, peer review committees and involved in writing the Best Practice Guide in Asylum 
cases (NL) and the Immigration and Asylum Accreditation Scheme (ENG). 
88  In the Netherlands, several of these respondents were interviewed in the context of a 
study into the quality of legal aid in immigration cases (Butter, Laemers & Terlouw 
2013); I asked for permission to use the interviews for this project as well. 
89  And France, which initially was part of the research plan. 
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2.5.3  Interview Conditions and Data Processing 
The interviews were held in person; on one occasion the interview started face-
to-face and was completed over the telephone. The interviews lasted 1 to 2.5 
hours with an average duration of 1.5 hours. Most interviews were held at the 
lawyer’s office; two at the lawyer’s home. I promised confidentiality of the law-
yer’s identity and the identity of the firm. All respondents were asked for per-
mission to record the interviews and, apart from one lawyer, all respondents 
agreed to the interview being taped. In the one instance the respondent did not 
give permission, I took elaborate notes and wrote an interview report directly 
after the interview. The recorded interviews were transcribed with the aid of 
student assistants. If respondents asked for transcripts of the interview or indi-
cated that they wanted to see which quotes I would use and how I would use 
their quotes concerning a sensitive or controversial topic (for example, because 
their identity might be traced), I provided them with these transcripts and/or 
fragments before using them. I coded the interviews based on the selection crite-
ria (e.g. nl10-so-+10-y-f or eng17-med-3-10-y-m).90 When quoting respondents I 
use these codes. Respondents who are also involved in norm setting are referred 
to under these codes when providing their personal accounts; when they are 
quoted in their capacity of norm setter (e.g. as author of Best Practice Guide in 
Asylum Cases), I refer to them as such. Using these different references when 
quoting these respondents is done in order to ensure confidentiality. I employed 
Atlas TI to facilitate the organisation and analysis of the data.  
2.5.4  Operationalisation  
I operationalised professional decision making through the selection of two 
ethical issues in respect of which I examined the decision making of respondents 
in the interviews: ‘time vs money’ and ‘hopeless cases’. These issues were cho-
sen because, taken together, they represent and expose the tension between the 
three central interests at stake: the client interest, the public interest in the ad-
ministration of justice and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival, and can 
provide insight into the role the institutional context plays in lawyers’ profes-
sional decision making. ‘Time vs money’ primarily serves as a preliminary issue 
and the ‘hopeless case’ constitutes the central issue through which I examined 
lawyers’ professional decision making. 
In this section I will further explain the selection of these issues as well as 
how I discussed these issues during the interviews. 
                                                        
90  See annex 1 for explanation on coding. 
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Time vs Money 
Legal aid lawyers are remunerated under the legal aid scheme which is – both in 
the Netherlands and England – largely based on fixed fee payments. The time vs 
money issue concerns the question of how lawyers deal with the amount of 
money (which usually stands for a certain number of hours) they receive for a 
case and the time they actually (believe they need to) spend on a case. Does the 
remuneration cover the time necessary to adequately prepare a case and repre-
sent the client? If not, how does one cope with this tension? Earlier studies have 
shown that this is an issue of ethical concern for legal aid lawyers both in the 
Netherlands and in England.91 For example, James and Killick found that this 
issue is a prevailing dilemma for case workers providing legal aid in immigra-
tion and asylum cases in the UK: due to the cuts in legal aid funding, they ‘find 
themselves caught in the middle between these ever increasing financial pres-
sures and their ethical obligations to their clients’.92 This issue may present law-
yers with what De Groot-van Leeuwen calls a ‘morality versus market’ di-
lemma.93 It constitutes a tension primarily between, on the one hand, both the 
client’s interest and the public interest in having well prepared asylum applica-
tions and, on the other, the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival (i.e. being able 
to run a financially viable (legal aid) practice).94 The issue is employed primar-
ily as a preliminary issue with a view to exposing the wider ‘market’ pressures 
with which lawyers may be confronted in the institutional context within which 
they operate. It serves to explore the financial pressures with which legal aid 
lawyers may be confronted and the running of a legal aid practice in this particu-
lar institutional context; its purpose is to comprehend the lawyer’s interest in 
profit or survival in the context within which the balancing act takes place. The 
next issue is central to the examination of the balancing act. 
‘Hopeless Case’ 
As touched upon in the introduction, the topic of the ‘hopeless case’ is a burning 
issue in the area of (publicly funded) asylum law and presents lawyers with an 
ethical issue: it primarily concerns the tension between the client’s interest (i.e. 
try every possibility to have one’s claim accepted or postpone expulsion) and the 
public interest (i.e. not unnecessarily burdening the administrative, judicial and 
legal aid system), but either one of those may be at odds with the lawyer’s inter-
                                                        
91  See e.g. Jacobs et al. (2006), p. 61 ff; Terlouw (2011); James & Killick (2010; 2012). 
92  James & Killick (2010), p. 13. 
93  De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998), p. 241. 
94  It is not only in the interest of the client, but also in the interest of the public that cases 
are well-prepared and sufficient time is spent to that end, as well-prepared and docu-
mented applications facilitate the decision making of both the immigration authority and 
the courts. Compare Guild (2011) and Matas (1991). 
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est in profit or survival. This issue serves to expose how lawyers balance the 
client’s interest against the public interest in the administration of justice, how 
the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival weighs in and the role played by the 
institutional context in that regard. As we will see below, what constitutes the 
public interest and the client’s interest and how the lawyer should ensure these 
may be interpreted in different ways. In order to recognise and comprehend 
these differences, I use the four approaches to lawyers’ ethics set out below for 
analysing lawyers’ professional decision making. 
It must be noted here that the term ‘hopeless case’ can be used and under-
stood in different ways and these different meanings and understandings are 
relevant for present purposes. Therefore, I refrain from adhering to a fixed defi-
nition of the term, but rather examine how it is understood by respondents and 
how they deal with what I term more narrowly ‘hopeless procedures’, that is an 
application or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of 
obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close 
to) zero.95 
Operationalisation in the Interviews 
These two ethical issues were discussed during the interviews. In conducting the 
interviews I used an interview guide which I continually adjusted and refined in 
the course of the fieldwork. Based on the general outline of the interview guide 
the interviews were set up as follows.96 After an introduction to the research, I 
posed some general questions about the lawyer’s practice and experience in the 
field. Subsequently, I posed several general, open questions about their work as 
a legal aid lawyer in the Netherlands/England, asking what first came to mind 
and enquiring into the difficult choices or decisions with which they had been 
confronted as a legal aid provider in asylum cases. Then, I turned to the selected 
issues (if these had not already been brought forward, as was often the case) 
without naming them as such. In examining the time vs money issue I enquired 
into the time spent on asylum cases, whether the fee they receive covers the time 
they spend and, if not, how they deal with the tension and, more generally, how 
they go about running their asylum legal aid practice.97  
                                                        
95  This thus constitutes a very narrow definition of what might be understood as a hopeless 
case: it covers the chance of success in a particular procedure at a particular moment in 
time.  
96  Some of the interviews with Dutch respondents were conducted in the context of a study 
into the quality of legal assistance in asylum/migration cases and the format of the inter-
view was slightly different. However, the main topics were discussed in a similar man-
ner. 
97  The specific questions were catered for and adjusted to the Dutch and English situations. 
For example, with English respondents the accepting of new clients was discussed more 
elaborately. 
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In examining lawyers’ decision making in respect of ‘hopeless cases’ I re-
frained from using the term ‘hopeless case’ in the questions and enquired about 
their decisions in respect of this issue indirectly. Through initially enquiring into 
this issue indirectly, I sought not to impose a definition of ‘hopeless cases’ as 
this would have prevented me from getting a full picture of their conception of 
what this entails, how they approach this question and the considerations they 
take into account when determining whether to proceed – and this is all relevant 
for understanding how lawyers balance their obligations to the public and the 
client and how their interest in profit or survival weighs in. I found in the course 
of the fieldwork that two interconnected questions could be distinguished: first, 
when does one consider a case actually hopeless – i.e. what is taken into account 
when determining this – and, second, whether, if one considers a case hopeless, 
the actual legal prospects of success are the lawyer’s only consideration. These 
interrelated questions taken together exposed how they balance the different 
interests at stake. Refraining from using the term ‘hopeless case’ in the ques-
tions, allowed me to learn about respondents’ position on these interrelated 
questions. Instead of asking directly how they deal with cases they consider 
hopeless, I posed questions about their decisions as regards proceeding with 
cases through enquiring, in particular, into the situations in which they were in 
doubt or hesitant to accept the client or proceed with a case at the different 
stages of the asylum process and the most recent case in which they had decided 
not to proceed; all by asking for examples of these situations. If I received no 
concrete responses to these questions, I probed further by posing more concrete 
questions, such as: ‘Has it occurred recently that you had a client who had a 
really tragic story and was in a desperate situation, but did not bring forward any 
grounds on which s/he may be granted protection?’ Or: ‘Have you ever pursued 
a case that was without merit in the legal sense, but that would benefit the client 
in some way?’ When discussing the examples given by respondents, I asked for 
clarification of their motivations and enquired into how they view their role as a 
lawyer in that regard as well as, more concretely, how they view and deal with 
their (possibly conflicting) obligations towards the client and the public.  
Role of Researcher’s Background in the Interviews 
The respondents were aware of my background in law and that I worked at a law 
faculty in a department specialised in migration law. I believe that this was fruit-
ful to having the in-depth conversations I intended to have. Ostrander warns 
against the tendency of ‘elites’ – which lawyers can be considered to be – to 
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‘just talk’.98 I think that my background helped to some extent in establishing 
that the interviews mostly consisted of conversations rather than lectures – 
which might have been a risk when interviewing these ‘elites’. Respondents 
generally did not start to explain the rules and regulations from scratch and we 
could talk about how they go about assisting their asylum seeking clients and 
how they deal with the issues they experience in that regard.  
2.6  Analysing Professional Decision Making 
2.6.1  Professional Ideals and Moral Reasoning 
When employing an empirical perspective to studying lawyer professionalism, 
Nelson and Trubek argued that one cannot understand lawyer conduct without 
paying attention to professional ideology: ‘Lawyer behavior is in itself oriented 
towards some normative vision, official or otherwise, and is unintelligible with-
out attention to ideals of conduct.’99 This idea was confirmed in the course of 
this study; when talking about the decisions respondents made in the course of 
their work, they repeatedly referred to their role as a (legal aid) lawyer and 
spoke about what it means to act professionally. Employing a set of conceptual 
tools that broadly covers the range of ethical approaches available to lawyers, 
assists in examining respondents’ professional decision making, i.e. how they go 
about making decisions on ethical issues and interpret and balance the different 
interests at stake. As explained above, in this research I adopt an explorative 
approach and I came across the set of conceptual tools used for interpreting my 
material – which I will discuss below – in the course of the research and I started 
employing it only after conducting the interviews and after an initial exploration 
and analysis of the fieldwork. This prevented me from focusing in the interviews 
only on aspects which I understood to be relevant based on the different ethical 
approaches available to lawyers distinguished in the literature and from steering 
(unconsciously) respondents’ accounts to fit the typology and allowed me to 
approach my data with an open mind.100 In conducting the analysis I employed a 
combination of the inductive and deductive approach. I initially explored and 
analysed the material without an analytical framework in mind: I simply dis-
tilled the arguments and motives given for the decisions made (inductive). Only 
in the second round of analysis I employed the analytical framework set out in 
                                                        
98  Ostrander (1993), p. 26: ‘(…) elites converse so easily and at such length that the re-
searcher may not be initially aware that what they are saying as they just “talk” is not 
specifically relevant to the goals of the research.’ 
99  Nelson & Trubek (1992), p. 182. 
100  Karsten & Tummers (2008), p. 9; Van Lanen (2010), p. 29-30. 
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this section (deductive). This in order to have a common framework to guide the 
analysis of the two cases. I combined both approaches, because I wanted to, on 
the one hand, approach the material with an open mind and, on the other, have a 
common framework in order to be able to fruitfully compare the two cases.101  
After an initial exploration of my fieldwork I found that the classic distinc-
tion in the literature between the ‘hired gun’ (focus on the client) and the ‘officer 
of the court’ (focus on facilitating the public administration of justice) did not 
sufficiently capture how respondents go about balancing the client- and the pub-
lic interest and, more in particular, why they do so. Respondents provided justi-
fications of a different nature – yet still referring to their role as a lawyer – 
showing a different interpretation and implementation of their obligations to the 
client and to the public. I then found literature in which other ethical approaches 
to lawyering were identified. Atkinson and Parker, for example, distinguished a 
third approach: the ‘moral activist’ (or moral individualist).102 This approach 
introduced personal morality (instead of professional or role morality seen in the 
hired gun and officer of the court approaches) as a basis for one’s conduct as a 
lawyer; I found this addition helpful, especially, since I was studying lawyers 
working in the legal aid field, which is generally understood as an indication of 
an ambition to ensure access to justice for the weaker groups in society and 
having particular convictions in that regard – and I came across such convictions 
in respondents’ accounts. The moral activist approach introduces personal mo-
rality, but it does not actually cover the relational aspect of lawyering, which I 
also encountered amongst respondents. This aspect is acknowledged in what 
Parker distinguishes as a fourth approach: ‘ethics of care’ (or ‘relational lawyer-
ing’).  
In brief, Parker distinguishes four approaches to ethical reasoning in legal 
practice, i.e. adversarial advocacy, responsible lawyering, moral activism and 
the ethic of care.103 I use this set of approaches as an analytical tool, as I agree 
with Evans and Forgasz that Parker’s attempt ‘to capture all of the essential and 
often competing ethical standpoints of lawyers as observed anecdotally by many 
writers and researchers’ comprehensively covers the different possible ethical 
                                                        
101  Van Lanen (2010), p. 29-30. 
102  Atkinson (1995); Parker (2004). Atkinson, distinguishes three modes of lawyering: The 
neutral partisan (or: the hired gun), the officer of the court and the moral individualist 
(p. 303 ff). See for references to other divisions of lawyer types, p. 303, fn. 187. 
103  Parker (2004). The first three approaches overlap to a large extent with the three types 
distinguished by Atkinson, but the fourth (ethic of care) approach is added, thereby 
providing a more comprehensive overview of the different possible ethical orientations 
of lawyers. I agree with Evans & Forgasz (2014, p. 138) that Atkinson’s taxonomy is ap-
pealing, but that it lacks within its formulation the element of care included in Parker’s 
typology.  
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orientations available to lawyers and it proved useful for interpreting the deci-
sions of the group of lawyers under review in this study.104 
These four approaches to ethical reasoning in legal practice are thus drawn 
from applied legal ethics and ethics-in-practice scholarship. They are formed 
from the key characteristics and elements of the main ethical approaches gener-
ally considered available to lawyers and emphasise what is distinctive about 
each approach; they can be considered ‘ideal types’.105 An ideal type involves an 
accentuation of typical courses of conduct and in reality these ideally con-
structed types cannot be found in their pure form. Parker argues that the differ-
ent approaches tend to complement each other in mentioning different ethical 
considerations that might carry different weight in different circumstances and 
that in practice most lawyers apply a combination of the approaches.106  
As described in the introduction, in this research I understand ‘lawyers’ pro-
fessional ethics in practice’ as the way in which lawyers deal with the different 
interests at stake and I examine lawyers’ decision making in respect of what I 
consider the three central interests at stake in publicly funded asylum cases: the 
client’s interest, the public interest and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival. 
Since Parker’s four approaches to lawyers’ ethics mainly help to understand the 
balancing between only two of these interests (client’s interest and public inter-
est) I will, for reasons of accuracy, refer to these approaches as the four ap-
proaches to moral reasoning in legal practice instead of ethical approaches.107 
Moreover, as using this tool does not allow for incorporating the lawyer’s inter-
est in profit or survival (the third central interest) in the analysis, I will add this 
‘market’ dimension to the analytical framework.108 In the following section, I 
                                                        
104  Evans & Forgasz (2014), p. 138, see references fn. 14. Even though this taxonomy is 
developed in a common law context (Australia) it is, given its wide range, also suitable 
for analysing the ethical reasoning of lawyers in a country with a civil law tradition, i.e. 
the Netherlands. Comp. Evans & Forgasz, p. 138, fn. 13: ‘(...) the broad nature of these 
four categories makes them likely to be of use across different jurisdictions with different 
jurisprudential traditions’. 
105  For Weber (1978, p. 6) the construction of an ideal type is generally based on a purely 
rational course of action and serves the sociologist as a type which has ‘the merit of clear 
understandability and lack of ambiguity. By comparison with this it is possible to under-
stand the ways in which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of all sorts (…).’ 
However, as Eldridge (1972, p. 23) pointed out, there is, in principle, ‘no reason why the 
concepts of typical action should not be constructed as irrational or emotive abstractions 
against which to analyse the actual course of behaviour. In either case the use of these 
conceptual tools enables us to understand the actual course of events more proficiently 
than we otherwise would.’  
106  Parker (2004), p. 55. 
107  In the literature the terms ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ are often used interchangeably. 
108  Comp. De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998, p. 241) who also sets this aspect apart from the 
other tensions in the moral domain. The lawyer’s interest in profit or survival (the ‘mar-
→ 
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will elaborate on the set of four approaches as understood by Parker, reflect on 
its applicability to the area of asylum law, discuss how I used this set of ap-
proaches and how I incorporated the ‘market’ dimension into the analytical 
framework.  
2.6.2  Four Approaches to Moral Reasoning in Legal Practice 
Adversarial Advocacy109 
The adversarial advocate approach derives lawyers’ morality from the social 
role that lawyers are supposed to play in an adversarial legal process and com-
plex legal system (role morality). This approach is generally considered the 
standard conception of the lawyer’s role in most common law countries. In the 
literature it is also referred to as ‘the hired gun’.110 It combines the principles of 
partisanship and non-accountability. Partisanship entails strict partiality includ-
ing that the lawyer should do all for the client that a client would do for himself, 
if he had the knowledge of the lawyer. Non-accountability entails that the law-
yer is not morally responsible for either the means or the ends of representing 
the client, provided both are lawful. It is the lawyer’s task to ensure client 
autonomy in a complex legal system. The individual lawyer and client do not 
have to concern themselves directly with the public interest in the administration 
of justice; this is justified because as long as the lawyers for all parties act as 
adversarial advocates in the narrow interest of their clients, the legal system will 
produce the right outcome. One should advocate the client’s interest as vigor-
ously as possible within the bounds of the law, in order to empower those who 
need to use the law to realise their rights or defend themselves against the pow-
ers of the state. The adversarial advocate believes that judging potential clients 
before they have had their ‘day in court’ amounts to a presumptuous denial of 
justice to anyone who wants to use the legal aid system. Taken to its logical 
extreme, this approach requires lawyers to resolve any ambiguity in the law and 
their own professional duties in favour of the client.  
Responsible Lawyering111 (Dutiful Lawyering) 
Like adversarial advocacy, the responsible lawyer approach derives lawyers’ 
morality from the lawyer’s role in the legal system and in society (role moral-
                                                        
ket’) is distinguished from lawyers’ moral reasoning in relation to the balancing of the 
client and the public interest (‘morality’).  
109  Parker (2004), p. 49-74. 
110  Yet, the English codes of conduct for solicitors and barristers suggest that only an attenu-
ated version of the standard conception operates in England and Wales, see Boon (2014), 
p. 28-30. 
111  Parker (2004), p. 60 ff. & Table One, p. 56. 
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ity), but defines that role differently. In contrast to the adversarial advocate, for 
whom the lawyer is first and foremost the client’s representative in the legal sys-
tem, the responsible lawyer sees the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and 
guardian of the legal system. Even though the responsible lawyer is an advocate 
for the client, s/he has an overriding duty to the legal system. S/he facilitates the 
public administration of justice according to the law in the public interest in 
order to preserve the social good that the legal system seeks to serve. The re-
sponsible lawyer certainly advocates for the client’s interests, but also represents 
the law to his or her clients and helps them to comply. The lawyer’s advocacy 
duties are tempered by the duty to ensure integrity of and compliance with the 
spirit of the law. S/he will not use procedural rules, loopholes or hardly arguable 
points to frustrate the substance and spirit of the law. The responsible lawyer 
may need to act as a gatekeeper of the law and advocate of the legal system 
against the client.  
In respect of this type – which he calls ‘officer of the court’ – Atkinson 
makes a further subdivision which is helpful. He distinguishes proceduralists 
and substantivists.112 Proceduralists believe that they should use procedural laws 
according to their purpose, i.e. to resolve issues fairly and expeditiously on their 
merits. As to substance, however, they believe that it is the job of the court to 
decide what the purpose of the law is. These lawyers would hence press any 
non-frivolous claim regardless of their personal opinion as to the merits and 
leave the substantive decision on the merits to the court.113 Substantivists, on the 
other hand, find themselves constrained by public limits both with respect to 
substance and to procedure: they pursue justice (i.e. justice in line with the spirit 
and purpose of the law), not just legally permissible outcomes.114  
Since responsible lawyering is about preserving the justice of the law as it 
stands – and finding oneself constrained by public limits rather than stimulated 
to effect change – attempts to challenge or change national law or policy in or-
der to make it more in line with European and international asylum legislation 
can be understood as not falling under this approach.115 It is a conservative 
                                                        
112  Atkinson (1995), p. 309. 
113  Here there is not much difference between the adversarial advocate and the responsible 
lawyer. However, the subtle difference may lie in the requirement that the claim must be 
‘non-frivolous’, which an adversarial lawyer may accept more easily than a responsible 
lawyer. 
114  Atkinson also refers to the dictates of ordinary morality in this regard. In Parker’s dis-
tinction this would be placed under one of the next two approaches: she categorises mor-
al activist and the ethic of care approaches as applying more general ethics to the legal 
profession. I will adhere to Parker’s distinction in this regard. 
115  This is something that is relevant in the area of asylum law. Both international and Euro-
pean legal frameworks impose asylum related obligations upon member states opening 
up the possibility of challenging the national legal framework. 
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rather than a progressive attitude. In other words, challenges to make national 
law more substantively just in line with supranational obligations or social jus-
tice external to the law are considered characteristic of the next approach that 
can be distinguished: moral activism. 
 
In brief, both the adversarial advocate and the responsible lawyer approaches are 
based on role morality, i.e. the ethics inherent in the lawyer’s role in the legal 
system and the administration of justice. Personal moral beliefs are generally 
irrelevant. In contrast, the next two approaches are not based on role morality, 
but rather on personal morality: general ethics is integrated with legal practice, 
albeit in different ways. 
Moral Activism116 
The moral activist approach entails that lawyers should do good according to the 
general moral theory that appeals to them.117 More particularly, lawyers should 
be concerned with doing justice as it is with this that the legal system is essen-
tially concerned. If the law and legal processes as they stand coincide with the 
lawyer’s ideals of justice, the moral activist will not act that differently from the 
responsible lawyer. However, if this is not the case s/he would not necessarily 
see herself/himself confined by a duty to the law. Rather, s/he would feel 
obliged to do justice even if that involves changing or challenging the law: law-
yers have a responsibility to seek to make the law and the legal institutions more 
substantively just in the public interest. This type of lawyering can also be called 
‘public interest’ or ‘cause lawyering’.118 As opposed to the responsible lawyer, 
the moral activist is thus not restricted by the idea of justice intrinsic in the legal 
system. Like an adversarial advocate, s/he may exploit loopholes and test the 
limits of the law to establish a client’s cause. However, s/he will not vigorously 
represent clients whose causes s/he believes are not just. The moral activist 
counsels clients to seek to persuade them of the moral thing to do and s/he with-
draws if the client disagrees. This approach contains a tendency to place the 
lawyer’s commitment to an ideal of justice above the client.  
Ethics of Care119 (Relational Lawyering) 
Like moral activism, ethics of care (or relational lawyering) involves the integra-
tion of personal morality with legal practice: it is based on personal morality 
instead of role morality. Yet whereas the moral activist is principally committed 
                                                        
116  Parker (2004), p. 65 ff. & Table One, p. 56. 
117  This does not have to be a formal philosophical theory, it may just be the lawyer’s per-
sonal ethics and philosophy of life. 
118  See Sarat & Scheingold (1998), p. 7. 
119  Parker (2004), p. 68 ff. & Table One, p. 56. 
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to the cause of justice and social change, the relational lawyer is interested in 
personal rather than social change. This approach is concerned with avoiding 
harm and concentrates on ‘trying to serve the best interests of both clients and 
others in a holistic way that incorporates the moral, emotional, and relational 
dimensions of a problem into the legal solution’.120 It thus focuses on the law-
yer’s responsibility to the client and their relationships; in contrast to the adver-
sarial advocate approach, the client’s best interests are seen within the context of 
his or her network of relationships. It sees relationships as more important than 
the institutions of the law or systemic and social ideas of justice and ethics. 
Parker argues that ‘ethics of care’ concerns have influenced legal practice in that 
it encourages a more holistic view of clients and their problems (considering the 
non-legal and non-financial consequences of the different legal options open to 
the client), emphasises participatory approaches to lawyering and dialogue be-
tween lawyer and client and encourages a preventive, problem-solving approach 
(non-adversarial ways to resolve disputes).  
Being unwilling or unable to compromise personal morality thereby selec-
tively abandoning professional obligations or modifying them according to 
one’s own beliefs – i.e. the rules of the legal system and professional conduct 
are weighed, but do not provide the final answer to what is morally right – is 
something I understand as an aspect of an ethics of care approach.121 In asylum 
cases this may entail, for example, continuing to assist the client in cases that 
may not succeed legally because one cannot ‘from a human perspective’ afford 
to let the client down.122 In brief, this type of relational lawyering encompasses 
all circumstances and particularities of the client’s case (legal and non-legal) 
and weighs all obligations, both professional and personal moral. 
 
To conclude, a final way to consider the difference between the first two ap-
proaches (based on role morality – focus on either being the client’s representa-
tive or guardian of the legal system) and the last two (based on personal morality 
– focus on either social or personal change) is along the lines of placing either 
the procedure or the outcome at the centre: the first two approaches focus on the 
                                                        
120  Parker (2004), p.70. Parker refers to the work of Gilligan (Carol Gilligan (1982), In a 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development) and Schaffer (Thom-
as Schaffer (1981), On Being a Christian and a Lawyer: Law for the Innocent; Thomas 
Schaffer & Robert Cochran (1994), Lawyers, Clients and Moral Responsibility) on the 
ethics of care and concludes that this is the focus in both conceptions. 
121  Following Jack & Jack (1989). They mention this as an aspect of ‘minimum role identifi-
cation’ i.e. adoption of an ethics of care as opposed to an ethics of rights approach 
(p. 120). 
122  A phrase used by several respondents. 
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lawyer’s role in the legal process, whereas the last two focus on the lawyer’s 
role in ensuring a fair outcome.  
Renaming ‘Responsible Lawyering’  
As explained above, I believe Parker’s set of conceptual tools provides a good 
basis against which to analyse lawyers’ professional decision making and I use it 
to that end. By combining Parker’s ‘responsible lawyer’ with Atkinson’s subdi-
vision of what he calls the ‘officer of the court’ a more comprehensive category 
is created, which I would like to rename. I believe that the term ‘responsible’ has 
a strong normative connotation which might raise confusion: are the other ap-
proaches to lawyering considered not responsible? All four approaches can be 
considered responsible, albeit in different ways. Rather than foregrounding 
one’s responsibility to preserve the legal system and the law as it stands – in the 
public interest in the administration of justice – the responsibility emphasised is 
the responsibility towards the client as the client’s representative in the legal 
system (adversarial advocacy), towards justice – possibly external to the law 
(moral activism) or towards the client in his or her network of relationships (re-
lational lawyering). The three latter approaches foreground other responsibilities 
than the responsibility to preserve the legal system and the law as it stands and, 
following these lines of reasoning, this could ultimately also be seen as acting 
responsibly in the broader public interest in the administration of justice. These 
approaches can thus be viewed as expressing different interpretations of what 
acting responsibly in the public interest in the administration of justice requires 
from the lawyer.123 I will, therefore, use the term ‘dutiful’ instead of ‘responsi-
ble’, as this gives expression to the lawyer’s loyalty towards the law and the 
existing legal system, without imposing as much of a value judgement. In brief, 
the four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice I employ are adversarial 
advocacy, dutiful lawyering, moral activism and relational lawyering (ethics of 
care). 
2.6.3  Incorporating the Lawyer’s Interest in Profit or Survival: The ‘Market’  
As an analytical construct I use the four approaches for ordering my empirical 
observations by the degree to which they are similar to or deviate from the pure 
type with a view to obtaining a better understanding of how respondents balance 
their obligations to the client and the public when these are in tension and why 
                                                        
123  For the purpose of the analysis, however, I do use the stricter distinction regarding the 
centrality of the public interest in the different approaches (set out in the overview be-
low). 
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they do so.124 The four approaches are thus used as a ‘benchmark’ against which 
to analyse lawyers’ decision making.125 However, using this tool does not allow 
for incorporating the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival (the third central 
interest distinguished in ethical issues) in the analysis. I incorporate this dimen-
sion (‘market’) and examine how this aspect relates to and plays a role in the 
ways in which lawyers interpret and weigh their obligations to the client and the 
public (‘morality’).126  
2.6.4  Analytical Framework: Overview 
In the introduction I depicted professional decision making which is the subject 
of this study in the following triangle. 
 
Professional Decision Making 
 
 
        Client interest  
 
       
                                                                            Decision 
 
          
 
 
Public interest                                                                Lawyer interest    
in the administration of justice                          in profit or survival 
 
The scheme below presents an overview of the set of conceptual tools used for 
interpreting asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making and how 
these relate to the different interests. 
124  Rueschemeyer (2009, p. 19) points out in this regard that Weber’s conception of an ideal 
type might be called a relational concept (used for ordering empirical observations by the 
degree to which they approximate or deviate from the pure model) and not a classificato-
ry concept (used for sorting descriptions of social reality into different categories) and 
that these are often not sufficiently distinguished. I thus use the ideal types as relational 
and not as classificatory concepts. 
125  Eldridge (1972) p. 23. 
126  Comp. De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998, p. 241) who also sets this aspect apart from the 
other tensions in the moral domain. The lawyer’s interest in profit or survival (the ‘mar-
ket’) is distinguished from lawyers’ moral reasoning in relation to the balancing of the 
client and the public interest (‘morality’).
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Analytical Framework for Interpreting Professional Decision Making 
 
MORALITY 
 
 Role morality  
(conservative / procedure) 
Personal morality  
(progressive / outcome) 
Client interest Adversarial Advocacy Relational Lawyering 
Public interest in the 
administration of justice 
Dutiful Lawyering Moral Activism 
 
(vs) 
MARKET 
 
 
Lawyer’s interest in profit or survival 
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3 Professional Decision Making in the Dutch Context 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making 
within the Dutch context. It consists of two main parts followed by a conclusion. 
The first part describes the context within which asylum legal aid lawyers in the 
Netherlands operate and the second part examines their professional decision 
making within this context. The first part consists of an overview of the profes-
sional context (section 2) as well as the institutional context – i.e. the asylum 
and legal aid system – in which asylum legal aid lawyers operate (section 3). In 
the second part, I discuss the running of the legal aid practice within this context 
and the morality versus market pressures with which it presents lawyers (section 
4). Against this background, I, subsequently, analyse their decision making in 
respect of ‘hopeless cases’ (section 5). In the final section I present my conclu-
sions (section 6).  
3.2  The Professional Context1 
3.2.1  Professional Organisation 
The 1952 Lawyers Act lays down the profession of the lawyer.2 In order to prac-
tise as a lawyer one is obliged to be a member of the Dutch Bar Association 
(Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten: NOVA). The Dutch Bar Association is en-
dowed with several (public law) tasks, which include the education of lawyers 
(both starting lawyers and securing continuing education), setting up the profes-
sional rules and codes of conduct for the profession, the monitoring of lawyers – 
including controlling the disciplinary system3 – and advising on legislation con-
                                                        
1  The law and policy is described as it stands in the period during which the bulk of the 
fieldwork for the Dutch case study took place, which was in 2013. 
2  Advocatenwet. 
3  At the time of the fieldwork, a proposal to amend the Lawyers Act was pending (Parlia-
mentary Papers II, 2012-2013, 32382). This included the plan to set up a new independ-
ent supervisory committee that would have the ultimate responsibility for the supervision 
of and ensure the Bar’s compliance with the Lawyers Act. This plan met with fierce op-
position from the Bar (reaction of the Bar to the legislative proposal, 18 November 2011, 
www.advocatenorde.nl). See for a discussion on the proposed reforms Doornbos & De 
Groot-van Leeuwen (2014). In the end, the supervisory committee was introduced as an 
internal body of the Bar. The president of the Bar is also the president of the committee 
and the two other members are lay people (however, both with a background in law). 
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cerning the profession. Both representation and regulation is thus in the hands of 
one organisation: The Dutch Bar Association.4 Within the National Bar, every 
district has a local bar, which is governed by a supervisory board headed by a 
local bar president. Complaints against lawyers can be lodged with the local bar 
president of the district in which the lawyer has his or her office. 
 
After having obtained a university degree in law, trainee lawyers are registered 
with the Bar, take the oath and then become members of the Bar. Trainee law-
yers must complete a three-year apprenticeship during which they work under 
the supervision of an experienced lawyer and undertake professional education. 
Once the professional education has been completed successfully, the lawyer 
can practise independently. Practising independently comes with the obligation 
to undertake a certain number of hours of professional education yearly. In addi-
tion to the conditions that apply to all lawyers, the Bar does not impose addi-
tional requirements on lawyers working in the field of asylum and migration 
law. Yet, lawyers wanting to provide legal aid have to comply with the condi-
tions set by the Legal Aid Board and, as we will see below, these include addi-
tional requirements (e.g. as regards education) for asylum law practitioners. 
3.2.2  The Lawyer’s Task and the Profession’s Core Principles 
In the Netherlands, protecting the interests of the client is considered the core 
task of the lawyer.5 This task consists of two parts: providing legal advice and 
representing clients in legal procedures. The role and position of lawyers in 
society has, however, been a topic of debate in recent years and the Dutch gov-
ernment commissioned a research report on this topic.6 Following the report, 
there was discussion on whether public responsibility for the proper administra-
tion of justice should be a separate core principle guiding the legal profession 
and as such have a place in the amended Lawyers Act. The government agreed 
with the research committee that the lawyer must constantly give account to the 
justified interests of the counterparty, third parties and to the proper administra-
tion of justice and was in favour of introducing the principle. The Dutch Bar 
Association, however, found this to be at variance with the core principle of 
partisanship. It argued that this public responsibility for the proper administra-
tion of justice constitutes an integral part of the professional rules; a lawyer 
always contributes to the public interest in the proper administration of justice 
                                                        
4  As opposed to the situation in England, where regulation and representation have been 
split (see next chapter). 
5  This section is largely based on Bauw, Böhler & Westerveld (2013). See for a more re-
cent description Bauw et al. (2016). 
6  Commissie Advocatuur (2006). 
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and it would not be necessary (or even undesirable) to take it up in the Act sepa-
rately.7 In the final legislative proposal to amend the Lawyers Act, it is not men-
tioned as a core principle, but the responsibility for the proper administration of 
justice is formulated as the general interest that constitutes the foundation for the 
lawyer’s special position. The reasoning behind this choice is that even though 
the lawyer is jointly responsible for the proper administration of justice, at the 
level of an individual case the lawyer must be partial. In adversarial proceedings 
all parties have their own roles and responsibilities.8 The lawyer’s partisanship 
contributes to a balanced quest for truth by the judge, which is considered essen-
tial for the proper administration of justice. Hence, the lawyer serves the public 
interest through being partial.9 Also relevant in this regard, is that in literature on 
the legal profession the independence of Dutch lawyers is emphasized and con-
trasted with the position of lawyers in the Anglo-Saxon legal system; the Dutch 
lawyer is no ‘officer of the court’.10 So much for the background to the applica-
ble professional rules. In the end, Article 10a of the Amended Lawyers Act, 
which stipulates lawyers’ duties and privileges reads:11 
 
In the interests of a proper administration of justice, the lawyer ensures the legal 
protection of his client. When exercising his profession to that end the lawyer is: 
A. independent towards his client, third parties and the cases in which he 
operates; 
B. partial when ensuring the legitimate interests of his client; 
C. competent and in possession of sufficient knowledge and skills; 
D. someone who acts with integrity and abstains from any act or omission that 
does not befit a decent lawyer; 
E. confidant and maintains secrecy within the boundaries set by law. 
 
Under Article 46 of the Lawyers Act, lawyers are subject to disciplinary pro-
ceedings if they do not act in conformity with the duty of care or act as it ‘befits 
a decent lawyer’. Both the five core principles and the oath lawyers take are 
guiding in this regard. The oath reads: ‘I swear loyalty to the King, obedience to 
the Constitution, respect for judicial authorities and that I shall not recommend 
                                                        
7  Dutch Bar Association (2008), Annual Report 2008, p. 70. 
8  Compare Loth & Gaakeer (2007), p. 103 who point out that in the US context this is 
known as ‘the adversary system excuse’. 
9  Compare Bannier (2011b). 
10  Bauw, Böhler & Westerveld (2013), p. 25. Bannier also mentions these opposing posi-
tions, but argues that, in practice, the difference is not that significant. Bannier (2011a), 
p. 166. 
11  Article 10a. At the time of the fieldwork, the proposal was pending (Parliamentary Pa-
pers II, 2012-2013, 32382), but the article was adopted in this form. The core values had 
already been accepted as generally applicable by the Bar. 
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or defend a case which I in good conscience do not believe justified.’12 It is 
clear, however, that both the oath and core principles are rather general and do 
not offer much concrete guidance.13 The general norms are made somewhat 
more concrete in the (non-binding) 1992 Code of Conduct.14  
In respect of the question how one should deal with ethical issues, the inter-
pretation of the core principles of independence (A), partisanship (B) and integ-
rity (D) are particularly relevant. Independence entails that the lawyer must not 
allow his or her independence to be compromised. The lawyer must be inde-
pendent from the state, third parties and also from the client. The latter entails 
that the lawyer may not fully identify with the client and his or her interests. The 
lawyer must be guided only by what is in the best interest of the client. S/he 
must keep a certain distance from the client in order to provide him or her with 
critical, independent legal advice. Code of Conduct rule 9 states: ‘Lawyers shall 
assume full responsibility for the handling of the case. Lawyers may not evade 
this responsibility by invoking the instruction received from their client. They 
shall not, however, perform any acts against the apparent wishes of the client.’ 
Partisanship (partijdigheid) or acting in the client’s best interest entails that 
the lawyer, in principle, does not take the interests of others, not being his or her 
client, into account; it requires that the interest of the client rather than any self-
interest shall determine the manner in which lawyers handle cases.15 In certain 
circumstances the lawyer must also consider the legitimate interests of third 
parties. The Code of Conduct explicitly recognises that lawyers may be con-
fronted with conflicting obligations (section 1.3). It reads that such quandaries 
must be resolved with care, while bearing in mind that looking after the interests 
of the client is the lawyer’s primary task. S/he must carry out this task in accor-
dance with the interest of the public at large in sound professional practice. In 
certain isolated cases, this might even have to take precedence over the interest 
of the client. There are two clear restrictions on the lawyer’s partisanship: one 
may not provide factual information which one knows or should have known to 
be incorrect and one must avoid being needlessly offensive when expressing 
oneself orally or in writing.16 
                                                        
12  Article 3(2) Lawyers Act. 
13  Compare Kaptein (2006) who states that lawyers’ disciplinary law is based on open 
norms that presume a clear conception of what being part of the legal profession entails 
and what acting as a lawyer requires (p. 23). 
14  Gedragsregels 1992. The rules are not binding, but provide more detailed guidance for 
interpreting the general norms laid down in the Lawyers Act and the core principles of 
the profession. They are meant as guidelines to lawyers in the exercise of their profession 
as well as to the disciplinary courts. 
15  Bauw, Böhler & Westerveld (2013), p. 102; 1992 Code of Conduct, rule 5. 
16  1992 Code of Conduct, rule 30 and 31. 
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Integrity is a principle whose precise meaning is difficult to determine. 
When discussing the task and function of lawyers, the Code of Conduct points to 
the special position of lawyers in society and the privileges that come with it.17 
Attention is drawn to the use of this position in such a way that it furthers the 
proper administration of justice. Lawyers should make appropriate use of the 
position and privileges conferred upon them, not only because this position and 
these privileges can be put in jeopardy if used improperly, but also because these 
represent a commitment to society. They shall refrain from acts which harm the 
trust placed in them. In the literature integrity is defined as acting in a way that 
is ‘ethically responsible’18 and being upright, honourable and trustworthy.19 In 
brief, even though the rules may offer some guidance on how to deal with ethi-
cal issues, in the end, it is up to the lawyer to ‘in good conscience’ interpret the 
rules and weigh the different interests involved. 
3.3  Institutional Context20 
3.3.1  Asylum System 
Dutch Asylum Law21 
The rules and regulations in respect of asylum are laid down in the Aliens Act 
2000, Aliens Decree 2000, Aliens Regulation 2000, Aliens Circular and also in 
the General Administrative Act.22 Article 29 of the Aliens Act determines that 
an asylum seeker is eligible for protection in the Netherlands on the basis of one 
of the following grounds: 1) the person meets the conditions of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, i.e. has a well-founded fear of persecution because of religion, race, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group; 2) the person is 
                                                        
17  These include the monopoly in lawsuits (rights of audience), the legal professional privi-
lege (protection of all communications) and that lawyers ‘have more and freer access to 
individuals and information than the average citizen, that they have the right to speak in 
situations in which others may be denied this right, and that they enjoy considerable 
freedom in the presentation of their arguments’. 1992 Code of Conduct, para. 1.2. 
18  Bauw, Böhler & Westerveld (2013), p. 103. 
19  Bannier (2011a), p. 161. 
20  The law and policy is described as it stands in the period during which the bulk of the 
fieldwork for the Dutch case study took place, which was in 2013. 
21  Even though, strictly speaking, I do not consider substantive asylum law as part of the 
‘institutional context’ it is part of the asylum system and I will, therefore, describe its key 
features as well as certain aspects (i.e. the assessment of an asylum account at the end of 
this section) that are important for understanding asylum legal aid lawyers’ accounts in 
the next part under this heading. 
22  Vreemdelingenwet 2000; Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000; Voorschrift Vreemdelingen 2000; 
Vreemdelingencirculaire; Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht. 
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eligible for subsidiary protection, that is, when there is a real risk that upon re-
turn to the country of origin the asylum seeker will be subjected to (i) the death 
penalty or execution, (ii) torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, or (iii) the applicant is a civilian and runs a serious and individual threat to 
his life or person because of indiscriminate violence in an international or inter-
nal armed conflict; 3) there are compelling humanitarian grounds, related to the 
reasons for departure from the applicant’s country of origin, due to which he 
cannot reasonably be asked to return (e.g. victims of trauma); 4) categorical 
protection, i.e. when the State Secretary is of the opinion that the overall situa-
tion in the country or region is so exceptional in terms of lack of security and 
human rights that return would constitute unacceptable hardship; 5) the person is 
a family member of an applicant who has been granted protection.23  
Main Actors in the Asylum Procedure 
The body responsible for processing asylum applications is the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service (Immigratie en Naturalisatiedienst, hereafter: IND), 
which operates under the responsibility of the State Secretary of Security and 
Justice. In the asylum procedures the IND collaborates with several other gov-
ernment agencies. The Aliens Police (Vreemdelingenpolitie) and the Royal Mili-
tary Police (Koninklijke Marechaussee) are primarily responsible for the first 
contact with asylum seekers arriving respectively by land or at the airport. Dur-
ing (and after) the procedure, reception and accommodation for the asylum 
seekers are arranged by the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seek-
ers (Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, hereafter: COA). The Dutch Refu-
gee Council (Vereniging Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland)24 provides information 
about the procedure and informs the applicant about his or her rights and duties, 
for example, the right to a lawyer paid for by the state. Specialised staff mem-
bers (the so-called documentalisten) also support asylum lawyers in preparing 
and documenting their cases by providing – on request – country of origin in-
formation, sources to substantiate the asylum account, and information on case 
law and (European) legislation. The decision of the IND can be appealed before 
the district courts. Onward appeals can be lodged with the Administrative Juris-
diction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de 
Raad van State, hereafter: CoS).  
                                                        
23  At the time of writing and conducting the fieldwork, a proposal to amend the article was 
pending (Parliamentary Papers II, 2012-2013, 33293 no. A); the third and fourth were 
removed as from 2014. 
24  The Dutch Refugee Council is a foundation, which receives, in addition to funding from 
the national lottery and financial support from donors, subsidies from the government for 
its role in the asylum procedure. 
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Assessment of the Asylum Application 
Without describing in full detail the way in which the asylum application is 
assessed by the authorities, I will briefly touch upon some of its key features.25 
Firstly, there is the question of determining the credibility of the asylum ac-
count. It is up to the applicant to substantiate his or her claim for international 
protection. The application will be rejected if the asylum seeker has not made a 
plausible case that his or her application is based on circumstances which consti-
tute a legal ground for protection. An application will be rejected where there is 
lack of credibility. There are a number of grounds which can be considered to 
undermine credibility. An example of a frequently applied ground is that of 
being unable to produce all the travel, identity or other documents necessary for 
the assessment of the application (i.e. to substantiate the travel route as de-
clared), which is considered to undermine credibility, unless the asylum seeker 
can make a plausible case that s/he is not to blame for the absence of these 
documents.26 If this ground applies, the asylum account must show strong per-
suasive powers (positieve overtuigingskracht) in order for the credibility of the 
asylum account to be established. There is a heavier burden of proof. The ac-
count cannot contain gaps, ambiguities, incongruities and contradictions at the 
level of relevant particulars.27 One single contradiction may be sufficient in such 
cases to reject the application on credibility grounds. In most cases asylum seek-
ers do not have such documents to substantiate the claim and this stricter crite-
rion of the account having strong persuasive powers applies. It is thus a common 
barrier with which applicants and lawyers are confronted. 
On appeal the regional district courts review both facts and points of law. 
Yet, in this regard it should be pointed out that the court only marginally re-
views the stance of the immigration authority concerning the credibility of the 
flight narrative. This doctrine, introduced by the case law of the Council of 
State, implies that when assessing the credibility of the flight narrative, as far as 
the facts in the past are concerned, the yardstick is not the opinion of the judge, 
but the question of whether there is a reason to rule that the administration could 
not reasonably have come to its finding on the credibility of the flight narra-
tive.28 When handling the case, the court carries out an ex nunc assessment, 
which means that it can take relevant new circumstances and policy changes into 
                                                        
25  These key features are described because these were brought forward frequently during 
the interviews with lawyers and a brief explanation is required in order to understand 
their concerns regarding these issues discussed in the second part of this chapter. Both 
the doctrines of positieve overtuigingskracht and marginal review applied at the time of 
the interviews, but are no longer applicable as from 2015.  
26  Article 31(2)(f) Aliens Act. 
27  See Doornbos et al. (2012), p. 95 ff. for an elaborate discussion on this topic. 
28  Baldinger (2013), p. 4. See p. 4 ff. for a full discussion of judicial review. 
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account during the appeal phase.29 However, bringing forward new evidence is 
only accepted if it was not possible for the asylum seeker to mention the facts or 
submit the evidence at an earlier stage.30  
The onward appeal to the Council of State is limited to points of law and 
consists of an ex tunc assessment. It is not allowed to submit new grounds dis-
puting the initial decision. Facts or arguments that have not been submitted be-
fore the court may also not be brought forward at the onward appeal stage. The 
appeal must be submitted in line with the so-called grievance system.31 The 
applicant must point out the part of the court’s decision with which s/he dis-
agrees and explain why that part is incorrect. The Council of State is allowed to 
– and generally does – restrict the judicial review to the grievances put forward. 
In addition, if these grievances will not lead to an annulment of the court deci-
sion and do not raise questions of interest for legal unity, legal certainty or the 
development of law in the general sense, the case can be dismissed without mo-
tivating the decision. More than 90% of migration cases are determined in a 
written procedure.32 
The Asylum Procedure: First Instance Procedure33 
As from July 2010 the so-called ‘general asylum procedure’ (GA procedure) 
entered into force. This is a standard procedure of eight days, which can, in cer-
tain circumstances, be prolonged to fourteen days.34 If it is not possible for the 
IND to take a decision within this period because further investigation is re-
quired, the application will be dealt with in the extended asylum procedure (EA 
procedure). In that case, a decision has to be taken within six months from the 
official application.35 Generally, asylum applicants are granted a rest and prepa-
ration period before the asylum procedure officially starts, which lasts at least 
six days.36  
                                                        
29  Article 83(1) Aliens Act 
30  Baldinger (2013), p. 4-5. 
31  Article 85 Aliens Act. 
32  In 2012. Annual Report Council of State 2012.  
http://jaarverslag.raadvanstate.nl/downloadattachment.aspx?intLSAttSetId=133. 
33  Since this study is, in principle, restricted to lawyers’ professional decision making in the 
regular asylum procedure – both in first instance and on appeal – only those procedures 
will be discussed here. The application process of applicants placed in aliens detention or 
the closed border procedure at Schiphol Airport – during which the asylum seeker is also 
kept in detention – are thus not described here.  
34  Article 3.110(2) Aliens Decree. See Article 3.115(1) Aliens Decree for circumstances 
under which the period can be prolonged. 
35  Article 42 Aliens Act 2000. 
36  See Article 3.109(6) and (7) Aliens Decree for the exceptions. The asylum seeker – who 
is not stopped at the border – must report to the central reception location in Ter Apel to 
ask for asylum. This is only a notification, after which an intake will take place. Subse-
→ 
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The General Asylum Procedure and the Lawyer’s Role 
During the rest and preparation period (in theory six days, but in practice this 
period is often several weeks) preceding the official start of the general asylum 
procedure, asylum seekers are informed by the Dutch Refugee Council about the 
procedure, the possibility of receiving legal aid, a lawyer is appointed and they 
are offered a medical examination.37 The lawyer first meets the asylum seeker 
during the rest and preparation period, which is usually at least six days before 
the official start of the asylum procedure. The asylum seeker travels to the law-
yer’s office to prepare the first asylum interview and the rest of the procedure. 
During the rest of the general asylum procedure the meetings take place, in prin-
ciple, at the application centre (see below).  
The general asylum procedure takes eight working days and is set up as fol-
lows.38 On the first day, the official asylum application is lodged and the first 
interview on the applicant’s identity and travel route takes place.39 On the sec-
ond day, the applicant discusses the first interview and prepares for the second 
interview with the lawyer. This second interview, concerning the reasons for 
applying for asylum, takes place on the third day. On day four, this interview is 
discussed with the lawyer and corrections and additions to the report of the sec-
ond interview can be submitted. On the fifth day, the IND will inform the asy-
lum seeker whether it accepts or intends to reject the application. If the IND 
decides to grant asylum, the procedure comes to an end. If it intends to reject the 
application, the procedure continues. If the procedure continues with an inten-
tion to reject, on the sixth day the asylum seeker and his or her lawyer draw up a 
written opinion in response to the IND’s intention to reject the asylum applica-
tion. On day seven or eight, the IND will make the decision to either reject or 
accept the asylum claim. The decision to either accept or reject the asylum claim 
will normally be communicated to the lawyer, who must then communicate the 
decision to the client and discuss any possible further steps.40 The IND can de-
cide at any point in the procedure that further investigation is required and redi-
rect the applicant to the extended asylum procedure. 
 
  
                                                        
quently, the applicant will be placed within the (non-detained) asylum procedure, which 
takes place at the in-land application centres in Ter Apel, Zevenaar and Den Bosch. 
37  Article 3.109(1) and (5) Aliens Decree. 
38  Article 3.111 to 3.114 Aliens Decree. 
39  The lawyer is allowed to be present during the interviews but in practice this rarely hap-
pens. The lawyer can ask someone from the Dutch Refugee Council to attend the inter-
view if the asylum seeker is a minor or vulnerable. 
40  There are some exceptions to this rule, e.g. a rejection of a repeated application is com-
municated by the IND to the applicant in person. See para. C16/3.1 Aliens Circular 2000. 
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Regime General Asylum Procedure 
Day Procedural step IND/Lawyer 
-6 days Preparation for procedure Lawyer 
Day 1 First interview IND 
Day 2 Discussion first interview & preparation second 
interview 
Lawyer 
Day 3 Second interview  IND 
Day 4 Discussion interviews & submission of corrections Lawyer 
Day 5 Intention to reject or decision to grant application  IND 
Day 6 Submission response to intention to reject Lawyer 
Day 7/8 Decision IND 
 
So in short, and according to the Best Practice Guide to Asylum Cases,41 the 
lawyer, in principle, during the general asylum procedure has (face-to-face) 
contact with his or her client at his or her office at some point during the rest and 
preparation period before the procedure officially starts (the so-called day-1), at 
the application centre on day 2, day 4, day 6 and day 8 (can also take place at the 
office). The lawyer normally deals with two or three cases that run parallel in 
the eight-day procedure (see section 3.2.5). 
Subsequent asylum applications are dealt with parallel, and in addition to, 
the other cases lawyers deal with during the eight-day procedure, but in these 
cases the procedure starts on day 3 with an interview on the new facts or cir-
cumstances brought forward by the applicant. For the rest the same regime ap-
plies. The lawyer either previously assisted the client and helped him or her 
submit the subsequent application, or the asylum seeker applied independently 
and the lawyer was appointed. In the latter scenario the first meeting with the 
client is on day 4. 
Dublin Procedure 
When there are indications that another European country is responsible for 
processing the asylum application, a so-called Dublin procedure will be started. 
The procedure gives the applicant an opportunity to contest the intention to send 
him or her back to that other country. If another member state is responsible, 
there will be one interview in which the asylum applicant can explain why his or 
her application should nevertheless be dealt with in the Netherlands. After that, 
if the IND is not convinced, an intention to reject is issued. Subsequently, the 
asylum seeker and his or her lawyer submit a response to the intention. For the 
lawyer this procedure runs parallel to other cases in the GA procedure; however, 
on day 3 the intention to reject is issued and on day 5 the decision is taken. If 
                                                        
41  Doornbos et al. (2012), p. 63 ff. See on the Best Practice Guide the next section. 
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further investigation is required, the applicant is referred to the extended asylum 
procedure on day 3. Usually, a negative decision will be issued as soon as the 
Dublin claim has been accepted by the responsible state.  
The Extended Asylum Procedure 
If, during the general asylum procedure, the IND comes to the conclusion that 
the application cannot be dealt with in the general procedure, it will be handled 
further in the extended asylum procedure.42 Reasons for extension can be that 
the IND has exceeded the time period or further investigation is needed. For 
example, research needs to be carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
there are indications that article 1F of the Refugee Convention may be applica-
ble, language analysis or medical research is required, etc. In principle a deci-
sion has to be taken by the IND within six months of the day of the official ap-
plication (day one of general asylum procedure).43  
The Asylum Procedure: Appeals Procedures 
Appeal 
After a negative decision on the asylum application in first instance, the appli-
cant can appeal to a District Court. When the decision is taken in the general 
asylum procedure, the appeal must be lodged within one week after the deci-
sion.44 The appeal does not have suspensive effect.45 In order to ensure that the 
applicant has a right to remain until the court has reached its decision, the appeal 
must be accompanied by a request for an interim measure which must be issued 
within 24 hours after the decision of the IND is made known to the lawyer.46 
The latter request and the appeal must be submitted simultaneously, so in prac-
tice the time limit for submitting the appeal together with the interim measure is 
24 hours. This can be a pro forma application after which the grounds for appeal 
can be supplemented at a later date. Appeals against subsequent applications 
also have no suspensive effect and requesting an interim measure is thus neces-
sary to prevent deportation before the judgment. When it concerns a repeated 
application (i.e. an application which has been denied by the IND based on the 
absence of new facts or circumstances), there is no right to await the decision on 
a request for an interim measure.47 If the application is rejected in the extended 
                                                        
42  C12/ 5.1 Aliens Circular 
43  Article 42 Aliens Act. 
44  Article 69(2) Aliens Act. 
45  Article 82(2)(a) Aliens Act. Yet, the asylum seeker is granted a period of four weeks to 
arrange his or her return during which s/he can stay at the reception centre and the court 
is supposed to decide on the appeal within this period. 
46  The request must have been submitted in time (C22/ 5.1 and C22/5.3 Aliens Circular). 
47  B1/10.6.4 Aliens Circular. 
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procedure, the applicant must lodge an appeal within four weeks after the deci-
sion.48 The appeal has suspensive effect and the asylum seeker will remain in the 
reception centre.49 The average lead times are seven weeks for GA appeal cases 
and 33 weeks for EA appeal cases.50 
Onward Appeal 
After appealing to the District Court, one can start proceedings before the Ad-
ministrative Litigation Department of the Council of State. When the decision is 
taken in the general asylum procedure, the appeal must be lodged within one 
week after the Court’s judgment. In the extended procedure this is four weeks. 
The appeal does not have suspensive effect. The applicant’s lawyer can request 
an interim measure but this is only granted when there is evidence of immediate 
deportation. In practice this means that the asylum seeker has no right to stay at 
the reception centre and is staying in the Netherlands irregularly until a decision 
is made. The average lead times are 23 weeks for onward appeals in GA cases 
and 31 weeks for onward appeals in EA cases.51 
ECHR 
Within six months of exhausting national remedies, a complaint can be lodged 
with the European Court of Human Rights. If the client can be expelled there is 
the possibility of submitting a request for an interim measure, but this is only 
granted on an exceptional basis.52 
3.3.2  Legal Aid System 
Set up and Organisation 
In the Netherlands, free legal aid is available during all stages of the asylum 
procedure and the provision thereof is integrated into the general legal aid sys-
tem. The rules and regulations on the legal aid system (insofar as relevant to 
asylum law) are laid down in the Legal Aid Act, Decree on the Criteria for 
Granting Legal Aid and the Remuneration Legal Aid Decree.53 The Legal Aid 
                                                        
48  Article 69(1) Aliens Act. 
49  Article 82(1) Aliens Act; C22/5.1 Aliens Circular. 
50  In the first half of 2013. Immigration Chain Report January-June 2013 (Rapportage 
Vreemdelingenketen), Parliamentary Papers II, 2013, 19637 no. 1724, attachment. 
51  In the first half of 2013. Immigration Chain Report January-June 2013 (Rapportage 
Vreemdelingenketen), Parliamentary Papers II, 2013, 19637 no. 1724, attachment. These 
are average lead times. In certain cases it can take up to a year before a decision is taken. 
52  See for situations in which the request based on art 34 ECHR is granted: www.echr.coe. 
int/Documents/FS_Interim_measures_ENG.pdf.  
53  Wet op de Rechtsbijstand; Besluit rechtsbijstand- en toevoegcriteria; Besluit vergoedin-
gen rechtsbijstand 2000. See for a comprehensive overview of the Dutch legal aid system 
Bauw, Böhler & Westerveld (2013), chapters 5 and 6. 
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Board (Raad voor Rechtsbijstand) is the public body entrusted with the organi-
sation and administration of legal aid and falls within the competence of the 
Ministry of Security and Justice. The responsibilities of the Board include 
matching the availability of legal experts with the demand for legal aid, as well 
as the supervision and quality control of the actual services provided.54 Legal aid 
in asylum cases is provided by private bar-registered lawyers who agree to work 
within the legal aid system and meet the conditions for participating in the 
scheme. They are engaged on a case-by-case basis. The Legal Aid Board has 
subdivisions in the centres where the asylum applications are processed (ACs). 
It assigns lawyers to asylum seekers in the general asylum procedure and ar-
ranges interpreters. The legal aid is provided by private bar-registered lawyers 
who agree to work within the legal aid system and are registered to this end. The 
group of asylum lawyers registered with the Legal Aid Board consists of solo 
practitioners, lawyers working in small firms and lawyers working in medium-
large firms. Some of those working in small and medium firms are the only ones 
specialised in asylum law, while their colleagues practise other areas of law. 
Eligibility 
Publicly funded legal aid is available to anyone in need of professional legal 
assistance, but unable to bear the costs.55 Even though eligibility for legal aid is 
officially subject to a sufficient means test,56 in respect of asylum applicants 
there is an automatic presumption that they lack sufficient resources and the test 
is thus not applied in practice. Asylum seekers thus do not have to contribute 
financially to the legal aid they receive. Merits of claim testing is provided by 
law, but not strictly applied in practice.57 It is only where there are subsequent 
asylum applications that it is verified whether there are new facts or circum-
stances which merit the granting of legal aid.  
Requirements for Legal Aid Providers under the Legal Aid Scheme 
In order to represent asylum seekers under the legal aid scheme, lawyers need to 
be registered with the Legal Aid Board to this particular end. They have to com-
ply with the Board’s general registration conditions as well as meet additional 
requirements pertaining to asylum law, both of which are set up in consultation 
with the Bar.58 The additional requirements obligate lawyers representing asy-
                                                        
54  Article 7 Legal Aid Act. 
55  Article 12 Legal Aid Act. 
56  Article 12(1) Legal Aid Act. 
57  Article 12(2)(a) Legal Aid Act in conjunction with Article 3 Decree on the Criteria for 
Granting Legal Aid. 
58  Articles 13-15 Legal Aid Act in conjunction with Articles 1 to 6, 6e and appendix 2 
Registration Conditions Lawyers 2013 (Inschrijvingsvoorwaarden advocatuur 2013) 
→ 
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lum seekers to have successfully completed the professional education of the 
Bar and specialised courses on asylum and immigration law, to be a member of 
the Legal Aid to Refugees Working Group of the Dutch Refugee Council and to 
act in accordance with the minimum standards laid down in the Best Practice 
Guide to Asylum Cases.59 Before being allowed to independently assist asylum 
seekers, lawyers must work under the supervision of an experienced lawyer. In 
order to prolong the entitlement, one must have at least ten asylum cases a year 
and attend a course on the topic at least once a year. Again additional require-
ments apply for lawyers who want to participate in the schedule for assisting 
asylum applicants in the application centre, where asylum applications in the 
general asylum procedure are processed (hereafter AC rota).60 Lawyers must 
deal with at least 30 asylum cases a year, submit files to the Peer Review Com-
mittee (Commissie Intercollegiale Toetsing) on request and lawyers new to the 
AC rota are subject to additional supervision conditions. 
Best Practice Guide in Asylum Cases 
Lawyers providing legal aid in asylum procedures have to comply with the Best 
Practice Guide in Asylum Cases (BPG). The guide has been developed by law-
yers and other specialists in the asylum legal aid field. It provides minimum 
norms for the provision of legal aid, offers suggestions for best practice and 
constitutes an addition to and application of the Bar’s Code of Conduct in asy-
lum cases. The guide discusses many practical questions and dilemmas and aims 
to contribute to the quality of the legal aid provided by giving guidance and 
advice in making choices. When discussing lawyers’ professional decision mak-
ing in the next part I will refer to the relevant minimum norms and guidance 
they provide on the issues under review. 
Monitoring Mechanisms and Disciplinary Procedures  
Monitoring Mechanisms  
The Legal Aid Board makes use of several mechanisms to monitor the perform-
ance of lawyers working within the legal aid scheme. First, there is a system of 
peer review. This system has been set up by the lawyers themselves, but the 
                                                        
Stcrt. 2013, 860. The general registration conditions include, inter alia, keeping a reliable 
registration of time spent on cases, compliance with quality standards and being prepared 
to submit to peer review mechanisms. There is a maximum (250) to the number of allow-
ances a lawyer may receive per year. 
59  Appendix 2 of the Registration Conditions Lawyers 2013. The Best Practice Guide pro-
vides for the minimum norms legal aid providers in asylum cases must observe and 
against which their conduct is examined when they are being subjected to monitoring 
(Doornbos e.a., 2012). 
60  Appendix 2 (3) and 2A (7) Registration Conditions Lawyers 2013. 
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Board facilitates the use of this instrument and integrates it into the registration 
conditions. Lawyers working in application centres can be required to submit 
files to the Peer Review Committee (Commissie Intercollegiale Toetsing) for 
assessment.61 Every application centre has its own Peer Review Committee. 
This committee randomly – but also based on signals it receives from, e.g. law-
yers, board employees or employees of the Dutch Refugee Council – requests 
files from the lawyers, who participate in the AC rota. In addition to assessing 
files, the committee attends court hearings. The lawyer’s work is assessed based 
on the minimum norms laid down in the Best Practice Guide in Asylum Cases. 
If it follows from the assessment of several files that there are problems with the 
lawyer’s work, the Peer Review Committee will start a counselling programme. 
If this does not lead to sufficient improvement, the Committee can notify the 
Legal Aid Board. The Board can then ask the Complaints Committee Legal Aid 
in Asylum and Aliens Detention (see below) to start an investigation into the 
quality of the legal aid provided. This is the second monitoring mechanism. 
Starting an investigation of its own motion by the Complaints Committee is not 
something that happens on a regular basis, but the possibility exists.62 Third, the 
Board has a project called ‘Project Risk profiles’. The project team has identi-
fied several risk profiles (e.g. lawyers claiming large numbers of legal aid fees) 
and further investigates lawyers fitting these profiles.63 As regards compliance 
with the general requirements for participation in the AC rota, the Legal Aid 
Board requires lawyers to demonstrate every two years that they still meet the 
requirements set out above. This is checked randomly.  
Complaints Procedures 
The asylum applicant – or his or her new or former legal aid provider or advisor 
– can lodge a complaint against the lawyer with the Complaints Committee 
Legal Aid in Asylum and Aliens Detention, set up by the Legal Aid Board.64 
The Committee can start an investigation on the basis of the complaint or of its 
own motion. In determining whether the lawyer in question has acted in accor-
                                                        
61  Article 3 and appendix 2 (3) Registration Conditions Lawyers 2013. These committees 
are made up of asylum lawyers elected from the lawyers working on the AC Rota of the 
particular application centre and the AC’s legal coordinator (a Legal Aid Board staff 
member), who is the secretary. 
62  Interview policy officer Legal Aid Board 20 February 2013. 
63  Interview policy officer (project leader Asylum/ Immigration) Legal Aid Board 15 Octo-
ber 2013. 
64  Regulation Complaints Committee Legal Aid in Asylum and Aliens Detention (Re-
glement Klachtencommissie rechtsbijstand asiel en vreemdelingenbewaring, KRAV) 
Stcrt. 2011, 10574. The committee is made up of a judge (president), lawyers, a staff 
member of the Dutch Refugee Council and a staff member of the Legal Aid Board (sec-
retary). 
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dance with professional standards and has provided adequate and effective legal 
aid, the Best Practice Guide in Asylum Cases is used.65 The Committee will 
advise the Legal Aid Board as regards which measures to take, the most severe 
being exclusion from the legal aid scheme. Once exclusionary measures are 
taken, the Bar Association, the Dutch Refugee Council and the Aliens Chambers 
of The Hague District Court are informed. The Complaints Committee also 
informs the Advisory Committee Legal Aid in Asylum and Aliens Detention66 
on the general aspects which are in its view relevant to the quality of legal aid.  
Remuneration and Expenses Covered under the Legal Aid Scheme  
Remuneration 
The remuneration of legal aid providers is provided through a system of fixed 
fees. The fixed fee is granted for an individual or, in the case of a family with 
close family ties there is the general assumption, for the entire family because it 
is assumed that they have a single legal interest.67 The system is based on the 
granting of a fixed amount of ‘points’ for providing legal aid at a certain stage in 
the procedure. One point equals € 106.9968 and reflects approximately one hour 
of work. The idea behind the fixed fee payment is that the more complex and 
time consuming cases can be compensated with the less complex cases requiring 
less work.  
Assistance during the general asylum procedure is divided into three mod-
ules, each of which merits four points.69 So if a lawyer assists the asylum appli-
cant during the entire procedure this will amount to a compensation of twelve 
points. If the general procedure is prolonged up to fourteen days, this does not 
affect the number of points granted. Where the IND decides that the application 
                                                        
65  See also Policy Measure of the Legal Aid Board Regarding the Provision of Legal Aid in 
Asylum and Aliens Detention (Maatregelbeleid Raad voor Rechtsbijstand inzake de 
rechtsbijstandverlening asiel en vreemdelingenbewaring), Stcrt. 2011, 10653. 
66  The main task of the Advisory Committee is to advise the Legal Aid Board on all matters 
pertaining to the provision of legal aid in asylum and aliens detention cases. See Regula-
tion Advisory Committee Legal Aid in Asylum and Aliens Detention (Landelijke Advies-
commissie Rechtsbijstand Asiel en Vreemdelingenbewaring, LARAV), Stcrt. 2011, 10652. 
67  A family consisting of mother, father and minors (children below 18) as well as a grand-
parent travelling with minors are seen as having close family ties. See work instruction: 
http://kenniswijzer.rvr.org/werkinstructies-toevoegen/asielenvreemdelingenrecht/v060-a. 
a.-procedure-per-1-september-2011.html. Exceptions are possible. If there is no single 
legal interest or the asylum accounts are very divergent, more than one fee may be grant-
ed. 
68  This is the amount for 2013. It is determined every year on the 1st of January. See Article 
3 Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000 (Besluit vergoedingen rechtsbijstand 2000), last 
amended 14 December 2012, Stcrt. 26952. 
69  Article 5a(1) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. 
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will be dealt with in the extended procedure, two additional points will be 
granted.70 In the so-called Dublin procedure the lawyer will receive four 
points.71 For subsequent applications the lawyer receives seven points, regard-
less of whether s/he has provided assistance at all stages of the general proce-
dure or whether the application is dealt with in the extended procedure.72 Remu-
neration for representation in the appeal procedure is fixed at eight points and 
for onward appeal at five points.73 The request for an interim measure accompa-
nying the appeal is respectively four and two-and-a-half points, which makes a 
total of twelve points granted for an appeal and request for an interim measure 
before the court.74 The table below presents an overview of points per stage of 
the procedure. 
In very complicated and thus time-consuming cases, a lawyer can ask for re-
imbursement of extra hours spent on the case on top of the compensation 
granted by the fixed fee system. If the amount of time spent on a case in the 
general or extended procedure exceeds 24 hours, every additional hour is com-
pensated with one point, that is, if the request (including a budget estimating the 
hours needed) is authorised by the Legal Aid Board in advance.75 In respect of 
appeal procedures the time spent on a case must be three times the number of 
hours compensated by the points (3x8 points amounts to 24 hours), in order to 
be eligible for additional compensation.76 The Board can accept the request and 
award additional remuneration where there is substantial factual complexity 
which is legally relevant or where the case is legally complex.77  
                                                        
70  Article 5a(2) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. Yet, it should be noted that if the 
IND takes this decision before the end of the general procedure, the lawyer will receive 
only points for the stages (or modules) in which s/he assisted the applicant. For example, 
if the decision to move the application to the extended procedure is taken on day five, the 
lawyer will receive eight points for the first two stages (2x4 per module) and an addition-
al two points for assistance in the extended procedure, so a total of 10 points.  
71  Article 5a(4) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. 
72  Article 5a(5) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. According to the explanatory mem-
orandum to the amendment of Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000, a lower remunera-
tion is justified since the applicant’s file has already been created and is usually known to 
the lawyer or easily accessible. Moreover, the lower remuneration is intended to prevent 
the ‘too easy’ filing of subsequent (or repeated) applications. Explanatory memorandum 
to the amendment of Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000, Stcrt. 2011, 15324, p. 8. As 
from 2014 a ‘no cure less fee’ policy will be introduced. This entails that if an applica-
tion is unsuccessful or an appeal is lost, the remuneration will be reduced to 2 points. 
73  Article 5(1) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. 
74  That is if the appeal and the request for an interim measure are decided on together at one 
hearing. 
75  Article 5a(6) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000.  
76  Article 13(1) Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. 
77  Legal Aid Board: Manual Extra Hours (Leidraad Extra Uren December 2008). Available 
at: http://www.rvr.org/nl/subhome_rbv/bibliotheek/handboeken,index.html. 
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Procedure Maximum number of points 
First instance  
General asylum procedure 12 
Extended asylum procedure GA + 2 
Dublin procedure 4 
Subsequent application 7 
Appeal  
Appeal (+ request for interim measure) 8 (+4) 
Onward appeal (+ request for interim measure) 5 (+2.5) 
Additional Expenses Covered 
In addition to the fees they receive for the provision of legal aid, lawyers are 
also compensated for expenses such as travel costs and travel time.78 Interpreta-
tion of administrative and court proceedings and meetings between the lawyer 
and the client are also covered. For the cases dealt with at the application centres 
to which lawyers are appointed, the Legal Aid Board arranges interpreters. Costs 
relating to expert consultations and medical examinations do not fall within the 
legal aid scheme. So if the authorities have established that the documents sub-
mitted by the applicant are false and the client contests this, the costs for a 
counter-inquiry are not covered. Counter-inquiries for language analyses are in 
principle also not covered, unless the Central Agency for the Reception of Asy-
lum Seekers covers the costs, which is not the case in the general asylum proce-
dure and where the application is rejected.79 In the extended asylum procedure 
costs are covered to a certain maximum. 
Process for Receiving Payment 
There are two different regimes for receiving payment. The first regime for re-
ceiving payment entails that the lawyer submits an application claiming payment 
for the legal aid provided and receives payment once the application is ap-
proved. In the general asylum procedure this occurs automatically. Second, there 
is the option of participating in the High Trust scheme.80 Lawyers who are ad-
mitted to the High Trust scheme receive the fees they apply for and these are 
checked on a sample basis afterwards. At the appeal stage, if a case is won, the 
lawyer’s fees are paid out of the legal costs incurred by the winning party which 
the losing party (IND/the State Secretary for Safety and Justice) is ordered to 
                                                        
78  Articles 2(2)(b), 24 and 25 Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000. Per 60 km 0.5 point is 
granted for travel time. 
79  Article 17(7) Regulation Allowances Asylum Seekers 2005 (Regeling verstrekkingen 
asielzoekers 2005). 
80  In the future this is envisaged to be the standard way of processing applications. 
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pay.81 The legal costs the winning party receives are then deducted from the 
legal aid fee the lawyer would receive. The remaining amount is covered 
through legal aid payment. The lawyer must thus first claim payment from the 
counterparty. Lawyers have been complaining about obtaining payment in this 
way because it is more difficult to retrieve payment from the counterparty than 
claiming fees directly from the Legal Aid Board – which is the case when a case 
is lost.82  
Appointment of Legal Aid Providers 
The Legal Aid Board appoints lawyers to asylum seekers before the asylum 
procedure actually starts, that is during the rest and preparation period. The 
Board is present in the application centres, where it coordinates the appointment 
of lawyers who participate in the legal aid schedule for the application centres 
(AC rota) to clients and arranges interpreters for the meetings between the law-
yers and the client. The Board sets up the schedule for the distribution of cases 
and the lawyer is allowed to indicate in which application centre s/he wants to 
work and the number of cases s/he wants in his or her ‘set’, i.e. a bundle of two 
or maximum three cases to which s/he is assigned in the eight-day procedure.83 
The cases in a set run parallel during the eight-day procedure. In principle, law-
yers must accept all kinds of cases and cannot refuse asylum seekers of certain 
nationalities, members of groups or families.84 Yet, if the lawyer fears time pres-
sures s/he can ask to have one case removed from the set. The lawyer is in-
formed about the cases to which s/he is appointed in advance. At the time of 
conducting this study, there was not much work but there were many lawyers on 
the AC rota, which meant that lawyers were often not given the amount of cases 
for which they had signed up.85 In principle, the asylum seeker must have the 
possibility to be represented by a lawyer of his or her choice. In practice, how-
ever, the principle of free choice of lawyer is very difficult to realise.86 This is 
due to the strict planning and regime of the general asylum procedure; the plan-
ning of the IND and the Legal Aid Board must match and the requested lawyer 
also has to be available on short notice. If a lawyer does not want to continue 
                                                        
81  Article 32 Remuneration Legal Aid Decree 2000 in conjunction with Article 8:75(2) 
General Administrative Act. 
82  E-mail Policy Officer Legal Aid Board 2 May 2013. 
83  See appendix 2A Registration Conditions Lawyers 2013 on the distribution of cases. 
84  Appendix 2A (2a) Registration Conditions Lawyers 2013. One case can be an individual, 
a couple or a family. 
85  In the internal newsletter (Signalering) 16 of the Legal Aid Board, 20 June 2013 the 
Board’s Asylum Manager explicitly mentions this issue. 
86  Compare Doornbos et al. (2012, p. 25). Once the asylum seeker arrives and knows a 
lawyer by whom s/he wants to be represented, the asylum seeker can make this known to 
the Legal Aid Board which must then do its best to accommodate the request. 
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with a case during or at the end of the general asylum procedure, s/he can put 
the case up for a second opinion, which will be provided by a consultation law-
yer present. If an asylum seeker is not satisfied with the lawyer, s/he can, in 
principle, switch lawyers between the different phases of the procedure (e.g. 
after the first instance procedure and before appeal).87 
3.4  Running a Legal Aid Practice in Asylum Law 
3.4.1  Financial Pressures and Incentives 
Lawyers providing legal aid in asylum procedures in the Netherlands are either 
sole practitioners or lawyers working in small firms or medium firms.88 Some of 
those working in small and medium firms are the only ones specialised in asy-
lum law, while their colleagues practise in other areas of law. Almost all re-
spondents combine asylum law with other areas of law. Many respondents say it 
is financially not possible to have a merely asylum law practice and therefore – 
some against their wishes – combine it with other areas of law. At the time of 
the interviews the influx of asylum seekers, and thus the new cases for lawyers, 
was low and many point to this phenomenon as an issue which has affected their 
asylum practice. 
We have seen that the institutional context within which Dutch lawyers op-
erate is characterised by a fixed asylum procedure with short time limits and a 
legal aid scheme catered to providing legal aid in that procedure. Lawyers are 
largely dependent on the Legal Aid Board for obtaining cases and do not have 
much room to influence the amount and types of asylum cases they have. In 
addition, they receive fixed fee payments for their work. The joint aspects of this 
institutional context – combined with the low influx of cases relative to the 
number of lawyers participating in the legal aid scheme – may raise financial 
and/or time pressures presenting lawyers with ethical challenges. Several re-
spondents point to the perverse incentives of this system arguing that it incites 
doing a bad job. Both the fixed fee aspect (‘the whole system facilitates inertia. 
                                                        
87  It must be noted here that this might be complicated because the applicant must find a 
lawyer willing to take on the case. It will require extra time (generally unpaid) for the 
lawyer to become familiar with the new cases and s/he has to do this within a short time 
period. 
88  Respondents in all categories have been interviewed (see selection of respondents). In the 
Netherlands there are no large firms like in England providing legal aid in asylum proce-
dures. 
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The less you do, the more money you make per hour’)89 as well as the financial 
advantages inherent in proceeding are mentioned in this regard: 
  
If I prepare him [the client] well and he then gives a good statement and therefore 
immediately gets asylum, I get less points than if I would lean back and mistakes are 
made and an intention to reject is issued […] It does kind of incite, well ... that when 
you do your work less well and as a result get a negative outcome in a case, you can 
1) proceed with a case and apply for a fee to that end and 2) you get your money 
easier.90 
 
Or as this respondent puts it: 
 
R: [...] It must be noted that a lawyer who performs badly simply earns much more. 
There is a benefit in not putting all cards on the table because then you’re more 
likely to end up in court and can claim that extra fee. That’s just the way it works. 
I: It works like that? 
R: Yes. Yes, maybe not consciously but certainly unconsciously. 
I: What do you mean by ‘not putting all cards on the table’? 
R: Well, you are supposed to present all your arguments at once, in first instance. 
But if that means that you will get a favourable decision sooner, you will miss out on 
a further procedure and you miss out on revenues. And it’s slim pickings in the 
asylum field. Quite a number of lawyers participate in the asylum rota.  
I: Are you saying that lawyers are not putting all cards on the table in the first 
instance procedure? 
R: I’m not saying that directly, but I do say that lawyers can have an interest in a 
case running as long as possible... have an interest in starting procedure after 
procedure.91 
 
These respondents sketch the morality versus market tension: delivering high-
quality legal work (and investing time to that end) negatively affects the law-
yer’s income. While lawyers who raised this matter state that it does not affect 
their way of working – although the respondent last quoted is quite frank in 
stating that financial considerations do play a role, as we will see more clearly 
below – the fact that it was brought up during the interviews indicates that it is a 
topic of ethical concern.92 The aspect of the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival 
when proceeding with cases within this system will be addressed in the next 
                                                        
89  nl20-med-+10-y-m. 
90  nl9-s--2-n-f. The last point this respondent raises refers to the fact that when a case on 
appeal is won, one must obtain the fee from the IND via the court, which can take a long 
time. Whereas when the case is lost, the lawyer obtains his or her fee from the Board, 
which is easier and quicker. 
91  nl8-s-+10-y-m. 
92  Even though these respondents would not go as far as saying that they see their col-
leagues purposefully doing a bad job, they do point out that they are sometimes shocked 
by their colleagues’ meagre work.  
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section when examining respondents’ professional decision making in respect of 
the ‘hopeless case’ issue. Here I will look into how lawyers deal with the fixed 
fee aspect of the payment system – in particular, in the first instance procedure – 
which is largely intertwined with the strict regime of the general asylum proce-
dure. 
3.4.2  Time vs Money? Operating within the Payment System 
The payment system is based on fixed fees, which may present lawyers with a 
morality versus market dilemma: what if the amount of time (they believe they 
need to) spend on a case exceeds the amount of money available under the fixed 
fee? This question is further complicated, firstly, by the fact that lawyers have 
minimal control over the types of cases to which they are assigned, i.e. they 
cannot indicate preferences based on expertise and a case might consist of one 
person or an entire family. Lawyers can influence the types of cases they take on 
when it concerns subsequent asylum applications – and some do, e.g. one re-
spondent explains that she only takes on clients of a nationality in which she is 
specialised because that allows her to work more efficiently – and they may add 
subsequent asylum applicants to the set of cases to which they are assigned in 
the general asylum procedure in order to be able to deal with more cases during 
the eight-day procedure. Secondly, the lawyer is confined to the institutional 
setting of the asylum procedure: the lawyer is bound by time constraints as there 
is one day for every action in the general asylum procedure. Respondents de-
scribe the general asylum procedure as a ‘carousel’, which may be best trans-
lated as a roller coaster. As, for example, one respondent states: 
 
What actually really bothers me is that you are in a ‘carousel’ with these people and 
it goes fast. You would want to take the time for people to follow their emotions. So 
if there is someone who gets highly emotional during our conversation, then it 
should be possible to say: we leave it here, drink something, take some rest and I’ll 
see you in a week. […] It just has to be discussed within two hours on that one 
day.93 
 
Given that only one day is granted per procedural step, the possibility of a time-
out or to resume the discussion of an interview report at a later time is not there. 
Moreover, many respondents argue that the strict regime makes it difficult for 
the lawyer to arrange what is necessary for the client, for example, allowing the 
client to collect additional documents to substantiate the claim, obtaining a 
statement from a doctor if the client has mental or physical problems, or organis-
ing a counter-inquiry. The respondents in this study do, in one way or another, 
                                                        
93  nl6-so-+10-n-m. 
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operate within this system, but there are lawyers who were not willing to par-
ticipate as this respondent explains: 
 
When the new procedure was introduced, one lawyer said: ‘I do not participate, 
because I think the system is wrong’. I think: Well, and then what? Then you can’t 
help these people. It is better to be in the system and do what you can from within.94 
 
When discussing with respondents whether the fee they receive covers the time 
they spend on a case during the different stages of the entire asylum procedure, I 
received diverse responses. The general answer was that it depends on the case: 
some nationalities require more time than others, some individual clients require 
more time than others, and of course a couple or a family takes more time than 
one person. Overall, a vast majority of the respondents say that they often spend 
more time on cases but that, in general, it is possible to compensate for the more 
complex cases with the less complex cases. Some respondents consider that they 
are structurally underpaid at certain stages of the procedure, and a few explain 
that they generally do not have any problems with the remuneration. These dif-
ferences might be understood based on a distinction made by a respondent, who 
is also involved in peer review and in writing the Best Practice Guide, between 
a ‘proactive’ versus a ‘reactive’ way of assisting asylum seeking clients. He 
explains: 
 
I myself adopt the proactive, labour intensive way. That means prepare everything, 
search the internet, enquire… Well, that is very time consuming. So, in relation to 
the fee we get all my cases take up too much time. Many lawyers adopt the reactive 
approach, so they just wait. First interview is held, then discuss it, second interview 
is held, then discuss. Maybe one has to write a response to an intention to reject and 
do some research to that end. They have, if I may put it somewhat disrespectfully, a 
rather laid-back attitude. But the great advantage is that is takes much less time. 
 
The actual differences in approach (i.e. proactive versus reactive) amongst re-
spondents are hard to make out from the interviews. However, the issue of time 
pressure and how they manage it – both generally and in relation to the fixed 
fees – has been discussed, showing different ways of dealing with it. Several re-
spondents explicitly state that they do not let themselves be limited in their work 
by the fixed fee, but rather that the short time limits impede them from spending 
the time they need to adequately assist the client. Essentially, time pressure may 
thus arise from either the short time limits in the general asylum procedure and/ 
or from the fixed fees in combination with the number (and types) of cases they 
have.  
                                                        
94  nl10-so-+10-y-f. 
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One way of controlling time pressure is to sign up for fewer than three cases in a 
‘set’ in order to have more time per case. When deciding on the number of cases 
lawyers opt for in their ‘set’ they thus have to weigh the risk of time pressure 
against the need to gain sufficient income. Most respondents sign up for three 
cases while stating that they do, at times, experience time pressure in the general 
asylum procedure. They opt for three cases and provide the following reasons. 
First, the lawyer is not always granted the number of cases signed up for. It does 
happen that s/he is granted one or two cases instead of three or that a case or all 
cases are cancelled at the last moment. Second, one or more of the cases in a set 
may become a so-called ‘Dublin case’. Generally, these are more straightfor-
ward and thus ‘easier’ cases. Besides, for a Dublin case the lawyer is granted 
four points for the entire general asylum procedure instead of twelve. Third, the 
risk of time pressure generally only arises when there are three complex cases in 
one set. A case where the application is granted before the second interview, 
would qualify as an ‘easy’ case; it is quickly finished and no work has to be 
done on days 4, 6 and 8. Moreover, they may try to get the general asylum pro-
cedure prolonged (up to 14 days) or get a complex case referred to the extended 
procedure, creating more time. Finally, as a last resort, there is also the option of 
dropping a case when the set is assigned and some explain that they might do so 
if they feel time pressure will be an issue. Many respondents who say they ex-
perience time pressure not so much because of the fixed fee, but because of the 
eight-day regime say their way of dealing with it is just to work very long hours. 
One respondent, for example, who has the same ethnic background as most of 
his clients, explains that he sometimes, after work hours when the application 
centre is closed, goes to the reception centre in the evening where the client 
stays to discuss the case with the client if he felt he did not have enough time 
during the day. Yet, this is only possible because he can communicate directly 
with many of his clients and thus does not require an interpreter. Even though 
there is the possibility of applying for an additional fee in certain complex cases, 
requesting for and granting of the fee is not common amongst respondents.95 
Some respondents decide to opt for only two cases in a set because they feel 
that, in order to provide high quality legal assistance, this is all they can handle 
in the available time. Many respondents stress that every minor detail in the 
                                                        
95  The law renders the possibility to apply for reimbursement of extra hours spent in certain 
complex cases, but this is not commonly referred to as an option. Partly because it re-
quires spending double or triple the amount of hours and because the request is viewed as 
very complex and time-consuming and many have the perception, supported by rejec-
tions from lawyers who tried to obtain the additional fee, that it is hardly ever granted. 
Even those lawyers who have never asked for the extra fee, said that the negative stories 
from other lawyers and the perceived administrative rigmarole involved in the applica-
tion stopped them from even requesting. 
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client’s asylum account is important and may be crucial in getting a positive 
decision from the IND, since if applicants are undocumented, one single contra-
diction can be enough to dismiss the story as implausible and thus reject the 
application. Therefore, this lawyer, for example, explains that he refuses to 
make concessions in this respect and tries to solve the issue of time pressure by 
signing up for only two cases in a set (thereby accepting earning less): 
 
In my opinion, there is only one way to discuss the interview report and that is read 
everything out loud, have it translated and when the client says: ‘No, this is not 
correct’ or ‘this must be understood differently’ you’ll have to take action.96 
 
Yet, even this respondent recognises that the time pressure affects his way of 
working in other situations. When asked whether he is confronted with difficult 
choices in his work, he answered: 
 
R: Well, of course there are difficult choices, on many levels. How do you go about 
writing corrections and additions? Are you extensively going to rewrite the entire 
report in a case in which it went wrong? Or will you do it in more broad terms? 
I: Whether you do or you don’t, that depends on what? 
R: I find that difficult to say. I don’t think I have some kind of manual, or a yardstick 
for that, but I think that gut feeling plays a big role. The thing that according to your 
gut feeling is best to do. Yes, what is gut feeling? That’s also... I believe time 
pressure undoubtedly plays a role. You can’t say that out loud of course, but that’s 
the way it works. 
I: Well, that seems quite realistic, no? 
R: Yes. Well, I think that time actually shouldn’t be the determining factor in how 
you go about in a case, but…  
I:…but it is? 
R: Yes, it will always play a role. 
 
Several respondents who opt for three cases in their set seem either to not so 
much experience time pressure or accept the way the system works and operate 
within that, without resorting to taking on fewer cases. Some explicitly ac-
knowledge that they adapt their work method to the regime of the general asy-
lum procedure and/or the hours they get paid and that this would not be the ap-
proach they actually prefer or consider best if they had more time. For example, 
not running through the interview reports word-for-word with the clients, but 
focusing on the matters that seem most important. As one respondent puts it:  
 
R: I sometimes say that if I would have more time then… Most IND officials have the 
entire day to conduct one interview. They are very elaborate. But you don’t have 
                                                        
96  nl11-med-3-10-y-m. 
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that time. Actually, you would have to approach it in a similar manner. Then you 
would need at least half a day for the interview report.  
I: Yes.  
R: So you always take risks when you… Because you need to run through the report 
word-for-word, and yes, there you encounter... 
I: But then that’s not possible, right? Run through it word-for-word? Or is it? 
R: Well, no. There is the tension.97 
 
Another respondent does not mention this tension, but seems to see the system 
in which she works simply as a given and something one needs to deal with. 
While not opting for taking on fewer cases in a set – on the contrary, adding a 
subsequent applicant to the set – she describes her way of coping with time pres-
sure (for example on day 4) as just ‘rushing it through’: 
 
You don’t have more time. You have to make it within the available time. They close 
at 6 o’clock and the asylum seekers return by bus. You also have to submit 
corrections on that day. You just have to manage your time really well and make 
sure you start on time and don’t run out. Sometimes I used to have a ‘hasa’ 
[subsequent applicant] added to my set and that caused problems. I sometimes say 
to the interpreter that he needs to move on quickly, for example, when I am getting 
coffee I tell him to go on. Then I also told the client that we have no time… It also 
depends on the client. I always say that I read it out loud, the interpreter translates 
and the client must indicate whether it is correct or not, and if not, say what is 
incorrect. Some people tend to repeat every answer and then you run out of time, 
then you just have to say: ‘No, don’t. Just nod yes or no.’98 
 
Again another respondent explicitly acknowledges that he adapts his work 
method to the legal aid system. This lawyer recounts that he sometimes used to, 
prior to the applicant’s first interview with the IND, not only ask about and dis-
cuss the client’s asylum account, but also note down the entire account in order 
to make sure that the whole story would come to the fore and not let it be pushed 
in a certain direction by a possibly biased IND official. When I asked whether 
he always works that way, he continued: 
 
R: Well, then I would have to transform my whole business. We have just a legal aid 
practice and we believe that with the time we spend we can serve our clients 
sufficiently. But maybe... 
I: Sufficiently or good enough? 
R: Look... [silent for a moment] The real refugee maybe not… sufficiently. But at the 
same time, a large part of our clients does not have a right to a status, but you help 
them to make sure that a well-founded decision can be made and their side of the 
                                                        
97  nl16-so-+10-y-m. ‘Spanningsveld’ is the Dutch word used.  
98  nl5-so-2-10-n-f. 
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story is heard. In other words, you are a ‘procesbegeleider’ rather than someone 
who has a result in mind.99 
 
Here we see that this respondent assists asylum seeking clients in a way that fits 
with the asylum regime and the legal aid system and justifies this by referring to 
his role as an asylum lawyer in the procedure, namely as someone who guides 
the client through to process (‘procesbegeleider’) and to the limitations of the 
legal aid system (‘we have just a legal aid practice’) – implying that having a 
legal aid practice in combination with acting within the asylum regime requires 
a particular way of working.  
3.4.3  Concluding Observations: Morality versus Market in a Fixed Asylum 
Regime 
Asylum legal aid lawyers in the Netherlands work in a particular institutional 
context which is characterised by a fixed asylum procedure regime with short 
time limits and a legal aid scheme catered to providing legal aid in the proce-
dure. Even though many respondents criticise the institutional setting in which 
they work – in particular, the pace of the general asylum procedure – they are 
participating in this scheme and thus work within the limits set.100 However, the 
way in which they conduct their work to fit the regime differs.  
This institutional context poses a morality vs market tension for asylum le-
gal aid lawyers in two ways. First, lawyers receive the same fee regardless of the 
time spent on a case; spending more time in order to provide high quality legal 
work thus negatively impacts the lawyer’s income. The strict asylum regime 
with its short time limits and the relative lack of control over the types of cases 
lawyers take on further complicates this matter. In respondents’ accounts we see 
different ways of balancing their interest in profit or survival against their obli-
gations to the client and the public to provide legal assistance and representation 
that result in well-prepared applications. Whereas some respondents seem to 
accept the system as a given and aim to do their work within the boundaries set 
– i.e. sign up for the maximum number of cases in a set (possibly adding subse-
quent applicants) and generally remain within the hours remunerated by the 
fixed fee – others express having trouble fitting within the regime and refuse to 
make concessions as regards the content of their work. This may lead them to 
sign up for fewer cases, drop cases if they believe they cannot assist clients well 
due to time constraints or work more hours than paid for, thereby deciding to 
bear the consequences financially. Even though there is the possibility of apply-
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ing for an additional fee in certain complex cases, this is generally not advanced 
as a viable option. 
A second morality versus market tension to which respondents allude lies in 
the financial advantages associated with proceeding with cases: lodging an ap-
peal or starting another procedure allows for obtaining additional legal aid fees. 
But what if the lawyer considers a case hopeless? This possible tension between 
the lawyer’s obligation to the client, or even more so to the public in ensuring 
the administration of justice (not unnecessarily burdening the legal (aid) system) 
– ‘morality’ – and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival – ‘market’– and the 
aspects complicating the decision making on this matter will be addressed in the 
next section on the ‘hopeless case’ issue.  
3.5  Decision Making in ‘Hopeless Cases’ 
3.5.1  Introduction 
R: Most people come here, no passport, and they absolutely do not want to go back. 
That is the attitude of most people; they absolutely do not want to go back. And then 
it’s like, you seize all opportunities. 
I: And that is your job as a lawyer? 
R: Well, my job is of course also that, when I see no more opportunities, I say so. 
And that is not the nicest job... You should of course not continuously lead people to 
believe that ‘I will do this, I will do that’, while you actually know beforehand: this 
has no chance of success. 
I: Yes, what do you do such in a situation? 
R: Yes, I find that difficult. Sometimes I think, I must train myself to be more clear in 
that respect, because I find it pretty difficult to say: ‘It’s over’.101 
 
This excerpt shows the ethically challenging situations in which lawyers may 
find themselves: they may be confronted with desperate clients who are adamant 
in their wish to proceed, while the lawyer sees no more opportunities. The issue 
of the ‘hopeless case’ is an intricate one in asylum law and, as we will see be-
low, there are different conceptions of what it entails. When examining lawyers’ 
decision making, I found that there are two – largely interconnected – questions 
that define respondents’ decision making on this issue: First, when is a case 
actually considered hopeless, i.e. what aspects are taken into account when as-
sessing the actual prospects of success; second, whether the actual prospects of 
success are the main (or sole) consideration for starting a procedure on the cli-
ent’s behalf or whether there are other considerations that play a role. The ques-
tions are interrelated and how respondents deal with these questions shows how 
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they interpret their obligations to the client and the public in the administration 
of justice and how they balance these interests with their interest in profit or 
survival. In respondents’ accounts a distinction can be discerned between, what 
some call, prospectless cases and pointless cases. A prospectless case is an ap-
plication or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of obtain-
ing legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close to) 
zero, but starting it, nevertheless, in the client’s interest and/or in the interest of 
justice. A pointless case is an application or court procedure in which the lawyer 
considers the chances of obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that 
moment in time to be (close to) zero and starting it neither in the interest of the 
client nor in the interest of justice.  
In this section I will elaborate on respondents’ decision making on this is-
sue, i.e. how the issue is understood by respondents and how they deal with 
what I term (more narrowly) ‘hopeless procedures’, that is an application or 
court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of obtaining legal 
success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close to) zero. In 
discussing respondents’ decision making in the course of the asylum process, I 
distinguish between first instance and after a rejection of the asylum claim. Even 
though the actual decisions made in concrete cases ultimately depend on the 
particular circumstances of the case, the client and the practical circumstances 
related to the different types of procedures, there are general arguments which 
are advanced to motivate decisions that show how the different interests at stake 
are interpreted and balanced. I will focus on these arguments and motivations 
underlying the decisions while also addressing these in relation to the different 
circumstances and reflect on their decisions in light of the context within which 
these lawyers operate. 
3.5.2  First Instance: Assisting Clients in the General Asylum Procedure 
We have seen that lawyers are appointed to clients with a view to assisting and 
representing them in the general asylum procedure. The asylum seeker’s appli-
cation is, in principle, determined in the general asylum procedure or, in certain 
circumstances, in the extended asylum procedure.102 All respondents state that 
once they are appointed to the client in the general asylum procedure they, in 
principle, complete the first instance procedure with the applicant, even though 
legally the odds of obtaining asylum are zero. It is only in exceptional circum-
stances – e.g. if a client becomes aggressive, has a severe mental disorder or 
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expresses a lack of confidence in the lawyer (see below) – respondents say that 
they decide not to proceed or say they might decide this if such a situation were 
to occur.  
In discussing these decisions and their role in the asylum procedure a strong 
adherence to the adversarial advocacy ideal is seen amongst most respondents. 
They emphasise their role as the client’s representative in the legal system in 
several ways, e.g. through talking about their function as ‘partisan’,103 stating 
that one ‘[...] has only one interest and that is the client’s interest’104 and by 
stressing that it is the lawyer’s job to assist the client in reaching his or her 
goals, i.e. ensuring client autonomy. As one respondent puts it: 
 
First, what does the client want? That’s what you should try to achieve. Most asylum 
seekers want asylum and some know that this won’t be that easy, but they want you 
to stall as long as possible. So that means that you sometimes do things which the 
IND doesn’t like, but are in the client’s interest. [...] We are of course the client’s 
advocate, that should be the number one priority.105 
 
In this regard, many respondents explicitly state that they see it as their job to 
make sure that the client can stay in the Netherlands, since this is what the client 
wants. As one respondent puts it: ‘For me the main idea is, well, if someone 
wants to settle here, for whatever reason, I will do anything – within the rules of 
course – to make sure this person can stay here.’106 This may mean assisting 
them in obtaining a refugee status via the asylum procedure or arranging for 
their stay via another route, which is often through an immigration procedure 
(family reunification/formation, stay on medical grounds, etc.). So the fact that 
the lawyer is appointed in the asylum procedure thus does not mean that his or 
her assistance is restricted to obtaining stay with a view to obtaining asylum. 
Several respondents explicitly stress that one should advocate the client´s in-
terest, regardless of the situation or the lawyer´s personal views about the case 
or the client indicating that one should refrain from moral judgement; the law-
yer’s personal morality is not relevant. As one respondent explains: ‘You, of 
course, hear lots of accounts that do not make sense, but then you still try to – 
it’s your client, after all – to keep the person in the country, one way or the 
other.’107 Another lawyer emphasises even more strongly that it is not her role to 
assess clients’ motives or to judge them: 
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At the start of my career, I had someone who said: ‘Ms. [x] I actually don’t have 
asylum motives, but I just want peace and quiet’. Then I’m thinking: who am I to 
judge that? Given what he told me, I was like: I can imagine he wants that.108 
 
These respondents explain that they may, in certain exceptional circumstances, 
nevertheless decide not to complete the first instance procedure. For example, 
because the client expresses a lack of confidence in the lawyer: 
  
R: The other day I had clients who had no confidence in me as a lawyer. They 
expected me to fabricate their asylum case; what would be the best thing for them to 
say? Because they heard that people who converted to Christianity received permits. 
They asked me what kind of questions the IND would pose. I asked them whether 
they actually became Christian. The answer was no, but they were considering it. I 
asked whether they attended church services, what they knew about Christianity, 
about the Bible… They answered that they heard about it. I told them: ‘Drop it, this 
is not going to work out.’ When they asked me what they were supposed to tell, I 
requested to have the case referred to someone else. 
I: So to you it’s important to be able to have confidence in what the client is saying? 
R: No, they need to have confidence in me, otherwise I don’t feel like assisting them. 
I told them it’s not going to work and if they accept that then I can go through with 
them. But if they ask me to fabricate their asylum case, then for me it ends there. 
Really, I’m not going to do the case and request the administration for another 
lawyer. [...] It’s about the relationship of trust. They need to confide in you. If I tell 
that the IND is not going to believe something and they accept that, we can move 
on.109 
 
So, the reason for refusing to proceed is not the client’s motive or account (the 
lawyer refrains from judging those) but rather that these clients do not trust the 
lawyer’s judgement; if they did, he would be willing to continue and look for 
other ways to achieve their aims.  
 
Several other respondents describe their role in the asylum process more (or 
also) in dutiful lawyer terms. Some refer to themselves as ‘procesbegeleider’, 
i.e. the one who guides the client through the asylum process. One lawyer ex-
plains: ‘I do keep somewhat of a distance to the client. The client is the one who 
builds the case. I just make sure that the process runs well and that he gets the 
best possible legal aid during the process’,110 thereby indicating that he has a 
mediating function between the law and the client. Another respondent even 
more strongly emphasises her role in facilitating the public administration of 
justice according to the law: 
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[...] I mean, the IND is not established for nothing, they also have to reject. If they 
don’t meet the criteria, they are rejected. I don’t want to be the one who does that, 
but I do see the need for that. They must tell their story. If they are eligible for a 
permit based on that, they must get it. In case they just tell they fled, because they 
did not have a job and it’s just all... other reasons and not because they are in 
danger, then they just have to go back.111 
 
When talking about their role in the asylum procedure these respondents empha-
sise that it is their task to inform the client about the law and explain the condi-
tions they need to fulfil to be eligible for a permit. One respondent points in this 
respect to the changing nature of asylum accounts. He explains that, in the past, 
there were more classic political refugees, whereas nowadays people often flee 
from famine or violent situations generally. Even though he considers their mo-
tivation still very understandable, it is in such situations really difficult to obtain 
a permit and he tells that he finds it an important part of his job to explain that: 
 
[...] the problem they have is very real, but that you just don’t get protection for that 
in Europe. Well, then they kind of understand it, but at the same time they don’t… 
[…] I find giving good information, explaining the chances of success and the 
asylum system in the Netherlands and Europe – for example, that for certain 
problems that are real and serious you can’t find a solution in Europe – a really 
important task.112 
 
As stated above, all respondents say that they, regardless of the chances of suc-
cess, in principle, complete the first instance procedure with the applicant; so do 
the respondents emphasising this part of their role. They point to the fact that 
they are appointed and therefore owe it to the client to assist him or her through-
out the first instance procedure, thereby also taking into account the immigration 
aspects of the client’s case. They are appointed to articulate and advance their 
clients’ views, even if these make no sense legally. The prevailing idea is: 
‘you’re appointed as a lawyer [...] and also in the less strong cases, you try to 
obtain the best possible result’.113 Moreover, most respondents seem not so 
much troubled by doing so arguing that one never knows how the IND will as-
sess the application – giving examples of situations where they received positive 
decisions in cases in which they expected the opposite – and that, even though 
they assessed the chances of success as being close to zero, there is always 
something to bring forward in response to the IND’s intention to reject: ‘In a 
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very bad case, the IND’s arguments can be so ridiculous and logically false, that 
you will actually have something to write down.’114 
In addition, many respondents refer to the short time limits in the general 
asylum procedure: refusing to continue with a case really restricts the appli-
cant’s possibilities for receiving legal assistance, since there is hardly time to 
find another lawyer, let alone to make him or her acquainted with the file. One 
respondent even states that he is ‘obliged to write a response’ to the IND’s inten-
tion to reject in the general asylum procedure.115 He thus seems to be under the 
impression that completing the general asylum procedure is an obligation for the 
appointed lawyer. The Best Practice Guide does not speak of an obligation to 
complete the procedure, but securing that the applicant will have a lawyer assist-
ing him or her in the process is emphasised.116 The rationale seems to be that the 
lawyer, once appointed, should be reticent in refusing to assist a client, as the 
client would then be deprived of (adequate) legal assistance because of the short 
time span of the procedure.117  
 
Here we see the role the institutional context – the joint set-up of the asylum and 
legal aid system – plays in lawyers’ decision making. Even respondents who 
speak not so much in adversarial, but in more dutiful lawyer terms about their 
role, do decide to complete the first instance procedure with reference to the way 
the system is set up. They are appointed with a view to assisting the client in the 
fixed and fast paced general asylum procedure and therefore seem to feel a cer-
tain obligation towards the client and the legal system (the public administration 
of justice) to assist the client in the first instance procedure up to the initial deci-
sion; this entails, in principle, completing the procedure at first instance, how-
ever hopeless they may deem the case to be. The rationale seems to be that by 
assisting the asylum seeker in this stage of the asylum procedure (however hope-
less the case) the lawyer is serving the public administration of justice. The 
question of whether to proceed with a case one considers hopeless thus be-
comes, within this institutional context, an issue only after a rejection of the 
asylum claim. 
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3.5.3  After Rejection of the Asylum Claim  
Virtually all respondents explain that they are willing to and/or tell about situa-
tions in which they assist clients in pursuing certain hopeless procedures – i.e. 
an application or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of 
obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close 
to) zero. The motivations advanced for starting these hopeless procedures in 
certain cases are diverse, depend on the circumstances of the individual case and 
often intertwine. In this section I will discuss the key motivations that can be 
distilled from respondents’ accounts, related motivations and address the moti-
vations and considerations limiting their decisions in this regard. 
The Client’s Day in Court 
A majority of the respondents take the position that after a rejection of an asy-
lum claim, clients, in principle, have a right to appeal. The system is set up in a 
way that allows for an appeal and clients have the right to have a full procedure 
including an independent judge who looks at their case. Although there may be 
exceptional situations in which they decide to withdraw from a case, their posi-
tion is that the client has this right to appeal, even in cases they may consider 
hopeless. For example, this respondent explains that it requires quite an effort 
from the lawyer, but that these are the consequences of her principled choice 
that the client has this right: 
 
[...] It occurs regularly, or yes, it does occur that you think: I will go there, explain 
the grounds of appeal, which I pulled out of thin air and put together with great 
difficulty, and then hope that the judge won’t pose too many questions, because I 
then have to conceal that I of course know myself that the case has no chance of 
success. So that does happen.118 
 
Another respondent who is less adamant about an absolute right to appeal tends 
to let the client’s wish prevail in order to let him have his day in court: 
  
[...] I knew the case was hopeless and I didn’t want to do it. I invited the young man 
to give him the chance to explain everything once more. I believed it was not going 
to work but, on the other hand, if he really wanted to tell his story to the court, I 
would go for it. I told him I had not much to say. I explained what I wanted to bring 
forward and also told him that it did not make sense, but that if he still wanted to 
make himself heard in court we would go.119 
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The motive of proceeding on appeal because the client wants to in combination 
with the view that the client has the right to present his or her case to a court, is 
advanced by most respondents putting forward this argument only as sufficient 
motivation at the appeal stage and not higher up. E.g.: ‘in order to lodge an on-
ward appeal there must be something you can actually argue’.120 The aspect of 
(un)predictability is at play here: several respondents point out that at the appeal 
stage one might win cases against one’s own expectations. They emphasise that 
it is really difficult to assess whether a case is actually hopeless, as one cannot 
predict how the decision makers will decide. This unpredictability motive can be 
seen as an indication of the adversarial advocacy line of reasoning: even the 
slightest ambiguity in the law is resolved in favour of the client and one’s per-
sonal views about a case – including their personal opinion as to the merits – 
should not principally be guiding. However, at the onward appeal stage, they 
point out, it is often more predictable how the court will decide making this 
argument less prominent. Besides, there is hardly ever an actual ‘day in court’ 
on onward appeal.121 
The decision to proceed with a case up to the European Court of Human 
Rights (hereafter: ECtHR) is generally taken with an even greater degree of 
reservation. It is at this stage that the obligation towards the legal system and 
acting as a ‘gatekeeper’122 becomes more important. This quote is illustrative in 
this regard: 
 
I only do it if… Look, then you really need to believe in a case. The European court 
really is inundated with cases. I can easily litigate up until the Council of State, but 
then tell the client: ‘This is where it ends’.123 
 
However, these respondents explain that they may decide to proceed with ‘hope-
less cases’ on onward appeal and possibly to the ECtHR but not solely for this 
reason (i.e. the client’s wish in combination with the view that the client has the 
right to present his or her case to a court) as we will see below. 
 
Apart from the principled right to appeal argument, respondents who decide to 
assist their clients on appeal in order to let them have their day in court, also 
explain that they do so for humanitarian reasons. From ‘a human perspective’ 
they cannot allow themselves to let the client down. A few respondents advance 
this as a key consideration which results in not refusing to assist the client in 
taking legal action in cases they consider hopeless – also not on onward appeal – 
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because ‘you can imagine that you would also want to try every possible op-
tion’.124 Also, in support of allowing their clients their day in court, several re-
spondents refer to a court judgment as a way to make it easier for the applicant 
to accept the decision and move on as ‘it means closure for people’.125 The ad-
versarial and the humanitarian motives are often advanced simultaneously, and 
the asylum seekers’ dependence on their lawyer and the lawyer’s position in the 
asylum process is important for understanding this combination. The next quote 
neatly illustrates this: 
 
If I say: I, as a lawyer, will not assist, and neither will my colleague nor my other 
colleague, well, then the client is done. He can’t go to court. He is locked up or in 
the reception centre and has no possibility to bring his matter before the court, 
while he really wants to. Well, are you ruthlessly going to say ‘no’? Then I’ve 
decided on it and I am not the government.126 
 
The humanitarian motive in relation to deciding to allow the client his or her day 
in court is also advanced in combination with speaking about one’s role in duti-
ful lawyer rather than adversarial advocate terms. For example, one respondent 
who is very resolute in declaring that he is not willing to assist clients in proce-
dures which he believes will not succeed (‘I won’t take alternative routes, no 
hopeless applications’), nevertheless, tells about a case in which he did in order 
to allow the client to present his case to the judge. It concerned a Syrian appli-
cant who entered Europe first through Romania and had to, because of the Dub-
lin regulation, go back to apply for asylum there. The client told that he was 
treated badly in Romania (beaten, kept in detention, blackmailed by a corrupt 
interpreter etc.) and did not want to return and apply for asylum there. The re-
spondent explains that, against his better judgment, he hoped for an exception to 
the rule: 
 
[…] the appeal phase approached. Are you going to appeal or not? You know in 
advance that the case will be rejected, because the judge also has to give good 
reasons for his decision and if he doesn’t, the Council of State will revoke it. But I 
couldn’t justify it to myself, I knew the kind of suffering he endured in Syria and he 
wanted to tell about that. Yet, he had to do that in Romania, and not here. I listened 
to it all, even though I knew it wasn’t relevant for his application in the Netherlands. 
That made it all more complicated, because then you see the suffering a person 
endured [...].127 
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In all examples we see that respondents believe the case to be what can be con-
sidered prospectless, but not pointless: even though they believe there is no ac-
tual chance of legal success there is some benefit to the client, that is the possi-
bility of presenting his or her case to a judge. In this we see the adoption of ad-
versarial and/or relational lawyer approaches (as well as how the latter may 
outweigh one’s initial dutiful lawyer line of reasoning): respondents act in the 
client’s interest because of their obligations as the client’s representative in the 
legal system and/or because of their personal morality: in their relationship with 
the client they cannot justify what they feel as letting the client – who is very 
much dependent on the lawyer – down.  
The ‘Day in Court’ Argument and the Role of the Institutional Setting and Time 
Limits 
The short time limits for lodging an appeal (24 hours for lodging a pro forma 
appeal and one week to submit grounds in GA cases) are advanced as one of the 
reasons for lodging appeals in certain hopeless cases; often in combination with 
the arguments discussed above. This argument seems to interrelate with the 
adversarial advocacy line of reasoning seen among many: even if the lawyer 
does not see any possibility whatsoever of a case being successful and might 
therefore not want to proceed, respondents argue that the time for finding an-
other lawyer – who then needs to become familiar with the case in order to ade-
quately assist the client – is too short, leaving the client without proper represen-
tation, which they deem unacceptable.128 Several respondents provide this as a 
reason for proceeding with certain such cases. For example, this respondent, 
who is of the view that it is not in the interest of the client to have another law-
yer for the appeal stage (and she stresses that clients have this right) explains: 
 
R: I believe it is best if I do it myself, because I know the file, I spoke to the client. 
Relatively, it takes me little time, several hours, to write it. And I mean, you also 
have no time… 
I: What do you mean by ‘no time’? 
R: Well, to hand over the case in an acceptable manner. If I say on day 8: ‘I won’t 
do it’, then someone else has to request the interim measure on day 8, if not, the 
applicant will have a reception problem. And you could say: ‘I’ll lodge a pro forma 
application and look for another lawyer.’ But then you would still only have a week, 
week and a half, and that’s […] you would need to speak to the client, read the file; 
that is a huge workload. So to me that’s not ideal. 
 
Whereas we see that the short time limits are used as an additional argument 
alongside the adversarial advocacy line of reasoning in support of the decision to 
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proceed with hopeless cases, we also see a few examples of respondents trying 
to deal with this aspect in a different way, i.e. by lodging a pro forma appeal 
while telling the client to look for another lawyer. A few respondents explain 
that if they do not want to proceed with a case because they consider it hopeless, 
they may deal with the short time limits by lodging a pro forma appeal while 
telling the client to look for another lawyer. For example, this respondent, who 
refers to himself as a ‘procesbegeleider’, explains: 
 
R: Well, that is a problem in GA-cases. When you know you’ll get a rejection, 
standard Dublin-case, nothing special, you have to… or there is the possibility of a 
requesting an interim measure within 24 hours. Well, that is difficult. Because you… 
I always just lodge the appeal and request the interim measure. 
I: Yes? 
R: Yes, but if I really do not want to go through with the case on appeal, I tell the 
client: ‘In order to secure your rights and obligations, I lodge the appeal, but I am 
not going to supplement grounds of appeal.’ Then I tell him: ‘You can of course go 
to another lawyer, second opinion.’ […] I find it difficult that you don’t have a bit 
more time in the GA-procedure. Now you just lodge the appeal because you have no 
choice. […]If you don’t, you have a problem. Imagine I don’t lodge an appeal and 
leave it to the client: ‘find another lawyer’ and the lawyer comes in too late, well 
then the client is done. And you’re blamed for that, and it is worthy of an official 
complaint, I think.129 
 
He regrets working in this way because everyone – the IND, the court, the plan-
ning – is put to work while this could be avoided. He further explains that he 
does not apply for a legal aid fee in such circumstances: ‘I think it is not appro-
priate to apply for legal aid fee for an appeal in which you do not conduct any 
work.’ Some respondents do not seem comfortable working in this way, but feel 
within this institutional setting forced to do so in order to avoid possible disci-
plinary measures. The idea that if the lawyer does not want to assist the client 
s/he should at least make sure the client has the opportunity to consult another 
lawyer can be traced back to the Best Practice Guide, which emphasises the 
responsibility of the lawyer in assisting in arranging a ‘second opinion’.130 
 
We thus see that the idea that the client, in principle, has a right to appeal and 
should be assisted by a lawyer to that end seems generally accepted: also re-
spondents who do not advance the day in court argument explain that they may 
feel obliged to take action in order to ensure that the asylum seeker’s opportu-
nity to present his or her case to a judge is not forfeited. We see that the com-
bined aspects of the institutional context seem to be at play here: asylum seekers 
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are (in practice) dependent on the lawyer for lodging an appeal, the short time 
limits make it difficult to find another lawyer if a lawyer finds a case hopeless 
and the Best Practice Guide emphasises the lawyer’s responsibility in assisting 
in arranging a ‘second opinion’. 
Stalling 
In addition to the ‘day in court’ motive, stalling is an important motivation ad-
vanced for proceeding in certain ‘hopeless’ cases. Stalling (‘rekken’) is the over-
arching term used in relation to motivate starting hopeless procedures in certain 
cases, but is essentially a delaying tactic used for different purposes. It entails 
filing an appeal or starting a new procedure on behalf of the client not with a 
view to obtaining legal success in that particular procedure, but for an ulterior 
motive. This can either be to prolong the procedure in order to keep the client 
within the process with a view to obtaining legal success at a later point in time 
– i.e. the case is considered hopeless at this moment in time or in this particular 
procedure, but eventually there may be the option of legal success, that is, legal 
stay – or for alternative reasons benefiting the client (e.g. prevent immediate 
expulsion).131 In other words, the first argument is within the realm of legal 
options as it relates to the possibilities of legal success in the long term – rela-
tivising the hopelessness of a case: whereas the procedure may be hopeless, the 
case may not be – whereas the second argument relates to the client’s broader 
interest and reaches beyond the actual prospects of legal success in the Nether-
lands.  
Virtually all respondents say that they may at times resort to this strategy for 
either one of those reasons. Whereas one respondent is quite extreme in stating 
that she is willing to assist the client in stalling, simply because the client wants 
to: 
 
Well, you have situations where someone says he has actually no asylum claim, but 
just wants to stall the procedure as long as possible. Well, should you do that or 
not? People will have their reasons [...] It is not up to me to judge.132 
 
For most respondents this consideration (the client wants to) is important but not 
sufficient, not showing such a far-reaching adherence to the adversarial ideal of 
merely acting on the client’s instructions; they explain that they must have the 
idea that stalling is actually in the client’s interest, that there actually is some-
thing to be gained. As stated above, this ‘something’ can, but does not have to, 
                                                        
131  Not all procedures and appeals (e.g. onward appeal before the Council of State) have 
suspensive effect. Yet, respondents say that in their experience the authorities often re-
frain from expelling the client if an appeal is lodged or a procedure is started. 
132  nl2-s-+10-n-f. 
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relate to obtaining legal success, that is legal stay. It can be subdivided into three 
categories: 1) eventually obtaining legal stay in the Netherlands, and there is a 
concrete indication that this can be achieved (e.g. anticipation of policy change 
or the possibility of obtaining evidence to substantiate the claim);133 2) the pos-
sibility of eventually obtaining legal stay in the Netherlands without a concrete 
indication that this can be achieved; 3) postponing departure with a view to en-
suring the client’s broader interest, possibly linked to a concrete event in the 
near future (e.g. keep reception to complete medical treatment or allow the client 
to prepare for stay elsewhere). These three categories of considerations are also 
used simultaneously. 
In these motivations for stalling we see different lines of legal moral reason-
ing: most clearly, adversarial advocacy, at times combined with both relational 
lawyering (and moral activism – see below). Many respondents point to the 
unpredictable nature of asylum law and its interconnectedness with immigration 
law. The characteristics of asylum law, i.e. its ambiguous nature both on a legal 
and factual level as well as its interconnectedness with immigration law, may 
make it difficult to determine when a case is actually truly hopeless. On a factual 
level, there is often uncertainty about the facts: the actual risk of persecution is 
hard to establish and may alter. On a legal level, there is an applicability of mul-
tiple legal frameworks: the national and the European (EU legislation and the 
ECHR) and the international (the original Refugee Convention). This opens up 
the debate as to whether national asylum policies are in line with European and 
international legislation. The judgments of the European courts flowing from 
these challenges may have implications for national policy and this renders the 
content of asylum law uncertain, making it harder to assess the actual chances of 
success. Also, the interconnectedness with immigration law opens up the possi-
bility – and when being appointed to provide legal aid in the asylum procedure, 
lawyers are actually expected to take certain immigration related aspects into 
account134 – to look at the broader situation of the client and beyond the legal 
opportunities for obtaining asylum. Again, as a consequence a case may thus not 
as easily be considered hopeless; if there is no valid asylum claim, there may be 
an opportunity for a stay on regular migration grounds – if not in the short term, 
than possibly in the long term. The ambiguous nature of asylum law and its 
interconnectedness with immigration law is often used in support of one’s ad-
versarial attitude: even the slightest ambiguity in the law or chances of success 
is resolved in favour of the client. Some accounts to illustrate this. For example, 
                                                        
133  Again, the short time limits play a role: due to the fast pace of the asylum procedure the 
asylum seeker may not have been able to obtain evidence from his or her country of 
origin to corroborate the asylum account. 
134  See Doornbos et al. (2012), part 3. 
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this respondent emphasises that if one waits long enough policies will change 
and it is thus in the clients’ interest to continue to vigorously advocate their case 
(the second consideration for using the stalling strategy): 
 
R: [...] We are often blamed for starting procedure after procedure, but I do have a 
large number of clients who eventually, in the end, stayed here, by using this 
strategy. 
I: Yes, so you are saying that it actually works? 
R: Yes. Well, I had a number of clients who eventually were eligible for the 
children’s pardon. Those were also clients whose files I had lying in the drawer for 
years on end.135 
 
Likewise, the next account illustrates this point and how the different considera-
tions for stalling are used simultaneously, showing a commitment to the client’s 
interest beyond the legal chances of success: 
 
Actually, I always lodge onward appeals… Because there’s always something in the 
court’s reasoning I can argue against. However, I can also imagine having a case in 
which there is nothing I can contest, that it’s just crystal clear. But even then I can 
imagine just making the best of it in onward appeal, simply to keep someone in the 
procedure. In case an expulsion date would be set, you could then ask for an interim 
measure to keep someone here for a while.136 
 
She explains that recently her belief that one cannot foresee how things will 
develop was confirmed and proceeding in ‘hopeless cases’ does make sense: 
 
Last year I had a client from the Congo and I went on holiday so my colleague took 
over. He said: ‘Well, this is obviously hopeless, I won’t lodge an onward appeal, I’m 
really not up to this.’ Then the young man went to another lawyer, who did lodge an 
onward appeal and also submitted a repeated application. Well, everything came 
kind of together and now the policy as regards the Congo is changed and eventually 
he will get solid ground under his feet. That has strengthened my view: just 
continue. 
 
However – amongst those who consider ‘stalling a legitimate interest’137 and 
that ‘a legitimate interest for the client does not have to stem from the appli-
cant’s ground for applying, gaining time can be a reason’138 – there is a division 
between respondents who stress that there must be something concrete that is in 
the client’s interest, as opposed to those who tend towards proceeding in certain 
‘hopeless’ cases if the client wants to, because one never knows how things will 
                                                        
135  nl16-so-+10-y-m. 
136  nl14-s--3-y-f. 
137  nl20-med-+10-y-m. 
138  nl18-s-+10-y-m. 
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develop (as sketched above). The former do not support the argument of ‘noth-
ing ventured, nothing gained’ since: ‘[...] When in every hopeless case you’re 
like “you never know”, well, then I think you’re just generating legal aid fees.’ 
They argue that it holds for all cases that there must be something concrete 
which justifies stalling, for example, finishing medical treatment, documents 
that are on the way, or concrete signs of a change in case law or policy (note: 
this does thus not have to lead to legal stay in the Netherlands). Where stalling 
does serve a concrete aim (e.g. to obtain a document for a procedure elsewhere), 
it is also referred to as ‘litigating strategically’: 
 
I told this boy that the case has no change of success whatsoever, but that I do it 
only to give him some time, because a new document would become available. I told 
him: ‘You can have the document sent over and then use it in your asylum procedure 
in Belgium.’ So that is litigating strategically to give the client some time. 
 
This can be considered litigating strategically at the individual level, but the 
term is most appropriate in relation to changing the law to the benefit of a wider 
group, as we will see below. Even though these respondents can be considered 
creative in what they regard as a concrete justification for stalling, they deem it 
not acceptable in all circumstances. For example, stalling merely to keep recep-
tion for a few more months in Dublin cases139 is not considered a good reason:  
 
I have the feeling that, especially during winter, many Dublin claimants apply for 
asylum in the Netherlands in order to have reception for a while. Because they 
know: ‘these bureaucratic procedures take time, it will take several months before 
they transfer me back to France or Belgium and in the meantime I don’t have to 
sleep under a bridge in Paris.’ Well, then I’m thinking… I’d only do that if the 
Dublin claim can actually be criticised.140 
 
Here we also see what is often mentioned as a key requirement for starting such 
a procedure, namely that there is what the lawyer considers ‘one legitimate ar-
gument’. At the core, we see in both groups of respondents the adoption of an 
adversarial advocate line of reasoning, but they differ on how far one can go in 
using procedural rules (i.e. the opportunity to lodge an appeal or application) in 
the client’s interest.  
 
                                                        
139  As explained earlier, these are claims laid by the Dutch government on another Member 
State that it deems responsible, based on the Dublin regulation, for examining the claim. 
The applicant can appeal this decision in order to have his or her claim examined in the 
Netherlands. 
140 nl18-s-+10-y-m. 
PROFESSIONAL DECISION MAKING IN THE DUTCH CONTEXT 
 
85 
 
In respect of the third category of justifications for stalling (postponing depar-
ture with a view to ensuring the client’s broader interest) we see, particularly, 
that the adversarial advocacy line of reasoning is combined with the relational 
lawyer line of reasoning. The quotes of the next respondent are illustrative in 
this regard: The aspect of empowering those who need to use the law to realise 
their rights and are confronted in that respect with the powers of the state is 
central: 
 
The interest of that individual client against that huge government – it is already 
extremely difficult to get that interest to the fore. So if there are possibilities within 
the client’s individual life to gain time, then I am of the view that as a lawyer one 
should do so.141 
 
But the lawyer’s responsibilities to people, communities and relations is also 
vital; she adopts a more holistic view of clients and their problems and this is 
established in dialogue with the client: 
 
If a client explains to me why he wants to stall – documents are on the way, wife 
needs to give birth – that can be a reason to start a certain procedure or lodge an 
objection even if it has not that much change of success. Then there is at least the 
suspensive effect. […] Yes, it’s all temporary, but if people say they need a few 
months, it is possible. That can be a reason.142 
 
Whereas this respondent expresses the view that it can be justifiable to use pro-
cedural rules to this end, another respondent – while emphasising her partisan-
ship – sees this somewhat differently and considers appealing merely to gain 
time for the client not really appropriate. However, she might still do so: ‘[…] 
time can be a reason to appeal. It is not really correct of course, but as I said, in 
the end it doesn’t happen that often. But if it occurs I am willing to help a client 
in that way.’143 Ultimately, we thus see in these examples that one’s personal 
morality is integrated with legal practice; the lawyer helps the client with the 
broader aspects of his or her problem, not restricting it to a legal solution (rela-
tional lawyering). 
 
Interestingly, examples of resorting to stalling in certain cases one considers 
hopeless at this moment in time and in the future – the purpose of stalling was 
                                                        
141  nl4-s-+10-y-f. 
142  This respondent talks about ‘lodging an objection’. This is not a legal remedy in asylum 
law, but in regular migration law. These areas overlap regularly; failed asylum seekers 
may try to obtain a permit on migration law grounds or apply for postponement of expul-
sion on medical grounds (Art. 64 Aliens Act). 
143  nl9-s--2-n-f. 
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thus not related to legal success, but to securing the client’s broader interests – 
are also given by respondents who speak in more dutiful lawyer terms about 
their role. The next accounts show how the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning may 
be outweighed by, what can be considered, ethic of care considerations (rela-
tional lawyering). The respondent quoted before in being very adamant about 
not wanting to pursue hopeless cases is nevertheless, under certain particular 
circumstances, willing to lodge appeals to prevent immediate expulsion/retain 
reception. He recounts a hopeless case in which he appealed, but did not go to 
the hearing: ‘Just to make sure he [the client] could stay with his wife longer. 
She was pregnant.’144 He does emphasise it being an exception: ‘(...) normally I 
don’t do this, seriously. It’s not good for my reputation.’145 
Respondents who refer to themselves as ‘procesbegeleider’ also acknowl-
edge that they might in certain circumstances stall for the client, while question-
ing the legitimacy of their approach when it is used merely to gain time: 
 
R: [...] there are not always substantive grounds. For example, sometimes the client 
wants reception just to bridge a period of a few weeks. I am very reticent in going 
along with that. 
I: Because? 
R: Yes, well, you’re not… It is not the purpose of the asylum procedure of course. 
Reception, in and of itself.  
I: But it does help the client? 
R: It might help the client, yes. And then you’re inclined to do it sometimes. 
Especially with existing clients.146 
 
The other respondent proclaims: ‘I can’t exculpate myself, because I think I also 
say sometimes: “Well, you know I’ll try something” or the client just wants to 
be here for a few more weeks.’ As an example, the respondent sketches the 
situation of a client whose problems are not asylum related, but who is neverthe-
less completely marginalised in his home country – which is part of Europe but 
not of the EU – and has no perspective whatsoever: 
 
Well, then there is this man in front of you who really has a huge problem in 
[country X] and is really suffering. He just really wants to be proven right and that 
doesn’t work out. Not in an asylum procedure, of course. [...] This case is now 
before the court. I told the man that: ‘Well, I will do it, but it’s only to postpone 
departure, because I’m sure we’re not going to make it in court.’ I can even ask 
myself: why do I bring such a case to court? Because I know in advance that there is 
                                                        
144  nl7-s--3-n-m. 
145  See below more elaborately on the role of reputation in this regard.  
146  nl15-s-3-10-n-m 
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no asylum ground for protection for this problem. No matter how deplorable the 
situation, he just has to go back to [country X].147 
 
Even though these respondents express the conviction that, as lawyers, they 
should not be acting in this way, they still feel the need to help the client and this 
may ultimately entail serving the client’s interest not only in a strictly legal 
sense; the case is thus prospectless, but not pointless from the lawyer’s point of 
view.  
 
The willingness to at times let the broader interest of the individual client prevail 
over the lawyer’s interpretation of what is in line with the applicable legal 
framework seems to interrelate with the nature of asylum seeking clients in 
combination with the way in which the asylum system functions and whether it 
is perceived as fair. This example given by one respondent – even though it is 
not actually an example of stalling and in some way exceeds the hopeless case 
issue – is interesting to discuss here because it shows, in quite an extreme way, 
that the way in which the asylum system functions (and how this is perceived) 
may play an important role in respondents’ choices. It concerned a situation in 
which the respondent helped a client in the preparation of what she refers to as 
his ‘fake conversion’ to Christianity in order to be eligible for a residence per-
mit.148 The client had obtained a permit, which was withdrawn at some point. He 
was a young man who had built a life in the Netherlands; he went to school, had 
a girlfriend, spoke Dutch really well and was also ‘a very nice guy’.149 She ex-
plains that this is not something she would normally do, but in the case of this 
young man she felt that he was smart enough for it to work and she was able to 
help him achieve it. In response to the question whether she did not feel troubled 
by doing so (the relational lawyer), she states: 
 
No. Given the situation… Look, there are many people who obtain permits… 
sometimes people obtain permits and then I’m thinking ‘how can this be?’ […] So 
then I’m thinking, this time I will use the system to my advantage. […] So I do not 
feel troubled by it. I actually thought it would be funny to see whether it would work. 
 
This shows how personal morality is not only integrated with legal practice, but 
may at times actually override role morality. It can be viewed as an ethic of care 
approach in that it is a (maybe quite far-reaching) participatory approach to 
lawyering and relationships are viewed as more important than the institutions 
                                                        
147  nl8-s-+10-y-m. 
148  The client came from a country where it is generally accepted that Christians may be 
persecuted, which is a ground for obtaining protection and a right to legal stay. 
149  nl10-so-+10-y-f. 
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of the law or systemic and social ideas of justice. What seems to play a role here 
is that she sees, and others have pointed to this as well, the asylum system as 
random, which makes her willing to use the system to her ‘advantage’ in a situa-
tion where she considers it just to help someone. Lawyers’ views about the asy-
lum system may also motivate them to challenge the applicable legal frame-
work, as will see below. 
Reputation and the Role of the Professional Community 
These two of the three central motivations (the client’s day in court and stalling) 
distinguished in respondents’ accounts for starting hopeless procedures – in, at 
times, hopeless cases – show a strong focus on the client’s interest and we see 
both lines of legal moral reasoning foregrounding the lawyer’s obligation to the 
client in these motivations, i.e. adversarial advocacy and relational lawyering. 
As indicated above, the actual decisions made, depend on the particular circum-
stances of the case and one line of reasoning may prevail over another in certain 
cases. The lawyer’s reputation (with the court) may play a role in this regard; 
this consideration is mentioned in varying degrees and taken into account in 
different ways. In the account of a respondent, who is resolute in condemning 
proceeding with hopeless cases, this motivation plays a prominent role and is 
not limited to his reputation with the court. He emphasises the importance of not 
giving false hope and explaining to the client the often harsh legal reality and 
explains in that regard: ‘I’ve built a good reputation and I want to keep it that 
way. […] What I have to offer is clarity: what are your rights? I won’t take al-
ternative routes, no hopeless applications.’150 In this we see the dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning also seen in a more moderate form in the accounts of one or 
two other respondents who advance the reputational aspect as, at times, decisive 
in their decision not to lodge an appeal in certain cases they consider hopeless, 
for example: 
 
I’ve had cases where clients already said in the interviews something like, ‘I came 
here only because I’m having a dispute with the tax authorities’ or ‘my dad is angry 
at me and that’s why I fled.’ Well, in all decency, there is nothing I can write to the 
court. So I tell them I don’t know what to write down and I won’t do it.151 
 
Apart from the lawyer’s individual reputation with the courts, some respondents 
also mention that lodging appeals in evidently hopeless cases ruins the credibil-
ity and reputation of the larger group making them careful in doing so, e.g.: ‘if 
you take too many as such cases to court, you are ruining it for your colleagues, 
                                                        
150  nl7-s--3-n-m. However, this does not prevent this respondent from, at times, doing so as 
we have seen above. 
151  nl-p2-med-+10-y-m. 
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because judges aren’t really listening and focused anymore, and are like: “here 
we go again…”.’152 This makes it eventually more difficult to obtain results in 
cases in which it really matters and in which one tries to influence policy and 
case law in the interest of their clientele, as these lawyers seek to do (see below). 
For several respondents reputational concerns (e.g. ‘I’m a very proud man. I 
don’t want my name to be associated with a lousy case’153) seem to, at times, 
constitute the outer limit to their adversarial stance, in that they decide not to 
proceed with a case for this reason. For example, in cases in which the client 
keeps changing his story and: ‘It was overtly clear he was lying. To me that is 
no problem, but everyone could see it.’154 Defending such a case in front of a 
judge is a bridge too far. 
For others, or in less extreme situations, considerations related to the law-
yer’s reputation do not affect their decision to proceed with a hopeless case for 
reasons of acting on the client’s wishes/allow the day in court or to stall for the 
client; it thus does not restrict their adversarial stance, or ethics of care consid-
erations outweigh reputational concerns.  
One way respondents advance for resolving this tension is to, nevertheless, 
make a serious effort. As, for example, a respondent states after clarifying her 
decision to instigate a ‘pointless procedure’ on onward appeal (quoted below on 
this matter) because the client really wanted to: ‘But I still try my best, because I 
know they read what I write. I believe the Council of State also keeps track of 
whether you lodged nonsense appeals.’155  
Another way of dealing with this tension advanced by a few respondents is, 
where stalling is the sole reason for proceeding, to decide (as an exception, not 
as a rule) to assist the client in lodging the appeal but not attend the hearing, for 
example: 
 
R: When the client asks me: ‘I would like you to file an appeal’, I am quite easily 
prepared to do so. But I would say: ‘Okay, I’ll file the appeal, but I won’t go to the 
hearing.’ 
I: Okay, and why in that way? 
R: Well, then I am doing it to give people extra time. That is often the reason behind 
it, but when I have nothing to bring forward, I will not stand in front of a judge.156 
 
Also, if the main argument for lodging an appeal is to allow the client his day in 
court, one respondent explains she may – again, only in certain very exceptional 
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circumstances, e.g. in this Dublin Belgium case – decide to solve tension in this 
way: 
 
R: This really went too far. The man had such a strange story. He came from 
[country X] and told me that a lot of people from [country X] live in Belgium and 
therefore he did not want to ask for asylum there, because he was afraid that they 
would do something to him because of his asylum account. In the Netherlands there 
were less people from [country X]. 
I: okay. 
R: And I let the court judge in a written procedure. 
I: On appeal? 
R: Yes, he wanted… I said: ‘Well, I’ll do it, but it doesn’t make any sense. I will not 
go to the hearing, but then you at least heard it.’ Because that’s what he really 
wanted. I am thinking: Well, for me it takes no effort and the man is happy, so...157 
 
Normally, however, this respondent explains that she has no problem in present-
ing cases she considers hopeless to court on appeal, as she is under the impres-
sion that the judges know and understand that lawyers have a certain relation-
ship with their client and accept the lawyer’s role: ‘You have a certain position 
in the game, you just play your part.’  
 
Appealing in certain hopeless cases for the sake of the client seems to be gener-
ally accepted by the professional community, both by members of the peer re-
view committee as well as judges.158 The next accounts illustrate this. A respon-
dent tells about a case in which she really did not want to appeal, because there 
was in her view absolutely nothing to bring forward. Yet, because her client so 
desperately wanted to, she eventually decided to lodge the appeal and, at the last 
moment, to attend the hearing. She recounts that a member of the peer review 
committee attended the hearing without giving notice: 
 
Afterwards, he said: ‘I think it’s very good that you came, because for this client it 
was extremely important.’ And the judge also picked up on that. He said: ‘Well, I do 
understand that you’re here for your client.’[...] He said something like: ‘I ap-
preciate it very much that you came along with your client.’159 
 
The statement of one of the respondents who is also a member of a peer review 
committee supports the idea that appealing in certain hopeless cases for the sake 
of the client is not principally disapproved of. He explains how, if he believes 
that the lawyer under review started a hopeless procedure, this is no reason for 
                                                        
157  nl10-so-+10-y-f. 
158  This is part of the ‘community of practice’ of legal aid lawyers as understood by Mather, 
Maiman & McEwan (2001). 
159  nl14-s--3-y-f.  
PROFESSIONAL DECISION MAKING IN THE DUTCH CONTEXT 
 
91 
 
the committee to take action: ‘It is not our job to say “you shouldn’t have started 
this procedure” or “you shouldn’t have done this or that.” That is not what we 
are for, our job is to assess the quality of the lawyer’s work.’ 
Another respondent explains in relation to judges: 
 
I kind of assume that the judge also knows that you can’t choose your client as a 
lawyer and you also can’t change the facts of the case. And, yes, in fact sometimes 
someone wants to appeal and he needs a lawyer for that and then ends up with me. 
And I also have the impression that… Sometimes the court asks a question and 
you’re beating around the bush so as not to say something negative which you know 
the court is alluding to. Some judges leave it at that. And I actually think that, at that 
moment, all of us know – me, the IND and the judge – what is going on.160 
 
While pointing out that they are concerned about their reputation with the 
judges, some explain having found ways to make clear that they are aware of the 
situation and the chances of success, e.g. by stating that: ‘My client says that…’. 
A respondent explains that on two occasions the judge made clear to him that he 
could not do anything with the case brought before him. He describes how he 
resolved this and why he did not feel criticised by the judge: 
  
R: […] at that point I told the judge that what he said to me, I also told the client. 
Then the whole atmosphere changed. 
I: Really? What happened? 
R: The judge said: ‘Well, that’s clear then, now you should look for other ways, but 
I can’t help you.’ 
I: The judge didn’t mind that you were there with that case? 
R: No, I had the impression that the judge appreciated me being honest about it.161 
 
It follows from these quotes that lawyers have the impression that judges actu-
ally accept the lawyer’s role and understand the position lawyers are in. The 
statements of an interviewed district court judge seem to support these lawyers’ 
views. The judge tells that she often sees when lawyers believe in a case and 
when they do not. For example, when they say ‘according to the client…’. 
While the judge questions the efficacy of proceeding in some cases because of 
the marginal review possibilities of the court, she explains: ‘As a judge you 
don’t show it when you believe a lawyer is defending a hopeless case. You can 
believe this is the case, but it is not up to the judge to comment on it.’ 162 
                                                        
160  nl17-med--3-n-f. 
161  nl6-so-+10-n-m. This particular example concerned a regular immigration procedure, 
but, as pointed out earlier, asylum and immigration are closely related and respondents 
also refer to experiences with authorities in this regard in the same breath. 
162  nl[I] District court judge. Here there does seem to be a difference between the initial 
appeal stage (district court judges) and the onward appeal stage (Council of State judges). 
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A Responsibility for Public Money? 
Compared to considerations relating to the client’s interest seen in the motives 
of ensuring the client’s day in court and stalling, there is much less mention of 
the public interest in respondents’ accounts – apart from the third central motive 
distinguished, i.e. challenging the applicable legal framework which shows a 
more progressive interpretation of what the public interest in the administration 
of justice entails (see the next paragraph). The public interest as interpreted in a 
dutiful lawyer sense (i.e. conservatively, with a focus on the lawyer being a 
trustee of the legal system, facilitating the public administration of justice in line 
with the applicable legal framework) is less present in respondents’ accounts 
and, as we have seen in some of the examples and will see more clearly below, 
this line of reasoning may be outweighed by other considerations. In asylum 
cases, lawyers are funded by public money in order to facilitate the administra-
tion of justice and whether and how respondents take this aspect into considera-
tion further shows how the obligation to the public is interpreted and weighed 
against the other interests at stake. Most respondents do not bring this aspect 
forward as something they take into consideration when deciding whether to 
proceed with cases or, when it is referred to as a relevant aspect, it ultimately 
does not seem to affect how they fulfil their role, which is often in an adversarial 
way. When explicitly asked about it, a few respondents are very clear about it 
not being relevant: 
 
I: Do you believe that lawyers have a certain public responsibility? Of course you 
are concerned with the client’s interest, on the other hand, you are paid through 
government funding. You receive legal aid fees for stalling clients’ departure. Has a 
lawyer a certain public responsibility in that respect? Do you take that into 
consideration? 
R: That I am being paid through government funding? My consideration ends with 
the client’s interests. 
I: That is leading? 
R: Yes. Look, if I would get paid per hour, I would probably look further than the 
client’s interest alone. 
I: Because that would cost more per hour…? 
R: The societal costs of the procedure, I would take those into consideration if I 
would be able to claim hourly fees. But since I receive this meagre legal aid fee, it is 
utterly marginal and not relevant to take that into consideration.163 
 
Another respondent states on whether there is a public responsibility for the 
lawyer in this respect: 
                                                        
The latter expressed greater discontent about lawyers starting hopeless cases as, for ex-
ample, the quote above (‘I believe Council of State also keeps track of whether you 
lodged nonsense appeals’) suggests. 
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No. […] Obviously, I am a taxpaying citizen myself. I mean, I don’t have my eyes 
and ears shut. However, as a lawyer I choose to work for my client even though I 
may put the government to great expenses.164 
 
Several others do refer to the public money aspect as being relevant, but it does 
not actually seem to affect how they fulfil their role. Two examples illustrate 
this. One respondent explains that he is of the view that lawyers have a public 
responsibility when they are dealing with government funds; when a lawyer is 
asking for money from the government, this must be justified: ‘You can only 
say: I want funding because I believe this client can make it or has a legitimate 
interest.’165 Again, and we have seen this above, this ‘legitimate interest’ can lie 
beyond the actual chances of legal success in the Netherlands. Another respon-
dent refers to the public money aspect in relation to deciding whether to proceed 
with a hopeless case on onward appeal: 
 
[…] The thing is, if people have elements they can absolutely not prove, you’ll lose; 
when there are no documents and they have no other way to prove what has 
happened to them – and there are many of those – well, then the case is so obviously 
hopeless before the Council of State, that I get kind of an abuse-of-the-law-feeling if 
I were to appeal… because I do, of course, make money out of it. 166 
 
However, he later continues – reaffirming his adversarial stance – that even in 
such cases he proceeds on onward appeal if the client insists on doing so. 
 
One respondent did explicitly, of his own accord, advance the public money 
aspect as being an argument for actually deciding not to assist clients in cases he 
considers hopeless. When referring to a situation where a client wanted him to 
stall the (immigration) procedure by lodging an objection, he explains: 
 
R: If he would pay for it himself and he would sign a document to that end, I would 
do it. You know why? He is paying for it himself and not through government funds. 
I: Is that important to you? 
R: Yes, absolutely. All the elements are interconnected and taking them together you 
can say I will do it or I won’t. And one of the elements is finances, who is paying for 
it.167 
 
This respondent has been quoted above in stating that he is principally against 
pursuing cases he considers hopeless, but may in certain very exceptional cir-
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cumstances nevertheless do so for humanitarian reasons. He clarifies how he 
considers and weighs the different elements: 
 
Look, if I were to appeal in a Dublin-Germany or Dublin-Belgium case, I would 
obtain the legal aid fee, but that’s not the point. You can do it incidentally when it 
concerns a really distressing case, but not regularly. As a lawyer you swore not to 
take on cases which are in advance hopeless. It is difficult, there are many aspects 
you need to look at. Sometimes you make a good decision and sometimes a less good 
one. 
 
Finally, another respondent who argues that the public money involved in pro-
cedures should be a factor of relevance when deciding whether to continue with 
a case, explains that it is difficult to actually act according to his own belief: 
‘market’ considerations may outweigh his principled view in this regard. He 
points to the amount of public money spent on procedures and in response to the 
question whether he believes that the lawyer has a responsibility in that regard, 
he declares:  
 
Pfff, yes. Yes, actually I do, but then… At the same time, it is really difficult to 
believe that… Because that might entail that you have to shut down your own 
practice. If you are really truly honest, you would maybe continue with only a few 
people.168 
 
Here we see how the issue of the hopeless case may cause a morality versus 
market tension within the institutional context in which asylum legal aid lawyers 
operate. Before further addressing this tension and the role of the lawyer’s inter-
est in profit or survival in respondents’ decision making, I will turn to the third 
central motivation distinguished in respondents’ accounts for starting hopeless 
procedures. 
Challenging the Applicable Legal Framework 
A final central motivation that can be distilled from respondents’ accounts for 
proceeding with certain ‘hopeless cases’ is disagreement with the applicable 
legal framework for determining asylum applications. It thus concerns cases that 
may be considered hopeless in view of the way policy and case law stand at a 
particular moment in time, but which they consider wrong and in need of modi-
fication: the case may be prospectless, but not pointless. Respondents refer in 
this regard in particular to the way in which credibility is assessed (‘this ridicu-
lous system of assessing an asylum account’).169 For example, if an applicant is 
not able to produce all the travel, identity or other documents necessary for the 
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assessment of the application (i.e. to substantiate the travel route as declared), 
one single contradiction in the applicant’s account may be sufficient to reject the 
application on credibility grounds.170 Moreover, on appeal the IND’s assessment 
concerning the credibility of the flight narrative is only marginally reviewed by 
the court, which means that cases are often not actually determined on the 
facts.171 This quote is illustrative of the disagreement expressed on this issue 
amongst respondents: 
 
In view of current case law and how this all works in the Netherlands it is indeed, at 
this moment in time, legally correct. Do I believe it should be different? Yes. So that 
is my motive. I believed that legally it should be different and I do not agree with the 
way arguments are being weighed. It is kind of fighting a losing battle, but then I’m 
like: we should just collectively continue doing this until the Council of State 
changes its mind, because if we all accept that things go the way they go, it will 
never change. So it’s a kind of protest... 172 
 
Also, the matter of a failing European asylum system – more in particular, the 
Dublin regulation which determines the member state responsible for the exami-
nation of the asylum claim and presumes that member states comply with Euro-
pean asylum legislation – is advanced as a reason to appeal in an apparently 
hopeless case: 
 
I know there are lawyers who don’t appeal in Dublin claims. But remember that 
young man who was in Belgium eight times, then I think you have something to say. 
He went to Switzerland and Norway and was continually claimed back to Belgium. 
In no time he’ll get another rejection and no reception, but apparently he can also 
not return to [country X], because Belgium doesn’t expel him. So he has become a 
‘refugee in orbit’. And by sending him back to Belgium, he’ll be on the street again. 
Belgium is apparently not complying with the Qualification-, Reception- and 
Procedures directives, so you can’t just assume the principle of interstate trust.173 
 
Lawyers’ disagreement with policy as it stands also motivates them to run cases 
that are hopeless in national procedures in order to eventually end up in the 
ECtHR. As this respondent explains: 
                                                        
170  Article 31(2) (f) Aliens Act. See Doornbos et al. (2012), p. 95 ff. for an elaborate discus-
sion on this topic. 
171  This doctrine, introduced by the case law of the Council of State and applicable at the 
time of the interviews (see section 3.3.1), implies that when assessing the credibility of 
the flight narrative, as far as the facts in the past are concerned, the yardstick is not the 
opinions of the judge, but the question of whether there is a reason to rule that the admin-
istration could not reasonably have come to its finding on the credibility of the flight nar-
rative. Baldinger (2013), p. 4. 
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I can imagine the situation in which I think: I will appeal and file an onward appeal 
in order to end up with the European Court, because I do not agree with this 
particular policy. You act against the Council of State’s established policy and case 
law. If you do that, the first response of many people is ‘pointless, prospectless, just 
for the money, the legal aid fee’. But the lawyer’s motivation can be: I need to run 
through all the procedures in order to arrive at the European Court, where I, in ten 
years’ time, will be proven right. That justifies running through all the procedural 
steps in the Netherlands.174 
 
In certain circumstances the stalling strategy may be employed to this end, but 
rather than merely helping an individual client, an important driving force is also 
the will to generate improvement for a larger group through changing the law or 
the way it is applied. This entails continuously proceeding in certain situations 
and is what a respondent calls a form of providing ‘structural legal aid’.175 This 
is often done in Dublin cases concerning countries in which the situation for 
asylum seekers is believed to be precarious – he explains: ‘Even though I know 
what the court thinks about the situation in Poland, I do think that the situation 
in Poland is unacceptable so we need to raise our voice.’ Several respondents 
recount how they brief one another about developments and strategies, and how 
this practice of, what can be considered, strategic litigation may lead to positive 
results. The infamous Dublin-Greece case176 is an example lawyers often refer to 
as showing that it actually helps to continue with such cases: ‘Finally, we were 
proven right by the ECtHR. At that time we had twelve procedures running with 
the ECtHR. The sole fact that the claim is rejected by the national court doesn’t 
mean that you shouldn’t persist.’177  
These respondents explicitly express the view that it is the task of the legal 
profession ‘to be critical towards the government.’178 Lawyers are supposed to 
question rules and policy and if they feel that the law is unjust, they should seek 
to change it as the lawyer is obliged to do justice. The next quote neatly illus-
trates this view: 
 
It’s like hitting the door with a hammer till it breaks down. Nowadays we have to 
proceed until Strasbourg [ECtHR] before things change. The government with its 
new tough attitude keeps the door closed and thinks we should accept it all like that. 
We can only ponder on the application of policy: ‘He is actually a Christian and he 
isn’t.’ But we don’t have to start about the fundamentals of policy changes. Rather 
not. ‘We as a government are doing such a great job.’ And that is really...we as 
lawyers are not going to accept that; we continue hammering. […]. It’s just politics. 
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We are not able to change that. The only thing we can do is continue with these 
kinds of cases.179 
 
These quotes show the moral activist line of reasoning seen amongst respon-
dents: the view that the legal system may need to be changed to become more 
just and that they as lawyers have a responsibility in effecting this change. This 
includes continuously testing the limits of the law or even challenging it by pro-
ceeding with cases that in view of the state of affairs at a certain moment in time 
may be hopeless, but lead to outcomes which they are convinced are unjust. The 
term ‘unjust’ is used in several ways and seems to work on different levels: the 
way in which the asylum claim is assessed can be considered principally unjust 
in itself (irrespective of the outcome), but the final outcome can also be consid-
ered unjust. As regards the latter, the term unjust is used in the sense of not be-
ing in line with the actual European or international framework on asylum law, 
as well as in the sense of not being fair based on one’s personal interpretation of 
the general idea behind the asylum project. 
Even though one might argue that these utterances can be seen as yet an-
other indication of favouring the client’s interest over the public interest – i.e. in 
asylum cases challenging the applicable legal framework is in the interest of 
asylum seekers collectively and may often (but not necessarily, as we will see 
below) be in line with the individual client’s interest who may want to try every 
possible legal option, including bringing an application to the European Court of 
Human Rights – I understand them as moral activism and thus as a progressive 
interpretation of the lawyers’ obligation to the public: acting in the public ad-
ministration of justice is not restricted to what the applicable legal framework 
prescribes. We have seen that it has also been phrased as such. Also, one might 
argue quite the opposite, namely that it constitutes dutiful lawyering in the sub-
stantivist sense: as a trustee of the legal system, the lawyer has to pursue justice 
in line with the spirit and purpose of the law. Depending on how this is inter-
preted, lawyers may be of the view that the national rules are not in line with the 
spirit and purpose of international treaties or EU legislation which they are sup-
posed to implement or be in accordance with. However, dutiful lawyering in-
volves finding oneself constrained by public limits, rather than stimulated to 
effect change in order to make the system more in line with the spirit and pur-
pose of the law. It requires acting as a gatekeeper of the law against the client in 
cases that are hopeless in view of the present state of the law and this does not 
resemble the attitudes seen in these accounts.  
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Concurrence of and Conflicting Motivations  
When narrating their decisions in respect of ‘hopeless cases’, all respondents 
mention at least one of these three different central motivations discussed (cli-
ent’s day in court, stalling and challenging the applicable legal framework) and 
several mention two or all three types of motivations: depending on the situa-
tion, different types of arguments apply. There may, however, be tension be-
tween the different types of considerations, since whereas the first two consid-
erations (day in court and stalling) are, generally, considerations prioritising the 
individual client’s interest, the latter (challenging the applicable legal frame-
work) essentially prioritises the public interest in the administration of justice. 
Even though in asylum cases the interest of the individual client and the interest 
of asylum seekers collectively in a legal system that produces just outcomes may 
often overlap, this is not always the case. There may be tension between what is 
in the interest of the individual client and what is in the interest of asylum seek-
ers collectively/of justice. For example, some respondents argue, as we have 
seen above, that lodging appeals in evidently hopeless cases (which may benefit 
an individual client) ruins the credibility and reputation of lawyers as a group.180 
This makes them more careful in doing so as this eventually makes it more diffi-
cult to obtain results in cases in which it really matters and in which one tries to 
influence policy and case law in the interest of asylum seekers collectively, 
which they deem in the interest of justice in these cases. 
An opposite example, concerns the decision whether to proceed with a case 
to the ECtHR, in relation to which respondents point to the practical disadvan-
tages of this procedure for the client: the procedure can take a very long time 
and during that period the client is not eligible for reception and can be ex-
pelled.181 The client must thus be willing and able to hold out for a long time. 
Many respondents provide this as a reason for being reticent and look for alter-
native possibilities, including issuing a subsequent application or investigating 
other grounds for legal stay, for example, on regular grounds (family life, medi-
cal reasons) and may thus let the interest of the individual client outweigh the 
collective interest in having a certain policy challenged. Also, some respondents 
refer in respect of this matter to the related inconvenience for the lawyer: be-
cause of the duration of the procedure, there is the risk of losing sight of the 
client or, on the contrary, being left with an impatient and unsatisfied client. 
Moreover, the preparation may take a lot of time (partly because of inexperience 
with these types of procedures) relative to the fee one receives; it conflicts with 
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the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival and one may thus not be able to afford 
this on a regular basis. This brings me to the final motive. 
The Lawyer’s Interest in Profit or Survival within the Institutional Context 
In addition to the motives discussed pertaining to the client’s interest and the 
public interest in the administration of justice (in the wide or progressive sense), 
the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival is a consideration that is brought for-
ward in relation to the decision whether to proceed with a case. Whereas several 
respondents explicitly reject the idea that they might let themselves be guided by 
economic motives, some candidly say considerations of a financial nature are 
taken into account when deciding whether to proceed with cases, also with cer-
tain cases they consider hopeless. As we have also seen above, many respon-
dents emphasise that it might be very difficult for the lawyer to decide not to 
proceed with a case partly because clients can be very demanding and some 
have strong feelings about wanting to continue. Moreover, some point out that 
the wish to keep the client happy and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival 
are often two sides of the same coin: 
 
[…] When I come to think of it, I did at one point lodge an onward appeal because 
he insisted on it. While I said ‘there is no point, you can’t stay in the reception 
centre’ he still wanted it and I eventually did it. That might have been a pointless 
procedure. Then you think ‘well, I will get a number of points for it.’182 
 
I do regularly file onward appeals, but that’s often also because evidence is on its 
way, either for a new procedure or… Often there is a reason why you think: ‘Yes, I 
will write it for these people.’ Then they have time to… And then you often have a 
new procedure or something medical or almost always something comes up which 
makes that you… Well, I also have to think about my practice of course. And the 
client’s trust. If I were to say to everyone: ‘No, I won’t do that.’ Well, then everyone 
will think: ‘She doesn’t do anything.’183 
 
The respondent last quoted speaks in this regard about ‘customer loyalty’ which 
is important for keeping her practice running. She further recounts that she only 
once decided not to go through with a case on appeal: ‘Because… partly for 
financial reasons, but also because clients just want to and because I believe you 
can’t hand over a case responsibly in the short time.’ Likewise, another respon-
dent who explains that she resorts to stalling if this is what the clients wants, 
further elucidates this decision by stating: ‘In fact it’s commercial; we keep our 
client.’184 Here we thus see that some of the arguments discussed above indicat-
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ing an adversarial stance (i.e. acting on the client’s instructions and in the cli-
ent’s interest) are used in the same breath as the economic argument: morality 
and market considerations are in line.  
Other respondents refer to the economic situation they are in – the low in-
flux of asylum seekers at the time of the interviews, meaning less income and 
more competition for cases – as affecting their decision to proceed in certain 
cases they consider hopeless; it makes them more willing to proceed if the client 
wants to. For example, one respondent recounts that he used to take the ap-
proach of lodging a pro forma appeal and telling the client to look for another 
lawyer in certain cases he considered hopeless, but does not do this anymore; 
partly because the short time limits make it difficult to hand over a case in an 
adequate way, but also because:  
 
At some point you just choose the easy road. When I say I do not want to lodge an 
appeal, because the client doesn’t stand a chance, but he nevertheless wants to and 
you know that he will go to another lawyer who will then lodge an appeal, then I am 
also more inclined to decide to file the appeal.185 
 
Another respondent is even more explicit in this regard. Even though she has 
been quoted before in expressing the view that ‘if people don’t meet the criteria 
[...] They just have to go back’ she explains – making a distinction between the 
situation a few years ago, when there was a higher influx of asylum seekers, and 
the current situation – she now proceeds with cases she considers hopeless, if the 
client wants to: 
 
R: I once had a Dublin-Germany case and said I was not going to appeal. That was 
in my glory days, 2011. If I would get such a case now, I’m not sure whether I would 
say ‘no, I won’t do it’. Simply because, financially, I’m not that well off now. I mean, 
I need to keep the pot boiling. That’s also a consideration. You’re also more likely 
to lodge an onward appeal.  
I: An onward appeal? 
R: Yes, that’s purely because the number of cases is dropping. There is just much 
less work and therefore you’re more likely to do that, of course. 
I: So, compared to 2011, you look at this differently? 
R: Yes, I am more likely to proceed. At that time, I would say: the case has no 
chance of success, so I won’t do it. But now I would. 
I: You tell the client that? 
R: Yes, I say that the case will most likely not succeed. 
I: Then they say they still want to pursue it? 
R: Yes, if they insist, I will do it.186 
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We see that in addition to the considerations relating to the client’s interest, the 
lawyer’s financial interest is taken into account and that within the (current) 
situation in the legal aid system these often coincide: the client wants to try 
every possibility and the lawyer receives a legal aid fee when assisting the client 
to that end. In many instances, the moral line of reasoning respondents adopt is 
in line with their interest in profit or survival: adversarial advocacy – by itself or 
in combination with relational lawyering – in asylum cases often leads one to 
proceed with cases, including cases one may consider hopeless. In a few in-
stances, we see this is different: the market aspect challenges one’s morality, in 
particular, dutiful lawyering (e.g. no willingness to start hopeless procedures, 
but doing so allows for sustaining one’s asylum legal aid practice) – but also 
moral activism (e.g. challenging the law by preparing procedures with the 
ECtHR which take more time than legal aid funding covers) – and may, at times, 
outweigh it. 
3.6  Conclusion on Professional Decision Making in the Dutch Context 
In this chapter I examined the professional decision making of asylum legal aid 
lawyers operating within the Dutch context. After having described both the 
professional and institutional context in which asylum legal aid lawyers operate, 
I discussed the running of a legal aid practice within this context and the moral-
ity vs market pressures with which it presents lawyers. We have seen that the 
Dutch institutional context poses a morality versus market tension for asylum 
legal aid lawyers in two ways. First, lawyers receive the same fee regardless of 
the time spent on a case; spending more time (in order to provide high quality 
legal work) thus negatively impacts the lawyer’s income. The strict asylum re-
gime with its short time limits and the relative lack of control over the types of 
cases lawyers take on further complicates this matter. In respondents’ accounts 
we see different ways of balancing their interest in profit or survival against 
their obligations to the client and the public to provide legal assistance and rep-
resentation that result in well-prepared applications. Whereas some respondents 
seem to accept the system as a given and aim to do their work within the 
boundaries set, others express having trouble fitting into the regime and refuse 
to make concessions as regards the content of their work. This may lead them to 
sign up for fewer cases, drop cases if they believe they cannot assist clients well 
due to time constraints or work more hours than paid for, thereby deciding to 
bear the consequences financially. A second tension to which respondents allude 
lies in the financial advantages associated with proceeding with cases. Even 
though one may be of the view that lodging an appeal or starting another proce-
dure will not lead to legal success, it does allow for obtaining additional legal 
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aid fees at a time when the influx of cases is low and, consequently, competition 
for clients high.187 
Against this background I analysed lawyers’ decision making in respect of 
‘hopeless cases’. From the way in which respondents explain how they perceive 
and deal with ‘hopeless cases’ we can observe the following about how lawyers 
balance and interpret their obligations to the client and the public, why they do 
so and how this relates to the third interest lawyers have to consider (the law-
yer’s interest in profit or survival). We have seen that the actual decisions law-
yers make in concrete cases ultimately depend on the particular circumstances of 
the case, the client, the stage of the procedure and the practical circumstances 
related to different types of procedures. Overall, however, we have seen a strong 
focus on the client’s interest in respondents’ decision making. Virtually all re-
spondents explain that they are willing to and/or tell of situations in which they 
assist clients in pursuing certain, what can be termed, hopeless procedures – i.e. 
an application or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of 
obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close 
to) zero. When explaining their decisions respondents advance a range of argu-
ments showing different lines of moral reasoning, how ‘market’ considerations 
are at play as well as how the institutional – and professional – context within 
which they operate play a role in their decision making.  
The decision to start a hopeless procedure in certain circumstances is, above 
all, justified with reference to it being in the interest of the client and/or of jus-
tice: the case is (as stated explicitly by some) prospectless, not pointless. The 
client’s day in court argument as well as the stalling strategy are often advanced 
in relation to the decision to start certain such procedures. Also, we have seen 
that the slightest ambiguity in the law or the chances of success is typically re-
solved in favour of the client. Respondents further motivate their focus on the 
client with a combination of arguments, including: the particularities of the asy-
lum seeking clients, i.e. they can be vulnerable, the stakes are high and there is 
great dependence on the lawyer to realise their rights and secure their interests; 
the fact that the lawyer is appointed to be the client’s representative to this end 
in a procedure that is characterised by its short time limits; the ambiguous nature 
of asylum law, both on a legal and a factual level, and its interconnectedness 
with immigration law which make it difficult to determine when a client’s case 
is actually truly hopeless (i.e. when there is actually no chance whatsoever of a 
right to legal stay in the Netherlands); and that the asylum determination process 
is or can be random. In the arguments we see both lines of reasoning that fore-
ground the lawyer’s obligation to the client (adversarial advocacy and relational 
lawyering).  
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In addition, we have seen respondents explain their decision to complete the 
first instance asylum procedure before the IND and, after a rejection, assist the 
client in lodging an appeal in certain ‘hopeless cases’ by pointing to the role 
they are given in the asylum process. Even though the assistance of clients in 
such cases may seem an indication of – as it is often described – prioritising the 
client’s interest over the public interest, it can also be seen as acting in the public 
interest in the administration of justice and this is also mentioned at times. In 
acting as what some call a ‘procesbegeleider’ (the one who guides the asylum 
seeker through the asylum process) also in cases one considers hopeless the 
lawyer serves the public interest in the administration of justice.188 The rationale 
– which can be traced back to the Best Practice Guide in Asylum Cases – seems 
to be that someone who has applied for asylum has a right to legal representa-
tion, at a minimum in the general asylum procedure at first instance, and if the 
lawyer does not want to assist the client on appeal, the client must be given the 
opportunity to obtain a second opinion. While referring to the possibility of 
disciplinary measures, we have seen a few respondents explain that they may, at 
times, feel obliged due to the short time limits to lodge a (pro forma) appeal in 
cases they consider hopeless. When acting in what can be considered an adver-
sarial way, both the adversarial advocate and the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning 
are used to explain this decision; here we see how the institutional and profes-
sional context shape the balancing act. 
We have also seen that the decision to start certain hopeless procedures is 
regularly explained with reference to disagreement with the applicable legal 
framework and the wish to challenge it. Respondents critique the way in which 
the asylum system functions; they question the fairness of the procedures and 
whether these lead to just outcomes. For example, the way in which asylum 
claims are assessed by the immigration authority (credibility assessment) and by 
the courts (marginal review) or the presumptions underlying the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System (e.g. asylum procedures having equivalent standards 
across the EU) that legitimise sending asylum seekers back to the European 
country in which they first arrived in order to have their claim dealt with there. 
Respondents point out that procedures challenging such rules and policies may 
initially seem pointless, but that there are examples of such cases that eventually 
did succeed. This might be seen as yet another indication of favouring the cli-
ent’s interest over the public interest – i.e. in asylum cases challenging the ap-
plicable legal framework may often be in line with the interest of the client who 
may want to try every possible legal option, including bringing an application to 
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the European Court of Human Rights, in order to have his or her claim ac-
cepted189 – and it is often described as such. However, and this also resonates in 
several accounts, it can also be seen as acting in the public interest in the ad-
ministration of justice, not in the narrow, but in the wide sense. It shows a more 
progressive interpretation of the lawyer’s obligation to the public (the moral 
activist line of reasoning): the lawyer is obliged to do justice and this is not nec-
essarily confined by the idea of justice inherent in the (national) legal system; 
one must use legal practice to change institutions and the law to make them 
more substantively just.  
Finally, we have seen that several respondents explain their decision to start 
a hopeless procedure by using the adversarial advocate and/or relational lawyer 
line of reasoning while mentioning, in the same breath, the financial advantages 
of doing so. Within the way the legal aid system is set up and lawyers are remu-
nerated – i.e. they receive a fixed fee per stage of the procedure and there are no 
direct financial implications to starting procedures that will not succeed – the 
client’s interest and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival often coincide: the 
client may want to try every possibility to have his or her claim accepted and the 
lawyer receives the legal aid fee when assisting the client to that end. In many 
instances, we thus see that the moral line of reasoning respondents adopt is in 
line with their interest in profit or survival. Some respondents talk about how 
they are struggling, e.g. not wanting to pursue cases they consider hopeless, in 
part because these procedures are funded by public money (uttering the dutiful 
lawyer line of reasoning) and how their interest in profit or survival may weigh 
in when making these decisions. The competition for clients, partly due to the 
low influx of asylum seekers at the time of the interviews, is mentioned in this 
regard and the need to sustain one’s (legal aid) practice means that they might 
let the client’s interest (or wishes) prevail over the public interest. So, in a few 
instances, we see that the market aspect challenges one’s morality, in particular, 
dutiful lawyering (e.g. no willingness to start hopeless procedures, but doing so 
allows for sustaining one’s asylum legal aid practice) – but also moral activism 
(e.g. challenging the law by preparing procedures with the ECtHR which take 
more time than legal aid funding covers) – and may, at times, outweigh it.  
                                                        
189  However, we have seen that this may not always be in the client’s interest as these pro-
cedures may take very long during which time the client may no longer be eligible for re-
ception and the chances of success are uncertain. 
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4 Professional Decision Making in the English 
Context 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making 
within the English context. It consists of two main parts followed by a conclu-
sion. The first part describes the context in which asylum legal aid lawyers in 
England operate and the second part examines their professional decision mak-
ing within this context. The first part consists of an overview of the professional 
context (section 2) as well as the institutional context – i.e. the asylum and legal 
aid system – (section 3) in which asylum legal aid lawyers under review, i.e. 
solicitors, operate. In the second part, I discuss the running of a legal aid prac-
tice within this context and the morality versus market pressures with which it 
presents lawyers, thereby specifically addressing the firm context (section 4). 
Against this background, I subsequently, analyse their decision making in re-
spect of ‘hopeless cases’ (section 5). In the final section I will present my con-
clusions (section 6).  
4.2  The Professional Context1 
4.2.1  Legal Professionals in the Field of Migration Law 
The legal profession in England and Wales is made up of many different actors.2 
In order to practise in immigration law and thus in asylum cases one needs to 
qualify as a solicitor, a barrister, a member of the Chartered Institute of Legal 
Executives, or act for and under the supervision of any of the above, or be regis-
tered with the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner (OISC).3 All 
these different practitioners are part of their own professional associations and 
subject to the accompanying independent regulatory bodies. The first three are 
so-called ‘qualified regulators’ and as such subject to the supervision of the 
Legal Services Board as oversight regulator (see table below). 
                                                        
1  In this chapter the law and policy is described as it stands in the period during which the 
bulk of the fieldwork for the English case study took place, which was from September 
to November 2014. 
2  This can mainly be ascribed to the introduction of the Legal Services Act 2007, which 
aimed to liberalise and regulate the market for legal services in England and Wales to en-
courage more competition and promote the interest of consumers. 
3  Section 84 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. 
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Professional Organisation of Immigration Practitioners 
Immigration 
Practitioner 
Solicitor Barrister Legal Executive OISC Legal 
Advisor 
Professional 
Association 
The Law Soci-
ety 
The Bar Coun-
cil 
Chartered Insti-
tute of Legal 
Executives 
 
Regulatory 
Body 
Solicitors Regu-
lation Authority 
Bar Standards 
Board 
ILEx Profes-
sional Standards 
Limited 
Office of the 
Immigration 
Services 
Commissioner 
Oversight Regulation of Immigration Advice and 
Services: 
Legal Services Board 
 
These different actors are also players in the market of publicly funded legal 
services in asylum cases.  
The traditional division between solicitors and barristers is that solicitors are 
primarily litigators and barristers are specialist advocates representing clients in 
the (higher) courts. Solicitors do all the initial work and communication with the 
client and may represent the client in the lower courts (tribunals). When neces-
sary, they may instruct a barrister to advise on the law or represent the client on 
their behalf. Solicitors share advocacy rights in the lower courts (including the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunals) with barristers, but only barristers have 
advocacy rights in the higher courts.4 In the following I will focus on the legal 
professionals that are the object of this study: solicitors. 
4.2.2  Professional Organisation of Solicitors 
The Solicitors Act 1974 as amended governs the regulation and responsibilities 
of practising solicitors and the firms for which they work. Following the Legal 
Services Act 2007, representation and regulation of solicitors had to be split and 
this resulted in two separate bodies: The Law Society (TLS) and the Solicitors 
Regulation Authority (SRA). TLS is the professional organisation representing 
solicitors in England and Wales. It is governed by its Council which is made up 
of solicitors. The SRA is the officially approved regulator of solicitors. It oper-
ates completely independently of TLS. The SRA Board consists of both solici-
tors and lay people. In addition, there is the Legal Services Board (LSB), which 
operates as an oversight regulator independent from government and from the 
                                                        
4  Solicitors are now granted the possibility to obtain higher rights of audience, i.e. become 
solicitor advocates. 
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legal profession.5 It also oversees the Office for Legal Complaints – with its 
Legal Ombudsman – which has been established to handle consumer complaints 
about lawyers. 
In order to qualify as a solicitor, one must have obtained a law degree or an-
other degree followed by a postgraduate law conversion course leading to the 
Common Professional Examination or the Graduate Diploma in Law. Subse-
quently, a vocational stage of training, the Legal Practice Course needs to be 
done. Finally, one must complete a two-year training contract in a solicitors’ 
firm. All qualified practising solicitors must have a practising certificate issued 
by the SRA which must be renewed annually. One of the requirements for ob-
taining and renewing the practising certificate is complying with the continuing 
education requirement. The SRA Handbook stipulates the requirements regard-
ing professional education for solicitors (continuous professional development - 
CPD).6  
4.2.3  The Solicitor’s Task and the Profession’s Core Principles 
In common law systems, with at their core the adversarial trial, there is a set of 
obligations that can be characterised as the ‘standard conception’ of the lawyer’s 
role.7 This standard conception has been mainly developed in the US and is 
based on core principles of partisanship, neutrality and non-accountability.8 The 
current codes of conduct for English lawyers, however, suggest that only an 
attenuated version of the standard conception operates in England and Wales.9 
Rather than portraying the ideal image of the standard conception, the wider 
duties of lawyers are emphasised. The importance of these wider duties have 
                                                        
5  Established by the Legal Services Act 2007, Part 2. The LSB is chaired by a lay person 
and consists of both lay and non-lay members. The LSB’s oversight role includes, among 
other things, that if the SRA wants to alter their internal professional regulatory arrange-
ments approval must be obtained from the LSB. 
6  The basic CPD requirement is that those working full time in legal practice must follow 
16 hours of CPD per CPD year. In addition, there are special requirements for new solici-
tors during the first months after admission and also after the first three years after ad-
mission. The latter consists of a management course. 
Section (d) Authorisation and Practising Requirements, (vi) SRA Training Regulations: 
(B) 2011 Part 3 – CPD Regulations, SRA, SRA Handbook, Birmingham: SRA 2014 (ver-
sion 10 published on 10 July 2014). 
7  See e.g. Parker (2004), p. 57; Boon & Levin (2008), p. 12-15; Boon (2014), p. 23.This 
paragraph is largely based on Boon (2014), p. 23 ff. 
8  See Parker’s description of adversarial advocacy (2004, p. 57 ff.). Boon also explicitly 
discusses the principle of neutrality as part of the standard conception. It requires that 
lawyers present cases on behalf of unpopular causes or cases they disagree with morally. 
It entails, first, the duty not to select between clients on moral grounds, and, second, that 
lawyers are emotionally detached from their client’s purposes. Boon (2014), p. 23-24. 
9  Boon (2014), p. 28-30. 
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been reinforced by the Legal Services Act 2007 which specifies professional 
principles requiring any person appearing before a court or conducting litigation 
to act ‘with independence in the interests of justice’.10 The code of conduct for 
solicitors is part of the SRA Handbook.11 All those subject to the regulation of 
the SRA must comply with the SRA Handbook. The first two sections of the 
Handbook are made up of the principles (i.e. ten mandatory principles which 
underpin all of the Handbook requirements) and the SRA Code of Conduct.12 
The principles are legally binding and define the fundamental ethical and pro-
fessional standards applicable to all those who are regulated by the SRA (i.e. 
firms and individuals, including non-solicitors). These principles are:13 
 
1. uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice; 
2. act with integrity; 
3. not allow your independence to be compromised; 
4. act in the best interests of each client; 
5. provide a proper standard of service to your clients; 
6. behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the 
provision of legal services; 
7. comply with your legal and regulatory obligations and deal with your 
regulators and ombudsmen in an open, timely and co-operative manner; 
8. run your business or carry out your role in the business effectively and in 
accordance with proper governance and sound financial and risk management 
principles; 
9. run your business or carry out your role in the business in a way that 
encourages equality of opportunity and respect for diversity; and 
10. protect client money and assets. 
 
The ideas underlying the standard conception cannot directly be distilled from 
these principles; we see quite the opposite, a great emphasis is placed on the 
lawyer’s responsibilities in serving the public interest. 
As regards partisanship the SRA Handbook presents a weak version of it. 
Principle 4 speaks about acting in client’s best interests, but this must be under-
stood as ‘acting in accordance with what they perceive to be the client’s best 
interests’.14 There is thus no particular commitment to promoting client auton-
omy as the principle of partisanship requires. On the contrary, the Handbook 
prescribes an overriding duty to the proper administration of justice. The notes 
to the principles state that: ‘Where two or more principles come into conflict, the 
                                                        
10  LSA Section 1 (3)(d). Boon (2014), p. 30. 
11  SRA Handbook (version 10 published on 10 July 2014). 
12  The other sections are: Accounts Rules; Authorisation and Practising Requirements; 
Client Protection; Discipline and Costs recovery, Overseas Rules; and Specialist Ser-
vices. 
13  SRA Principles 2011, SRA Handbook (version 10 published on 10 July 2014). 
14  Boon (2014), p. 29. 
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principle which takes precedence is the one which best serves the public interest 
in the particular circumstances, especially the public interest in the proper ad-
ministration of justice.’15 Hence, when the client and the public interest are in 
conflict, the public interest, in the form of the duty to the proper administration 
of justice and within this, the duty to the court, must get priority. I will elaborate 
on this duty below. As regards the principle of neutrality: whereas the English 
bar retains the cab-rank rule, which requires barristers to accept briefs in the 
order that they are received,16 such a rule does not occur in the Solicitors Hand-
book. Solicitors are required to run their business in a way ‘that encourages 
equality of opportunity and respect for diversity’ (principle 9) which entails not 
discriminating unlawfully, including in the selection of clients. Yet, this is not 
the same as moral neutrality as understood under the standard conception.  
 
It thus follows from the principles that the lawyer’s obligations to the client are 
balanced by a wider duty to legality, which if lawyers are acting as advocates is 
expressed as a ‘duty to the court’. This includes the following duties: to refer the 
judge to the relevant authorities and points of law that may have eluded an op-
ponent; to point out procedural irregularities; not to allow the presentation of 
certain kinds of misleading testimony.17 It follows from decisions on what the 
duty to the court entails that advocates should not allow partial evidence to cre-
ate a wrong impression.18 The SRA Code of Conduct also gives guidance on this 
point.19 Chapter 5 discusses the solicitor’s duties to the client and to the court 
when acting as an advocate. It prescribes, among others, the following out-
comes: ‘you do not attempt to deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the 
court’ and ‘you are not complicit in another person deceiving or misleading the 
court’.20 
Furthermore, when acting in court, solicitors also have the ‘duty to the court 
in question to act with independence in the interests of justice’ and to observe 
the conduct rules of their authorising body.21 The courts have the power to sanc-
                                                        
15  SRA Principles 2011 – notes, section 2.2, SRA Handbook (version 10 published on 10 
July 2014). 
16  The idea behind this rule is that, since representation in the adversarial system is impera-
tive, it ensures that every person has a champion. 
17  Boon (2014), p. 684. 
18  Boon (2014), p. 685-689. 
19  It contains the outcomes which, when achieved, will help ensure compliance with the 
Principles in the particular contexts covered by the various chapters in the Code. It also 
sets out ‘indicative behaviours’ to aid compliance. 
20  SRA Code of Conduct 2011 – Chapter 5, section O(5.1)-O(5.2), SRA Handbook (version 
10 published on 10 July 2014).  
21  Legal Services Act 2007, section 188. 
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tion solicitors by making wasted costs orders.22 A recurring theme in wasted 
costs applications is the lawyer acting in a ‘hopeless case’. These include cases 
that must fail in law and those that may be very difficult to establish, either in 
law or in fact. Lawyers who present hopeless cases can, in theory, be sanctioned 
for abuse of process. Yet, with a few exceptions, courts have been reluctant to 
sanction lawyers for bringing claims that proved to be unmeritorious.23 It has 
been recognised that it is not always easy to distinguish hopeless cases from 
cases that constitute an abuse of process, and that, in case of doubt, must be 
resolved to the benefit of the legal representative. However, despite the relative 
lack of success of the wasted costs applications, it remains the case that it cre-
ates an environment of uncertainty for lawyers: they must exercise their own 
discretion in bringing a case, but are potentially liable if they get it wrong.24 
Confidentiality – which is described as a core principle in the Netherlands – 
is discussed as a duty under principle 4 (acting in the best interests of each cli-
ent). 
4.3  Institutional Context 
4.3.1  Asylum System25 
UK Asylum Law26 
Asylum matters are laid down in a range of national acts and regulations which 
include the implementation of international and European legislation on interna-
                                                        
22  This paragraph is based on Boon (2014), p. 621-628. 
23  However, in immigration cases judges have been criticising lawyers and mentioned 
referring solicitors to the SRA, e.g.: B & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of 
State For The Home Department & Anor (Rev 1) [2012] EWHC 3770 (Admin) (20 De-
cember 2012); Awuku (No 2) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2012] EWHC 3690 (Admin) (10 December 2012); Awuku, R (on the application of) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 3298 (Admin) (16 November 
2012); Butt, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2014] EWHC 264 (Admin) (28 January 2014). (http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/prac-
tice/jrs-without-merit-may-see-solicitors-referred-to-sra/5040008.article.) 
24  Boon (2014), p. 628. 
25  This section is largely based on the national country report of the United Kingdom of 
April 2014 as produced by Asylum Aid for Asylum Information Database, the AIDA-
project. Available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/united-kingdom.  
26  Even though, strictly speaking, I do not consider substantive asylum law as part of the 
‘institutional context’ it is part of the asylum system and I will, therefore, describe its key 
features as well as certain aspects (i.e. the assessment of an asylum account discussed at 
the end of this section) that are important for understanding asylum legal aid lawyers’ ac-
counts in the next part under this heading. 
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tional protection.27 An application for international protection will be granted if 
the applicant qualifies as a refugee as defined in the Refugee Convention, has a 
valid human rights claim based on article 2 or 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights or if protection is required based on the European directives on 
asylum.28 
Main Actors in the Asylum Procedure 
The responsible body for dealing with both immigration and asylum matters is 
the Secretary of State of the Home Office. Within the Home Office asylum deci-
sion making is delegated to the UK Visas and Immigration Section (UKVI – 
previously the UK Border Agency: UKBA).29 In the following I will use the 
overarching term ‘Home Office’ to refer to the authority responsible for process-
ing asylum applications. 
Appeals in asylum cases are to be made to the special independent First Tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) and, subsequently, to the Upper 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). The power to deal with judicial 
reviews, i.e. applications to challenge the legality of a decision, in immigration 
matters also lies with the Upper Tribunal. Decisions of the Upper Tribunal may 
be challenged before the Court of Appeal.30 Ultimately, the decisions of the 
Court of Appeal can be appealed to the UK’s final court of appeal, the Supreme 
Court. Asylum appeals in which national security interests are involved are con-
sidered by a different appellate body, the Special Immigration Appeals Commis-
sion (SIAC).31  
Assessment of the Asylum Application  
Without describing in full detail the way in which the asylum application is 
assessed by the authorities, I will briefly touch upon some of its key characteris-
                                                        
27  Including: The Immigration Act 1971; The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993; 
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999; The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002; The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004; Immigration, 
Asylum and Nationality Act 2006; The Immigration Rules (HC 395), Part 11 to 12; The 
Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, 
SI 2006/2525. 
28  Temporary Protection Directive 2001/55/EC, or the Qualification Directive 2004/ 
83/EEC. 
29  If an asylum application is made at the border, an Immigration Officer from the UK Bor-
der Force may carry out a screening interview and then refer the claim to UK Visas and 
Immigration. 
30  Section 13 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
31  Section 2 Special Immigration Appeals Commission 1997 as substituted by Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Section 114(3), and Schedule 7, para. 20; and as 
amended by Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 Section 14, Schedule 1, pa-
ra. 14. 
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tics.32 When deciding on an asylum application, the decision maker must rely on 
the information provided by the asylum seeker and must assess objective mate-
rial about the country of origin. In addition to country of origin reports, so-called 
‘country guidance cases’ are used in this regard to serve as a factual precedent. 
These cases are binding as to a factual situation in a certain country.33 In addi-
tion to an assessment of the objective material an assessment of the asylum 
seeker’s own testimony must be made, which entails the question of credibility. 
This term is used to refer to whether or not the decision maker believes the ap-
plicant is telling the truth. According to Clayton et al.: ‘Many problems with the 
quality of asylum decision-making result in and stem from an over-emphasis on 
individual credibility and/or a flawed assessment of credibility.’34 Paragraph 
339L of the Immigration Rules reads that ‘where aspects of the person’s state-
ments are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects will 
not need confirmation when all of the following conditions are met: 
(i)  the person has made a genuine effort to substantiate his asylum claim or 
establish that he is a person eligible for humanitarian protection or substan-
tiate his human rights claim;  
(ii)  all material factors at the person’s disposal have been submitted, and a satis-
factory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been 
given;  
(iii) the person’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not 
run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the per-
son’s case;  
(iv) the person has made an asylum claim or sought to establish that he is a per-
son eligible for humanitarian protection or made a human rights claim at the 
earliest possible time, unless the person can demonstrate good reason for not 
having done so; and  
(v) the general credibility of the person has been established.’ 
 
At the appeal stage, the First Tier Tribunal reviews both the facts and points of 
law and the judge is free to form his or her own opinion on the credibility of the 
applicant’s account. The evidence is re-evaluated at the date of the hearing. 
Appeals before the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal are restricted to points 
of law. Appeals to the Supreme Court will only be heard on arguable points of 
law of general public or constitutional importance. 
                                                        
32  These key features are described because these were brought forward frequently during 
the interviews with lawyers and a brief explanation is required in order to understand 
their concerns regarding these issues discussed in the second part of this chapter. 
33  See Clayton et al. (2014), p. 370-371. 
34  Ibid., p. 372. 
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The Asylum Procedure: First Instance Procedure35 
Asylum applications may be made at a port of entry (port applications) or at a 
later stage after entry (‘in-country’ applications’).36 There are no schemes for 
legal assistance at the ports and there is thus no opportunity for obtaining legal 
aid at that stage. In the case of an in-country application, the application is made 
at the Asylum Screening Unit or from detention. In the first scenario the asylum 
seeker has to call a special telephone number to register the application by ap-
pointment at the Asylum Screening Unit. An appointment for a screening inter-
view will be made with a case owner, a Home Office official, who will be re-
sponsible for the application. This first screening involves an interview about 
health and family information, details of the travel route and a broad outline of 
the reasons for claiming asylum, and biometric data are taken. On the basis of 
this screening interview it will be decided which route the application will fol-
low. The possible routes are: the regular procedure, the procedure for unaccom-
panied children (these are referred to a local authority); the accelerated proce-
dure (detained fast track or non-suspensive appeal procedure)37 or the safe third 
country procedure.38 The image below depicts a flow chart of the procedure.39 
                                                        
35  Since this study is, in principle, restricted to lawyers’ decision making in the regular asy-
lum procedure – both in first instance and on appeal – only those procedures will be dis-
cussed here. The procedures followed in detention (detained fast track processes) are thus 
not described here. 
36  If an asylum application is made at a port of arrival, an immigration officer of the UK 
Border Force may carry out a screening interview and decide whether to detain the appli-
cant or grant entry in order to enable the asylum seeker to pursue his or her claim. After 
the screening interview the claim is referred to the Home Office, UKVI. 
37  These procedures continue in detention and are not included in this study. These so-call-
ed detained fast track processes (DFTP) include the Detained Fast Track Process, and the 
Detained Non-Suspensive Appeals Process. Claims in the latter category include claims 
which are considered clearly unfounded. Typically these are claims made by nationals 
from countries generally designated as ‘safe’, and when the claim is deemed unfounded 
there is no right of appeal in the UK (Section 94 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002.) Claims which apparently could be decided quickly are considered in the De-
tained Fast Track Process.  
38  If it concerns EU Member States, the Dublin regulation is applied. In general, applicants 
are detained when a Dublin decision is made (after the screening interview) and infor-
mation about the procedure is given if the person is in detention. There is no substantive 
interview in this procedure. Once a third state is deemed responsible for examining the 
asylum application, the claim is refused on third country grounds without its substance 
being considered. If the applicant already sought legal advice prior to the screening inter-
view, the legal aid provider may continue representation after the issuing of the Dublin 
certificate.  
39  Taken from AIDA-report 2014, p. 10. 
CHAPTER 4 
 
114 
 
 
 
Applicants who have applied from within the UK may have contacted a legal aid 
provider prior to the screening interview; applicants at the border have not. The 
screening unit case workers have access to an online appointment system for 
legal representatives (the Voluntary Appointment Scheme, see below) and they 
provide the applicant with an opportunity to make an appointment with a legal 
aid provider in the region to which the asylum seeker is going to be sent for 
initial accommodation, that is if s/he is eligible for support.40 It may occur that 
the applicant has already contacted a legal representative before claiming asy-
lum. Legal aid funding (for applicants who are eligible, see below) is available 
for advising the asylum seeker before the substantive interview. The legal aid 
provider can advise and assist the applicant on the gathering of evidence in sup-
port of the application and on additional written presentations to the Home Of-
fice. As in the Netherlands, legal aid providers are not funded to accompany a 
client to the interviews. Legal aid for attending the interviews is only available 
in the detained fast track processes, and if the client is under 18 years old or 
lacks mental capacity.  
                                                        
40  Support (including accommodation) is only available for asylum seekers who are ‘desti-
tute’ (Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, s. 95). 
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After the interview the asylum seeker has five days in which to submit fur-
ther representations, which can be, for example, extended if evidence needs to 
come from abroad or the applicant needs an examination. The immigration rules 
state that a decision must be taken ‘as soon as possible’ but there is no enforce-
able time limit.41 In 2012/2013 the asylum decisions for adults that were taken 
within 30 days constituted 54%, the number of asylum conclusions within six 
months was 50% and within 12 months 63%.42  
Subsequent applications are considered by the Home Office, which then de-
termines whether it amounts to a ‘fresh claim’. This will be the case when the 
submissions ‘are significantly different from the material that has previously 
been considered’.43 The applicant will not be removed before the submissions 
are considered.44 
The Asylum Procedure: Appeals Procedures 
Appeal 
Appeals against decisions of the Home Office can be lodged before the First 
Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) which is an independent 
Tribunal dealing with asylum appeals as well as other immigration and national-
ity matters.45 The time limits for submitting an appeal are ten working days after 
the applicant has received notice of the refusal. The appeal has suspensive ef-
fect. As a general rule, in the case of an in-country appeal, the hearing must be 
fixed within 28 days after the Tribunal has received the notice of appeal.46 In 
practice, this will generally be much later. The case is decided by the Tribunal 
on the basis of the evidence presented before it, including new evidence that has 
not been considered by the Home Office in the first instance procedure. The 
Tribunal has the power to allow an appeal on the merits, which entails that it 
may direct that the applicant must be granted asylum.47 
When an asylum claim is not decided in the regular procedure and is consid-
ered clearly unfounded or the applicant is provided with a safe third country 
                                                        
41  Immigration Rules, Part 11, paragraph 333A. 
42  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/299605/H 
O_Transparency_Data_2012-13_-_Asylum_Speed_Measures_-_Annual_Data.pdf.  
43  Immigration Rules, para. 353. 
44  Ibid., para. 353A. 
45  Section 82 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as substituted by SI 2010/21, 
Article 5 (1) and Schedule 1, para. 22. 
46  For an oral hearing of an asylum appeal in the regular procedure a fee of £140 is re-
quired. This does not hold for asylum seekers who receive asylum support or are in re-
ceipt of legal aid. 
47  Section 87(1) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as amended by section 
26(7) Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, and section 14 Im-
migration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. 
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decision an appeal may not be exercised within the UK (non-suspensive ap-
peal).48 Against these decisions there is only the possibility of lodging a judicial 
review application (see below).  
Onward Appeals 
The asylum seeker has an onward right to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Immi-
gration and Asylum Chamber) on a point of law. In order to appeal, the appli-
cant must make an application for leave to appeal, usually within five working 
days. For this permission the applicant must first turn to the First Tier Tribunal, 
and in case of a refusal s/he can apply to the Upper Tribunal for permission.49 
Permission will only be granted if it is considered that the First Tier Tribunal’s 
decision making involved an error on a point of law. The Upper Tribunal has the 
power to set aside the decision of the First Tier Tribunal and can either remit the 
case or re-make the decision.50 If it chooses the latter option, it has the same 
power as the First Tier Tribunal, i.e. to allow an appeal on the merits.  
 
A decision of the Upper Tribunal may be challenged before the Court of Appeal. 
In order to be allowed to challenge the decision, permission must be granted by 
either the Upper Tribunal or the Court of Appeal and this will only be the case 
when the proposed appeal would raise some important point of principle or prac-
tice, or when there is some other compelling reason to hear the appeal. The 
grounds of appeal must relate to a point of law and excluded decisions cannot be 
appealed.51 The Court of Appeal has the power to set aside the decision of the 
Upper Tribunal and can either remit the case to the Upper Tribunal or the First 
Tier Tribunal or re-make the decision.52 If it chooses the latter option, it has the 
same power as the Upper Tribunal or First Tier Tribunal, i.e. to allow an appeal 
on the merits. 
 
In certain exceptional cases, where either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme 
Court certifies that the case concerns arguable points of law of general public or 
constitutional importance, permission may be granted for a final appeal to the 
Supreme Court. 
                                                        
48  Section 94 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
49  Rule 21 (2) Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, SI No. 2698. 
50  Section 12 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
51  Section 11 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Excluded decisions in asylum 
cases include procedural, ancillary or preliminary decisions by the First Tier Tribunal, or 
decision to review or not to review its earlier decisions (The Appeals (Excluded Deci-
sions) Order 2009, SI 2009/275). 
52  Section 14 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
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Judicial Review 
In supplement to the appeal system there is the possibility in certain situations to 
issue a claim for a judicial review. In a judicial review procedure the court su-
pervises the exercise of public power on the application of an individual; it en-
tails that a court reviews the process of the decision making and not the decision 
itself. Applications for judicial review can be made if one wants to challenge the 
legality of a decision and there is no alternative remedy (e.g. refusal of permis-
sion to appeal by the Upper Tribunal), or when there is no suspensive right of 
appeal. There are broadly three situations in which a suspensive right to appeal 
is denied. The first situation relates to removal to safe third countries (e.g. Dub-
lin);53 second, if the Home Office refuses the asylum claim and certifies it as 
clearly unfounded;54 and, third, when a repeated asylum claim is not accepted as 
a ‘fresh claim’. Originally, applications for judicial review were to be made to 
the High Court, but now most asylum and immigration judicial reviews are 
within the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction.55 
4.3.2  Legal Aid System 
Set up and Organisation 
The relevant legislation concerning the provision of legal aid is the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012, which entered 
into force on 1 April 2013. The Act provided for the establishment of the Legal 
Aid Agency (hereafter LAA), which replaced the Legal Services Commission.56 
The LAA is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice and its role is to ad-
minister legal aid services in England and Wales. It commissions and procures 
legal aid services from providers (solicitors, barristers and the not-for-profit 
sector). In other words, it buys the services of providers in the geographical 
areas (procurement areas) where it believes, projecting forward, the need for 
legal advice is going to be. The legal aid system is based on a market-based 
approach, which entails that the different legal aid providers compete for con-
tracts with the LAA in order to supply a certain amount of legal work.57 Only 
providers who responded to invitations to tender for contracts and have been 
awarded the contract are allowed to provide legal aid services under the legal aid 
                                                        
53  Section 94(1) and (7) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
54  Section 94(1) (1A) and (2) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
55  Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 section 53. 
56  The Legal Services Commission was the non-departmental public body sponsored by the 
Minister of Justice responsible for running the legal aid scheme until 31 March 2013. 
57  See for a concise overview of the development of the market based approach in asylum 
legal aid services: Trude & Gibbs (2010). 
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scheme (see below for the requirements that have to be met).58 In the tendering 
process of 2013 all providers who met the criteria set by the LAA (see below) 
were offered a three-year contract as from April 2013. There are approximately 
300 contracted providers (entities) in England and Wales, which equates to 
about 500 offices.59 The market of legal aid providers consists of a number of 
large to medium sized solicitors’ firms, some smaller firms, not-for-profit or-
ganisations and other regulated organisations of different sizes.60 So compared 
to the situation in the Netherlands, in England there is a greater variety in the 
size of solicitors’ firms providing legal aid in asylum procedures; there are sev-
eral large firms, but yet not many sole practitioners, in the sense of there actually 
being only one solicitor.61 
Terms, conditions and funding of legal aid work in asylum cases is regulated 
in the 2013 Standard Civil Contract.62 Firms that are awarded a contract are pro-
vided with a certain number of ‘matter starts’, i.e. the number of cases which 
they are permitted to accept on legal aid without prior authorisation from the 
LAA.63 If a legal aid provider uses up the entire allocation of matter starts, the 
                                                        
58  Apart from the mainstream immigration contract work, the work delivered in Immigra-
tion Removal Centres (IRCs), including onsite detention surgeries and the detained fast 
track schemes is subject to exclusive schedule arrangements. So in principle these ser-
vices are provided only by the firms who are awarded these exclusive contracts (2013 
Standard Civil Contract, Specification, Section 8, paragraph 8.5-8.6). 
59  Most are located in and around London. Interview LAA development officer 5 Septem-
ber 2014. 
60  In 2011-2012, only 13% of the newly started immigration cases (i.e. both asylum and 
non-asylum cases) was started by not-for-profit organisations, the remaining part by so-
licitors. See table CLS 2 (8,524 of the 61,105 controlled work new matters in immigra-
tion started by NfP organisations) of the Legal Services Commission: Statistical infor-
mation pack for financial year 2011-2012. So a vast majority of the work is done by so-
licitors’ firms. 
61  One can be registered as a sole practitioner with the SRA, but still have more people 
working in the practice for which the registered solicitor is responsible. 
62  http://www.justice.gov.uk/legal-aid/contracts-and-tenders/standard-civil-contract-2013. 
The Standard Civil Contract is made up of four documents: 
Standard Terms 2013: govern the underlying commercial relationship between the LAA 
and providers. 
Specification: sets out the rules governing the provision of civil Contract Work. The pro-
cedures and rates for carrying out such work are found in Legal Aid Legislation and are 
also referred to in this document. Section 8 sets out the specifics for immigration and 
asylum work. 
Schedule: sets out provisions specific to the individual provider, including the number of 
Matter Starts allocated to the provider, i.e. the maximum number of cases the provider 
can take on under the contract. 
Contract for Signature: gives effect to the 2013 Standard Civil Contract as a whole. 
63  The tender process for 2013 consisted of two lots. The requirement for lot 1 was that if 
the provider met all the quality criteria set down, the firm would get a contract. If the 
provider wanted more than 100 matter starts, a slightly higher threshold would have to be 
→ 
PROFESSIONAL DECISION MAKING IN THE ENGLISH CONTEXT 
 
119 
 
firm may ask for supplementary matter starts. These will only be granted under 
specific circumstances, e.g. when there is evidence of unmet need for legal aid 
in asylum cases in the procurement area.64 Of the contract work, 90% of the 
asylum matter starts must be delivered to clients who are physically located 
within the designated immigration and asylum procurement area.65  
 
Legal aid providers in asylum procedures assist clients under the civil legal aid 
scheme. Legal aid under this programme is provided through Controlled Work, 
which includes Legal Help (LH) and Controlled Legal Representation (CLR), 
and Licensed Work. Legal Help includes advice and assistance on claims made 
to the Home Office and CLR is provided for appeals against refusals before the 
First Tier Tribunal and the Upper Tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum 
Chamber). Licensed work covers all representation other than CLR and thus 
comprises legal aid for judicial reviews and higher appeals. The table below 
provides an overview of the different stages. 
 
Funding Level of Service Stage of Asylum Application 
Controlled Work Legal Help (LH) First instance, i.e. application to 
Home Office 
Controlled Legal Representa-
tion (CLR) 
Appeal stages before the First 
Tier- and Upper Tribunal (Immi-
gration and Asylum Chamber) 
Licensed Work Legal Representation Onward appeal and judicial re-
view to the higher Courts (Court 
of Appeal and High Court ) 
 
Solicitors can assist the clients up until the Upper Tribunal stage.66 In the higher 
courts solicitors instruct barristers to represent asylum seekers. Some solicitors, 
however, choose to instruct a barrister for advocacy in the tribunals as well. 
Appeals to the Upper Tribunal are on points of law and solicitors may decide to 
                                                        
met, i.e. the firm must employ an IAAS accredited level 3 (advanced) caseworker (lot 2). 
Those meeting this threshold are given precedence in matter start allocation. – Family, 
Housing & Debt and Immigration & Asylum from 1 April 2013 ITT IFA, September 
2012, section 6.11, available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919133 
628/http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/civil_contracting/Information_for_Applicants
_ITT_Civil_Contracts_from_April_2013_v.1.pdf. 
64  See for all conditions para. 1.20 ff 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 
1 April 2013). 
65  Para. 8.24 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
66  Only if they have higher rights of audience, i.e. if they are solicitor-advocates they can do 
advocacy in the higher courts. 
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instruct a barrister because of the barrister’s expertise in these matters. The so-
licitor remains responsible for all contact and communication with the client. 
Eligibility 
When a client comes to a solicitor for legal help, the solicitor (being a legal aid 
provider) must check: 1) whether the case is one for which legal aid is available 
(scope); 2) the client’s financial eligibility (means); and 3) the likelihood of the 
client being successful (merits). With the entry into force of LASPO legal aid 
for most immigration matters is no longer available, but asylum is still in 
scope.67 Admission to legal aid in asylum procedures is subject to means and 
merits tests at both the initial and appeals stages. There are guides for determin-
ing whether the applicant has insufficient resources and thus meets the means 
test at the different stages.68 Application of the merits test is laid down in the 
Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013. In order to obtain Legal 
Help the client needs to meet a ‘sufficient benefit test’.69 Eligibility for Con-
trolled Legal Representation and for licensed work is subject to a more demand-
ing merits test; there must be at least a 50% chance of success.70 
                                                        
67  Schedule 1, Part 1, paragraph 30 LASPO. 
68  See financial eligibility calculator: https://www.gov.uk/civil-legal-aid-means-testing.  
69  Section 32 Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013 reads: 
‘An individual may qualify for legal help only if the Director is satisfied that the follow-
ing criteria are met—  
(a) it is reasonable for the individual to be provided with legal help, having regard to any 
potential sources of funding for the individual other than under Part 1 of the Act; and 
(b) there is likely to be sufficient benefit to the individual, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances of the case, including the circumstances of the individual, to justify the cost 
of provision of legal help.’ 
70  Section 60 (3) Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013 (as amended by 
amendment 2014 No. 131) reads on the prospects of success:  
‘The Director must be satisfied the prospects of success are—  
(a) very good, good or moderate; or 
(b) unclear, and— 
(i) the case is of significant wider public interest; 
(ii) the case is one with overwhelming importance to the individual; or 
(iii) the substance of the case relates to a breach of Convention rights.’ 
Para 4.1.4 Lord Chancellor’s Guidance under section 4 of LASPO 2012 (June 2014) 
reads: ‘If the prospects can be identified as below 50%, or are considered borderline, any 
application that is subject to a prospects of success test must be refused. In assessing pro-
spects of success it is necessary to consider all the hurdles an applicant must clear in or-
der to reach a successful outcome and to reach a composite view; it is not sufficient that 
there may be at least moderate prospects of success in respect of each stage or issue con-
sidered on its own.’ As from 27 January 2014 ‘borderline’ cases (i.e. the case is not ‘un-
clear’ but it is not possible, by reason of disputed law, fact or expert evidence, to 
(a) decide that the chance of obtaining a successful outcome is 50% or more; or (b) clas-
sify the prospects as poor) may thus no longer be pursued. 
PROFESSIONAL DECISION MAKING IN THE ENGLISH CONTEXT 
 
121 
 
For Controlled Work (Legal Help and Controlled Legal Representation) the 
legal aid provider carries out the means and merits assessments and thus decides 
whether s/he may assist the client on legal aid. The powers to determine eligibil-
ity for legal aid are devolved to the provider and the provider must actively en-
sure that the client is eligible.71 Powers to determine eligibility for Licensed 
Work are not devolved to the provider, but remain with the LAA. This entails 
that before funding is granted the application of the means and merits tests by 
the provider is checked by the LAA, which would then grant a certificate if it 
agrees that funding should be granted. LAA officers explain that the means and 
merits tests must be applied properly by the providers, which means that they 
will actually have to inquire into the client’s means and consider the merits of 
the case.72 Their assessments may be checked on audit (see below).  
According to LAA officers the merits test does not tend to be an issue in 
asylum cases because of the overwhelming interest of the client. The provider 
must, however, carry out a merits assessment and must evidence on the file that 
the assessment has been done. As a LAA auditor explains: ‘Across the board, 
whether it is the merits, the financial means test or in terms of the substantive 
work, the onus is upon the solicitor to demonstrate that the work has been con-
ducted on the file. Especially with the financial means assessment, there must be 
evidence that the client is in scope. The risk to the provider is that the costs he 
has claimed are going to be disallowed in entirety.’73 
In addition to making a determination that an asylum seeker does not qualify 
for legal aid, the provider may decline for another ‘good cause’, for example, if 
the provider lacks the appropriate matter starts or does not have capacity to take 
                                                        
71  Section 24 Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012 on the position of providers 
reads: 
  ‘(1) Notwithstanding the relationship between an individual and the provider or any 
privilege arising out of that relationship, where the provider knows or suspects that the 
individual— 
(a) has failed without good reason to comply with a requirement to provide information 
or documents; or 
(b) in providing required information or documents has made a statement or representa-
tion knowing or believing it to be false, the provider must immediately report the rele-
vant circumstances to the Director.’ 
72  Providers have to fill in a so-called CW2 form on which they explain why the means and 
merits test are met. As regards the merits test this involves a step-by-step guide for ex-
plaining the merits and includes questions such as: ‘What are the prospects of this appeal 
being successful? Give brief reasons with reference to your client’s case.’ And: ‘Do the 
likely benefits to be gained from the proceedings justify the likely costs?’ https://www. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/346246/legal-aid-con-
trolled-work-2-immigration.pdf.  
73  Interview LAA auditor 5 September 2014.  
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the case on.74 It is not allowed under the contract to decline on the basis of any 
considerations regarding fees.75 In other words, one may not decline if the pro-
vider considers the fixed fee inappropriate for the amount of time s/he would 
need to spend on a case.  
Requirements for Legal Aid Providers under the Legal Aid Scheme 
As indicated above, legal aid is provided by those working in firms and organi-
sations holding a contract with the LAA.76 In order to be awarded a contract, 
both the firm and the persons working there need to comply with a range of 
requirements.77 These requirements include, among others, holding the Special-
ist Quality Mark (owned by the LAA)78 or Lexcel (The Law Society’s practice 
management standard) which aim to demonstrate that the firm is well managed, 
provides good levels of client care and has systems in place to ensure delivery of 
good quality advice; having permanent presence in the specific procurement 
areas; accreditation of everyone in the firm providing immigration and asylum 
services with the Immigration and Asylum Accreditation Scheme (IAAS); not 
having received a confirmed peer review rating of 4 or 5 (on scale 1-5) in immi-
gration and asylum law since 2009 (see below).79 The IAAS is run by The Law 
Society.80  
                                                        
74  2013 Standard Civil Contract, Section 3, paragraph 3.50 ff. 
75  2013 Standard Civil Contract, Section 3, paragraph 3.54. 
76  With the exception of barristers who are instructed by those holding a contract. 
77  In order to be eligible as a firm or organisation for the exclusive contracts in immigration 
removal centres (including providing legal aid in the detained fast track processes) the 
firm first needs to fulfil the standards criteria and can then compete in the tender for these 
contracts.  
78  The SQM requires inter alia that of the obligatory Continuous Professional Development 
(CPD) required by all regulators (see below), that caseworkers must spend 50% of the six 
CPD hours in the relevant area of law and that for supervisors all six CPD hours must be 
spent on asylum, immigration or nationality law. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/315041/LAA-specialist-quality-mark-stand 
ard-april-2013.pdf. 
79  See LSC – Family, Housing & Debt and Immigration & Asylum from 1 April 2013 ITT 
IFA, September 2012, section 5 ff, available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov. 
uk/20120919133628/http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/civil_contracting/Information 
_for_Applicants_ITT_Civil_Contracts_from_April_2013_v.1.pdf. 
80  http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/productsandservices/accreditation/accreditationimmigra-
tionasylum.page.  
IAAS has four levels of membership: Probationary; Level 1 Accredited; Level 2 Senior; 
Level 3 Advanced.80 An additional Supervisor membership is available only for level 2 
and 3 members. The levels specify the type of legal work the members may carry out. 
Only those accredited at level 2 or 3 may pursue Controlled Legal Representation cases, 
i.e. preparation and advocacy relating to proceedings before the Immigration and Asylum 
Tribunals and assist unaccompanied asylum seeking children. 
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When the contract is awarded the organisation has to meet all the terms of 
the contract, which include inter alia meeting so-called Key Performance Indi-
cators (KPIs). These include obligations such as that the aggregate amount of 
the costs claimed by the provider are not reduced on assessment by more than 
10% in controlled work (non-fixed fee cases) and by no more than 15% in li-
censed work and that the provider must achieve a positive outcome in at least 
40% of controlled legal representation cases (i.e. appeals before the tribunals) it 
pursues.81  
There is no Best Practice Guide comparable to the one in the Netherlands, 
in the sense that compliance with such a guide is a requirement for participating 
in the legal aid scheme and that it serves as the basis for assessing the provider’s 
conduct by the peer reviewers. 82  
Monitoring Mechanisms and Complaints Procedures 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
The LAA itself does not monitor the actual quality of the legal aid provided, but 
it aims to ensure that the contracted providers deliver quality work through en-
suring compliance with the conditions set out in the contract. This is done 
through audits.83 In addition, the LAA aims to ensure quality by imposing con-
tract requirements that involve monitoring mechanisms. First, the quality stan-
dard requirement (Specialist Quality Mark or Lexcel) involves monitoring 
whether the required standards are still being met through audits. Second, the 
compulsory membership of the IAAS involves monitoring by The Law Society 
of its IAAS members and has the power to investigate any matter which may 
call into question the fitness of a scheme member. In addition, membership is 
subject to re-accreditation exams.84 Third, the LAA makes use of peer review to 
                                                        
81  Paragraph 2.57 ff. 2013 Standard Civil Contract. Even though apparent non-compliance 
with these KPIs on its own can be sufficient to investigate the firm and – when many are 
not complied with – terminate the contract, LAA officers say that firm’s previous success 
rate was not taken into account when awarding the 2013 contracts (interview LAA de-
velopment officer 5 September 2014). 
82  ILPA has produced many specific best practice guides (e.g. working with women and 
young children, for the detained fast track process: http://www.ilpa.org.uk/pages/publica-
tions.html) and the most recent general Best Practice Guide in this area is produced by 
the Electronic Immigration Network (EIN: http://www.ein.org.uk/bpg/contents). The lat-
ter aims to provide the practical advice and information required to conduct each stage of 
the appeal according to best practice. Compliance with these guides is not binding upon 
legal aid providers. 
83  https://www.gov.uk/legal-aid-agency-audits. 
84  During the exams the lawyer’s performance is also checked for gross professional errors 
which, if these occur, can result in termination of membership. Some examples of gross 
professional errors are: misleading the court, advising the client to overstay, knowingly 
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measure the quality of advice and legal work carried out by legal aid providers. 
The tool is developed and managed by the independent Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies and the peer review is carried out by experienced legal aid practi-
tioners. The quality is assessed using a 1-5 rating and for ratings below compe-
tence (4 and 5) a further peer review will be conducted. If the rating is con-
firmed, the LAA will take further action which may affect the provider’s con-
tract and could even lead to termination of the contract, but this will depend on 
the provider’s particular circumstances.85 
Complaints Procedures 
As regards complaints procedures as part of the legal aid system and thus with 
the LAA, there is only the possibility to complain if a legal representative has 
refused funding, and thus to accept a case on CLR legal aid (i.e. appeal before 
the Immigration and Asylum Tribunals), because it considers that the merits test 
of a 50% chance of success has not been met. In that situation, the applicant can 
appeal to the LAA’s Independent Funding Adjudicator. When the legal aid pro-
vider refuses CLR, s/he must inform the client about this right to a review of the 
provider’s decision.86 The client must be provided with a copy of form CW4 
stating the reason for the refusal which can then be completed with the client’s 
arguments and submitted to the LAA. Complaints about legal aid refusals for 
licensed work by a LAA Director can also be reviewed by an Independent Fund-
ing Adjudicator.  
Complaints about poor services delivered by the legal aid provider are sub-
mitted to the Legal Ombudsman and if the complaint includes issues of profes-
sional misconduct the Legal Ombudsman will refer the complaint to the appli-
cable regulatory authority (SRA) for consideration. These procedures are part of 
the professional rules and disciplinary proceedings. 
Remuneration and Expenses Covered under the Legal Aid Scheme 
There have been a number of legal aid cuts in the field of immigration up to 
2014. In order to have a better understanding of the situation providers were in 
at the time of the interviews in 2014 (i.e. how their financial situation changed), 
I will briefly set out the most recent ones: In October 2011, following the gov-
ernment’s legal aid reforms, all legal aid funding was cut by 10%; as from April 
2013 with the enactment of LASPO legal aid for most non-asylum immigration 
                                                        
putting forward false information on behalf of the client, inventing evidence (IAAS guid-
ance (last updated version June 2014), available at: http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/accred-
itation/specialist-schemes/immigration-asylum/). 
85  See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31427 
4/independent-peer-review-process.pdf, section 7.15 ff. 
86  Para. 8.41 ff 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
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claims are no longer in scope, which means that there is no legal aid funding 
available for these cases;87 in December 2013 the rate paid for representation in 
Upper Tribunal cases was reduced;88 and as from April 2014 the legal aid pro-
vider receives funding for applications for permission for judicial review only if 
the permission is granted.89 So the applying for permission stage is ‘at risk’ for 
the provider; s/he only gets paid for the work done if permission is granted. 
 
As explained above the legal aid work is funded based on Controlled Work and 
Licensed Work, for which there are different payment arrangements. The system 
consists of a mixture of fixed fees and hourly rates. For most of the Controlled 
Work, fixed fee payments are available, with the exception of certain activities 
which are payable by an hourly rate. Licensed Work is remunerated on hourly 
rates. Remuneration for both standard fees and hourly rates are stipulated in The 
Civil Legal (Remuneration) Regulations 2013. 
Remuneration for Controlled Work 
Controlled Work is remunerated according to either standard (fixed) fees or 
hourly rates. For the controlled work that is remunerated through the standard 
fee there is a fixed fee for the separate stages of the work provided. For Legal 
Help (LH) there is a single fee (£413) and for Controlled Legal Representation 
(CLR) there are two fees depending on the point at which the case concludes, 
i.e. whether or not a substantive hearing is held (respectively £227; £567). See 
annex 2(a) for the stages, fixed fees and additional fees at the Controlled Work 
Stages. 
A matter may ‘escape’ the standard fee scheme and become payable by 
hourly rate when, following the conclusion of Stage 2 (or earlier if the case con-
cludes before this), the case exceeds three times the value under the standard 
fee.90  
Other matters covered by hourly rates include inter alia advice on the merits 
of lodging an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (where 
not granted under Stage 2), CLR in relation to an application for permission to 
appeal and appeals before the Upper Tribunal, advice and applying for a Certifi-
cate for Licensed Work, advice in relation to a client who is an unaccompanied 
                                                        
87  LASPO 2012, Schedule 1, Part 1 sets out the civil legal services that are still in scope of 
legal aid. 
Concerns have been expressed that the removal of many immigration matters from the 
scope of publicly funded legal aid, will lead to a further withdrawal of firms from the 
sector, because they will not be able to sustain their firms financially on only asylum 
work. See e.g. F. Webber (2012a). 
88  The Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 No. 2877. 
89  The Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014 No. 607. 
90  Para. 8.72 ff. 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
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asylum seeking child and initial advice on an asylum application prior to claim-
ing asylum, e.g. at the Asylum Screening Unit, where the provider then ceases to 
be instructed.91 Hourly rates and disbursements are subject to limits.92 
In respect of the second matter (CLR for an application for permission), it is 
important to note that if the application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to 
appeal is refused, the practitioner may not claim any costs relating to the appli-
cation or appeal, other than those covered by Stage 2 or costs of interpreters or 
experts instructed in connection with the application.93 This is the ‘at risk’ 
phase. The grounds are prepared at risk, since when the permission to appeal to 
the Upper Tribunal is not granted, this work is not paid for.  
In addition, there are some possibilities for rate uplifts.94 See annex 2(b) for 
payment rates for controlled work hourly rates cases. 
Remuneration for Licensed Work  
Licensed Work is rewarded on the basis of hourly rates.95 A solicitor is not al-
lowed to do advocacy in the higher courts (unless s/he is a solicitor-advocate), 
but the rate for attendance at court or conference with counsel (barrister) is 
£33.30 per hour. The LAA or the court may allow fees at more than the pre-
scribed rate when it considers that the work was done with exceptional compe-
tence, skill or expertise; with exceptional speed; or the case involved exceptional 
circumstances or complexity.96 This can amount to an enhancement of 50% or 
100% of the prescribed rate in very exceptional circumstances. 
As with applications for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the le-
gal aid provider receives funding for applications for permission for judicial 
                                                        
91  Also for any matters opened as a result of an on-site surgery or a fast track client, this 
only holds for providers who hold an exclusive schedule. For all situations covered see 
para. 8.77 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
92  £ 800 in asylum matters or £ 100 if the lawyer ceases to be instructed prior to making the 
asylum application, the client decides not to make an application or where advice is pro-
vided in relation to the merits of an appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Para. 8.80 2013 Stand-
ard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
93  This does not apply when the application is made under the fast track scheme or when 
the application for permission is lodged by the Home Office. Para. 8.93 ff. 2013 Standard 
Civil Contract Specification, (version 1 April 2013). 
94  E.g. For Controlled Work which is payable by hourly rates and personally undertaken by 
Level 3 Advanced Caseworkers, a 5% uplift is claimable. Furthermore, there is the very 
exceptional possibility for a rate uplift for advocates if an exceptionally complex, novel 
or new point of law is raised or a matter of significant wider public interest (Para. 8.79 
and Para. 8.90 ff. 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
95  The hourly rate for preparation and attendance for higher courts cases run up to £ 71.55 
per hour (London rate) and £ 67.50 per hour (Non-London rate). Source: Table 10 (a) 
Schedule 1, Part 3 of The Civil Legal (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, No. 422. 
96  Para. 6.16 ff. 2013 Standard Civil Contract (version April 2013). 
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review only if the permission is granted.97 So the applying for permission stage 
is ‘at risk’ for the provider; s/he only gets paid for the work done if permission is 
granted.  
Additional Expenses Covered 
Reasonably incurred costs and disbursements (e.g. travel fares, interpreting 
costs, expert reports) are paid up to a maximum of £ 400 for LH and £ 600 for 
CLR.98 If the provider wants to go over these limits s/he has to apply to the LAA 
for an extension in advance. If permission is granted for an appeal to the Upper 
Tribunal, one does not need to ask for an extension before incurring a disburse-
ment. However, one may only incur reasonable expenses and must justify these 
on the file. So it is only in this situation that the provider does not need to apply 
for an extension in advance. Apart from costs for interpretation, expert consulta-
tion and the provider’s own travel expenses, the costs of the client’s travel to the 
provider may under certain circumstances also be claimable as disbursement.99  
Process for Receiving Payment 
Payment of legal aid services goes by way of a standard monthly payment. 
Firms providing legal aid providers have a contract manager who determines, 
depending on the size of the firm and the other types of contracts they may have, 
the standard monthly payment the firm receives. Providers will then bill against 
that. The contract manager controls the standard monthly payment which s/he 
can increase or decrease depending on the amount of work in progress. This 
system ensures that providers have an income before cases are closed. In asylum 
cases it can take quite a long time before the Home Office or the Tribunals make 
a decision and one can only bill after the case is closed. So if they receive pay-
ment only after a case is closed, this can cause financial difficulties for the pro-
vider. This standard monthly payment does not apply to licensed work, and in 
those cases providers can only bill once the case is closed and this might take 
several years. Disbursements (interpreters’ fees and fees for expert reports) can 
be billed earlier, i.e. every six months. Sole practitioners providing legal aid 
report that the standard monthly payment system cannot apply to them, because 
they are too small (not enough case influx, to reach a monthly average).100 These 
providers bill cases once they are actually closed and then get paid afterwards. 
Legal aid providers have to submit the whole file and when the case is billed 
as an escape fee case (i.e. it went three times over), the provider must complete a 
                                                        
97  The Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014 No. 607. 
98  Limits may be extended. Para. 8.70 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 
1 April 2013). 
99  Paras. 8.49-8.51 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
100  E.g. interview solicitor: eng5-so-+10-y-m. 
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form requesting the additional payment and submit it with the whole file in or-
der to justify the request. The LAA will then audit the file and see whether it 
will grant the additional payment.  
As mentioned above, the LAA also performs audits to check that the deci-
sion to grant CLR funding has not been made wrongly, i.e. that the means and 
merits tests have been applied correctly. It can overturn the decision and thus 
decide to refuse the funding after the work has been done.  
Appointment of Legal Aid Providers 
In the regular asylum procedure asylum seekers are not appointed a legal aid 
provider, but need to find a legal aid provider themselves.101 There is a Volun-
tary Appointment System to facilitate the setting up of appointments between 
applicants and providers. Providers can request to be listed and participate in the 
system if it operates in the particular procurement area of the firm. The lawyer 
who wants to be involved can put his or her diary on the central electronic sys-
tem. The Home Office can access this system to find a lawyer nearest to where 
the client is going to be residing. Applicants can thus arrange an appointment 
with a lawyer through the Home Office when they register their asylum claim. 
The two not-for-profit organisations, the Refugee Council and The Migrant 
Helpline, who assist and support newly arrived asylum seekers also have access 
to this system and can thus make appointments. In addition, there are NGOs, 
such as Asylum Aid, operating free telephone advice lines, which can facilitate 
referrals. Other NGOs also refer asylum seekers and provide support in finding a 
lawyer.  
4.4  Running a Legal Aid Practice in Asylum Law 
4.4.1  Financial Pressures and Different ‘Business Models’ 
In order to comprehend individual solicitors’ professional decision making 
within this context, the impact of the legal aid system on the level of solicitors’ 
firms (e.g. its size and operations) requires consideration. Especially, the succes-
sive legal aid cuts in recent years play a role in this regard. Therefore, I will start 
by discussing the range of ways firms are coping with legal aid funding – i.e. the 
                                                        
101  The situation in the detained fast track procedures is different from the regular procedure. 
In these procedures there is a rota system through which a legal aid provider is appointed 
and the asylum seeker can thus not choose his or her lawyer.  
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different ‘business models’102 that can be distinguished among asylum legal aid 
practices – and some of the financial struggles firms, especially the smaller and 
solo firms, are facing. This sketch of the differences in this aspect of the ‘work-
place’ in which individual solicitors operate provides the background against 
which to understand their decisions. 
 
Solicitors working in a range of different firms were interviewed. From the ac-
counts of this varied group of respondents, several different ways of running an 
asylum legal aid practice can be distinguished. One such business model is that 
of the large firm, employing many caseworkers and/or trainee solicitors. Often 
junior staff conduct the bulk of the work at the initial stages and the more com-
plicated or higher court work is done by the more senior solicitors (supervisors). 
One respondent supervising a team of junior solicitors and caseworkers at such a 
large firm explains that his firm remains financially viable partly because of the 
large number of cases they do. The firm also provides legal aid in detention 
centres (has an exclusive contract to that end) and thus has work coming from 
that in addition to the number of matter starts it received under the standard 
contract with the LAA. Also, the firm has a policy of imposing a number of 
chargeable hours on their staff (the so-called ‘fee-earners’). Six hours per day 
must be chargeable, i.e. work for which payment is available, either through the 
fixed fee or from hourly rates. If these targets are not met, there are reviews to 
‘find out where the problem is’.103  
On the other side of the large to medium firm spectrum there are some pres-
tigious firms that tend to put a lot of time and effort into their cases, many of 
which can be big or complicated. One respondent works at a firm that explicitly 
chooses to take on only a small number of asylum cases and do them very well. 
This is possible because the firm has other departments that can bring in the 
money in order to compensate for asylum cases. Also the solicitors who are very 
determined in putting in a lot of time and effort in asylum cases (and work in 
firms that allow such methods), usually work on hourly rates; because of the 
kinds of cases they take on in combination with their work method, the cases go 
‘three times over’ the fixed fee rate and become payable at hourly rates, which 
makes it financially doable.  
Then there are many medium and several small firms in-between these two 
extremes. Some are specialised in asylum and immigration, others combine it 
                                                        
102  In the English system, which is based on a market based approach, this is the terminolo-
gy often used. Compare Sommerlad (2008, p. 184) who talks about the ‘imposition of a 
business rationality on the [legal aid] sector.’ 
103  eng1-l-3-10-y-m. One junior solicitor working in such a large firm says that she does 
manage to reach the six hours per day and explains this would be because she does more 
hourly rate cases than fixed fee cases. 
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with other areas of law. Some firms work with both solicitors and (junior) case-
workers and others choose to have only very experienced staff or only employ 
solicitors and no caseworkers. The idea is that, even though they are more ex-
pensive, they are able to work more efficiently. They also have greater legal 
skills which are needed to take cases further up to the Upper Tribunal and the 
higher courts for which a higher rate is available (and in certain circumstances 
one might recover the cost from the other side) and which ‘are the sort of cases 
that actually make legal aid worth doing’.104 Trying to do as much higher court 
work as possible in order to subsidise the work at first instance, as well as doing 
more private work, are general strategies mentioned by many respondents from 
all firm sizes. 
Firm Pressures and Sole Practitioner and Small Firms Struggles 
The firm environment in which solicitors work to a great extent sets the limits 
within which they (can) do their work. The accounts of two respondents who 
used to work at a medium-large and a large firm illustrate this. These solicitors 
decided to resign and start up their own firm, because they could not reconcile 
the ethos of those firms with their own conscience: ‘it was a bit like a factory; do 
cases as quickly as possible and take as much on as you can’.105 As the other 
respondent explains: 
 
If you’re in a firm where all they care about is what you’re billing, what hours 
you’re doing and how much money you’re billing each month and year... If you 
think there’s a borderline case that you shouldn’t really grant, but you’re going to 
grant it, because it’s not your responsibility. The firm can worry about it, you’ve put 
your billing in and you’re going to get paid for that. Not granting is going to go 
against your monthly and yearly figures, so it does affect people if firms operate that 
way. So that’s why a lot of firms have these production lines churning cases 
through, that’s how they operate. And that’s why I don’t want to work for places like 
that. They take away your personal, ethical decision making, because they apply 
pressure on you.106 
 
He goes on naming a list of issues he encountered during his time at the firm, 
including: the practical impossibility to actually supervise the junior people he 
was supposed to supervise; not seriously carrying out means assessments as one 
of the ways in which these firms are ‘abusing’ the system; the influence of inter-
preters on solicitors’ work (regarding taking cases on or not), because these 
people bring in clients; placing the firm’s interest above the client’s interest. 
This solicitor acknowledges that the reason why these firms work this way is 
                                                        
104  eng14-med+10-y-m. 
105  eng-p1-s-3-10-y-m. 
106  eng5-so-+10-y-m. 
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partly for survival. He is himself really struggling to survive and keep his prac-
tice as a sole practitioner running. He explains that he may be forced to give up 
legal aid work, because he is on the verge of bankruptcy: 
 
I have no idea at which point everything might just collapse and close. It’s a very 
fine line between getting a certain amount of work each month and to be able to bill 
everything. You’ve got that perennial struggle, I’ve got to pay all the interpreting 
fees, and potentially, if the Home Office doesn’t make decisions – like they haven’t 
been, they’ve got a backlog – I can’t bill my files. Like the files I opened 2-3 months 
ago, potentially I can’t bill them until at least 6 months after the opening date.107 
 
In addition to these cash flow problems, the fee in and of itself is a problem: 
‘how can anyone in private practice be charging £40-£50 an hour to do legal 
work? It’s laughable isn’t it?’ Even though when he started out as a solicitor he 
wanted to do legal aid work, he now feels trapped in it. However, he would not 
return to one of his previous employers: 
 
R: I’ve tried, I know how things are working in London firms, and if I could work for 
a nice place, I’d quite happily do it, get paid every month. 
I: But it’s just not an option right now? 
R: I couldn’t face that. It’s kind of selling your soul to the devil. 108 
 
Some respondents (and solicitors who were contacted for interviews, but de-
clined because they did not provide legal aid work anymore) decided – or are 
considering – to stop providing legal aid work for financial reasons, either vol-
untarily or reluctantly. Not being able to provide legal services as considered 
necessary while at the same time ‘generate enough money to be able to make a 
decent living’, is a reason to stop providing legal aid. One respondent, whose 
small firm still has a contract with the LAA, is, in principle, not willing to pro-
vide legal aid in asylum cases anymore for this reason. He only exceptionally 
takes on a legal aid asylum case if someone comes in who desperately needs a 
solicitor and cannot find someone else to do his or her case after trying for a 
week or so. He does not take on fresh claimants at all and he resolves this by 
offering legal assistance on a private basis: 
 
I: So, if people come with a fresh claim, you say: ‘Well, we’re not taking it on.’ 
R: I say that: ‘We’re happy to do it for you on a private basis and if you want 
someone to do it on legal aid basis, here’s the telephone number of LAA. You can 
see if you can find a solicitor anywhere else in the area that might want to help you.’ 
And to be honest with you: a lot of the fresh client cases, they do have the funds. Not 
                                                        
107 eng5-so-+10-y-m. 
108 eng5-so-+10-y-m. 
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necessarily themselves, but again through family or friends. Because they often 
come to us through a friend or family and that friend or family will say: ‘Look, 
we’re happy to do it on a private basis.’109 
 
This respondent has been developing his private case load, so that he does not 
have to rely on legal aid anymore. The solicitor’s hourly private rate amounts to 
at least three times the legal aid fee and he explains that he thus has to do fewer 
cases for the same amount of money.  
Another respondent also tells that he recently stopped taking on legal aid 
work; not because he wanted to, but in order to prevent bankruptcy. This solici-
tor is a sole practitioner who used to work with two caseworkers and now with 
only one.110 He explains that he never wanted to do private work and, even 
though it has become financially difficult during the last years to do legal aid 
work, that was no reason to stop doing it because he ‘believed it was important 
work to do’. Yet he says that the LAA ‘are just completely ruining the system’ 
and made it ‘absolutely untenable’ for people like him to continue doing pub-
licly funded work. 
 
One of the worst aspects of this system is that they give you a contract, you sign the 
contract and you agree to do a certain number of cases over certain periods of time, 
and then after a few months they’ll come along, look at the files and say: ‘you didn’t 
tick that box, you didn’t look at this and we don’t think you did that properly, so 
we’re not giving you any money for it’. So a case that they might have given half a 
thousand pounds for; they’ll just cancel it, take it back. And they’re legally entitled 
to do that, because of the nature of the contract. They can just come and punish 
you.111  
 
And this is what happened to this respondent, because he did not follow the 
precise requirements set by the LAA in relation to the means test. 
 
So there’s a set of rules whereby, if someone comes to see you and they don’t have 
any income at all, the question is then raised: where do they live, how do they eat? 
Most of the people we see who are in that circumstance would typically be sleeping 
on the sofa of a friend who’d share with them what food they could. Just complete 
destitution really. The LAA doesn’t accept that as an explanation as to why someone 
can’t be financially assessed. So then they told us we must get a letter from the 
person who’s accommodating them to say, ‘yes, I’m giving them accommodation, 
I’m giving them a bed and some food’. Then they changed that and they said, ‘no, 
we don’t just want that, we want the person to specify how much value is attached to 
that service. So if they’re sleeping on someone’s floor, we want their friend to tell us 
                                                        
109  eng6-s-3-10-y-m. 
110  One can be registered as a sole practitioner with the SRA, but still have more people 
working in the practice for which the registered solicitor is responsible. 
111  eng13-s-+10-y-m. 
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how much it’s worth, how much equivalent they would be deemed to be giving them 
in kind’. It’s just ludicrous! 
 
He explains that, because the letters he provided from clients’ friends lacked the 
precise value specification, the LAA has nil-assessed many of his files and he 
now owes the LAA thousands of pounds. Other respondents shared similar ex-
periences, but were able to absorb the losses because of the size of their firms. 
This respondent’s view of the LAA is: ‘They’re set up to be aggressive, they 
don’t see themselves as facilitating giving a service, but preventing it. Their job 
is actively preventing the expenditure of income and recouping money, stopping 
people from doing their job as much as possible.’ These struggles with the LAA 
and the financial problems arising from it are the reason he no longer takes on 
legal aid cases, something which he is sad about.  
 
This brief sketch of the variety of ways to run an asylum legal aid practice and 
introductory illustrations of firms’ financial struggles, which seem to hit the solo 
and small firms in particular, provide us with the background against which to 
understand providers’ decision making in the course of the asylum process. It 
gives a first impression of the morality vs market dilemmas the legal aid system 
may pose for providers of which we will see more in the following sections.  
4.4.2  Obtaining and Selecting Clients  
A vast majority of the respondents say that they encounter a high demand for 
legal aid by asylum seekers. Many have to turn people away regularly, or even 
often, due to a lack of capacity. Only the respondent who is a sole practitioner 
has difficulties in obtaining enough clients. The most common way to obtain 
clients is through word-of-mouth (former clients), through referrals either from 
charities/NGOs, social services or experts (e.g psychiatrists) solicitors work 
with. Other ways of obtaining clients is via interpreters or the above-mentioned 
Voluntary Appointment System. Clients may also just walk in or attend the 
drop-in sessions some firms offer.112 As explained above, the moment in the 
asylum process at which an asylum seeker first contacts a solicitor for legal aid 
may differ. This can be before the applicant applied for asylum, after the screen-
ing interview but before the substantive interview, after the initial stage – when 
the applicant initially represented himself or another lawyer refused CLR – or 
after the applicant went through the asylum process and wants to pursue a fresh 
claim. Once the solicitor is approached by a potential client s/he can decide 
                                                        
112  The firms that also have an exclusive contract to provide legal aid in the detention cen-
tres obtain work from the surgeries and the providers who also have a DFT contract are 
appointed in the detained fast track process. 
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whether or not to take the case on. S/he has to work within the framework set by 
the LAA, which includes inter alia determining whether a case is in scope of 
legal aid and conducting means and merits assessments, to which I will turn 
below. In addition to the rules set by the LAA, the solicitor can also apply his or 
her own criteria for accepting new clients. How do solicitors go about selecting 
their clients and what are the criteria they use in this regard?  
Several respondents say that they do not apply any selection criteria other 
than those imposed by the LAA. The main criterion is whether the firm has the 
capacity to take the case on. Others say they try to avoid selecting, but that there 
is bound to be some selection because of the overwhelming number of asylum 
seekers that approach them – for some in combination with the limited number 
of matter starts. They thus have to turn people down.  
‘Picking and Choosing’? 
Respondents express different ideas about whether selecting is acceptable. Many 
respondents expressly point out that it is not allowed to ‘pick and choose’ cases 
based on profitability and stress that they do not do so – a few say that they take 
profitability into account as we will see below. One respondent brings up the 
issue of the limited number of matter starts her firm has and the number of cli-
ents that come to the firm for help, because another firm has recently closed 
down.113 Many of these clients are already at the appeal stage. She explains the 
dilemma of missing out on the fee for the initial procedure while losing a matter 
on the case which is at the appeal phase: 
 
If a client comes from this stage we’re losing our £ 400, but we’re still willing to do 
that because we can’t tell a client who needs help to go away. So, where is the 
incentive? What do I do? Shall I just say I rather take a client who brings me £1000 
than take a client who brings me £600?114 
 
She finds the limited amount of matter starts unfair, because she feels compelled 
to take on these clients as refusing a client without a good cause would be a 
breach of the legal aid contract: 
 
You can’t pick and choose your clients, because if you’re a legal aid firm, you’re 
meant to provide services in a fair manner to all clients that come through the door. 
Unless it’s an unmeritorious matter […] But I can’t sit here and make a business 
                                                        
113  The firms that also hold exclusive contracts for the detention centres can adopt alterna-
tive strategies to deal with the limited matter start issue. They can, for example, if they 
think it is likely that the client will be detained, advise the client briefly, and give their 
contact number, but not open a matter. Instead they pick the client up once s/he has been 
detained (which does not count as a matter start). 
114  eng2-med-+10-y-f. 
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decision: ‘I’m going to take this client, that client.’ I can’t pick and choose the 
client. 
 
Another respondent argues that there is no obligation for a legal aid provider to 
take on any client – unless it would constitute unlawful discrimination – and that 
the limited number of matter starts forces him to choose some over others (‘most 
of the time the case will be taken on by reference to the vulnerability of the indi-
vidual’).115 He does acknowledge that picking and choosing cases based on 
profitability may be contrary to the legal aid contract, and that the fact that the 
LAA constantly ‘bombards people with you can’t pick and choose, you got to 
take all cases, rough or smooth, some are profitable, some are unprofitable’ 
might explain the statements of other respondents. Yet he argues that it is not 
even possible to cherry pick cases based on their (future) profitability as it is 
impossible to predict how cases will develop in terms of profitability. 
Prioritising 
When accepting clients, a number of respondents give priority to the more vul-
nerable people including unaccompanied minors. Several say they do this be-
cause of the limited number of matter starts or because of capacity issues. Unac-
companied minors are payable at hourly rates (up to a limit which can be ex-
tended) and cases of vulnerable people may escape the fixed fee payment and be 
payable at hourly rates as they are usually complex and can take a lot of time; 
and one solicitor-supervisor explains that he tries to prioritise unaccompanied 
minors and vulnerable people partly for this reason: ‘So it’s all about selecting 
cases that can be more financially rewarding, rather than taking on cases that are 
less rewarding.’116 He distinguishes A type cases (fixed fee cases) from B type 
cases (more rewarding, i.e. hourly rates). His own B type cases are the Higher 
Court cases (judicial review e.g. cases where the applicant has been unlawfully 
detained). If such cases are won, costs can be recovered from the other side 
rather than from the LAA, which means that the solicitor can charge his private 
rate which would be at least three times the rate the LAA pays for High Court 
work: ‘So again, as another selection type, you would want cases whereby the 
defendant pays your cost.’ 
Some respondents indicate that they prioritise people who have just arrived. 
Some will not accept fresh claims (i.e. subsequent asylum claims) at all or are 
                                                        
115  eng3-med-+10-y-m. 
116  eng-p1-s-3-10-y-m. He does not really deem it appropriate to refuse clients and he stress-
es that he still takes on complex (‘risky’) A type cases, yet he talks about ‘selecting’. Dis-
tinguishing the A from the B type cases can be considered a strategy for dealing with 
cases once they have been taken on, but the way he explains it also suggests (as does the 
term ‘selecting’) that there is a process of prioritising and thus of selection going on. 
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very reticent in accepting them. One respondent prioritises first time claimants 
(either in first instance or an appeal) because he would rather make ‘good use’ 
of the limited number of matter starts the firm has and he wants to give the 
chance to those ‘who need it most’, as opposed to someone who has already 
been to court since ‘that person has had more or less a fair bite of the cherry.’117 
Another respondent is not willing to take on fresh claims at all on legal aid, 
because it is financially not doable: 
 
For a solicitor to find out whether or not there are merits in a case can involve 2,3,4 
hours of work, which is not claimable. Obviously we cannot open a file into wishing 
there are merits to do the case. So, that’s why we’ve made a decision: if we have to 
spend 3,4 hours on every client and there won’t necessarily be a positive result, we 
can’t pay our bills.118 
 
Prioritising also occurs on the basis of experience and expertise. Whereas sev-
eral respondents are not eager to accept fresh claims, there are solicitors who 
tend to specialise in certain types of cases and fresh claims could be considered 
one such type. Other types of what one could call a kind of ‘specialisation’ are a 
particular expertise in High Court work or experience in dealing with certain 
nationalities. Having a particular interest in or experience with certain cases can 
mean that a solicitor looks for a case in order to challenge a particular issue. 
This also constitutes a selection mechanism.  
Connected to the special expertise or experience of solicitors with certain 
types of cases is the filtering process that takes place through referrals from 
charities/NGOs or local authorities/social services. Many solicitors point to the 
importance of having good referral sources. On the one hand, they can rely on 
them for doing some kind of preselection and, on the other hand, it is a source of 
obtaining enough cases. Even in very busy times, a solicitor explains, new cli-
ents can get through to her via a referral source, because ‘if you don’t have peo-
ple referring then you could be without cases. I very much doubt that’s going to 
happen, but, you know, you have to keep up the goodwill.’119 The preselection 
NGOs carry out (‘this particular NGO is quite good at spotting really important 
issues’) seems to be important given the time it can save providers. This follows 
from the next quote in response to a question about the last time the respondent 
hesitated about whether to take someone on: 
 
Sometimes I say: ‘this is incredibly unfair of me, but I just don’t have the resources 
to sort of look into your case, to go on a fishing expedition. ‘[…]it’s quite sad really 
                                                        
117  eng17-med-3-10-y-m. 
118  eng6-s-3-10-y-m. 
119  eng9-med-3-10-y-f. 
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to think of it, I’m obviously not doing myself any favours by saying it, but it would 
often be people who can’t articulate their case in the slightest […] sometimes, kind 
of the worst case scenario, they don’t really know why they’ve been refused, they 
don’t know what’s going on and what you’re really saying is that you don’t have 
capacity to explore it. It’s completely unsatisfactory, obviously, but that’s something 
that time-wise I just find, have found difficult. So that’s in contrast to the example 
where the NGO has done a bit of groundwork.120  
 
So prioritising referrals, partly because it serves as preselection, is a way of 
being efficient. Even some respondents who say that they do not really prioritise 
or select – but just take cases on according to capacity – recognise that often 
clients come to them through referrals which means that, even though not pur-
posefully, some selection is bound to have taken place.  
To sum up, in addition to the prioritisation of referrals, the selection criteria 
mentioned by respondents are: prioritising vulnerable people (including unac-
companied minors), prioritising new arrivals, selecting cases based on the solici-
tor’s personal experience and expertise, distinguishing between A and B type 
cases and selecting the more profitable Btype cases (hourly rates and Higher 
Court cases) when there is an imbalance between the two. Only one or two so-
licitors explicitly refer to the time involved in a case, which would not be cov-
ered by the fixed fee, as a reason not to accept a case in certain circumstances. 
The next quote shows how this may interconnect with determining the client’s 
eligibility for legal aid: 
 
R: […] sometimes for the amount of work you have to do, to be honest, legal aid 
won’t cover that. Because legal aid for immigration cases is about £270. For the 
amount of time you spend, you can’t… 
I: So, that’s also taken into account when you…? 
R: Yes, that’s taken into account at times, yes. At times. So, it’s about getting a 
balance between costs and merits. It’s not always easy.121 
 
The decision whether to take on a new client on legal aid cannot be separated 
from determining whether the client is eligible and I will go into this in the next 
section, when turning to the central issue under review (‘hopeless cases’) and 
the topic of merits testing. For now it is important to point out that these ac-
counts show that the way the legal aid system is set up may raise morality vs 
market dilemmas for solicitors; even though they may feel that everyone who 
                                                        
120  eng15-med-3-y-m. Here this respondent refers to fresh claimants, which is a large part of 
his clientele. 
121  eng8-l-3-10-y-f. This respondent refers to the amount one would get for an immigration 
case when this was still in scope of legal aid. 
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might have an asylum claim is entitled to legal aid, the economic reality may 
prevent some from taking on the less straightforward cases. 
Apart from what respondents report about there generally being a larger de-
mand for legal aid than the number of (‘good’) providers available – which 
makes selecting necessary – the fixed fee element is a crucial aspect of the legal 
aid system that may present the provider with a morality vs market dilemma. 
Solicitors have their own ideas about how to run an asylum case and this may be 
at odds with the time that is available under the fixed fee system. In the follow-
ing section I will, focusing on the first instance stage, discuss the different ways 
respondents explain how they deal with this tension (if they experience it).  
4.4.3  Time vs Money? Working within the Payment System  
Roughly three different ways of coping with the payment system, which is ini-
tially based on fixed fees, can be distinguished from respondents’ accounts: 1) 
spend way more time, thereby usually escaping fixed fee payment or having 
extensions of the time limit in hourly rates cases; 2) spend more time on cases 
than covered by the fixed fee and accept the loss (usually not escaping fixed fee 
payment by going three times over); 3) stick, on average, to the time limits 
and/or adjust work method to the fixed fee. 
 
The first work method is to spend a lot of time on cases and often the number of 
cases these respondents take on is limited: ‘I’m definitely from the school of 
thought “don’t stack them high”. It’s not the numbers of cases that I have, it’s 
just the fact that there’s so much work going on in all of them.’122 These solici-
tors stress that they want to maintain a high standard and are convinced that 
putting in a lot of time, especially in the first stages, is very important. Some of 
the work is done pro bono.123 They usually have a lot of ‘client time’ and lots of 
time is devoted to the client’s statement (e.g. 8-10 hours only for preparing a 
statement), the aim of which is to get the story out and to prepare the client for 
the interview: 
 
The aim and objective really is to help people understand what it is the Home Office 
wants to get from them and trying to explain a sequence of events in as 
chronological a way as possible. Of course people’s memories are not 
chronological and people do not tell stories that way, that’s why it takes so long. 
                                                        
122  eng15-med-3-y-m. 
123  E.g. eng18-l+10-y-f: ‘If I’m representing unaccompanied children I go to the HO with 
them, if they’re adults I don’t get LA for that so I don’t. In the past I’ve done that pro 
bono and every now and again I will do that. [...] when somebody’s really vulnerable or I 
think there’s a problem and I think the interview is going to be too difficult or there are 
issues that are too complex; I make a judgement and sometimes do it pro bono.’ 
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Whereas you could do it very quickly, ‘I left Eritrea on Monday, I went to Italy and I 
didn’t tell them my name and I’m here now and my case is I left illegally’. You could 
do a statement like that. But we do, ‘I lived here, this was my family, this is what my 
family did…’124 
 
The solicitors working in this way, including the respondent who is a peer re-
viewer, point out that, even though it might take a lot of time and thus money, it 
is very important to run cases in this way and to get to that level of detail. They 
are confirmed in their view when they get papers from other firms where ‘peo-
ple have been obviously sticking to very strict time frames’ and ‘lawyers only 
did work up until the fixed fee’ even though there is a lot more work needed in 
those cases of which they have to ‘pick up the messes’. In dealing with cases in 
this way, they run the risk that the LAA does not accept the amount of time 
spent and cuts back the hours and thus does not grant the hourly rates. Respon-
dents report at times having trouble obtaining the escape fee from the LAA and 
that the fight that follows can be exhausting. In order to ensure that one actually 
receives payment for the legal aid work, being very careful in actually keeping 
and thus being able to charge the time spent, i.e. being ‘diligent time recorders’ 
is brought forward as vital for surviving as a firm.125 Overall, we see this ap-
proach amongst respondents working in the more well-established medium to 
large firms, by which I mean firms that seem to have a good reputation in the 
field of asylum/immigration law and have a lot of work based on NGO refer-
rals.126 
The second way of coping – which is seen among respondents across all 
firm sizes, but somewhat more amongst the small to medium ones – is usually 
spending more time, yet not three times more than the time that stands for the 
fixed fee, on cases and accepting the loss to a certain extent: ‘we are making a 
conscious decision to make losses on cases to get better results.’127 Yet, many do 
try to somewhat curtail the time they spend in order to remain viable. This re-
spondent explains the approach of her firm as: ‘do as good a job as possible, but 
not really to provide, I suppose, super deluxe every possible thing is looked 
into.’ And she continues that even though in terms of legal outcome that might 
                                                        
124  eng18-l+10-y-f. 
125  eng15-med-3-y-m. ‘[…] what we try and do here is be really diligent time recorders. We 
just take that so seriously. You just have to. If you get off the phone and you don’t time 
record it there and then, then you’ve just given some pro bono advice, pro bono time. So 
you have to be really diligent on that.’ 
126  As reported by respondents themselves, sometimes corroborated by other respondents 
and academics. Having cases referred by NGOs means that there might be (some re-
spondents point out) some pre-selection in the types of cases these respondents have; the-
se are usually not just any cases. 
127  eng-p1-s-3-10-y-m. 
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be fine, it is not the service she would actually choose to provide, but she cannot 
provide more: 
 
[...] when we look at our client satisfaction forms, the biggest complaint we get is 
that it’s really hard to speak to us. That they can never get through reception. So 
while they may be happy with the legal work and the outcome and the skill of their 
lawyer. In terms of customer service... If someone walks into reception and wants an 
appointment, they would be really discouraged from ever doing that again: ‘We 
know what we need to know from you, you need to fit in with us, forget about what 
your own needs are.’128 
 
The respondent who supervises a team of junior solicitors and caseworkers at a 
large firm, as already mentioned, explains that he divides his time between what 
he calls A and B type cases and he also asks this from his team: 
 
So I said to my colleagues 2 weeks ago: ‘listen, we cannot say no to clients, but 
there are cases I want you to divide: The A type and the B type’ The A type cases we 
know are fixed fee are not rewarding. So it takes a lot of our time, it’s not 
rewarding. So we have to divide our day in the non-rewarding ones half a day, on 
which we spend 3 hours, and 4 hours on the more rewarding ones, so we can quickly 
achieve our targets. […] The B type. So detention centre work is more rewarding: 
fast track asylum claims, surgery time, hourly rate files are more rewarding. So 
that’s one strategy of getting the balance right really.129 
 
He explains that this is one way in which the firm has tried to adapt to the re-
strictions in order to maximise profits. Yet, he and another respondent who 
works at this firm say that they do not stay within the fixed fee time for asylum 
cases – their work method must thus be understood within the context of the 
larger firm; they have many different (types of) cases and have thus adopted 
these alternative strategies. This as opposed to solicitors who describe a third 
way of coping: sticking to the fixed fee time. 
Respondents who report this third way of working (i.e. remain, on average, 
within the time limits of the fixed fee) explain that they do so because they be-
lieve that this is perfectly well possible or because they have adjusted their way 
of working to the fixed fee. This approach is seen among respondents of all firm 
sizes. Some consider it feasible to work within the approximately eight hours to 
which the fixed fee amounts at the first stage. Compared to the respondents in 
the first group, these solicitors take about one-third of the time to prepare the 
statement and, overall, in first instance a simple case may take six hours and a 
complex one up to 20 hours, but on average it will work out: 
                                                        
128  eng-p2-med-+10-y-f. 
129  eng1-l-3-10-y-m. 
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The stage up to the interview and up to the decision is relatively light in terms of 
workload. Often, not always. Sometimes it’s more complicated. But generally speak-
ing I’d think that is fairly straightforward. I might typically see the client twice. I’d 
advise them on how the interview is likely to proceed, advise them on what parts of 
their case are perhaps stronger, which bits they might want to emphasise. I might 
actually advise them on what areas might be problematic, what they might think 
about carefully. [...] I think some practitioners do too much. They fuss over a lot of 
it and they don’t need to.130 
 
Respondents in this category will not per se prepare a full written statement, but 
‘take notes and details’. A solicitor working at a medium firm finds it hard to 
run cases within the fixed fee, but does make the effort; she explains that one 
has to be very organised and as efficient as possible. Because as a medium-sized 
firm they have the scope to have paralegals, support (‘we ensure that the admin 
work is done by other people, so that fee earners do only the legal side’) and a 
system that backs up the work (template letters etc.). She also strictly sticks to 
what is essential for the asylum claim and points to the need to make clients 
aware of that:  
 
We make them understand the reality of things. And you cannot, of course it depends 
on the client, on their vulnerability and on the case and so on, but you have to 
concentrate on giving the advice and concentrate on doing the best for their asylum 
claim, that’s it. 131 
 
One respondent was very clear in stating that he has adjusted his work method 
and that of his employees to the fixed fee payment system. He explains that he 
and his partner employ a model which is a combination of having experienced 
people (mostly solicitors) and working efficiently in order to make the fixed fee 
work for them; experience allows for efficiency: 
 
I think I can get the relevant information from a client much more quickly than 
someone who doesn’t really know as much. So we used to see people having inter-
views with clients to try and get initial information, but it was taking 3-5 hours 
sometimes, the initial appointment, which in some ways is good because they are 
building up a rapport, but actually it’s not. They were talking about loads of stuff 
that wasn’t ever going to be relevant to their case. […] Because of your experience 
you can deal with a lot more quickly, you can be a lot more focused in what you do. 
That’s why we’re able to work within a fixed fee ration, because we do it in a 
different way.132  
                                                        
130  eng13-s-+10-y-m. 
131  eng-p3-med-3-10-y-f. E.g. there is no longer a fee available for assisting the client with 
their NASS claim (National Asylum Support Service, i.e. welfare support) and therefore 
no assistance is provided on those issues. 
132  eng14-med+10-y-m. 
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He explains what he expects from his people: 
 
I: But you sometimes have to say to your team, ‘guys, mind the hours’? 
R: It’s something that I sort of monitor and if we’re having people that were 
spending far too much time regularly, then I would speak to them in supervision and 
say, ‘is there a reason?’. 
I: Has that happened? 
R: Yes, a number of our members of staff have come via places like [nfp-org x] and 
[nfp-org y], so they’ve had to change their working practices and realise that you 
can’t always spend as much time as you’d like on every single case. Sometimes you 
have to make a judgement, is that actually going to benefit the client, is it going to 
make a difference? 
 
Someone recently left the firm, because this person could not ‘get out of that 
mind-set and spent hours and hours and hours on things that really weren’t go-
ing to make any difference.’ He continues: 
 
You have to make a judgement. If you think there’s a very small chance of finding 
something useful, is spending 10 hours researching it all trying to find something or 
spending that time with the client actually going to benefit them? You have to be 
realistic enough to be able to make those sorts of assessments. Some people find it 
difficult. But if there was a decent chance of finding something or getting some extra 
evidence or there was some reason that it was likely to benefit the client, I wouldn’t 
say ‘you shouldn’t do it’. But I want to understand why they were doing it and make 
sure that they understood why they were doing it or if there was a way for them to be 
doing it more efficiently.  
 
Other practical ways of being efficient and thus coming in under the fixed fee 
mentioned by this respondent are coordinating the lodging of appeals (have 
them on the same day, so the solicitor only has to go once), and using technol-
ogy for communication: ‘communicate with clients via texts and email rather 
than writing loads of letters and getting them to the office every time to tell them 
things that you don’t always need to say face to face’. These are ways to be 
more efficient, yet, he does acknowledge and stresses the need to differentiate: 
‘some clients you’ve always got to see face to face and you’ve got to make sure 
you get them in and explain things, because it’s the only way they can under-
stand, it’s the only way to reassure them’.  
It is, however, not only the fixed fee that shapes this solicitor’s work 
method, it is also the way the asylum system works: 
 
I suppose in an ideal world you’d get paid for all the time you spend and you’d 
spend hours and hours going through every single aspect of the client’s case more 
than once. Prepare fantastically detailed witness statements, provide it to the Home 
Office who would read it in detail before the interview and then, hopefully, if there 
was an interview, it would only be an hour to clarify things and we would get good 
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decisions. Unfortunately the system doesn’t work like that, so you have to work 
within the system to represent your client in the best way.  
 
He refers in this regard to the way the Home Office works and what it demands 
from the lawyer in terms of speed and other requirements. For example, as there 
is no longer an obligation to submit a written statement in regular asylum cases, 
he does not submit such a statement. In unaccompanied minor cases, there is 
such an obligation. Moreover, these cases are payable at hourly rates, and pay-
ment for attending the interview is available. He explains that he did his first 
unaccompanied minor case and found it much more satisfying: ‘I had four to 
five two-hour appointments or longer with the client – because they have to 
prepare a statement – building up a rapport, going through their account, through 
a number of issues they were uncertain about, so I let them go and think about it 
and they’d come back in.’  
If we compare this with the above where he states that spending time to 
build up a rapport was not that necessary, we see that he does consider it a good 
thing to do when one is paid to do it. So, we see he adapts his work method to 
the requirements of the Home Office and the legal aid payment available, which 
he also explicitly acknowledges: 
 
There’s the economic reality that if I’m going to allow all my lawyers to spend 20 or 
15 hours on a case, they’re not going 3 times, but they’re going 2. So they’re 
spending £ 1000 effectively in time on every case, but we’re only getting paid £ 400. 
We’re not going to be able to survive on that. So there comes a point, there has to 
be, it’s very unfortunate that there has to be a disbalance. The clients, without a 
doubt, are disadvantaged by the fixed fee scheme, because there will be times you 
can’t do everything that you want to do. And that’s just the reality of it.  
 
In brief, this elaborate account shows the difficulties in balancing the different 
interests at stake. We see that whereas the solicitors who explain adopting the 
work method first discussed are not willing to make concessions, this solicitor is 
quite frank in stating that he does: he has adjusted his work method to the fixed 
fee and the broader Home Office system, thereby accepting, to some extent, the 
consequences this may have for the client.133  
                                                        
133  Even though he initially said that it is possible to provide good legal services while stick-
ing to the fixed fee time and that he does put in more time when necessary, the later 
statements imply that he believes it does have an effect. 
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4.4.4  Concluding Observations: Morality versus Market, Individual 
Decisions and Firm Contexts  
The way in which the legal aid system is set up presents solicitors with morality 
versus market dilemmas. This ranges from the decision which new clients to 
accept on legal aid to how to deal with asylum cases once they have been taken 
on; respondents may want to provide legal aid equally to all asylum seeking 
clients that come through the door and/or spend more time on cases than the 
legal aid fees allow, but at the same time need to ensure a sufficient income in 
order to remain financially viable as a firm. Solicitors have different ways of 
dealing with these questions and their individual decision making can largely be 
connected to the type of firm in which they work. 
Within the remuneration system there are different ways to escape or com-
pensate for the fixed fee payment at the initial stages – e.g. assisting unaccom-
panied minors, or more vulnerable clients with complex cases that go three 
times over or do more cases from the Upper Tribunal stage onwards which are 
payable at hourly rates (albeit at risk)134 – and this is used more by (and appear 
more readily available for) respondents working in the larger or the more well-
established medium to large firms. First of all, as regards obtaining and selecting 
clients, these respondents often (have more opportunities to) specialise and ac-
cept cases based on their expertise, and they seem to rely more on referral 
sources (e.g. NGOs) for obtaining their cases. In that scenario often some prese-
lecting has taken place and these are not ‘just any cases’. Second, apart from the 
selection of cases (more often hourly rates cases), especially the larger firms 
amongst them have other departments that also bring in money. If a fixed fee 
case goes three times over, but this is not accepted by the LAA these firms 
would be able to absorb the risk of having their hours cut back by the LAA and 
not obtaining hourly rates instead of the fixed fee, as well as run the risk of the 
at risk phases on onward appeal and in judicial review cases (see more elabora-
tion on this topic in the next section). The hourly rates cases are often also the 
more financially risky cases and the smaller or less well-established firms may 
not be able to afford to run these risks; solicitors working in these firms seem to 
(attempt to) stick more to the fixed fee.  
As one respondent, who considers herself to be in a very ‘privileged posi-
tion’ because she can afford to spend more time on certain cases because of her 
seniority and the type of firm in which she works, explains:  
 
                                                        
134  These last two types of cases may constitute a risk: the case may not go three times over 
or permission to appeal may not be granted in which case Upper Tribunal and judicial 
review cases – which are ‘at risk’ – the preparatory work is not paid for. 
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But I know if I was in another firm and I was a very junior person I wouldn’t be able 
to do that. It would be: 2 hours here, 2 hours there, 2 hours there. And what you see 
is very committed people not really able to do top-class work.135 
 
We have seen that several respondents who are not so ‘privileged’ to work in 
such a firm environment and who adhere to the second and third options distin-
guished – i.e. on average going over the fixed fee time, yet not three times and 
thus work at a loss in these cases or (attempt to) stick, on average, to the time 
limits of the fixed fee – explicitly say that they are struggling because they feel 
they have to compromise on the services they deliver: they say they cannot af-
ford to provide the service they would want or consider necessary. The impor-
tance of making the client understand what the lawyer can and cannot assist with 
under legal aid and focus solely on what is directly relevant for their case is 
stressed by these respondents.136 Some solicitors who explain that they want to 
adopt a more relational approach to lawyering (e.g. a more participatory ap-
proach to lawyering, dialogue between lawyer and client, spending time listen-
ing to the client’s broader concerns in finding solutions) state that they cannot 
do so because of the financial constraints they experience from the fixed fee 
model (e.g. ‘you need to fit in with us, forget about what your own needs are’). 
Finally, we have seen that the morality vs market tension led two respon-
dents working in firms in which they found ‘the market’ prevailed too strongly 
(e.g. ‘production lines churning cases through’) and could not reconcile this with 
their personal ethics, to leave this work environment and start for themselves. 
Yet the tension remained: One of them owns a small firm and runs his fixed fee 
cases the second way (on average going over the fixed fee time, yet not three 
times) and has thus made ‘the conscious decision to make losses’; the other is a 
sole practitioner on the verge of bankruptcy. Two other respondents, owning 
respectively a small and a sole practitioner firm, drew the ultimate conclusion: 
even though they still have a legal aid contract, they decided to stop providing 
legal aid – either voluntarily (cannot provide legal assistance in line with one’s 
own standards) or reluctantly (wants to provide legal assistance to marginalised 
groups in society, but cannot cope with the financial difficulties and uncertain-
ties arising from the system e.g. cash flow problems, funding recoveries from 
the LAA). So, in brief, we see that within this particular legal aid system, the 
firm context further bounds (i.e. delimits or enables) solicitors’ choices in sev-
eral ways and to an important extent.  
 
                                                        
135  eng18-l+10-y-f. 
136  Yet, a few others do not consider this problematic and feel this is still adequate legal 
assistance. 
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To conclude, within the legal aid system, ‘market’ considerations challenge 
legal aid solicitors’ ‘morality’ (obligations towards the client and the public) in 
terms of the time they spend on cases with a view to delivering high quality 
work, as well as in respect of the decision to accept – and continue to assist – 
clients on legal aid. The decision whether to continue to assist clients under the 
legal aid scheme if the prospects of obtaining success in a certain procedure are 
not high enough causes such tensions because of the financial risks involved for 
the lawyer. In the next section I will analyse how solicitors deal with ‘hopeless 
cases’ and discuss their application of the eligibility criteria, in particular the 
merits test, in that regard and we will see how this tension plays out. 
4.5  Decision Making in ‘Hopeless Cases’ 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Sometimes we’re faced with situations where we can no longer represent people on 
legal aid, because the merits are not there.[…] My worst moments in practice have 
been those times, when people are actually very vulnerable, but they haven’t got the 
law on their side and there’s no way we can progress the case in asylum.137 
 
This excerpt shows the ethically challenging situations in which legal aid law-
yers may find themselves: they may be confronted with vulnerable clients in 
whose cases the chances of success are not there or not high enough, in which 
case the lawyer is not allowed, because of the merits test and the restriction of 
legal aid to asylum cases, to continue legal assistance under the legal aid 
scheme. 
As also described in the previous chapters, I found, when examining law-
yers’ decision making on this issue, that there are two – largely interconnected – 
questions that define their decision making in ‘hopeless cases’: First, when is a 
case actually considered hopeless, i.e. what aspects are taken into account when 
assessing the actual prospects of success; second, whether the actual prospects 
of success are the main (or sole) consideration for starting a procedure on the 
client’s behalf or whether there are other considerations that play a role. The 
questions are interrelated and how respondents deal with these questions shows 
how they interpret their obligations to the client and the public in the administra-
tion of justice and how they balance these interests with their interest in profit or 
survival. Whereas we have seen in the preceding chapter that the second ques-
tion played an important role in Dutch respondents’ accounts, the interviews 
with the English respondents largely revolved around the first question. When 
                                                        
137  eng4-l-+10-y-f.  
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discussing the issue under review, it seemed that the idea of starting a procedure 
for reasons other than obtaining success was something which some respondents 
were not really able to comprehend (or were not willing to discuss). Talking 
about a case in terms other than merit or legal success appears not to be part of 
their thinking and a few do not seem to entertain the idea that there may be a 
discrepancy between, on the one hand, what a client seeking to apply for asylum 
wants and/or may be in the client’s best interest and, on the other, starting only 
procedures in asylum cases with chances of success within the applicable legal 
framework (which would be in the public interest in the administration of justice 
interpreted in a conservative sense, i.e. not burdening the legal system with such 
cases). This idea follows from statements that, in asylum cases, the interests of 
the client and public are not in conflict. Since the UK has the obligation to en-
force the Refugee Convention, it is in the public interest that individuals who 
have a right to asylum are allowed to stay and looking at their cases is thus in 
the wider public interest: ‘it’s all about the merits of the case’.138 If a case has 
merit, so the reasoning goes, the lawyer can assist the client on legal aid, and if 
not, the (legal aid) lawyer has no business assisting the client. Several respon-
dents do recognise that there may be a discrepancy between what is in the cli-
ent’s interest and only starting procedures that actually have a chance of success 
within the applicable legal framework, but are keen to stress that the lawyer has 
no role to play when the two do not coincide. Several others do explicitly recog-
nise that there may be a discrepancy between the possibility of obtaining legal 
success within the applicable legal framework and what is in the best interest of 
the client and/or justice (the public interest in the administration of justice in the 
wide sense/progressively, i.e. more broadly than: in line with the current appli-
cable legal framework) and that the lawyer has, in principle, a role in assisting 
the client in procedures that might realise these interests. However, as we will 
see below, there are differences in how far one is willing to go in this regard.  
In this section I will elaborate on respondents’ decision making on this is-
sue, i.e. how the issue is understood by respondents and how they deal with 
what I term (more narrowly) ‘hopeless procedures’, that is an application or 
court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of obtaining legal 
success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close to) zero. I will 
do so by considering the parameters of the institutional context within which 
they operate, in particular the responsibility conferred upon them to apply the 
merits test, as respondents’ decision making on this issue cannot be examined 
and understood without taking this into account. We have seen in the previous 
part of this chapter that the question of how to deal with ‘hopeless cases’ is for 
English respondents to some extent curtailed by the responsibility conferred 
                                                        
138  eng6-s-3-10-y-m. 
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upon solicitors to determine the applicant’s eligibility for legal aid. They have to 
determine from the start whether a case is in scope – generally legal aid is only 
available for asylum and deportation matters, but not for any other immigration 
issues the client may have – and conduct means and merits tests. Respondents 
explain that this sets the boundaries within which legal aid solicitors can oper-
ate: in principle, assist the client in the asylum process, not in obtaining legal 
stay on any other immigration ground and solely in cases in which there is a 
prospect of success in the asylum case. The actual decisions made in concrete 
cases ultimately depend on the particular circumstances of the case, the client 
and the practical circumstances related to the different types of procedures. 
There are, however, several general arguments which are advanced to motivate 
decisions that show how the different interests at stake are interpreted and bal-
anced. I will focus on these arguments and motivations underlying the decisions 
– in particular, in relation to the obligation to apply the merits test – while also 
addressing these in relation to the different circumstances. In doing so, I distin-
guish between their decision making in first instance and after a rejection of the 
asylum claim.  
4.5.2 First Instance: Determining Eligibility for Legal Aid 
Before discussing respondents’ actual decision making in first instance, I will 
briefly touch upon the responsibility conferred upon legal aid providers to de-
termine eligibility in general by illustrating how this responsibility is experi-
enced and how it may work out in practice. The potential client’s eligibility for 
legal aid has to be determined regardless of whether a client approaches the 
solicitor independently for assistance or an asylum applicant is linked to the 
provider through the Voluntary Appointment System. Several respondents point 
to the difficulties they experience in applying the eligibility criteria. They men-
tion the strict distinction between asylum and other immigration matters, which 
some call ‘impossible’ (as these are often interrelated) and they refer to the dif-
ficulty of explaining to clients all the technicalities about the availability of legal 
aid only for asylum and not for any other migration issues they may have. Apart 
from determining whether a case is in scope, several also take issue with their 
role in means and merits testing. For example, this respondent recounts situa-
tions in which he gets clients referred through the Voluntary Appointment Sys-
tem by the Home Office. He explains that the applicant is generally not in-
formed about the content of the appointment and often does not know what the 
appointment with the lawyer is for or thinks it is by definition free. He describes 
how the first appointment goes and why he considers his role in means testing 
problematic: 
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R: Because people come in and expect to just talk to you about their case, like they 
would do if they went to a private place. But they come in here, and of course on 
legal aid the first thing you have to talk about is ‘how do you support yourself? 
What’s your money?’ It’s a bit of a hurdle. You’ve got this person who doesn’t know 
you, you’ve got to build trust, yet the first thing you’ve got to talk to them about is ‘I 
need to know what money you have, how you support yourself and I need evidence 
of how you pay for your living, your food, your rent and whatever, and who’s paying 
it’. You’ve got to do all of that before you can even start dealing with their case. 
Because you’ve got to assess whether or not they are eligible.  
I: So how do you go about that? You first discuss means and then you move to the 
merits, does it work like that? 
R: It’s kind of all in one. You’ve got to establish what their situation is: do they have 
a partner, are they working, do they get money from somewhere, do they have a 
bank account, all these things. Which are not always the best questions. The first 
time you meet someone, you don’t really want to be asked these kind of things. 
[...]So it’s always the case that the first meeting is just dealing with that stuff and 
then make another appointment for them to come back.  
I: So you don’t discuss the content on the first meeting, or a little bit? 
R: A little bit, just so I can get an idea of what it is. Because you have to know 
roughly what the case is otherwise there is no point in coming back.139 
 
In respect of the merits test he continues: 
 
It’s not my job to judge my client. I’m there to help them through to process and 
present their case, whatever it may be. But again, that’s where LA has created these 
barriers between lawyer and a client. They make you judge. They’re making you 
make a call on the merits. 
 
At the same time he does, however, subscribe to it being a necessary part of his 
job: ‘My view has always been: I do legal aid work and part of my role is to 
look after public money and not to waste it.’ Several other respondents equally 
point to what this solicitor refers to as ‘barriers’ created by the legal aid system, 
whilst at the same time accepting it as part of their role. A majority of the re-
spondents explicitly mention that it is part of their duty as a legal aid lawyer to 
look after public money. Whereas some refer to this mainly as having ‘a respon-
sibility to be judicious about it’ in relation to how they run their case (e.g. not 
asking for funding for expert reports when this cannot really help win the case, 
self-censoring when writing time to LAA), others speak about this in relation to 
their decision to take a case on or proceed with a case (the money needs to be 
used ‘for genuine cases’) as we will see below. 
 
Merits testing as part of determining the client’s eligibility for legal aid is thus a 
prominent feature of the legal aid system demarcating lawyers’ assistance to 
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their asylum seeking clients. At first instance, the merits test entails that there 
must be a sufficient benefit to the client. In the previous section, obtaining and 
selecting clients was discussed and the application of the merits test cannot be 
viewed separately and must be understood against this background. If an appli-
cant has not yet claimed asylum, but comes to the solicitor first – either through 
a referral source or independently – most respondents say that they accept that 
the merits test at this stage has been met if the possible client potentially has a 
case, i.e. advances asylum grounds, unless it is obvious to the solicitor that the 
claim will not be successful and/or is a ‘blatant fabrication’.140 It may occur that 
once a case has been taken on, it appears that the asylum claim actually has no 
substance. Many respondents share the view that in respect of the first instance 
procedure: ‘(...) once you’ve taken something on there is an obligation to sort of 
run with it, to see where it goes. And if it doesn’t go very far, then at least 
you’re giving the individual the opportunity to put his case in the strongest way 
possible, on the material that’s available.’141 Especially if the first meeting is 
after the asylum seeker applied for asylum, i.e. the claim has been registered by 
the Home Office, this is for most respondents reason enough to accept that the 
sufficient benefit test has been met and to grant legal aid for the initial stage. 
One respondent, who normally takes on clients after the screening interview, has 
quite a clear stance on this: 
 
We don’t look at the merits of their case at that stage. [...] If someone has a hopeless 
case, they’re still entitled to the advice: to assess their case and tell them their case 
is hopeless.[...] So there’s always sufficient benefit to take an asylum case on and 
advise them about the process and the merits of their case and deal with it up until 
the decision of the Home Office.142 
 
In these accounts we see what can be interpreted as the dutiful lawyer line of 
reasoning – in the proceduralist sense – or the adversarial advocacy line of rea-
soning; in any case we see a focus on role morality and procedure. The idea that 
the lawyer is the client’s representative within the legal system and that it is the 
lawyer’s task either to facilitate the public administration of justice according to 
the law in the public interest and that this entails that procedural laws should be 
used according to their purpose and that any non-frivolous claim regardless of 
one’s personal opinion as to the merits should be pursued (proceduralist dutiful 
lawyering) or that the lawyer’s main task is to be the client’s representative and 
ensure client autonomy in a complex legal system (adversarial advocacy). 
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In several other accounts we see a stricter application of the sufficient benefit 
test and respondents expressing the view that – even after registration of the 
asylum claim – they do have to make their own assessment: ‘We don’t take 
cases solely on the basis that the Home Office has accepted their claims at the 
screening interview. We go slightly beyond that point.’143 Several respondents 
emphasise that legal aid should be used for ‘proper’ or ‘genuine’ cases, since as, 
for example, one respondent who is adamant in stating that she is not willing to 
grant legal aid to people with no real asylum claims explains: ‘because legal aid 
is already scarce’.144 In these arguments we see a more dutiful lawyer line of 
reasoning in the substantivist sense, that is the idea that the lawyer must facili-
tate the public administration of justice according to the law in the public inter-
est and this is interpreted as pursuing justice in line with the spirit and purpose 
of the law, not just legally permissible outcomes (i.e. so not pursuing any non-
frivolous claims, regardless of one’s personal opinion as to the substantive mer-
its).  
This is also seen in the example given by one respondent of the case of a 
Libyan applicant who stayed in the UK as a student and subsequently applied 
for asylum. The client claimed that he would be at risk if he went back, because 
his family was associated with the old regime of Gaddafi. Even though the re-
spondent accepted that this was in principle a valid claim, he decided not to 
further assist the applicant at this initial stage. When he discussed the claim with 
the client, it turned out that the client had been back to Libya six months previ-
ously and had returned with no harm which according to the respondent ‘com-
pletely destroys any claim’ as it showed that there was no risk upon return. No-
tably, in support of his decision to refuse to further assist this client on legal aid 
he pointed specifically to the role conferred upon providers and the risk one 
would run at audits when being too lenient in fulfilling this role:  
 
R: Providers are asked to be the gatekeepers, so there’s an expectation. If I had 
represented him and they’d took the file, they would say ‘you had no right to do this, 
you shouldn’t have done this. It’s obvious that he’s not in fear’.  
I: So that’s your reason actually? 
R: Not being funded is the reason, yes. But that’s probably the biggest single reason 
for refusing to represent people. Because if you would, you would get in trouble. 145 
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The substantivist dutiful lawyer line of reasoning seen in respondents’ accounts 
is often combined with references to the possible financial implications of not 
acting as a gatekeeper. These accounts provide a first impression of the role of 
the legal aid system in solicitors’ decision making, of which we will see more in 
the following section.  
4.5.3  After Rejection of the Asylum Claim 
Almost all respondents explain that, after rejection of an asylum claim, the start-
ing of hopeless procedures, i.e. an application or court procedure in which the 
lawyer considers the chances of obtaining legal success in that procedure and at 
that moment in time to be (close to) zero is something they are not willing and/or 
able to do as a legal aid lawyer.146 When explaining their decisions, they refer to 
the obligation conferred upon them to apply the merits test, which after the first 
instance procedure requires a 50% chance of success. The way in which respon-
dents explain their application of the merits test, in general and in concrete 
cases, ranges roughly from what can be considered a strict application, in which 
the gatekeeping argument plays a central role, to a more lenient application of 
the merits test (referred to by some as a ‘liberal’ approach to the merits test), in 
which we see other arguments instead of or alongside the gatekeeping argument. 
The actual decisions made, i.e. whether one is strict or lenient in a particular 
situation, depend on the particular circumstances of the case and the stage of the 
procedure, but this rough distinction, which presents the outer ends of a contin-
uum of the ways respondents talk about their application of the merits test, al-
lows for discussing the range of arguments given in respect of their decision to 
(not) start a hopeless procedure on behalf of the client under legal aid.  
A Strict Application of the Merits Test and the Gatekeeping Argument 
When narrating their decisions and application of the merits test, many respon-
dents explicitly refer to percentages in explaining how they assess the merits of 
the case. The next quote by a respondent describing how he conducts the merits 
test at the appeal stage is quite specific, but illustrative in this regard:  
 
There are situations when you discuss the refusal letter with the client and the client 
gives you a fair position of their side. At the same time the reasons for refusal from 
the Home Office cannot be dismissed willy-nilly. These are substantive decisions. So 
you end up having a situation where it’s almost 50/50. In such situation the 
approach we take is to accept the client and then assess the merits as we go along. 
As we work on the case, the client may provide more evidence, more information, 
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more answers to the issues arising and, perhaps, if there is need to get an expert 
report, we can request such a report, which could decide whether the case is 50% or 
it’s 70% by the time we go to court. If the client is not able to provide any such 
information, then it could be that by the time we should be going to court, the merits 
are 40% and then we recuse ourselves. We advise the client that because he failed to 
provide material issues and evidence, we can’t continue to provide LA, we cannot 
proceed.147 
 
Allowance of asylum claims often hinges upon the credibility of the applicant. 
When the applicant is found to be not credible by the Home Office, several re-
spondents are clear in explaining that they base their decision in this regard on 
their own assessment of the credibility of the client’s story based on the legal 
requirements that apply – not so much taking into account the uncertainties in-
herent in the system, e.g. judicial unpredictability – refusing legal aid if they 
consider the merits to have dropped below 50%.148 For instance, this respondent 
explains how he decides whether to proceed (i.e. grant legal aid) after a refusal 
by the Home Office stating the reasons for rejecting the application: ‘Unless the 
client provides me with a credible response, I refuse it.’149 This solicitor and 
another respondent gave examples of cases in which they were reprimanded by 
the LAA (or its predecessor the Legal Services Commission) for refusing legal 
aid following a client’s application for review of the refusal, which illustrates 
this strict application.150 Both cases concerned credibility issues and the LAA 
found that the respondents should have given the client the benefit of the doubt. 
The respondent last quoted recounts: 
 
It was a guy from Iran. He was claiming that he was a journalist, but the 
information he gave about his knowledge about the media in Iran was so bad – how 
could the guy really be a journalist? His claim was so inconsistent, lots of mistakes. 
And he said: ‘I’ve got newspaper articles which show that I’m a writer.’ I said: 
‘These newspaper articles can just be produced, they can be produced on a 
computer in half an hour. This doesn’t override all the lack of information that you 
gave at your interview.’ […]But the LAA said: ‘It’s borderline, but we think he 
should be given the benefit of the doubt.’ That’s what they said. So, that’s fine… 
 
In response to my question whether it is actually also his role to filter the real 
refugee he replies: ‘Kind of, kind of’.  
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The case of the other respondent concerned a young woman from an African 
country who claimed she fled for fear of female genital mutilation. The respon-
dent explains: ‘It was a credibility issue and based on the evidence I could not 
do it. Based on my previous experiences this was not 50%.’ He explains how the 
application of the legal test in these cases works and how the available evidence 
would not stand up in court. In response to my question what stops him from 
pursuing these kinds of cases, he explains:  
 
 If you go on that route then there is no point in merits testing at all. We are bound 
by it to use our professional opinion and experience to apply it. We are using 
taxpayers’ money. Our role is to some extent the same as the judge, the same things 
apply. On the available evidence you have to make the best decision you can.151 
 
Likewise, the quote of another, more junior, solicitor illustrates how this respon-
sibility to act as a gatekeeper of the law – more in particular: the legal aid sys-
tem – against the client is felt:  
 
It’s my role, it’s my task, I’m here dealing with public funds. The government has 
basically given us delegated powers to use on their behalf. I can’t go around grant-
ing funding to whoever I like. That would be fraudulent as far as I’m concerned. 
That’s not fair. Just because the government is not here to authorise it every time, 
doesn’t mean you’re not in a responsible position. […] That money could be used 
for someone else. It’s not always about the client, you have to be very careful, it’s a 
balancing act. 152 
 
These accounts show the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning that the legal aid law-
yer’s duty to the client is tempered by the lawyer’s duty towards the system as a 
whole (i.e. the public administration of justice): it is a ‘balancing act’. Whereas 
the respondent second to last quoted says he has no difficulty in applying the 
merits test – he feels he can rely on his experience – the more junior solicitor 
explains that she does find it difficult to fulfil the task conferred upon her: 
 
[...] to assess the merits I find quite tricky at times to be honest. Because there’s a 
lot of material to consider and I don’t like refusing funding for what could have 
been a genuine case. You’ve placed somebody at risk and not given them the full 
opportunity to present their case. I find that very, very difficult. 
 
Even though she recognises the difficulty of deciding on the merits of the case, 
she explains that she tries to apply the test to the best of her abilities and does so 
based on her opinion about the actual merits of the case. The uncertainties inher-
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ent in the system, e.g. judicial unpredictability, are not taken into account in her 
assessment of the merits, even though she acknowledges that which judge hears 
the case may play a critical factor in the success of an appeal: ‘you don’t base 
your merits decision on what judge you are going to get, because you expect 
fairness in a tribunal anyway. So you just proceed with what you feel the merits 
are.’  
An interesting side note in this regard: another junior solicitor recounts how 
her approach to the merits test has shifted and she attributes this to having 
gained more experience and expertise: 
 
This is when I was like starting out in 2011 when I didn’t really… I thought, ‘yeah, 
refuse him’. Whilst I was considering cases I was less detailed than I am now. [...] I 
think my experience has changed my prospects in certain instances. I used to be 
quite limited or narrow-minded on certain cases. Now I think I’m more broader and 
give people the benefit of the doubt with certain aspects. Especially when it comes to 
credibility.153 
 
Respondents who supervise more junior solicitors confirm this idea; a senior 
solicitor at a large firm tells that in his experience starting solicitors are more 
likely to accept the views presented by the Home Office and that it takes much 
training to get them to ‘start thinking in terms of what they can do for the cli-
ent.’154  
 
In these descriptions of the application of the merits test in this, what can be 
considered, strict(er) manner (i.e. explicit references to percentages and basing 
decisions regarding credibility on one’s own assessment about the credibility of 
the client’s story based on the legal requirements that apply, thereby not so 
much taking into account the uncertainties inherent in the system, e.g. judicial 
unpredictability) and the arguments given for doing so, we see the dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning, in particular in the substantivist sense. The ideal typical sub-
stantivist dutiful lawyer finds oneself constrained by public limits both with 
respect to substance and to procedure. Respondents express that their personal 
view as to the merits of the case must be over 50%; in other words, there must 
be a substantive chance of success, not just one legal argument. Moreover, the 
substantivist seeks to pursue justice (i.e. justice in line with the spirit and pur-
pose of the law), not just legally permissible outcomes and this resonates in 
these accounts through the repeated reference made to ‘genuine’ clients and 
cases in relation to the decision to grant legal aid. This idea is also seen in 
statements in which certain forms of stalling are condemned. While recognising 
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that there may be a discrepancy between what is in the client’s interest and only 
starting procedures that actually have a chance of success within the applicable 
legal framework at a certain moment in time, several respondents are keen to 
stress that the lawyer has no role to play when the two do not coincide. They 
acknowledge, for example, that stalling is a possibility and refer to examples 
they have seen in papers of other firms (e.g. file an application or appeal in order 
to continue asylum support), heard of or were confronted with in their own prac-
tice, but state that this is something they would not do or even disapprove of, for 
example: 
 
One could imagine that someone is in the UK for 7 years and has a child in the UK 
who is almost 7 but not yet. By lodging an appeal, time will pass and the person 
would have a stronger case. But I have never done that. That is making abuse of the 
system.155 
 
In this we see the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning of seeking to pursue justice in 
line with the applicable legal framework, not using procedural rules or loopholes 
to frustrate the substance and spirit of the law. Also, we often see in these ac-
counts that respondents emphasise that the assessment of ‘genuine’ clients and 
cases is based on the legal test of plausibility, e.g.: ‘[...] I’d believe in it if I 
thought that she was credible in the answers that she’d given, plausible. Which I 
think would meet the legal test anyway.’156 No conception of justice external to 
the law is expressed and personal moral beliefs seem generally irrelevant.  
However, I also found that, whereas when speaking more generally about 
the application of the merits test respondents describe a strict application utter-
ing this dutiful lawyer line of reasoning (focus on role morality: gatekeeper), 
when talking about concrete cases personal morality is, at times, introduced and 
that one’s assessment is not necessarily put on a par with or described in terms 
of the legal test. We see this, for example, in the account of the respondent 
quoted before in describing his strict application of the merits test by sticking to 
the 50% threshold; his personal conviction (regardless of the actual merits) that 
the client is a ‘genuine’ asylum seeker may temper the strict application of the 
merits test. When talking about a case concerning a heavily traumatised woman, 
he explains that although he was inclined to think that the case was weak based 
on the reasons given by the Home Office for the refusal, after talking to the 
client he could ‘actually tell this client is being sincere and genuine’ and ‘you 
end up granting legal aid for those cases once you are convinced these things 
happened to this client.’157 Several others also mention that if they actually feel 
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the client’s life is at risk, this makes them somewhat more lenient on the merits 
test. For example, one respondent refers to a case in which the client had been 
very inconsistent in the interview and there was no evidence to substantiate the 
claim: ‘the story was just not credible’.158 She explains that she did continue to 
represent the client on appeal and grant legal aid funding (CLR) because ‘if it’s 
something they insist that I do and I feel like their life or their liberty is at stake, 
then I will definitely go ahead and do it for them’. In such cases the chances of 
success do not have to be 50% for her: ‘I would at 40% grant CLR if I feel like 
there is a chance that their life is at risk on returning.’ 
One could argue that the key motivation expressed in these examples is still 
seeking to pursue justice in line with the spirit and purpose of the law (substan-
tivist dutiful lawyering). However, one could also argue that this must be inter-
preted as relational lawyering. Respondents describe a more lenient application 
of the merits test than what they, in principle, describe as a proper application of 
the merits test, which can be seen as an indication of not wanting to compromise 
one’s personal morality and modifying the rules, i.e. application of the merits 
test, in certain situations according to one’s own beliefs. In certain specific 
cases, one may ultimately not let the rules determine what is morally right. In 
the next example, this may be seen somewhat more clearly. The respondent 
second to last quoted gives another illustration of situations in which he inter-
prets this obligation under the legal aid scheme somewhat differently than de-
scribed earlier, seemingly in order to have it conform with his personal morality 
(relational lawyering). In response to the question whether he had ever pursued a 
case that was without merit in the legal sense, but was of some benefit to the 
client, he explains: 
 
R: Yes, we have such cases. Particularly ladies from Pakistan. Some of them are 
quite vulnerable, they actually narrate how they’ve been forced to marry into a 
marriage where they end up being extremely abused by their in-laws and the family 
of the husband. So there may not be a clearly defined Refugee Convention reason. 
Of course we tend to cite membership of a particular social group, but at times it 
doesn’t really come out clearly. You end up having this sentiment that at least this 
client managed to be here and if she can settle here and perhaps she can start over 
and move on. We have such cases. There would be a lot of vulnerability on those 
clients. They would have narrated how badly they have been treated in their 
country. 
I: Yes. But then the question is, what do you do then? Do you lodge an application, 
do you lodge an appeal or how do you go about that? 
R: You lodge an application, yes. Emphasise how vulnerable the client is and 
obviously in terms of the merits there will be a sufficient benefit to the client, this is 
a vulnerable client who without intervention would not be secure.  
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I: Okay, so you do lodge the application, but you say: there are no actual 
convention grounds. When it comes to appeal, how do you go about it then? 
R: It’s the sufficient benefit test as well. The merits, if it is going to benefit this client 
in terms of, if you clearly highlight how vulnerable the client has been and what she 
has gone through, then you can also justify granting legal aid on that basis.159 
 
So, even though we see in these accounts the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning 
(facilitating the public administration of justice according to the law – i.e. the 
rules regarding merits testing – in the public interest and acting as a gatekeeper 
against the client if the merits test of 50% is not met), we also see aspects of, 
what can be considered, the relational lawyer line of reasoning in a few ac-
counts. In certain specific cases, one may ultimately not let the rules (or the 
strict application thereof advocated earlier) determine what is morally right and 
interpret the rules slightly differently in order to do what one considers just.160 
Depending on the situation, different considerations carry different weight.  
 
At the onward appeal stages, the gatekeeping argument and the dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning is seen (more prominently) in many respondents’ accounts. 
The next example is illustrative. This respondent tells about a situation in which 
he acknowledges that in cases where the Home Office and the court accept that 
the client may face some danger upon return, but subsequently argue that the 
client could relocate or just go to the authorities in the home country for protec-
tion, this is for financial or cultural reasons not really an option. He explains 
why he does not challenge such a decision on onward appeal: 
 
You have a chance at it, but if the courts don’t accept it crosses that threshold to 
qualify, then you can’t do anything about it. Because it is error of law. You can’t 
take it on just because you don’t like the decision.161  
 
In response to my question whether he would not want to challenge the criteria 
in such cases, given how he feels about the client’s situation upon return, he 
says: 
 
You do. What you find then is, often the decision that comes back is: the judge was 
perfectly within his rights to reach that decision. Yes, it might be a legal point in 
whether or not there is in fact support or help in their own country, but the judge 
weighs everything up, explains the decision, and it’s within his rights to reach the 
decision he did. It’s not an error of law. And that’s usually what you get. 
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Even though he recognised that, in reality, the client would not be able to go 
back to his country of origin (or doing so would mean extreme hardship), he did 
not proceed with the case because the client’s situation did not meet the legal 
threshold. He explains that from his experience he would know what would 
succeed and what would not. In addition, he refers to all the elements that dis-
courage providers from proceeding, including the ‘at risk’ aspect and the possi-
bility of judges reporting cases they consider meritless to the SRA and the disci-
plinary sanctions this may induce.162 Moreover, these stages often involve the 
instruction of barristers who may play an important role in identifying the error 
of law which is required at these stages. I will come back to these aspects and 
how these play a role in the following paragraphs, but here I would like to point 
out that, again, we see the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning: the lawyer facilitates 
the public administration of justice according to the law in the public interest 
and, being an officer of the court, will thus not present cases to the court which 
he believes will not succeed within the applicable legal framework.  
A Lenient Application of the Merits Test: The Gatekeeping Argument in 
Perspective and Other Arguments  
As opposed to, what can be considered, a strict application of the merits test 
sketched above, a more lenient application of the test is also seen in respon-
dents’ accounts (in general and/or in certain cases) and a range of arguments 
justifying this application which show different lines of legal moral reasoning. 
In this, what I consider, more lenient application not so much reference is made, 
when explaining one’s decisions and the application of the merits test, to the 
prospect of success in percentages, but rather in terms of whether there is some-
thing that can legitimately be argued. Also, when explaining one’s assessment of 
credibility in this respect, emphasis is placed on leaving the decision on credibil-
ity to the judge.  
While recognising one’s responsibility as a legal aid lawyer, there are risks 
involved in acting too ‘judge-like’ as a solicitor explicitly pointed out in this 
regard: one respondent says he sees this happening around him and constantly 
tries to correct himself when he is inclined not to proceed with a case, because 
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he himself cannot imagine the situation as portrayed by a client to have actually 
happened. He explains: ‘if I must be really harsh on myself, you can get caught 
up with stereotypes [...] And into thinking, these sort of claims are common-
place.’163 He refers to two recent cases in which he was very close to deciding 
not to proceed for this reason; both cases were allowed by the judge. This con-
firmed his belief to not substitute his own judgement about credibility for that of 
the judge. 
Likewise, another respondent, while expressing the same (gatekeeping) ra-
tionale as seen in the previous paragraph showing no principled problems with 
the act of merits testing (‘if there is no merit in the application, then there is no 
justifiable reason for the legal aid authorities to be paying for meritless applica-
tions’)164 explains that he applies the merits test in, what can be considered, a 
more lenient way, arguing that it is ultimately for the court to decide on the ap-
plication of the law. When recounting cases in which the Home Office presents 
information suggesting that the information the client provided in the asylum 
application is false, he states: ‘It’s my role to try and probe the client for infor-
mation, in order for the court to be assisted to establish whether a situation is 
this way or that way.’ He leaves the decision on substance to the court whilst 
emphasising that if he knows that what the client claims cannot be true, he will 
no longer represent the client because of his ‘obligations to the court’. I will 
discuss these limitations in more detail below.  
In these accounts we see the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning – i.e. the law-
yer having a mediating function between the law and the client and as an officer 
of the court complying with his or her obligations to the court – but rather in the 
proceduralist sense as opposed to the substantivist sense, seen in the previous 
paragraph: it shows the idea that procedural laws should be used according to 
their purpose but that, as to substance, it is the job of the court to decide what 
the purpose of the law is, i.e. any non-frivolous claim regardless of the lawyer’s 
personal opinion as to the merits should be pursued leaving the substantive deci-
sion on the merits to the court. 
 
In addition to the argument of the lawyer not being a judge – and should there-
fore refrain from acting as one, also when acting as a legal aid lawyer – the un-
predictability of the courts is mentioned by several respondents as an element 
they take into account and put forward as a justification for proceeding with 
weak cases on appeal before the First Tier Tribunal. For instance, this solicitor 
narrates what she describes as a very weak case – it concerned a client who had 
given three completely different accounts of what happened, there were lots of 
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problems and discrepancies and the Home Office argued that his account was 
completely unreliable – which was pursued and won on appeal. She explains 
that she is very reluctant in meriting out such cases since: ‘it’s difficult to say no 
when you know that weak cases can win with the right judge on the right 
day.’165 This argument is often, as in the account of this respondent, combined 
with emphasising the lawyer’s duty to the client to advocate the client’s interests 
as vigorously as possible – and without judging the legitimacy of the client’s 
claim and expressing views about whether the individual client’s claim is justi-
fied or questioning whether the client is a ‘genuine’ asylum seeker – within the 
bounds of the law.166 In response to the question whether when acting for the 
client, one needs to take the public interest into account, this respondent answers 
no. However, she goes on to explain how this is tempered by her duties as a 
solicitor to the legal system, in particular the duty not to mislead; she states that 
she draws the line at the point at which she would be ‘professionally embar-
rassed’. These references to professional duties as limiting one’s obligation to 
the client are seen in virtually all accounts and I will elaborate on this below. 
Similarly, another respondent explains that as long as it is not absolutely 
clear that the client’s case is a ‘blatant fabrication’ she proceeds despite the ac-
tual legal prospects, for example:  
 
In a case like this, you knew something really bad happened to this woman. But you 
couldn’t build a case around her, it was horrendous. Just roll the dice, because you 
never know, you might get a nice judge.167  
 
The unpredictability of the courts (at the first appeal stage) is thus used as an 
argument justifying what can be considered a lenient application of the merits 
test and shows, in combination with the stronger focus on the lawyer’s obliga-
tion to the client, an adversarial advocacy line of reasoning. A more relational 
lawyer line of reasoning can also be discerned in some respondents’ accounts, as 
for example the last quote illustrates: the solicitor states that she has no case 
legally, but that she considers this person to be in need of protection which 
shows that what this respondent considers a just outcome in the individual case 
is taken into account in deciding to proceed – personal morality weighs in.  
Furthermore, in the accounts of many respondents a critique on the asylum 
system is seen and several refer to this when explaining their (at times) lenient 
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application of the merits test. Respondents refer to their experiences with the 
Home Office and express their views about the broader setup of the asylum 
system; some speak of a ‘culture of disbelief’ towards asylum seekers and refer 
to their work assisting clients within the system as a ‘fight’.168 The view that the 
system is inappropriate for establishing the truth is also expressed and some 
even say that it was not set up with this aim. As, for example, one respondent – 
referring to the system as ‘shambolic’– explains in relation to the assessment of 
credibility: 
 
I think it’s a very fine line between lying and not conforming with the standards over 
here. […] When you ask someone who’s born and brought up in this country certain 
questions: Where do you go to school? How would you describe your mother, 
father, your family? What did you do last weekend? There’s a lot more precision in 
the answer because of how we are brought up, the culture, the society that we live 
in. We’re kind of orientated to know things, to have a bit of intellectual ability to be 
able to give precise answers. But if you have someone from Somalia – where all they 
have seen throughout their life is war, fight – if you ask them these questions […] If 
you use the life over here as a yardstick to measure how they should respond to 
certain things, then everything what the person is going to say is going to come 
across as a lie. Because they’re not conforming to the standard that we have set […] 
Their lifestyle is completely different. A ten-year-old boy from Somalia. All he heard 
was fighting, gunshots and bombs, all ten years of his life. Compare that to a ten-
year-old from the UK… It’s a completely different… reality. […] It’s very easy for 
you to sit here and listen to someone from say, Syria or somewhere else, and ask 
them some questions. They can’t give you straightforward answers. They can’t look 
at you and answer questions. They can’t precisely tell you: ‘Oh, this is when that 
happened. This is the time. This is the date. This is what happened.’ No, they can’t. 
They’ve got too many bitter memories to remember. So, would you say that they’re 
not telling the truth? 169 
 
Several respondents advance comparable fundamental doubts as to the propriety 
of the system as a motivation for their decision to hardly ever merit people out at 
the appeal stage before the First Tier Tribunal.  
This is however different at the onward appeal stages. Respondents empha-
sise that onward appeals require an error of law and being able to actually iden-
tify such a legal error is a prerequisite for pursuing a case at these stages. 
Whereas at the First Tier Tribunal stage the judge has quite some room to decide 
on a case (and the chances of success may depend on the judge who hears the 
case), respondents explain that at the onward appeal stages the error of law con-
dition is more clear cut and less open to interpretation, leaving less room to pro-
ceed. Moreover, as we have seen above and I will elaborate on this below, there 
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is a financial risk involved in doing so (these procedures are prepared ‘at risk’ of 
obtaining permission to appeal). Nevertheless, several respondents explain that 
they are willing to take up this work and proceed with cases which they expect 
are not very likely to succeed, because they want to test the limits of the current 
legal framework, or even challenge it, for their individual client (adversarial 
advocacy line of reasoning) or for a wider group of clients because the system 
does not produce just outcomes (i.e. justice in the public interest: the moral ac-
tivist line of reasoning) and give examples of such cases.170 Some respondents 
explain, when pointing to the difficulties in finding barristers who are prepared 
to do work at risk, that they may at times resort to drafting the grounds them-
selves if they feel that they have a case, and instruct a barrister later on. This 
respondent describes how she goes about deciding whether to pursue the diffi-
cult – or maybe within the existing legal framework hopeless – cases if she be-
lieves a case needs to be pursued: 
  
R: […] what we nearly always do is, unless counsel absolutely says to us there’s no 
merits, we would always try if we think the case needs to be pursued. Even if we 
can’t immediately see the error of law, there might be something. 
I: Why would you think a case needs to be pursued? 
R: I’m of the view that every case needs to be properly tested, absolutely properly 
tested. And sometimes you get a decision from the First Tier Tribunal and you think 
the evidence has been viewed in a very jaundiced way or something’s gone wrong in 
the hearing or there’s been a misunderstanding of the evidence, you can see that 
something’s gone awry. That’s not to say that the judges always get it wrong, I’m 
not saying that at all, but I am very reluctant to drop a case, any case if I think there 
is some other way of making sure it is absolutely tested and challenged as far as it 
can go. 171 
 
Because, she continues: 
 
[…] our primary duty is to represent our clients and do the best for our clients.[…] 
And it is always, in my view, in the best interest of the client to challenge a refusal if 
you can. 
 
Whereas, these quotes show a focus on the individual client since the lawyer is 
the client’s representative in the legal system (adversarial advocacy line of rea-
soning), in the account of this respondent as well as in some of the others, deci-
sions are also explained by mentioning the lawyer’s role in making the law and 
the legal institutions more substantively just in the public interest (moral activist 
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line of reasoning). For example, on the issue of legal aid and as a way of ex-
plaining her ‘liberal’ approach to granting it this respondent states:  
 
It’s actually a much bigger issue, it’s a societal issue about fairness, it’s about 
saying the state is not always right. And that’s why I say I never give up, because I 
never accept the state is always right. And I know that the Home Office decision 
making is not a fair and balanced system. It’s driven by politics, which is 
numbers.172 
 
Likewise, several respondents mention their commitment to the refugee/migrant 
cause in relation to their application of the merits test. For example, this respon-
dent states: 
 
[...] this line of work is slightly vocational. Because… If you try and practise asylum 
law out of a textbook, you just sit there with your textbook and work out, ‘oh that 
doesn’t meet that threshold, therefore I can’t win.’ If you work like that, you would 
merits fail all your clients. If you really are a bit ambivalent about human rights law 
or refugees, and you’re basically in it because it’s a job, then you’re just not going 
to make the right decisions.173 
 
Another respondent explains that her main consideration for proceeding with 
certain cases that may be within the existing legal framework considered hope-
less is that she does not agree with policy: 
 
I seemed to be the only one believing that [country X] is not safe. And I’ve horribly 
been proven right, because [country X] is now a mess again. But sometimes I felt 
like I’m the only one thinking that [country X] is not safe. So yes, it’s a risk. I 
literally was the only one, people were dropping [country X] cases.174 
 
This example of continuously proceeding with certain types of cases with a view 
to changing the policy in respect of a certain country can be considered a form 
of strategic litigation, i.e. seeking to challenge or change the law in order to 
achieve justice. 
Acting As a Legal Aid Lawyer versus Acting Privately: Different Duties? 
When discussing with respondents their decision making on the issue under 
review, several respondents brought up the difference between their decisions 
when acting as a legal aid solicitor as opposed to acting as a solicitor in private 
cases. They explicitly distinguish between the two and express a stronger focus 
on the client’s interest, in particular, by uttering a more adversarial advocacy 
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line of reasoning (‘acting on the client’s instructions’), when talking about their 
decisions on the issue in private cases. However, this focus on the client is al-
ways accompanied by explicit references to its limits. The following accounts 
illustrate this. 
Acting on the Client’s Instruction and/or Interest 
Several respondents explain that if they believe the chances of success in a pro-
cedure to be very small or zero, i.e. when they consider it an actual hopeless 
case, or in any case a hopeless procedure, they feel they cannot act under the 
legal aid scheme, but may be willing to do so on a privately paying basis as, for 
example, the next quote shows. In response to the question whether the respon-
dent ever pursued a case that was in his view without merit (no direct possibility 
of legal success), but would benefit the client in some way, he states: 
 
R: Well, certainly not under Legal Aid.  
I: No? 
R: No, because you do the merits test. 
I: But you say you are liberal with the merits test? 
R: Not that liberal. I would never… I’ve told clients this on many occasions, we 
have a duty to the court. We can’t put forward grounds that have absolutely no 
foundation whatsoever, but if there’s potentially some argument although, 
realistically, the prospects of it succeeding are very low, but the client still wants to 
pay to do that, then we’re obliged to do it.  
I: Okay, but only if the client is paying you, on legal aid it’s never an option? 
R: No, because those sorts of arguments or considerations come up when… it’s 
usually not even at the First Tier Tribunal stage. It normally comes up either when 
you’re making an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal or an 
application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal or potentially a Judicial 
Review. At all of those stages there are merits tests. Whereas yes, I can be liberal 
with it, my view of what has 50% chance of success can be different to another 
lawyer’s, but if I think the chances of success are only 10-20%, I can’t do it. But 
some people will pay if the chances of success are only 10-20%. 
I: So there’s really a difference? 
R: Yes. 
I: With a paying client you would and with a non-paying client you wouldn’t? 
R: Yes, I think professionally we’re obliged to. You can’t put forward spurious 
arguments to a court, but if they’re fairly weak – you’re allowed to put forward 
weak arguments. If a client instructs you to do it and as long as you’ve advised them 
about the prospects of success, the likely consequences and so on, I think as a 
solicitor you are obliged to do it.175  
 
He does so because he believes that as a solicitor one is ‘professionally obliged 
to act in your client’s best interests’. Several respondents point to the clear dif-
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ferences in their role as a solicitor in public as opposed to private cases since ‘if 
people are paying me privately, I can do whatever they want, obviously. Be-
cause I’m a solicitor with a reason’ as long as ‘my ethics are not breached’.176 
The argument of acting on the client’s instructions – in other words, ensure cli-
ent autonomy – is considered an important value, to which they can adhere in 
private cases. However, in legal aid cases this value seems to be outweighed by 
the lawyer’s responsibility to uphold the institutions of law and justice, i.e. the 
legal aid system, in the public interest. The next quote further illustrates how the 
legal aid lawyer’s responsibility for public money as an argument overriding the 
lawyer’s loyalty to the client is regarded. This respondent refers to a private 
immigration case she pursued only because the client wanted to and explains she 
could not have done this at public expense: 
 
R: Because that money comes from the government. That money can be better used 
in other services.  
I: Yes. So you do have a responsibility there? 
R: A massive responsibility. […] because we have custody of public money. Public 
money is something that has to be respected. Our firm respects the role that we have 
as legal aid lawyers very, very much. There is not an endless stream of money 
obviously.177 
 
An explicit distinction is made between one’s responsibilities as a legal aid law-
yer as opposed to acting as a lawyer in private cases. Ultimately, we see that 
these respondents accept that they have a different role when acting as a legal 
aid lawyer. The idea that the lawyer has a responsibility in maintaining the legal 
aid system in good form in the public interest and that this may override the 
solicitor’s duty to act on the client’s instructions is seen in these accounts, but 
also the simpler argument that they ‘can’t’ pursue certain cases under legal aid is 
advanced – i.e. not referring so much to the responsibility towards the legal aid 
system but rather to the practical circumstance that they are not allowed to. 
Limits to Acting on the Client’s Instruction and/or Interest 
Yet, also in private cases, respondents are explicit in formulating the outer limits 
to the solicitors’ duty to act in their client’s best interest. For example, if a law-
yer knows that the arguments a client wants to bring forward are untrue (‘spuri-
ous’) or when there is absolutely nothing that can legitimately be brought for-
ward, especially at the onward appeal stages:  
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R: So long as it’s not illegal, a lawyer’s job is to represent your client. So as long as 
they tell you to do something and so long as it’s not illegal, doesn’t breach anything, 
ethics or whatever, you do it.[…] You see, that’s the thing about law, isn’t it. If a 
client chooses to spend his money on however frivolous a case it might be, it’s his 
money. So as long as I’m not doing something that is unlawful, I’m expected to 
follow instructions.  
I: You can burden the court with that?  
R: Yes. Unless, like I said, it depends on what stage it is. Obviously if you are 
dealing with the upper courts, then part of our duty is not to waste the court’s time. 
So there is obviously legal sort of barriers. If a case literally has zero merits 
whatsoever, then yes, you shouldn’t waste the upper court’s time.178 
 
Or, when there is absolutely nothing that can legitimately be brought forward 
and the only reason for proceeding would be gaining time (i.e. a form of stall-
ing). The next examples illustrate how some respondents say they deal with the 
tension between ensuring the client’s best interest (as they recognise that gaining 
time might be in the client’s interest) and their duties to the court. In relation to 
his decision not to assist a client in applying for permission to appeal to the Up-
per Tribunal if there is nothing he can ‘legitimately put forward’, this respondent 
explains: 
 
R: (…) So what I’m saying, if all they want is to stay here lawfully a bit longer, they 
can put it in themselves. They can write anything on it: ‘I don’t like this decision’. 
[…] They fill it in themselves, sign it, fax it off, they’ll get a decision and then when 
it’s refused they can renew the application to the Upper Tribunal, so give themselves 
another 3-4 months here lawfully. 
I: Okay, it works like that. 
R: Yes. And it’s perfectly legitimate.179 
 
Or as another respondent, who is also keen to stress that he is serious about 
lodging appeals, explains:  
 
‘(…) it’s about extremes, if an application is so hopeless to make, but it would 
nevertheless get him the extra 2 weeks that he needs, so you can say confidently that 
will get him 2 weeks, but the application is so hopeless that it’s a breach of your 
professional duties really to do it, sometimes the answer is, ‘if you want to do it by 
putting in an application, this might be the outcome, you might get your extra 2 
weeks, but you might be the one that wants to do this by yourself’. […] I think the 
client can still be happy with the situation, because if he has proper advice on the 
implications of him filling out that fax and putting it in, he can just do it himself.180 
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The solution is thus advising the client about the legal options and consequences 
without formally assisting him or her. These quotes show that these respondents 
have no fundamental problems with the client using a court process to this end – 
and no feeling of having a role in preventing the client from doing so – however, 
they will not assist the client in their capacity as a solicitor. It shows adherence 
to the adversarial view of ensuring client autonomy limited, however, by the 
solicitor’s duties to the legal system.  
Apart from the limitations mentioned by virtue of respondents’ professional 
duties as a solicitor (on which I will elaborate below), quite some respondents 
mention, in general as well as in relation to not wanting to start procedures with 
very small or no chances of success, the ‘bad press’ about immigration lawyers. 
The negative image of immigration and/or legal aid lawyers in the media, as also 
discussed in the introduction, is thus something these lawyers are aware of and 
take into account when (talking about) acting for their clients. One account illus-
trates this. Comparable to some of the solicitors last quoted, this respondent 
explains that he has no moral opinion about people (mis)using the asylum sys-
tem; however, he will not assist them: 
 
R: I tell them how to claim asylum. That information is public knowledge. They are 
entitled to that […] 
I: But you don’t assist them? 
R: Yes, I’ll say ‘I’m not helping you because you don’t have a case’. I mean, some 
practitioners are faintly irritated by that, I think. I don’t think it makes much 
difference. 
I: What do you mean? 
R: People misusing the asylum system. So I’m saying, ‘I think asylum might be one 
way in which I can stay in the country’, it was never really set up to be like that, was 
it?  
I: You mean you are not irritated by that? 
R: No, not really. My view is you can’t blame people for wanting to stay in a first 
world country. I’d do the same if I was living in poverty in Malawi.  
I: But you don’t assist them?  
R: Well, I can’t, that’s what I’m saying. I can’t if you don’t have a case… I can’t 
give you Legal Aid anyway, because your case isn’t strong enough. There’s also no 
point in me saying I’ll do it on a private basis, because to me that’s where 
immigration solicitors fall into disrepute, when they say: ‘yes, we’ll make an 
application, you’ll be alright’, when you know that, really, the only option for 
someone is to return.181 
 
Finally, the examples given by two respondents can be considered somewhat 
atypical in that they concern specific situations in which they would assist the 
client (however, again not necessarily under legal aid) in a procedure not with a 
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view to obtaining legal success in that procedure as they know that this would 
not be obtained in that particular procedure, but for an ulterior aim in the client’s 
interest.182 Yet, they explain they do this not simply because the client wants to: 
they stress that they are serious about their role as solicitors and their reputation 
with the courts and they make their own assessment as to how their actions 
might help the client. One respondent gives the example of a situation in which 
she continued to lodge an appeal to the Court of Appeal to keep the client in the 
process and from being removed:  
 
[…] he got refused permission on the papers by a very senior judge. And there 
wasn’t really any merits in us doing anything more on the appeal. But we said, we 
can do a fresh claim, because you’ve now been here even longer and he had a 
girlfriend and all this kind of stuff. So we opened up a fresh claim. To protect him 
and give him more time, we helped him renew his application to an oral hearing, 
even though I did not do it under funding. So that’s the scenario that can happen 
where, if we get refused on the papers or orally in a court, it’s not always worth 
pursuing that to another appeal and a fresh claim is better. […] So I did renew for 
him, helped him renew, because he still wanted to do the oral hearing. And that also 
protected him, extended his leave, while I was helping him prepare the fresh 
claim.183  
 
Later on in the interview she refers back to the case and summarises how she 
went about it: 
 
On the boy who I said there was no merits for me to appeal, but I’ll do the fresh 
claim, I lodged his appeal, but I didn’t get funding to do that. Because I don’t think 
there’s merits to do that. So I helped him, I did it pro bono. And if it would go to 
court, he would go with his key worker and we wouldn’t have gone. 
 
The appeal thus merely served as a means not to have him removed. Therefore, 
she would not apply for legal aid funding and not assist the client in court. 
Hence, she lodged the appeal because she helped the client by doing it and she 
believed that there was a chance of him obtaining legal stay in the end. This 
respondent also refers to situations in which the client plans to leave the country: 
‘you might appeal to just protect them for the two weeks that they’re preparing 
to go away, and then withdraw the appeal.’ Here the aim is to prevent the client 
from being detained whilst preparing to leave. So it seems this respondent is, in 
certain specific circumstances, willing to go somewhat further in that she assists 
the client in lodging appeals that she knows will not succeed (yet, without apply-
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ing for legal aid funding in the procedure), because there is a concrete benefit to 
the client which may lie beyond obtaining legal success.  
The other respondent, who acknowledges that she at times instigates legal 
action for reasons other than immediate legal success, gives the following ex-
ample of what she might undertake in the client’s interest:  
 
I might put in a claim that isn’t really ready, because for example the person is 
being supported by Social Services, and they are threatening to withdraw the 
accommodation, or the person is risking being removed. So I have to put in a claim 
that I’m not happy with it, that it’s not fully documented and I don’t know if it will 
be, because I’m under pressure from that point of view. So I’m doing it for an 
ulterior motive, to stop removal or to maintain accommodation. But when it comes 
to the Upper Tribunal, I’m doing it – sometimes praying but sometimes thinking 
‘definitively this is a really good application’ – but always to win the case, not to get 
something else.184  
 
She further explains that there are also cases where an application to the Home 
Office is put in as a ‘holding mechanism’ in order to fulfil the conditions for 
obtaining a right to legal stay at a later moment in time. This respondent empha-
sises that she acts in the client’s best interest: ‘there is a benefit in making an 
application, even if the application itself may not be successful, because it may 
lead to something else that may be successful’.  
In these examples, we thus see a strong focus on the client’s interest both 
based on adversarial advocacy and the relational lawyer line of reasoning: pro-
cedural rules are used to advocate the client’s interests as vigorously as possible 
either with a view to eventually obtaining legal success or because there is an-
other concrete benefit to the individual client in that particular circumstance 
(e.g. preventing the client from being detained whilst preparing to leave) show-
ing a more holistic view of clients and their problems and not restricting assis-
tance to a legal solution. The respondent last quoted explicitly recognises the 
tension between the different interests at stake by stating that although ‘there 
may be very good reasons for what we do, from the point of view of the client’ 
[…] ‘that doesn’t make it correct’ from the point of view of the Home Office. 
The focus on either one of these interests and the solicitor’s obligations in this 
regard (respectively to client and to the public in the administration of justice) 
may shift in the course of the asylum process; we see that she distinguishes be-
tween onward appeals and other applications, suggesting that the lawyer’s duty 
to the court, particularly at the onward appeal stages, ultimately limits the solici-
tor’s actions for the client.  
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The ‘Professional Duties’ Argument and the Role of the Professional Context 
As already touched upon in the previous paragraphs, the argument of the solici-
tor’s ‘professional duties’, also referred to under the term ‘duty to the court’, is 
mentioned by virtually all respondents as ultimately restricting – in addition to 
the other arguments, including one’s duties under the legal aid system – what 
they might undertake on the client’s instructions and/or in the client’s interest; 
both when talking about legal aid cases and the application of the merits test and 
when talking about private cases (the distinction is not always made). From 
respondents’ accounts we can distil that the core of these duties seems to entail, 
as the above already suggests, not presenting cases to the (Upper Tribu-
nal/Higher) court without a legitimate argument and not misleading the court or 
other state authorities. The following accounts further illustrate this.  
The main consideration restraining respondents’ actions who, as quoted ear-
lier, proceed with cases which they expect are not very likely to succeed at the 
onward appeal stages, because they want to test the limits of the current legal 
framework, or even challenge it, for their individual client (uttering the adver-
sarial advocacy line of reasoning) or for a wider group of clients because the 
system does not produce just outcomes (i.e. justice in the public interest: uttering 
the moral activist line of reasoning) appears to be their reputation with the courts 
following from their duties as a solicitor within the legal system and, in that 
regard, the necessity of advancing legitimate arguments and not misleading the 
court. The accounts of this respondent are illustrative of this: 
 
We’re very careful about not putting stupid grounds to the Upper Tribunal, very 
careful about that. […] Because we want our litigation to be taken seriously. We 
want the judges to know that we take seriously our duties to the court and not waste 
time, that we are fully engaged and properly preparing the case. We are serious 
representatives, serious about our role as representing clients and doing the best we 
can in the best interest of the client. And it is always, in my view, in the best interest 
of the client to challenge a refusal if you can.185 
 
In response to my question whether when acting for the client one needs to take 
the public interest (more in particular the public administration of justice) into 
account, she states: 
 
Yes, I think we do in the sense of we have to prepare, treat the court with respect, 
not mislead the court, we have to be efficient in the way we prepare our case, we 
have to make sure we’re not making any submissions that we know are untrue. So 
we have all of those duties. But our primary duty is to represent our clients and do 
the best for our clients. I don’t think a lawyer’s public interest duty involves saying 
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‘I don’t fancy taking this case because the arguments are hard’. I think our duty is 
to test the law and apply it for our client.186  
 
When referring to one’s professional duties, some literally mention the profes-
sional rules (code of conduct) to which solicitors are subject. For example, the 
respondent quoted earlier (uttering the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning) in stat-
ing that it is his role to ‘try and probe the client for information, in order for the 
court to be assisted to establish whether a situation is this way or that way’ 
whilst emphasising that if he knows that what the client claims cannot be true, 
he will no longer represent the client, further explains this decision: 
 
The rules of professional practice mean that I should serve the best interest of my 
client at all times, but I should also serve the court at all times, and if the two come 
into conflict, then I must ensure that the obligations to the court trump that of the 
individual. 187 
 
Another respondent who speaks in somewhat more adversarial terms by answer-
ing ‘no’ to the question whether when acting for the client, one needs to take the 
public interest into account, nevertheless stresses that her actions for the client 
are always limited by one’s duties as a solicitor towards the legal system, in 
particular the duty not to mislead: 
 
I: So the client’s interest is on top, it’s the most important thing? 
R: Yes. You can’t deceive the Home Office, you have some parameters. You have a 
duty to the court, to be honest, obviously. If after a while your relationship with the 
client breaks down because he keeps changing what he’s saying to you, then, 
although it might be in the interest of the client to just present what he said to you at 
the very last account he’s given, if I haven’t got confidence in what he’s saying is 
correct then, even though it might be in his best interest to do that, I can’t do that 
because of my duty as a lawyer. […] You have a duty as a solicitor not to put 
forward an account where you’d be misleading the Home Office or the court. Those 
are the sort of ethical things I get in quite a lot.188 
 
She refers to this as being ‘professionally embarrassed’ in which case she does 
not continue representation. These quotes illustrate the outer boundaries seen in 
respondents’ accounts on this topic; these limitations are always mentioned as 
ultimately restricting what one may undertake in the client’s interest. When 
seeking to understand respondents’ decision making in this regard, the argu-
ments given can be interpreted as adversarial advocacy, i.e. advocating the cli-
ent’s interest as the client’s representative within the legal system as vigorously 
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187  eng3-med-+10-y-m. 
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as possible within the bounds of the law; the bounds of the law being: the SRA 
Code of Conduct which reads that when the client’s interest and the public inter-
est in the administration of justice are in tension, the latter must prevail. Alterna-
tively, the repeated reference made to the lawyer’s professional duties as limit-
ing the lawyer’s actions for the client can ultimately also be interpreted as a 
dutiful lawyer line of reasoning: even though the lawyer is an advocate for the 
client, s/he has an overriding duty to the legal system and at times acts as a gate-
keeper of the law against the client. In any case, the adversarial advocacy seen 
amongst respondents can be considered moderate compared to the adversarial 
advocacy seen in the accounts of their Dutch counterparts. One could argue that 
the dutiful lawyer ideal, i.e. the idea that the lawyer has a special position in 
society which involves a responsibility to the public to facilitate the administra-
tion of justice according to the law and to act accordingly (e.g. as an officer of 
the court), is what Wagenaar calls the ‘objective meaning’ underlying lawyers’ 
decisions.189 Even if respondents do not explicitly refer to themselves as an offi-
cer of the court or say that the public interest prevails over the client’s interest 
when these are in tension, the solicitor’s duties to the court are always men-
tioned as ultimately constraining respondents’ actions for the client. 
As a final point, in addition to the SRA Code of Conduct prescribing which 
interest must prevail, the possibility of disciplinary sanctions in combination 
with judges actually criticising lawyers for not acting as an ‘officer of the court’ 
seems to play a role in respondents’ decision making on the topic. Respondents 
refer to the possibility of judges reporting cases they consider meritless to the 
SRA (pointing to the examples of cases in which judges did reprimand lawyers) 
and the disciplinary sanctions this may induce.190 As, for example, one respon-
dent explains, giving the example of judicial reviews in which (allegedly hope-
less) applications were lodged to stop removal: 
 
                                                        
189  Wagenaar (2011), p.18: ‘Objective meanings do not explain an individual’s actions but 
rather the meaning that a pattern of activity has in and for the larger culture.’ It is the ba-
sic assumption that makes a particular activity (here: lawyering) possible. It is a 
presuppositional concept that is implicit, i.e. it is not always part of the reason giving of 
the actors. 
190  See cases in which judges criticise immigration lawyers and mention referring solicitors 
to the SRA, e.g.: B & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For The Home 
Department & Anor (Rev 1) [2012] EWHC 3770 (Admin) (20 December 2012); Awuku 
(No 2) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 3690 (Ad-
min) (10 December 2012); Awuku, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2012] EWHC 3298 (Admin) (16 November 2012); Butt, R (On the 
Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 264 (Ad-
min) (28 January 2014). (http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/jrs-without-merit-may-
see-solicitors-referred-to-sra/5040008.article). 
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R: […] So the court judges got annoyed with it. They got all these cases without 
merit and said ‘stop wasting our time, you’re backing up the system with loads of 
pointless cases that should never be made.’ So they can penalise you, they can 
report you to the SRA. 
I: But that’s only in such extreme situations?  
R: Yes. They can penalise the individual lawyer or the firm. 
I: Is it only in judicial reviews or also at other stages? 
R: I suppose potentially the judges can report anybody.191 
The Lawyer’s Interest in Profit or Survival within the Institutional Context  
In addition to the arguments discussed above regarding the decision whether to 
proceed with a case and the application of the merits test in that regard, the legal 
aid lawyer’s interest in profit or survival in acting as a gatekeeper is mentioned, 
in particular, alongside the gatekeeping argument and the dutiful lawyer line of 
reasoning seen in that regard. When explaining, what can be considered a strict 
application of the merits test (both at first instance and after a rejection of the 
asylum claim), often reference is made to the need to justify to the LAA why 
one granted legal aid (e.g. ‘providers are asked to be gatekeepers, so there is an 
expectation’) and that it may affect the provider’s financial situation directly and 
indirectly: an incorrect application of the test may lead to fee withdrawal in that 
case and more generally it may be detrimental to the legal aid contract. For ex-
ample, the respondent quoted before describing his strict application of the mer-
its test, further elucidates his way of applying the test: 
 
If we do [proceed], they are going to check the background, when an audit takes 
place, and it becomes very difficult for us to get paid. We won’t be paid, so we don’t 
want to work for free in those circumstances.192  
 
Or, as one junior solicitor explains in relation to her strict assessment before 
opening a file on legal aid: ‘We have been given devolved powers to assess 
merits and means and sufficient benefits. We should do it properly, otherwise 
the money won’t be paid.’193 References to possible financial implications are 
often combined with the statements (also seen above) about using legal aid for 
‘proper’ or ‘genuine’ cases. Another respondent, who is also quite adamant in 
not wanting to grant legal aid to people with no real asylum claims ‘because 
legal aid is already scarce’, states: ‘it’s also about the firm’s reputation with the 
LAA. It’s not as if we’re protecting them, but it’s still a partnership. So you 
can’t be seen to be abusing…’.194  
                                                        
191  eng5-so-+10-y-m. 
192  eng17-med-3-10-y-m. 
193  eng10-s-3-y-f.  
194  eng8-l-3-10-y-f. 
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Solicitors’ perceptions of how the LAA reviews legal aid providers’ merits 
assessments during audits differ. Respondents referring to their approach as 
more ‘liberal’ report that they have never had any issues with the LAA on this 
matter and the LAA may not easily criticise the provider’s application of the 
merits test (or attach consequences to it). Yet the mere fact that the LAA could 
do so already appears to be a factor of relevance for some.195 Interestingly, these 
economic motives are uttered in this regard (the risk of fee withdrawal) mainly 
by solicitors working in the smaller or sole practitioner firms. This might be 
explained by their not being in a position to absorb any possible adverse finan-
cial consequences, whereas the larger or well-established firms might be able to 
absorb any such costs if they were to occur. 
One respondent – quoted above in the examples of a strict application of the 
merits test – explicitly mentions another way that financial constraints might 
affect the decision whether to proceed with a case and the application of the 
merits test, i.e. it discourages putting in the time and effort to ensure that a case 
will meet the merits test:  
 
R: […]you can’t grant legal aid if there’s less than 50% chance of success. But the 
thing is, my idea of 50% might be different from other lawyers. As long as on paper 
I can justify why I think this case has got more. For example, a person might come 
to me and say: ‘My case is being refused.’ Then the lawyer said that the case is less 
than 50%, but I can do some research and find some material online which the other 
lawyer didn’t bother to check or didn’t find. And through that I can say: ‘Hang on, 
it’s actually…’ 
I: But that will take time. 
R: That will take me time, but in the past I used to do that, but not anymore. You 
understand? In the past it was ok, because at least I could make a decent salary. I 
could put in the hours.196 
 
In the situation where a case is not clear-cut or where at first glance the merits 
test has not been met, it might be very time-consuming to find arguments to 
pursue the case, especially when this requires instructing experts after the dis-
bursement limit has been reached. Requesting additional funding from the LAA 
is referred to by many respondents as troublesome, requiring time, effort and 
persistence. Yet, many emphasise that they do make this effort and that the lim-
ited fees do not prevent them from doing so. A few declare, as the last quote 
illustrates, that the discrepancy they perceive between the time they might need 
                                                        
195  We have seen in the previous section that many respondents do mention other funding 
conflicts with the LAA (for example, the retrieval of funding because of incorrect appli-
cations of the means test) which might explain the cautious attitude of some. 
196  eng6-s-3-10-y-m. This respondent was quoted in the previous section saying he intends 
to withdraw from the legal aid scheme altogether, because of the financial pressures in-
volved. 
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to put in and the fee they will receive, may affect their choice whether to take a 
difficult (maybe hopeless) case on or to proceed on appeal. 
At the onward appeal stages, the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival is 
even more at stake. When discussing with respondents their choice whether to 
proceed with a case after an appeal has been rejected by the First Tier Tribunal, 
the ‘at risk’ aspect of onward appeal procedures (Upper Tribunal and judicial 
reviews) was a key thing that came up: the fact that one risks not obtaining 
payment if permission to appeal is not granted. Several respondents explain, 
especially in relation to judicial review applications, that they are now really 
‘careful’ in pursuing these cases. This quote shows how this is talked about: 
 
But now what’s happening is, especially in judicial review cases. The LAA is saying: 
we only pay for your solicitors costs if you’re successful in your challenge. […] Or, 
if it’s not, we exercise our discretion. Can you understand that point of view? We 
incur £3,000-£4,000 worth of costs and if it’s not successful and the LAA decides not 
to exercise their discretion, we’ll be left without any form of payment whatsoever.197 
 
He continues to refer to a (non-asylum) case in which he decided not to apply 
for judicial review, which he would have pursued before:  
 
Because we would have been granted funding regardless whether we win or lose the 
case. But now they seem to bring in the no win, no fee, which is ridiculous. So, you 
know, again, it’s another reason for me personally to think: is it worth carrying on 
doing legal aid? Because if at the end of the case the barrister presents you a bill of 
£2,000 and it’s no guarantee that the LAA are going to be satisfied and that they’ll 
pay it...  
 
This respondent refers to the costs one would incur for instructing a barrister. 
Many respondents, however, explain that they see it as a risk mainly for the 
barrister – who would need to accept not getting paid for his or her preparatory 
work if permission is not granted – and, partly for this reason, generally leave it 
largely up to the barrister to make the decision on whether to lodge the appeal. 
As one respondent puts it: ‘barristers are not as emotionally involved as we 
are’.198 Hence, it might be easier for the barrister to observe a primary loyalty to 
the court and to decide not to accept a case (especially when s/he needs to pre-
pare the grounds at risk of not getting paid) and solicitors to some extent defer 
the responsibility of refusing funding to the barrister.199 If barristers are not will-
ing to accept cases while the solicitor may want to proceed, this requires more 
                                                        
197  eng6-s-3-10-y-m. 
198  eng8-l-3-10-y-f. 
199  Comp. Boon (2014), p. 57: ‘Barristers might only see lay clients once before a court 
hearing, even in serious cases, making it easier to observe a primary loyalty to the court.’ 
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work and even more perseverance from the solicitor. As we have seen above, 
some explain, when pointing to the difficulties in finding barristers who are 
prepared to do work at risk, that they may at times resort to drafting the grounds 
themselves, because they want to test the limits of the current legal framework, 
or even challenge it, for their individual client (adversarial advocacy line of 
reasoning) or for a wider group of clients because the system does not produce 
just outcomes (i.e. justice in the public interest: the moral activist line of reason-
ing). 
Respondents mention that the financial pressures of the legal aid system (es-
pecially the ‘at risk’ phases on onward appeal) weigh heavily on them. Com-
bined with the functioning of the asylum system, this may lead to a feeling of 
not being able to persist as vigorously in striving to ensure the rights of their 
clientele in general and to seek to make the law more substantively just in the 
public interest (moral activism), but rather focus on what the lawyer can do in 
the individual client’s interest, as this respondent explicates:  
 
I suppose my aims are much lower than they used to be. When I first came into this I 
was like ‘I can change the law’ and, you know, you could. You could have good 
cases and maybe they made a difference. They made a difference for a short amount 
of time. But now the system is so random, so weighted against people, that all you 
can do is focus on the individual outcomes that you get for some people.200 
 
In brief, we see that in addition to, in particular, the considerations relating to 
the solicitor’s obligation to the public (if necessary, acting as a gatekeeper of the 
law against the client), the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival is taken into 
account. The dutiful lawyer line of reasoning and arguments relating to lawyers’ 
financial interests (‘market’ considerations) often intertwine. Within the way the 
legal aid system is set up, the public interest in the proper administration of jus-
tice (interpreted conservatively, i.e. not pursuing procedures of which the 
chances of success within the applicable legal framework are (close to) zero – or 
less than 50%) and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival often coincide. In 
acting as a gatekeeper and being strict on the merits test, the lawyer runs the 
least financial risk: not spending time finding arguments to meet the merits test 
and no risk of fee withdrawal – or receiving no fee at onward appeals and in 
judicial reviews – or damaging the relationship with the LAA for wrongfully 
granting legal aid and the financial implications that might have for the solici-
tor’s business (e.g. ultimately termination of the contract). 
In many instances, morality and market seem to be in line: respondents utter 
a dutiful lawyer line of reasoning (morality) and acting as a gatekeeper generally 
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is in the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival (market). However, we have also 
seen that the obligation conferred upon lawyers under the legal aid system to act 
as a gatekeeper is interpreted differently and that respondents, at times, describe 
a, what can be considered, more lenient application of the merits test uttering 
other lines of moral reasoning. In these instances, we see a possible tension be-
tween morality and market, i.e. the potential risk of fee withdrawal, but even 
more so, not obtaining funding for the preparatory work in certain onward ap-
peals and judicial reviews if permission to appeal is not granted. The more ad-
versarial advocate or moral activist line of reasoning seen amongst some re-
spondents, particularly at onward appeals, might thus be contrary to (or at least 
provides a risk for) the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival.201 Also the acting 
pro bono some respondents describe in starting certain hopeless procedures 
which nevertheless benefit the individual client and the adversarial advocacy 
and the relational lawyer line of reasoning seen in that regard, are contrary to the 
‘market’. Relevant to note here is that respondents who explain that they are 
willing to take up this work and pursue the more difficult, or even ‘hopeless’ 
cases, and/or assist the client pro bono, for the reasons set out above, are also the 
respondents who, as discussed in the previous section, generally go over the 
funding time limits (both in fixed fee and hourly rates cases), work in the (me-
dium-) larger firms and/or in what could be considered the more well-
established firms.202 This suggests the importance of having financial leverage 
and the firm context in this regard.  
Finally, we have also seen that respondents refer to the obligation conferred 
upon them by the legal aid system to act as a gatekeeper as restricting them in 
what they might otherwise do for the client in private cases; suggesting, at first 
glance, a tension between morality and market. However, the additional restric-
tions imposed by the legal aid system are generally accepted with reference to 
the public money involved in legal aid cases; the accounts of some respondents 
indicate an acceptance of having somewhat different obligations as a solicitor in 
legal aid as opposed to private cases and, arguably, a different morality: a 
stronger focus on the client in private cases, in particular the adversarial advo-
cate line of reasoning, is seen. Moreover, what respondents say they do for the 
client, both in private and legal aid cases, is restricted by their professional du-
ties. Ultimately, the solicitor’s obligation as an ‘officer of the court’ to ensure 
the administration of justice in the public interest thus seems to be key; the obli-
                                                        
201  On the other hand, it must be noted that respondents also point out that the onward ap-
peal cases can also be the more financially rewarding cases when permission to appeal is 
obtained, since these are payable at hourly rates. 
202  Having cases referred by NGOs – as the more well-established firms do – means that 
there might be (some respondents point out) some pre-selection in the types of cases the-
se respondents have; these are usually not just any cases. 
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gation under the legal aid system is only an additional obligation that is gener-
ally considered justifiable – suggesting less of a moral tension. 
4.6  Conclusion on Professional Decision Making in the English Context 
In this chapter I examined the professional decision making of asylum legal aid 
lawyers operating within the English context. After having described both the 
professional and institutional context within which English asylum legal aid 
solicitors operate, I discussed the running of a legal aid practice within this con-
text and the morality vs market pressures with which it presents lawyers. We 
have seen that such dilemmas range from the decision which new clients to ac-
cept on legal aid to how to deal with asylum cases once they have been taken on: 
respondents may want to provide legal aid equally to all asylum seeking clients 
that come through the door and/or spend more time on cases than the legal aid 
fees allow, but at the same time need to ensure sufficient income in order to 
remain financially viable as a firm. Respondents describe different ways of deal-
ing with these questions including selecting or prioritising certain cases over 
others and seeking to escape or compensate for the fixed fee payment at the 
initial stages. Within the remuneration system there are several ways to escape 
or compensate for the fixed fee payment at the initial stages, e.g. assisting unac-
companied minors, or more vulnerable clients with complex cases that go three 
times over or do more cases from the Upper Tribunal stage onwards; these are 
all payable at hourly rates (albeit at risk).203 The option of escaping or compen-
sating for the fixed fee payment through hourly rates cases is advanced more by 
(and appears more readily available for) respondents working in the larger or the 
more well-established medium to large firms.204 We have seen that respondents 
who are not so ‘privileged’ to work in such a firm environment explain that they 
largely work within the fixed fee regime. They explain that they either, on aver-
age, go over the fixed fee time, but not three times and thus work at a loss in 
these cases, or that they (attempt to) stick, on average, to the time limits of the 
                                                        
203  These last two types of cases may constitute a risk: the case may not go three times over 
or permission to appeal may not be granted in which case in those Upper Tribunal and 
judicial review cases – which are ‘at risk’– the preparatory work is not paid for. 
204  If a fixed fee case goes three times over, but this is not accepted by the LAA these firms 
would be able to absorb the risk of having their hours cut back by the LAA and not ob-
taining hourly rates instead of the fixed fee, as well as run the risk of the at risk phases on 
onward appeal and in judicial review cases. Also, on the other hand, we have seen that 
there are also respondents who used to work in certain medium to large firms and found 
that ‘the market’ prevailed too strongly and could not reconcile this with their personal 
morality – so instead of spending more time and being allowed to do so, they experi-
enced this firm environment as ‘churning cases through’. 
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fixed fee. Several of these respondents explicitly state that they are struggling, 
because they feel they have to compromise on the services they deliver; they 
cannot afford to provide the service they would want or consider necessary.205 
Respondents’ individual decision making thus seems largely connected to the 
type of firm in which they work as this further bounds (i.e. delimits or enables) 
solicitors’ choices.  
Against this background I analysed lawyers’ decision making in respect of 
‘hopeless cases’. From the way in which respondents explain they perceive and 
deal with ‘hopeless cases’ we can observe the following about how lawyers 
balance and interpret their obligations to the client and the public, why they do 
so and how this relates to the third interest lawyers have to consider (the law-
yer’s interest in profit or survival). We have seen that the actual decisions law-
yers make in concrete cases ultimately depend on the particular circumstances of 
the case, the client and the stage of the procedure. Overall, however, we have 
seen that the public interest in the administration of justice (in particular in the 
conservative sense of the term) is prominent in respondents’ decision making. 
Almost all respondents explain that the starting of hopeless procedures – i.e. an 
application or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of 
obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close 
to) zero – is something they are not willing and/or able to do as a legal aid law-
yer – depending, however, on the stage of the procedure.206 When explaining 
their decisions respondents advance a range of arguments showing different 
lines of moral reasoning, how ‘market’ considerations are at play as well as how 
the institutional – and professional – context within which they operate play a 
role in their decision making.  
Considerations other than the prospects of success within the applicable le-
gal framework – as seen in the accounts of many Dutch respondents – are far 
less present, and if so in a more moderate form, in English respondents’ ac-
counts. Respondents refer to the role of gatekeeper conferred upon them when 
explaining their decisions. They have to determine from the start whether a case 
is in scope – generally legal aid is only available for asylum and deportation 
matters, but not for any other immigration issues the client may have – and con-
duct means and merits tests. They explain that this sets the boundaries within 
which legal aid solicitors can operate: in principle, assist the client in the asylum 
process, not in obtaining legal stay on any other immigration ground and solely 
in cases in which there is prospect of success in the asylum case.  
                                                        
205  Yet, a few others do not consider this problematic and feel this is still adequate legal 
assistance. 
206  E.g. many explain in the initial application procedure to the immigration authorities, the 
chance of obtaining legal success is less (not: not) important. 
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The way in which respondents explain their application of the merits test (in 
particular after rejection of an asylum claim), in general and in concrete cases, 
ranges roughly from what can be considered a strict application, in which the 
gatekeeping argument plays a central role, to a more lenient application of the 
merits test (referred to by some as a ‘liberal’ approach to the merits test) in 
which we see other arguments instead of or alongside the gatekeeping argument. 
In their explanation of what can be considered a strict application of the merits 
test,207 respondents refer to their role as a gatekeeper and their responsibility for 
public money, speak about a balancing act and mention the need to act as a 
gatekeeper of the legal (aid) system against the client if necessary; that is, if the 
chances of success are not there or are not high enough – there must be a sub-
stantive chance of success, not just one legal argument. Also, repeated reference 
is made to ‘genuine’ clients and cases in relation to the decision to grant legal 
aid as well as to how this is based on the legal test of plausibility. In these argu-
ments we see the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning, in particular in the substantiv-
ist sense, i.e. the idea of seeking to pursue justice in line with the applicable 
legal framework, showing no conception of justice external to the law and hav-
ing limitations both with respect to procedure and substance: pursuing justice in 
line with the spirit and purpose of the law, not just legally permissible outcomes. 
As opposed to, what can be considered a strict application of the merits test, 
a more lenient application of the test is also seen in respondents’ accounts (in 
general and/or in certain cases), entailing that not so much reference is made to 
percentages, but rather to whether there is something that can be legitimately 
argued, and an emphasis is placed on leaving the decision on credibility to the 
judge. In explaining this more lenient application of the merits test, some re-
spondents argue, while acknowledging their responsibility to act as a gatekeeper 
under the legal aid system and emphasising their duties to the court (see below), 
that one should be careful not to act too ‘judge-like’, arguing that it is ultimately 
for the court to decide on the application of the law. These arguments show the 
dutiful lawyer line of reasoning in the proceduralist sense, i.e. the idea that pro-
cedural laws should be used according to their purpose but that, as to substance, 
it is the job of the court to decide what the purpose of the law is: any non-
frivolous claim regardless of the lawyer’s personal opinion as to the merits 
should be pursued leaving the substantive decision on the merits to the court. 
Also, when explaining one’s ‘liberal’ application of the merits test, reference is 
made to the unpredictability of the courts as well as to the asylum system as 
                                                        
207  I.e. explicitly referring to percentages – the 50% threshold – and basing decisions regard-
ing credibility on one’s own assessment about the credibility of the client’s story based 
on the legal requirements that apply, thereby not so much taking into account the uncer-
tainties inherent in the system, e.g. judicial unpredictability. 
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being inappropriate for establishing the truth or generating just outcomes. Sev-
eral respondents emphasise in that regard their obligation to the client as the 
client’s representative and express the wish to test the limits of the current legal 
framework, or even challenge it, for their individual clients. The unpredictability 
of the court argument is advanced in this regard and shows how the slightest 
ambiguity in the law or the chances of success is resolved in favour of the client. 
In this we see a more adversarial advocate line of reasoning. Also, these argu-
ments are used in a few instances when referring to cases of particularly vulner-
able clients and the need, despite a sufficient prospect of legal success, to repre-
sent these individuals in those particular circumstances. This also points to a 
strong emphasis on the client’s interest, but based on a relational lawyer line of 
reasoning. Furthermore, some respondents express the wish to test the current 
legal framework, or even challenge it (for a wider group of clients), because it 
does not produce just outcomes. This shows a conception of justice external to 
the law and the lawyer’s role in establishing this, in which we see a more pro-
gressive interpretation of the lawyer’s obligation to the public (the moral activist 
line of reasoning). We have seen several respondents make clear that they are in 
certain cases willing to, for example, pursue cases to the Upper Tribunal or the 
Higher Courts to these ends. Yet, it should be noted that – when uttering lines of 
moral reasoning other than dutiful lawyering – the possibility of obtaining legal 
success is always mentioned as the central consideration in deciding whether to 
start a procedure on behalf of the client; if one believes the possibility is not 
there, one would not pursue the case under legal aid.  
In addition, we have seen several respondents make an explicit distinction 
between what they can and want to do as a solicitor in legal aid cases as opposed 
to private cases. While unequivocally recognising and accepting the additional 
restriction imposed by the legal aid system to act on the client’s instructions and 
in the client’s interest, they speak in more adversarial terms and describe giving 
greater weight to the client’s interest (or wishes) in private cases. Still, they do 
refer to their ‘professional duties’ – e.g. the duty not to mislead and not present-
ing cases to the (Upper Tribunal/Higher) court without a legitimate argument – 
as ultimately limiting their legal actions as a solicitor for the client. The argu-
ment of the solicitor’s ‘professional duties’, also referred to under the term ‘duty 
to the court’, is mentioned by virtually all respondents as ultimately restricting – 
in addition to the other arguments, including one’s duties under the legal aid 
system – what they might undertake on the client’s instructions and/or in the 
client’s interest; both when talking about legal aid cases and the application of 
the merits test and when talking about private cases – the distinction is not al-
ways made. This shows the importance of the lawyer’s obligation towards the 
administration of justice in the public interest: even if, as respondents describe, 
their actions for the client are not limited by one’s obligations under the legal 
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aid system, they are by one’s professional obligations as a solicitor to the legal 
system in general. One could argue that the dutiful lawyer ideal, i.e. the idea that 
the lawyer has a special position in society which involves a responsibility to the 
public to facilitate the administration of justice according to the law and to act 
accordingly (e.g. as an officer of the court), is what Wagenaar calls the ‘objec-
tive meaning’ underlying lawyers’ decisions.208 Even if respondents do not ex-
plicitly refer to themselves as an officer of the court or say that the public inter-
est prevails over the client’s interest when these are in tension, the solicitor’s 
professional duties are always mentioned as ultimately constraining respon-
dents’ actions.  
Finally, we have seen that in addition to, in particular, the considerations re-
lating to the solicitor’s obligation towards the public (if necessary, acting as a 
gatekeeper of the law against the client), many respondents point to the possible 
adverse financial consequences of not acting as a gatekeeper. The dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning and arguments relating to the lawyers’ financial interests (mar-
ket considerations) often intertwine. Within the way the legal aid system is set 
up, the public interest in the proper administration of justice (interpreted conser-
vatively, i.e. not pursuing procedures of which the chances of success within the 
applicable legal framework are (close to) zero – or less than 50%) and the law-
yer’s interest in profit or survival often coincide. In acting as a gatekeeper and 
being strict on the merits test, the lawyer runs the least financial risk: not spend-
ing time finding arguments to meet the merits test and no risk of fee withdrawal 
– or receiving no fee at onward appeals and in judicial reviews – or damaging 
the relationship with the LAA for wrongfully granting legal aid and the financial 
implications that might have for the solicitor’s business (e.g. ultimately termina-
tion of the contract). In many instances, morality and market seem in line: re-
spondents utter a dutiful lawyer line of reasoning (morality) and acting as a 
gatekeeper is generally in the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival (market). 
However, we have also seen that the obligation conferred upon lawyers under 
the legal aid system to act as a gatekeeper is interpreted and fulfilled differently 
and that respondents, at times, describe a more lenient application of the merits 
test (both on appeal and onward appeal and thus procedures that are ‘at risk’) 
uttering the other lines of moral reasoning. In these instances, we see a possible 
tension between morality and market. Also the acting pro bono some respon-
dents describe in starting certain hopeless procedures is contrary to the ‘market’. 
                                                        
208  Wagenaar (2011), p.18: ‘Objective meanings do not explain an individual’s actions but 
rather the meaning that a pattern of activity has in and for the larger culture.’ It is the 
basic assumption that makes a particular activity (here: lawyering) possible. It is a 
presuppositional concept that is implicit, i.e. it is not always part of the reason giving of 
the actors. 
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Relevant to note here is that respondents who explain that they are willing to 
take up this work and pursue the more difficult, or even ‘hopeless’ cases and/or 
assist the client pro bono are also the respondents who generally go over the 
funding time limits (both in fixed fee and hourly rates cases), work in the (me-
dium) larger firms and/or in what could be considered the more well-established 
firms.209 This suggests the importance of the firm context and having financial 
leverage in this regard. 
 
                                                        
209  Having cases referred by NGOs – as the more well-established firms do – means that 
there might be (some respondents point out) some pre-selection in the types of cases the-
se respondents have; these are usually not just any cases. 
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5 Understanding Lawyers’ Professional Decision 
Making: The Role of the Institutional and 
Professional Context 
5.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapters I examined the professional decision making of asylum 
legal aid lawyers within the context in which they operate in the Netherlands 
and England. I examined the running of a legal aid practice within these differ-
ent institutional contexts, the morality vs market pressures with which lawyers 
are confronted in this regard and, subsequently, analysed their professional deci-
sion making in respect of the ethical issue of the ‘hopeless case’. In doing so I 
found that respondents’ actual decision making, i.e. how the balancing act plays 
out in this issue in concrete cases, depends amongst both groups of respondents 
on the particular circumstances of the case, but that an important difference in 
focus can be observed between Dutch and English respondents: overall, the 
professional decision making of Dutch respondents is characterised by a focus 
on the client’s interest and, in comparison, the public interest in the administra-
tion of justice (in the conservative sense) plays a more prominent role in the 
decision making of English respondents.  
In this chapter I will reflect on these findings and combine and contrast both 
analyses to further understand asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision 
making and the role of the institutional – and professional – context in how the 
balancing act plays out. First, I will through drawing from both analyses elabo-
rate on how the particular circumstances of the case affect the balancing act and 
address the role of the law’s morality in lawyers’ moral reasoning in that regard. 
Subsequently, I will through contrasting both analyses reflect on the general 
differences observed in the professional decision making of Dutch and English 
respondents and discuss the role of both the institutional and the professional 
context within which these lawyers operate in understanding this difference.  
5.2  The Circumstances of the Case and the Role of the Morality of the 
Law  
In studying the professional decision making of lawyers in both the Netherlands 
and England in respect of ‘hopeless cases’, I found that respondents’ actual de-
cision making ultimately depends on the particular circumstances of the case; in 
one situation either the client or the public interest is given more weight and the 
arguments for doing so may differ, showing different lines of moral reasoning 
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prioritising the client or the public interest based on role morality or personal 
morality. I thus found, in line with what Parker argued, that different moral con-
siderations may carry different weight in different circumstances and, in prac-
tice, most lawyers apply a combination of approaches to moral reasoning in 
legal practice.1 Even though we have seen that some lines of reasoning are more 
prominent or prevalent in respondents’ accounts (and how this differs between 
the groups of Dutch and English respondents), many respondents utter different 
lines of reasoning simultaneously and, depending on the situation with which 
one is confronted, one line of reasoning may be emphasised or even prevail over 
another. The particular aspects playing a role that can be distilled from the ac-
counts of both groups of respondents are the nature of the case (the nature of the 
client’s claim, the degree of hopelessness and whether it is a legal aid or a pri-
vate case); the stage of the procedure (first instance, appeal, onward appeal); and 
the nature of the client (the degree of vulnerability, whether there are distressing 
particularities to the client’s situation and whether the client is considered ‘a 
genuine refugee’).  
5.2.1 Circumstances of the Case 
Nature of the Case  
First, the nature of the case can play a role in whether a line of reasoning fore-
grounding the client’s interest or the public interest – based on either role or 
personal morality – is adopted as well as in the strength of respondents’ adver-
sarial advocacy. To start with the latter, we have seen, in particular in the ac-
counts of Dutch respondents, quite a strong adversarial stance, but how far re-
spondents are actually willing to go in acting on the client’s instructions and in 
the client’s interest may depend on the nature of the client’s claim. For example, 
while respondents explain that they may engage in stalling and start a procedure 
not with a view to obtaining legal success in that procedure, but in order to post-
pone expulsion with a view to ensuring the client’s broader interests, some stress 
that they would not do so, for instance, if the client wants to stall merely to keep 
reception for a few more months in so-called Dublin cases (and the application 
is lodged in the Netherlands with a view to obtaining reception) and no one 
single legitimate argument can be made.2 Or, if the lawyer knows the client is 
                                                        
1  Parker (2004), p. 55. 
2  I.e. cases in which the receiving government deems another state responsible for pro-
cessing the asylum application. If the decision to put such a claim on another member 
state is made, the asylum seeker can appeal the decision and retain reception. Which, if it 
concerns a transfer to e.g. France or Belgium, this is generally, if there are no specific 
circumstances, considered hopeless. 
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lying and wants to maintain the lie, this may constitute a barrier to proceeding 
on the client’s instructions.3 
Also, depending on the nature of the client’s claim and the degree of hope-
lessness either the adversarial advocate or the moral activist line of reasoning is 
emphasised by respondents who utter both. The latter is emphasised in relation 
to cases in which ‘it really matters’, that is, cases which can lead to a change in 
policy or case law in the interest of asylum seekers collectively. As there may be 
tension between what is in the interest of the individual client and what is in the 
interest of asylum seekers collectively – i.e. a change in policy or even law lead-
ing to a more just asylum system in the public interest of justice – it is interest-
ing to note that if these approaches are combined, some (particularly Dutch) 
respondents adopt a somewhat less strong adversarial stance. They state being 
more careful in lodging appeals in certain evidently hopeless cases (which the 
client may instruct the lawyer to do and may benefit an individual client), be-
cause it ruins the credibility and reputation of lawyers as a group. This, in turn, 
makes it more difficult to obtain results in the cases in which one tries to influ-
ence policy and case law in the interest of asylum seekers collectively, because 
judges take them less seriously.  
Whether a case is a private case or a legal aid case can also play a role in 
whether the obligation to the client or to the public prevails, as we have seen 
particularly amongst English respondents. Several respondents explicitly distin-
guish between the two and express a more adversarial advocate line of reasoning 
when talking about their decisions in private cases.4 The argument of acting on 
the client’s instructions as the client’s representative – in other words, ensuring 
client autonomy – is considered an important value, to which they (can) adhere 
in private cases. However, in legal aid cases this value may be outweighed by 
the lawyer’s responsibility to uphold the institutions of the law and justice, in-
cluding the legal aid system, in the public interest. We see an explicit distinction 
being made between one’s responsibilities as a legal aid lawyer as opposed to as 
a private lawyer and, ultimately, an acceptance of having a different role when 
acting as a legal aid lawyer. As a legal aid lawyer one has a responsibility in 
maintaining the legal aid system in good form in the public interest and this may 
                                                        
3  This could also be seen as an example of how the nature of the client is at play (i.e. the 
client is a lying client), but the argument is also used in combination with the degree of 
hopelessness of a case (e.g. because it is ‘overtly clear’ the client is lying, the chances of 
success are not there), which makes it more of an aspect relating to the nature of the case. 
4  However, still a moderate adversarial stance compared to Dutch respondents. 
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override the solicitor’s duty to act on the client’s instructions (dutiful lawyer line 
of reasoning).5 
Stage of the Procedure 
Second, the stage of the procedure can play a role in whether a line of reasoning 
foregrounding the client’s interest or the public interest – based on either role or 
personal morality – is more dominant or, one could argue, in whether lawyers’ 
adversarial advocacy is stronger or more moderate. Amongst both Dutch and 
English respondents we have seen how the adversarial advocate line of reason-
ing uttered when explaining their decisions in first instance or at the first appeal 
stage (district court/ First Tier Tribunal) may be replaced or supplemented by 
dutiful lawyer considerations at the higher stages. For example, Dutch respon-
dents who explain (largely uttering the adversarial advocacy line of reasoning, at 
times combined with relational lawyer considerations) that they have no diffi-
culty starting certain hopeless procedures for their client up until the appeal 
stage (district court), state they may draw the line at the onward appeal stage 
(Council of State) or, later, at the European Court of Human Rights stage. Espe-
cially at the latter stage, the overburdened European court and the need to act as 
a ‘gatekeeper’ in that regard is mentioned. Amongst English respondents we 
have seen a similar tendency: the higher up in the legal system (i.e. from the 
Upper Tribunal stage onwards), the more prominent the dutiful lawyer consid-
erations. Moreover, if respondents do proceed to the higher stages (ECHtR and 
Higher Courts) this is often justified by using the moral activist line of reason-
ing; this is related to the previous aspect, i.e. the nature of the case. In such 
situations the argument is of a different nature and a different rationale is at play 
involving personal morality rather than role morality: the asylum system is con-
sidered unjust or the applicable legal framework is considered to produce unjust 
results (by the lawyer’s standards) and as a lawyer one has a responsibility in 
seeking to make the law more substantively just in the public interest. In brief, 
the higher the stage of the procedure, the more weight is given to the public 
interest in the administration of justice both in the conservative and the progres-
sive sense: either dutiful lawyer considerations or the moral activist line of rea-
soning supplement or override the adversarial advocate line of reasoning ex-
pressed at earlier stages. 
                                                        
5  Also the simpler argument that they ‘can’t’ pursue certain cases under legal aid is ad-
vanced – i.e. not referring so much to the responsibility towards the legal aid system, but 
rather to the practical circumstance that they are not allowed to. 
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Nature of the Client 
Finally, the nature and particularities of the client can determine whether the 
public or the client’s interest prevails or whether, when prioritising the client’s 
interest, this is justified based on role morality or personal morality. In the ac-
counts of both Dutch and English respondents we have seen that in cases con-
cerning vulnerable clients the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning respondents ex-
press may be outweighed by the relational lawyer line of reasoning. Dutch re-
spondents who state that they are not willing to pursue ‘hopeless cases’, giving 
arguments showing a dutiful lawyer line of reasoning, nevertheless give exam-
ples of cases (stressing that these are exceptions) in which they have been will-
ing to lodge appeals to prevent immediate expulsion or retain reception, explain-
ing that they felt the need to help that individual client because of the client’s 
vulnerability or the distressing particularities of the client’s situation, for exam-
ple, because the client is completely marginalised or the client’s wife is preg-
nant. Similarly, amongst English respondents we have seen how in certain cases 
in which the client is extremely vulnerable or one is convinced that the client is 
a ‘genuine’ asylum seeker, the strict application of the merits test to which one 
generally expresses adherence – explaining this by uttering the dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning – may not be followed and relational lawyer considerations 
weigh more heavily. So, the client’s vulnerability and the particularities of the 
client’s situation may mean that the public interest is outweighed by the client’s 
interest and that role morality (the dutiful lawyer line of reasoning) is overridden 
by personal morality (the relational lawyer line of reasoning): in such cases the 
rules, or the strict application thereof advocated earlier, do not ultimately deter-
mine what is morally right and these rules are interpreted slightly differently in 
order to do what the lawyer considers just in that particular situation.  
Moreover, we have also seen that the client’s vulnerability and the particu-
larities of the client’s situation may mean that personal morality prevails over 
role morality while the focus is and remains on one interest, i.e. the client’s in-
terest. Both Dutch and English respondents who utter the adversarial advocate as 
well as the relational lawyer line of reasoning employ or emphasise either one of 
those lines of reasoning depending on these aspects and the view that the asylum 
system does not lead to ‘just’ outcomes in individual cases is often expressed in 
that regard. A somewhat extreme example in this respect is the Dutch respon-
dent who recounts how she in one – very exceptional – situation assisted a client 
in what she referred to as his ‘fake conversion’ in order for him to be eligible for 
a residence permit as she believed, considering his personal circumstances and 
the relationships he had built in the Netherlands, that this was a just outcome in 
that particular situation. She refers to the asylum system as random and in this 
particular case she wanted to help the client: relationships (and what she consid-
ers just) are viewed as more important than the institutions of the law and one’s 
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obligations as a lawyer in that regard – personal morality prevails over role mo-
rality. 
 
To sum up, the particular circumstances of the case, including the nature of the 
case, the stage of the procedure and the nature of the client, play an important 
role in how the balancing act plays out and the arguments given for doing so. 
Depending on the circumstances a particular aspect of the lawyer’s role is em-
phasised (the adversarial advocate or dutiful lawyer line of reasoning) or per-
sonal morality (the relational lawyer or moral activist line of reasoning) rather 
than role morality is advanced to justify the decision.  
The circumstances that elicit a shift in focus from the client’s interest to the 
public interest are: the improper nature of the client’s claim (e.g. the wish to stall 
merely to retain reception without any other special circumstances; the client is 
lying and wants to maintain the lie), an extremely hopeless case, a case being a 
legal aid case rather than a private case and proceeding at the higher stages of 
the legal system. In these circumstances we see a weaker adversarial stance and 
that the adversarial advocate and/or relational lawyer line of reasoning may be 
supplemented or replaced by the dutiful lawyer or moral activist line of reason-
ing. In contrast, the circumstances that trigger a shift in focus from the public 
interest to the client’s interest are related to the nature of the client, that is, the 
client being very vulnerable, there being other distressing particularities to his or 
her situation or being ‘a genuine refugee’. In these circumstances we see that the 
dutiful lawyer line of reasoning may be outweighed by relational lawyer consid-
erations. Furthermore, in addition to a shift in interest focus, several of these 
circumstances may lead personal morality to override role morality – either 
while retaining the focus on the same interest or shifting between interests. We 
have seen that the nature of the client (vulnerability, other distressing particulari-
ties to his or her situation) may mean that the relational lawyer rather than the 
adversarial advocate line of reasoning is employed or emphasised. Also, the 
nature of the client’s case, i.e. whether it is a case in which it ‘really matters’ 
and can lead to a change in policy or case law, may mean that respondents pro-
ceed to the higher stages uttering the moral activist line of reasoning rather than 
the adversarial advocate or dutiful lawyer line of reasoning when explaining this 
decision. In other words, if the lawyer considers that a strict or mere application 
of the law as it stands produces unjust outcomes, s/he is more likely to let per-
sonal morality prevail and operate possibly at the boundaries of what is profes-
sionally and legally acceptable. 
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5.2.2 The Morality of the Law and the Legal (Asylum) System 
Interestingly, we have seen that the uttering of lines of reasoning based on per-
sonal morality (relational lawyering and moral activism) when justifying the 
strategies employed in assisting their clients is connected to lawyers’ views 
about the morality of the law and the legal (asylum) system. Reference is made 
to the asylum system being random, containing flawed elements and producing 
unjust outcomes in individual cases: the asylum system is qualified as not being 
fair or just and this has been used as a justification – mainly by Dutch lawyers – 
for not fully playing by the rules: e.g. the (exceptional) example of assisting a 
client in a fake conversion, or the more common, starting of evidently hopeless 
procedures. Discontent with the applicable legal framework and with the way in 
which asylum claims are assessed, may thus lead lawyers to start hopeless pro-
cedures which may nevertheless be in the interest of the individual client (rela-
tional lawyering) or in the interest of justice because the applicable legal frame-
work is challenged with a view to making the law and the legal system more 
substantively just (moral activism).  
My findings in this respect further substantiate what Appelqvist and Levin 
showed within the context of asylum/immigration law,6 as well as what Levin 
and Mather have argued more generally, namely that lawyers’ perceptions of the 
law’s morality may affect the way lawyers approach ethical dilemmas: ‘Law-
yers’ perceptions that the particular law or systems within which they operate 
are unfair, unjust, or unreal may lead lawyers to behave in more problematic 
ways or to develop norms that are at odds with the positive law.’7  
 
In brief, the circumstances of the case in combination with lawyers’ views of the 
morality of the law and the legal system in the field of asylum law are important 
in understanding their professional decision making in this particular area of 
law, i.e. whether the balancing act plays out in favour of the client or the public 
interest through reliance on personal morality rather than role morality. Yet, the 
examination of the two groups of lawyers operating in different contexts – and 
the differences in their professional decision making observed – suggests that 
the role these aspects play in lawyers’ actual decision making is shaped, or at 
                                                        
6  Appelqvist (2000); Levin (2012). 
7  Levin & Mather (2012), p. 369. However, one can debate whether, in the Dutch context, 
the starting of hopeless procedures is actually at odds with positive law. In Dutch admin-
istrative law – as opposed to civil law – there are no clear rules on abuse of process (e.g. 
Barkhuysen (2014)) and the professional rules are, as we have seen, rather general and do 
not offer much concrete guidance on this issue. The oath requires that one does not rec-
ommend or defend a case which s/he ‘in good conscience do not believe justified’; this is 
thus open to the lawyer’s interpretation. 
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least limited, by both the institutional and professional context within which 
lawyers operate. 
5.3  The Role of the Institutional- and Professional Context 
Even though we have seen that how the balancing act plays out in concrete cases 
depends on the particular circumstances of the case, overall, we have observed a 
difference in focus in the professional decision making of Dutch and English 
respondents: the decision making of Dutch respondents is characterised by a 
focus on the client’s interest and, in comparison, the public interest in the ad-
ministration of justice (in the conservative sense) plays a more prominent role in 
the decision making of English respondents. Virtually all Dutch respondents 
explain that they are willing to and/or tell about situations in which they assist 
clients in pursuing certain, what can be termed, hopeless procedures – i.e. an 
application or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chances of 
obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time to be (close 
to) zero, whereas almost all English respondents explain that this is something 
that they are not willing and/or able to do as a legal aid lawyer – depending, 
however, on the stage of the procedure. The arguments advanced by respondents 
to explain their decisions show different lines of legal moral reasoning – the 
adversarial advocate as well as the relational lawyer and moral activist line of 
reasoning are relatively more prominent amongst Dutch respondents and the 
dutiful lawyer line of reasoning is relatively more prominent in English respon-
dents’ accounts8 – how ‘market’ considerations are at play as well as how both 
the institutional and professional context within which they operate shape or 
curtail their decision making. The examination and juxtaposition of lawyers’ 
decision making in these two different contexts exposes the role played by the 
institutional context, in combination with the professional context (which also 
differs in the two countries under review), in shaping lawyers’ decisions. I will 
reflect on this role below by discussing the differences between the Dutch and 
the English institutional and professional context I found to be key to under-
standing the overall difference in focus seen in the professional decision making 
of Dutch and English respondents. 
                                                        
8  Moreover, the adversarial advocacy – as well as the moral activism and relation lawyer-
ing – seen amongst English respondents is more moderate than amongst Dutch respond-
ents.  
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5.3.1  The Institutional Context: Role Assigned to Legal Aid Lawyers in 
Asylum Cases and Accompanying Payment Structures  
Lawyers providing legal aid to asylum seekers in the Netherlands are, within the 
joint setup of the asylum and legal aid system, given the role of the client’s rep-
resentative, whereas English lawyers providing legal aid are given the role of 
gatekeeper. Dutch lawyers are appointed to the client with a view to assisting 
him or her in the general asylum procedure and have no control over the types of 
clients and cases they are assigned. The procedure has a fixed nature and is 
characterised by its short time limits. We have seen respondents explain that, 
because they are appointed in this fixed, fast paced procedure, they feel an obli-
gation towards the client and the legal system to assist him or her in the first 
instance procedure up to the initial decision and thus, in principle, complete the 
procedure regardless of whether they consider a case hopeless. The notion that 
the lawyer has a certain responsibility in securing that the asylum seeker can 
present his or her case to a judge if s/he wants to is also common amongst Dutch 
respondents; if the lawyer does not want to assist the client, he or she should at 
least make sure that the client has the opportunity to consult another lawyer. The 
Best Practice Guide in Asylum cases (which lays down the minimum standards 
with which legal aid lawyers in asylum cases need to comply) emphasises the 
lawyer’s responsibility both in assisting the client during the first instance pro-
cedure and in ensuring this second opinion. So, in the Dutch context the law-
yer’s role as the client’s representative within the fixed and fast paced asylum 
process is emphasised and the generally accepted rationale seems to be that by 
focusing on one’s obligation to the client – at times entailing the starting or 
completing of hopeless procedures – the lawyer is ultimately also serving the 
public interest in the administration of justice (the adversarial advocate line of 
reasoning).9 In this regard, it must be remembered that having legal assistance 
and representation available during the general asylum procedure also allows for 
having the procedure the way it is (i.e. fixed and fast paced).  
The institutional position of English legal aid lawyers is, one could argue, 
the opposite. Lawyers are made responsible for determining asylum seekers’ 
eligibility for legal aid. They have to determine from the start whether a case is 
in scope – generally, legal aid is only available for asylum and deportation mat-
ters, but not for any other immigration issues the client may have – and conduct 
means and merits tests. This responsibility places on providers the role of gate-
keeper. We have seen respondents explain how this sets the boundaries within 
which they can operate as well as how it encourages – especially the responsi-
bility for applying the merits test – a certain attitude and conduct: it incites judg-
                                                        
9  See more on this point below in the section on the professional context. 
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ing the client(‘s case) instead of merely representing him or her. The imposition 
of the gatekeeper role thus stimulates, or even requires, a focus on the lawyer’s 
role as a guardian of the legal system to facilitate the public administration of 
justice based on the applicable legal framework (dutiful lawyering), rather than 
on the lawyer’s role as the client’s representative within the legal system (adver-
sarial advocacy).  
 
While the English system restricts legal aid funding largely to the asylum as-
pects of the client’s case, in the Netherlands legal aid funding covers both asy-
lum and immigration. Asylum and immigration law are closely interconnected 
and having legal aid available for both allows for the focus on the client (i.e. 
both adversarial advocacy and relational lawyering) seen amongst most Dutch 
respondents: the lawyer can help the client in reaching his or her aim (i.e. re-
maining in the country) without being limited to considering the asylum aspects 
of a case. Also, as a result, a case may not as easily be considered ‘hopeless’: if 
there is no valid asylum claim, there may be an opportunity for a stay on regular 
migration grounds, if not in the short term then possibly in the long term. The 
English system’s restriction of legal aid availability to asylum cases incentivizes 
looking at clients and their cases through the lens of the chances of legal success 
on asylum grounds leaving less room to explore alternative possibilities for the 
client and looking at the client’s case in a more holistic way. Rather than taking 
the client’s wish as a starting point, the lawyer is asked to represent the law to 
the client and help him or her comply, i.e. to facilitate the public administration 
of justice in line with the applicable legal framework in asylum cases, or in other 
words, to act as a dutiful lawyer. The observation that starting solicitors can be 
‘narrow minded’ in their application of the merits test is especially interesting in 
this regard: it seems that solicitors who start their work as a legal aid lawyer in 
this system are particularly inclined to prioritise their obligation to the public 
and act as a gatekeeper. This supports what Sommerlad argued: that the way in 
which the English legal aid system is set up leads to a loss of control over the 
character of lawyers’ work and affects their professionalism;10 she observed that 
legal aid contract compliance audits lead to a shift in practitioners’ primary ob-
jective to meeting the requirements of the audit rather than serving the client.11 
The imposition of the gatekeeper role thus shapes lawyers’ decision making and 
possibly even their morality.  
 
In line with the previous points, the assignment of the different roles is con-
nected to the way in which legal aid lawyers are remunerated. One could say 
                                                        
10  Sommerlad (1995). 
11  Sommerlad (2008), p. 186. 
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that within the way payment in the Dutch legal aid system is organised, the law-
yer’s interest in profit or survival often coincides with the client’s interest (i.e. 
the client may want to try every possibility to have his or her claim accepted and 
the lawyer receives the legal aid fee when assisting the client to that end), 
whereas in the English system the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival is put on 
a par with the public interest in the administration of justice (in the conservative 
sense, i.e. having cases determined in line with the applicable legal framework 
and not burdening the legal system with cases in which the chances of success 
within this framework are (close to) zero – or less than 50%). The fulfilment of 
the gatekeeping role is checked during audits (with the possibility of fee with-
drawal) and preparing onward appeals and judicial reviews is ‘at risk’ of not 
obtaining payment if permission to appeal is not granted. In acting as a gate-
keeper and being strict on the merits test, the lawyer thus runs the least financial 
risk: not spending time finding arguments to meet the merits test and no risk of 
fee withdrawal – or receiving no fee at onward appeals and in judicial reviews – 
or damaging the relationship with the Legal Aid Agency for wrongfully granting 
legal aid and the financial implications that might have for the solicitor’s busi-
ness (e.g. ultimately termination of the legal aid contract). We have seen that 
both Dutch and English respondents refer to these financial incentives (or barri-
ers) and explain that this raises morality vs market dilemmas and how this may 
actually affect their decision making.  
Dutch respondents refer to the morality vs market tension arising from the 
financial advantages associated with proceeding with cases: even though one 
may be of the view that lodging an appeal or starting another procedure would 
not lead to legal success, it does allow for obtaining additional legal aid fees at a 
time when the influx of cases is low and, consequently, competition for clients 
high.12 We have seen that in Dutch respondents’ accounts the moral line of rea-
soning they adopt (adversarial advocacy and/or relational lawyering) often coin-
cides with their interest in profit or survival: morality and market are in line. 
However, we have also seen how the market aspect, in particular the competi-
tion for clients, may challenge one’s morality and lead to acting contrary to the 
moral line of reasoning to which one expresses adherence. For example, the 
respondent who explains that even though s/he would not want to proceed with 
certain cases, because s/he considers them hopeless and utters the dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning in that regard, may nevertheless do so because refusing those 
cases means not having enough work to keep the practice running.13 As de-
                                                        
12  Which was the case at the time of the interviews. 
13  Also, we have seen how the ‘market’ may challenge moral activism, e.g. challenging the 
law by preparing procedures with the ECtHR which take more time than legal aid fund-
ing covers. 
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scribed, there is no cap on the number of providers participating in the Dutch 
legal aid scheme (so increased competition, especially at the time of the inter-
views when the influx of asylum seekers was low) and within the fixed fee re-
muneration system there is hardly any room to compensate in other ways.  
In the English legal aid system this is different in both respects: there is a 
limit on the number of asylum legal aid lawyers – only contracted providers can 
provide legal aid in a certain amount of cases and most respondents report hav-
ing higher demand for their services than they can offer – and there is, in princi-
ple, more room within the remuneration system to escape or compensate for the 
fixed fee payments at the initial stages than providers in the Dutch context have. 
For example, by assisting unaccompanied minors, or more vulnerable clients 
with complex cases that go three times over the fixed fee time limit or doing 
more cases from the Upper Tribunal stage onwards: these are all payable at 
hourly rates (albeit at risk).14 Yet, this in combination with lawyers having to 
determine the potential client’s eligibility (and the financial risks involved) and 
room to decide which clients to accept on legal aid raises its own pressures, e.g. 
whether to provide legal aid equally to all asylum seeking clients that come 
through the door or select or prioritise certain (more profitable/non-risky) cases 
over others. Notable findings in this regard are that using the possibilities to 
escape or compensate for the fixed fee payments is referred to more by respon-
dents working in the larger or the more well-established medium to large firms 
and that the economic considerations related to the risk of wrongly granting 
legal aid are expressed mainly by solicitors working in the smaller or sole practi-
tioner firms. This might be explained by the latter firms not being in the position 
to absorb any possible adverse financial consequences, whereas the larger or 
well-established firms might be able to absorb any such costs if they were to 
occur.15  
In English respondents’ accounts morality and market also seem to be in 
line in many instances: respondents utter a dutiful lawyer line of reasoning (mo-
rality) and acting as a gatekeeper is generally in the lawyer’s interest in profit or 
                                                        
14  These last two types of cases may constitute a risk: the case may not go three times over 
or permission to appeal may not be granted in which case in those Upper Tribunal and 
judicial review cases – which are ‘at risk’ – the preparatory work is not paid for. 
15  The hourly rates cases are often also the more financially risky cases and the smaller or 
less well-established firms may not be able to afford to run these risks. If a fixed fee case 
goes three times over, but this is not accepted by the LAA, these firms would be able to 
absorb the risk of having their hours cut back by the LAA and not obtaining hourly rates 
instead of the fixed fee, as well as run the risk of the at risk phases on onward appeal and 
in judicial review cases (see more elaboration on this topic in the next section). 
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survival (market).16 However, we have also seen that the obligation conferred 
upon lawyers under the legal aid system to act as a gatekeeper is interpreted 
differently and that respondents, at times, describe a more lenient application of 
the merits test uttering the other lines of moral reasoning. In these instances, 
there is a possible tension between morality and market. We have seen respon-
dents giving examples, while acknowledging the financial risks, of cases in 
which they were willing to pursue procedures that are ‘at risk’ in order to test 
the limits of the applicable legal framework for the individual client (adversarial 
advocacy) or even try to change the law with a view to making it more just 
(moral activism) – or assist the client pro bono in certain hopeless procedures 
because, e.g. looking more holistically at a case and the client, it would benefit 
the individual in the particular circumstances (relational lawyering). Relevant to 
note here is that respondents giving these examples of pursuing the more diffi-
cult, or even ‘hopeless’ cases and/or assisting the client pro bono are also the 
respondents who generally go over the funding time limits (both in fixed fee and 
hourly rates cases), work in the (medium-) larger firms and/or in what could be 
considered the more well-established firms. It thus seems that reliance on the 
adversarial advocate (and relational lawyer) or moral activist line of reasoning 
when explaining one’s decisions is connected to working in a firm context 
within which one has the financial room to actually prioritise the client’s interest 
or to adopt a more progressive interpretation of the lawyer’s obligation to the 
public or, in other words, to let morality prevail over market. 
These findings are in line with what Blumberg and others found in the 
criminal law context about the importance of the lawyer’s place in the system, 
i.e. their institutional position, in shaping their conduct.17 Blumberg refers to 
criminal court lawyers as ‘double agents’: the lawyer is held to a standard of 
ethical performance and has a duty to the client as well as to the court and he 
found that the lawyer’s status is that of an ‘officer of the court’ (as opposed to 
the ‘hired gun’). In other words, the lawyer has a higher loyalty to the organisa-
tion than to the client. He argued that this could be explained by the fact that the 
lawyer’s relationship with the client is transient, temporary and often superficial, 
whereas the professional, economic, intellectual and other ties to the various 
elements of the court system are far greater; the lawyer is ‘co-opted’ by the or-
ganisation.18 My findings show that this is also at play in the area of publicly 
funded asylum law and further show how the institutional position of the asylum 
                                                        
16  It should be noted that acting as a gatekeeper is not necessarily supported by the dutiful 
lawyer line of reasoning, but also with reference to what is (financially) possible within 
the legal aid system. 
17  Blumberg (1967, 1970); e.g. Martorano Van Cleve (2012). 
18  Blumberg (1967), p. 112-113; (1970), p. 19-21. 
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legal aid lawyer and the continuing (dependent) relationships arising from this 
position including financial dependence, play a role – that is, in whether lawyers 
act more as an ‘officer of the court’ or as a ‘hired gun’. The institutional position 
of the asylum legal aid lawyer, i.e. the role the lawyer is given and what is ex-
pected from the lawyer in that regard – both based on the rules and regulations 
as well as on expectations arising from the communities of practice and, more 
broadly, the legal culture within which they operate (see below) – differs within 
the Dutch and the English contexts: within the English context, asylum legal aid 
lawyers are given the role of gatekeeper of the legal (aid) system and, relatively, 
the ‘officer of the court’ attitude (dutiful lawyer line of reasoning) is more 
prominent in respondents’ accounts; in the Dutch context asylum legal aid law-
yers are given the role of the client’s representative and, comparatively, the 
‘hired gun’ attitude (adversarial advocate line of reasoning) is more prominent. 
On a final note regarding this point, my findings on the decision making of 
Dutch lawyers – initially – seem somewhat at odds with Doornbos’ findings 
regarding asylum legal aid lawyers operating within the Dutch context discussed 
before. Doornbos found in her ethnographic study into institutional communica-
tion in the asylum procedure in the Netherlands that the strict routine and bu-
reaucratic character of the (previous) Dutch asylum procedure posed a threat to 
independent legal aid provision.19 She observed that the counsel and information 
provided by legal aid providers in asylum procedures was primarily directed 
towards ensuring cooperation and promoting communication between the appli-
cant and the decision makers and that, even though typifying these lawyers as an 
‘officer of the court’ (or officer of the IND) would go too far, only a few law-
yers in the research acted as a ‘hired gun’ for asylum seekers.20 Even though I 
did find differences between respondents who seemed to accept the system as a 
given and aimed to do their work within the boundaries set (explaining their way 
of providing legal aid more in the way Doornbos describes), others expressed 
trouble fitting into the regime and refused to make concessions as regards the 
content of their work, often clearly expressing both the adversarial advocate 
(‘hired gun’), as well as the moral activist and relational lawyer line of reason-
ing. This difference might be explained by the procedural changes that were 
implemented in 2010. Under the general asylum procedure introduced in 2010 
(which applied at the time of my study) lawyers are appointed to be the client’s 
representative in the procedure; the client has one lawyer who assists him or her 
during the entire procedure. In the previous procedure, studied by Doornbos, 
                                                        
19  Doornbos (2006). Her conclusions relate to the previous Dutch asylum procedure which 
took 48 hours. Now the general procedure lasts eight days, but the fixed and bureaucratic 
nature of the procedure has not changed.  
20  Ibid., p. 236.  
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL DECISION MAKING 
 
199 
 
lawyers were not linked to one client; one asylum seeker could have different 
legal aid providers in the course of the first instance asylum procedure after 
which one of them would decide whether, after a rejection, s/he would want to 
assist the client on appeal. The relationship between lawyer and client might 
have, therefore, been more transient and less close than in the current procedure 
in which the lawyer is appointed to be the client’s representative and is, in prin-
ciple, expected to assist the client during the entire eight-day procedure. In this 
respect, the observation of an interviewed Legal Aid Board employee working at 
one of the application centres is interesting. After the introduction of the new 
general asylum procedure, he noted a shift in lawyers’ approach to deciding 
whether to proceed with a case on appeal after a rejection of the asylum claim, 
namely, more willingness to do so (arguably showing a more ‘hired gun’ atti-
tude) and links this to the changed setup of the procedure.21 One could argue 
that the difference in findings in Doornbos’ and this study are not actually con-
tradictory; they might in part be explained by the procedural changes, which 
further corroborates the idea that the lawyer’s institutional position matters: 
following the procedural reforms, the lawyer’s institutional position changed 
making the lawyer-client relationship less transient and superficial and the stud-
ies conducted during the old and the new procedures show a shift in lawyers’ 
attitudes towards that of a ‘hired gun’.22 
5.3.2  The Professional Context: Professional Regime and ‘Legal Culture’ 
The difference in emphasis seen in the way the legal aid systems are set up, i.e. 
either in the client’s interest (the Dutch system) or on the public interest – in the 
conservative sense – (the English system), is also seen in the professional re-
gimes to which lawyers are subject in the two countries – which probably ex-
plains the difference between the legal aid systems. In the Netherlands, the prin-
ciple of partisanship – as one of the five core principles that are central to the 
legal profession – and acting in the client’s best interest can be considered the 
key principle in the professional rules. The discussions that led up to the adop-
tion of the core principles in the Lawyer’s Act – including in particular the Bar’s 
rejection of the idea to insert public responsibility for the appropriate admin-
                                                        
21  Interview NL Legal Aid Board employee 10 September 2013.  
22  An alternative or additional explanation might lie in the difference in research method: 
while Doornbos conducted observations and attended meetings between lawyers and 
their asylum seeking clients, I mainly conducted interviews and this might give a differ-
ent picture. Moreover, contrasting findings in the Dutch context with the English context 
might give a different idea of what acting as an officer of the court actually entails: com-
parative to English lawyers the conduct of Dutch lawyers might seem less that of an of-
ficer of the court.  
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istration of justice as a separate core principle and the fact that this proposed 
principle did not make it into the Act – suggest that the professional regime 
requires the lawyer to put one’s obligation to the client (rather than to the public) 
at the centre.23 We have seen how this idea resonates in the accounts of Dutch 
respondents.  
In addition, the examples given by Dutch respondents about their experi-
ences with both the peer review committee and judges show how partisanship 
and acting in the client’s best interest as being central to the lawyer’s role also 
appears accepted by this part of the ‘community of practice’24 – or the ‘local 
legal culture’25 – within which these lawyers operate. The examples show how 
this ties in with the moral lines of reasoning seen amongst Dutch lawyers. Sev-
eral respondents recount how, when presenting certain cases they consider hope-
less to the court for the client’s sake, the peer review committee and judges re-
sponded: they did not condemn it or even approved of it and respondents report 
having the impression that judges subscribe to the idea that everyone plays their 
role in the legal process and that partisanship is central to the lawyer’s role – and 
that this is especially so in asylum cases where the stakes are high and the client 
is very much dependent on the lawyer.26 Assisting the client in starting certain 
hopeless procedures, because of one’s obligations as the client’s representative 
in the legal system (the adversarial advocacy line of reasoning) and/or because 
one cannot in that particular circumstance – taking into account the moral, emo-
tional and relational dimensions of the problem – justify letting the client down 
(the relational lawyer line of reasoning), seen amongst many Dutch respondents 
thus seems not to be principally condemned (or is possibly approved of) within 
this internal (local) legal culture.27  
 
In England, in contrast, the professional rules with which solicitors need to 
comply prescribe a different focus. Language that appears to limit partisanship 
                                                        
23  Reasoning that in doing so, the public interest is best served. Dutch Bar Association 
(2008), Annual Report 2008, p. 70. Compare Loth & Gaakeer (2007), p. 103; Bannier 
(2011a); Bauw, Böhler & Westerveld (2013), p. 25. 
24  I.e. the groups of lawyers with whom practitioners interact. Mather, Maiman & McEwen 
(2001), p. 10 ff. 
25  I.e. the common norms and practices prevailing in a certain local community (e.g. courts) 
and arising from the continuing relationships between the parties. Mather, Maiman & 
McEwen (2001), p. 11. This can be considered part of what Friedman calls ‘internal legal 
culture’, i.e. the views and attitudes of legal professionals. Friedman (1975), p. 223. 
26  N.B. We have seen that this applies at the appeal stage, not so much at the onward appeal 
stage. 
27  I.e. the views and attitudes of legal professionals within the community of asylum law-
yers and judges. Friedman (1975), p. 223. 
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permeates the code of conduct for solicitors.28 The SRA Handbook explicitly 
lays down that if two of the core principles mentioned in the Handbook come 
into conflict, the principle which best serves the public interest, especially the 
public interest in the proper administration of justice, must take precedence. We 
have seen that English respondents repeatedly refer to their ‘professional duties’ 
as laid down in these rules showing the importance of the idea of the lawyer as 
an ‘officer of the court’ (rather than a ‘hired gun’). Both the focus in the code of 
conduct and solicitors’ emphasising their ethical obligations towards the courts 
and to the public (i.e. facilitate the administration of justice through compliance 
with these duties), must be understood against the background of the changes in 
the English legal profession after the entry into force of the Legal Services Act 
2007 as well as the debates on legal aid – including the negative images of im-
migration and legal aid lawyers discussed in the introduction – and the reforms 
that ensued. From the re-emergence of market capitalism in the 1980s, govern-
ment strategy has been to force down legal costs by reducing the market privi-
leges of the legal profession (barristers and solicitors) and by increasing compe-
tition between existing legal providers by bringing new providers into the legal 
services market.29 The Legal Services Act 2007 allowed for these changes.30 
The restrictions on the legal profession that ensued (e.g. loss of monopoly and 
autonomy through restriction of self-regulation) diminished the professional 
power of the traditional legal profession and it has been argued that ‘continued 
sponsorship of professional power depends on the profession’s guarantee of 
ethical behaviour’.31 We have seen an awareness of this need for ‘ethical behav-
iour’ in respondents’ accounts. Moreover, we have also seen quite some respon-
dents mention, in general as well as in relation to not wanting to start procedures 
with a very small or no chance of success, the ‘bad press’ about immigration 
lawyers and their having a certain responsibility, as legal aid lawyers, for public 
money. The negative image of immigration and legal aid lawyers in the media is 
thus something these lawyers are aware of and take into account when (talking 
about) acting for their clients. The emphasis placed by respondents on compli-
ance with their ethical obligations and concerns about their image must thus be 
understood against the backdrop of these changes in the legal professional land-
scape, the legal aid debates and the negative press about immigration and legal 
                                                        
28  Boon (2014), p. 29. 
29  Ibid., p. 104. 
30  Also, the Act emphasised the wider duties of lawyers (rather than a strong focus on the 
client) by specifying that any person appearing before the courts must act ‘with inde-
pendence in the interests of justice’ (Section 1(3)(d)). 
31  Ibid.  
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aid lawyers or, in other words, the external dimension of the legal culture within 
which these lawyers operate.32  
In addition, the institutional division between solicitor and barrister in the 
English legal system – which plays in particular at the onward appeal stages and 
in judicial review – seems to play a role in the priority ultimately given to the 
public interest seen in the decision making of many English respondents. We 
have seen that solicitors, when assisting clients on legal aid, can to some extent 
defer the decision of whether there are chances of legal success within the appli-
cable legal framework, and thereby the responsibility of refusing legal aid fund-
ing, to the barrister; some explain that they do. It has been pointed out that bar-
risters have sometimes been seen as taking on an almost judicial role (refusing 
unmeritorious claims) and that due to the greater distance between the barrister 
and the client, it is also easier for barristers to observe a primary loyalty to the 
court.33 The dispersed responsibilities between solicitor and barrister further 
stimulate – especially when, under legal aid, the barrister needs to prepare the 
grounds at risk of not getting paid – a focus on the chances of legal success 
within the applicable legal framework, giving priority to the lawyer’s duties to 
the court and leaving other considerations (e.g. relating to the client’s broader 
interest) aside.  
Furthermore, within the English court system there is the possibility to grant 
so-called wasted costs orders if there is an abuse of process, i.e. when hopeless 
cases are being pursued. Respondents emphasise the diversity in judges’ atti-
tudes, but the examples of judges reprimanding immigration solicitors (yet not 
leading to wasted costs orders) for their conduct in court are also mentioned. 
Even though the cases on this matter suggest that judges exercise their jurisdic-
tion to grant wasted costs orders with extreme caution, it remains the case, as 
Boon points out, that lawyers cannot simply act as hired guns.34 Due to the pos-
sibility of ordering wasted costs, an environment of uncertainty is created. Law-
yers must weigh up competing considerations and exercise their own discretion. 
                                                        
32  I.e. the views and attitudes of the population towards law and legal institutions including, 
one could argue, its actors: lawyers. Friedman (1975), p. 223. Interestingly, even though 
there have also been bad press and discussions in the Netherlands, these do not ultimately 
seem to play such an important role in the decision making of Dutch lawyers, possibly 
because the critiques did not get much of a foothold in the professional rules and pene-
trate through the internal legal culture. 
33  Boon (2014), p. 57; 61 referring to M. Burrage (2006), Revolution and the Making of the 
Temporary Legal Profession: England, France and the United States, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 489. Moreover, the Bar traditionally had close relationships with the 
judiciary because of its institutional embedding in the Inns of Court, its consultancy role 
and judges being appointed from senior advocates, i.e. barristers. Boon (2014), p. 58. 
This does not hold for solicitors.  
34  Boon (2014), p. 621 ff. 
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They need not filter out hopeless cases, but are accountable to the court: ‘They 
must advance their client’s case with reason, but are potentially liable if they get 
it wrong.’35 Both the possibility of ordering wasted costs when hopeless cases 
are being pursued and the references to critical judges suggest that pursuing 
procedures for reasons other than legal success, as seen in the Dutch context, is 
less accepted and how this can shape lawyers’ decisions. In brief, these differ-
ences in both the professional regimes (‘book law’) and what can be considered 
aspects of the national ‘legal culture’ (‘living law’) in which lawyers operate 
seem, in conjunction with the institutional context aspects discussed, key to 
understanding the overall difference in professional decision making seen 
amongst Dutch and English asylum legal aid lawyers.  
5.4  Conclusion on the Role of the Institutional and Professional Context 
Based on the joint analysis of the Dutch and the English case studies, I found 
that the circumstances of the case (the nature of the case, the stage of the proce-
dure and the nature of the client) in combination with lawyers’ views on the 
morality of the law and the legal system in the area of asylum law are important 
in understanding lawyers’ professional decision making in this particular area of 
law – that is, in how the balancing act ultimately plays out and whether the cli-
ent’s interest or the public interest is given more weight based on role morality 
or personal morality. However, the juxtaposition of both analyses suggests that 
the role these aspects play in their actual decision making is shaped, or at least 
limited, by both the institutional and professional context within which lawyers 
operate; it exposes the role played by the institutional context, in combination 
with the professional context (which also differs in the two countries under re-
view), in shaping the balancing act. Overall, the professional decision making of 
Dutch respondents is characterised by a focus on the client’s interest and, in 
comparison, the public interest in the administration of justice (in the conserva-
tive sense) plays a more prominent role in the decision making of English re-
spondents and I found the differences between the Dutch and the English institu-
tional context (the characteristics of the asylum and the legal aid system, i.e. the 
lawyer’s institutional position and accompanying payment structures) and pro-
fessional context (the professional regime and the national legal culture) key to 
understanding this overall difference in focus. 
 
                                                        
35  Ibid., p. 628. 
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6.  Conclusion  
 
 
The aim of this study was to obtain a better understanding of asylum legal aid 
lawyers’ ‘professional ethics in practice’, i.e. how these lawyers as members of 
the legal profession balance the different interests at stake when assisting their 
asylum seeking clients under the state’s legal aid scheme, and to explore the role 
of the institutional context in that regard. The central question to this research 
was: 
 
What does the professional decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers look 
like, how can this be understood and what role does the institutional context 
play in this regard? 
6.1 Main Findings 
Having studied the professional decision making – i.e. the balancing of the pub-
lic interest in the administration of justice, the client’s interest and the lawyer’s 
interest in profit or survival – of asylum legal aid lawyers operating in two dif-
ferent institutional contexts and having analysed this by employing the analyti-
cal framework set out in chapter 2, I found that the way in which the balancing 
act ultimately plays out depends on the particular circumstances of the case: in 
one situation either the client’s interest or the public interest is given more 
weight and the arguments for doing so may differ, showing different lines of 
moral reasoning prioritising the client’s interest or the public interest based on 
role morality (adversarial advocacy, dutiful lawyering) or personal morality 
(relational lawyering, moral activism). The particular aspects playing a role are 
the nature of the case (the nature of the client’s claim, the degree of hopeless-
ness and whether it is a legal aid or a private case); the stage of the procedure 
(first instance, appeal, onward appeal); the nature of the client (the degree of 
vulnerability, whether there are distressing particularities to the client’s situation 
and whether the client is considered ‘a genuine refugee’).  
The circumstances that elicit a shift in focus from the client’s interest to the 
public interest are the improper nature of the client’s claim (e.g. the wish to stall 
merely to retain reception without any other special circumstances; the client is 
lying and wants to maintain the lie), an extremely hopeless case, a case being a 
legal aid case rather than a private case and proceeding to the higher stages of 
the legal system. In contrast, the circumstances that trigger a shift in focus from 
the public interest to the client’s interest are related to the nature of the client, 
that is, the client being very vulnerable, there being other distressing particulari-
ties to his or her situation or the client being ‘a genuine refugee’. Furthermore, 
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in addition to a shift in interest focus, the nature of the client (vulnerability, 
other distressing particularities to his or her situation) and the nature of the case 
(a case in which it ‘really matters’ and can lead to a change in policy or case 
law) may lead personal morality to override role morality – either while retain-
ing the focus on the same interest or shifting between interests.  
Moreover, the uttering of lines of reasoning based on personal morality 
when justifying the strategies employed in assisting their clients is connected to 
lawyers’ views about the morality of the law and the legal (asylum) system. 
Discontent with the applicable legal framework and with the way in which asy-
lum claims are assessed, may lead lawyers to start hopeless procedures which 
may nevertheless be in the interest of the individual client (relational lawyering) 
or in the public interest of justice, because the applicable legal framework is 
challenged with a view to making the law and the legal system more substan-
tively just (moral activism). In other words, if the lawyer considers that a strict 
or mere application of the law as it stands produces unjust outcomes, s/he is 
more likely to let personal morality prevail and operate possibly at the bounda-
ries of what is professionally and legally acceptable. 
The circumstances of the case in combination with lawyers’ views of the 
morality of the law and the legal system in the area of asylum law are thus im-
portant in understanding their professional decision making in this particular 
area of law. Yet, as the juxtaposition of the analyses of the Dutch and the Eng-
lish cases suggests, the role played by these aspects in the actual balancing act is 
shaped, or at least limited, by both the institutional and professional contexts 
within which lawyers operate. I found that, overall, the professional decision 
making of Dutch respondents is characterised by a focus on the client’s interest 
and, in comparison, the public interest in the administration of justice (in the 
conservative sense) plays a more prominent role in the decision making of Eng-
lish respondents. The differences between the Dutch and the English institu-
tional and professional context are key to understanding this overall difference 
in focus. 
First, the lawyers’ institutional position within the asylum and legal aid sys-
tem. i.e. whether they are assigned the role of the client’s representative (NL) or 
are given the role of gatekeeper of the legal (aid) system by being made respon-
sible for determining asylum seekers’ eligibility for legal aid and by having to 
apply a merits test to that end (ENG).The imposition of the gatekeeper role 
stimulates, or even requires, a focus on the lawyer’s role as a guardian of the 
legal system to facilitate the public administration of justice based on the appli-
cable legal framework (dutiful lawyering), rather than on the lawyer’s role as the 
client’s representative in the legal system (adversarial advocacy). Second, the 
payment structures accompanying the assignment of these different roles, in-
cluding whether there are financial risks to not acting as gatekeeper (ENG) or 
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not (NL). Within the way payment in the Dutch system is organised, the law-
yer’s interest in profit or survival often coincides with the client’s interest (i.e. 
the client may want to try every possibility to have his or her claim accepted and 
the lawyer receives the legal aid fee when assisting the client to that end), 
whereas in the English system the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival is put on 
a par with the public interest in the administration of justice (in the conservative 
sense, i.e. having cases determined in line with the applicable legal framework 
and not burdening the legal system with cases in which the chances of success 
within this framework are (close to) zero – or less than 50%, i.e. do not meet the 
merits test). This difference in parallel interests is further enhanced by the dif-
ference that there is no cap on the number of providers participating in the Dutch 
legal aid scheme (so increased competition), whereas within the English legal 
aid system there is a limit on the number of asylum legal aid lawyers. Only con-
tracted providers can provide legal aid in a certain amount of cases. Third, the 
emphasis in the professional regimes to which lawyers are subject, i.e. whether 
this is placed either on the principle of partisanship and acting in the client’s best 
interest (NL) or on the public interest in the proper administration of justice and 
has aspects which stimulate or enforce compliance with the lawyer’s duties as an 
‘officer of the court’ (including the institutional division between solicitors and 
barristers and the possibility of ordering wasted costs if there is an abuse of 
process – ENG). Finally, the focus within the national legal culture in which 
asylum legal aid lawyers operate, i.e. whether this is on partisanship and acting 
in the client’s best interest (NL) or on the public interest in the administration of 
justice including an ‘officer of the court’ ideal that is held in high regard (ENG). 
To sum up, these four aspects of the institutional and professional context shape, 
or at least limit, the decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers and are, there-
fore, key to understanding how the balancing act plays out. 
On a side note, in both Dutch and English respondents’ accounts we have 
seen that in many instances the moral line of reasoning they adopt (for the 
Dutch: adversarial advocacy and/or relational lawyering – for the English: duti-
ful lawyering) coincides with the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival: morality 
and market are in line. However, we have also seen instances in which these are 
in tension; it is remarkable in this regard that reliance on these other lines of 
reasoning (in the Dutch context: dutiful lawyering – and, in some instances, 
moral activism – and in the English context: adversarial advocacy, relational 
lawyering and moral activism) seems to be connected to the firm context within 
which lawyers operate (i.e. whether one works in the (medium-) larger firms 
and/or in what could be considered the more well-established firms) and more in 
particular to having the financial room to actually let morality prevail over mar-
ket. Especially in the English context – in which there are great differences in 
firm types and sizes – this seems to be at play. The precise role of the firm con-
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text was beyond the scope of this study, but it would be an interesting topic for 
further research. 
6.2 Methodological Reflections 
I studied the ‘professional ethics in practice’ of asylum legal aid lawyers by 
examining how they balance the client’s interest, the public interest in the ad-
ministration of justice and the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival.1 I focused 
on these three central interests, because these lie at the core of the debates dis-
cussed in the introduction that prompted this research. Focusing on these three 
interests carries with it the risk of disregarding other interests that may be at 
play. Even though I purposefully chose, because of studying this topic in the 
particular context of publicly funded asylum law, to examine the balancing act 
between these three interests, I also tried not to disregard other interests; the 
initial inductive analysis allowed for this. I found that the lawyer’s reputation 
plays a role the balancing act and I have discussed how: reputational concerns 
are involved in prioritising the public interest in the administration of justice 
(both in the conservative and the progressive sense) or the client’s interest and 
that this is connected to how within the national legal culture the balancing of 
one interest over another is valued – in other words, which way of acting is con-
sidered acceptable and results in a good reputation (which in turn is in the law-
yer’s interest in profit or survival). In brief, I found employing the three interests 
model fruitful for the purpose of this research; other interests relate to the three 
central interests at stake.  
The analytical framework used for interpreting asylum legal aid lawyers’ 
professional decision making, i.e. the balancing act, was largely based on 
Parker’s four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice.2 They can be con-
sidered ‘ideal types’ and were as such used as relational rather than classifica-
tory concepts.3 I introduced this set of conceptual tools in the course of the re-
search – that is only after having conducted the interviews and after an initial 
exploration and analysis of the fieldwork – I agreed with Evans and Forgasz that 
Parker’s set of tools comprehensively covers the different possible ethical (or 
moral) orientations available to lawyers and is sufficiently broad so as to analyse 
lawyers operating in different areas of law and in different jurisdictions.4 How-
                                                        
1  Following the definition of ‘ethical issue’ by Moorhead et al. (2012), p. 7.  
2  Parker (2004).  
3  Rueschemeyer (2009, p. 19) on Weber’s conception of an ideal type. 
4  Evans & Forgasz (2014), p. 138. For example, in legal aid cases being funded by public 
money is an additional aspect, but this can be seen as an extra aspect of facilitating the 
public administration of justice according to the law in the public interest which is key to 
→ 
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ever, for the purposes of this study it lacked the ‘market’ dimension. The set of 
tools allowed me to obtain a better understanding of how respondents balance 
their obligations to the client and the public when these are in tension and why 
they do so, but did not allow for incorporating the lawyer’s interest in profit or 
survival (the third central interest) in the analysis. Therefore, I added this dimen-
sion (‘market’) to the set of four approaches to moral reasoning (‘morality’) and 
incorporated it in the analytical framework.5 In sum, I found that Parker’s ap-
proaches to moral reasoning comprehensively cover the range of lawyers’ moral 
orientations, but for studying professional ethics in practice as understood in this 
study (i.e. including the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival), it required adding 
the market dimension.  
6.3 Findings in Light of the Literature and the Debates 
In line with previous research on lawyers practising in various areas of law, I 
found that asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making involves a 
continuous balancing between morality and market and that the actual decisions 
made depend on the particular circumstances of a case and are shaped by the 
complex interplay of the professional regime, workplace settings, personal iden-
tities and values through the ‘communities of practice’ within which lawyers 
operate.6 In particular, this study has shown that the law’s morality and lawyers’ 
views thereof is a factor of relevance and how this plays a role in the decision 
making of lawyers practising in the field of asylum law. Levin and Mather ar-
gued that this factor, i.e. ‘the impact of law itself, the normative values and qual-
ity of justice embedded in it, and how lawyers think about the law and the sys-
tem in which they are working’ received insufficient attention in research.7 
Studying lawyers within the context of asylum law, as this research has done, in 
part, helps to fill that gap and shed more light on the role of the law’s morality 
and the extent to which the law and the legal system are considered just. Within 
the context of asylum and immigration law, the work of Appelqvist and Levin 
indicated the importance of how lawyers think about the law and the system 
within which they work for understanding their decision making.8 This research 
further supports this: we have seen how the law’s morality and the extent to 
                                                        
the responsible (or dutiful) lawyering concept. The concept is sufficiently broad so as to 
allow for including this aspect in the analysis. 
5  Comp. De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998, p. 241) who also sets this aspect (the ‘market’) 
apart from the other tensions in the moral domain.  
6  E.g. Parker (2004); De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998); Mather, Maiman & McEwen (2001); 
Levin & Mather (2012). 
7  Levin & Mather (2012), p. 365. 
8  Appelqvist (2000); Levin (2012). 
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which the law and the legal system are considered just plays a role in lawyers’ 
decision making, more in particular, how this is at play in personal morality 
overriding role morality. We have seen that if the law and legal processes as 
they stand do not coincide with the lawyer’s ideals of justice, respondents may 
not necessarily, depending on the circumstances of the case, find themselves 
confined by a duty to the law (not fully ‘play by the rules’), but rather use their 
professional skills as strategies of resistance to the injustice and unfairness they 
experience, either with a view to making the law and the legal institutions more 
substantively just in the public interest (moral activism or ‘cause lawyering’)9 or 
to mean something in the life of one individual client, in other words, to achieve 
personal rather than social change (relational lawyering). 
Furthermore, this study nuances the claim, made in the context of studying 
lawyer decision making within one country, that one of the most significant 
influences on lawyers’ ethical decision making is the practice area in which 
lawyers work.10 Studying the decision making of lawyers practising in the same 
area of law in two different countries suggests that other aspects are more im-
portant. The groups of lawyers under review in this study both practise in the 
field of asylum law – and the same international and European legal frameworks 
apply: the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the EU Directives on Asylum11 – but we have seen important differences in their 
professional decision making. As argued above, the differences in institutional 
context (the characteristics of the asylum and the legal aid system, i.e. the law-
yer’s institutional position and accompanying payment structures) as well as in 
professional context (the professional regime and the national legal culture) 
between the two countries are key to understanding these differences. This re-
search thus substantiates in the asylum law context what has been found in the 
criminal law context: the importance of the lawyer’s place in the legal system, 
i.e. his or her institutional position and the dependent relationships stemming 
therefrom.12 
In addition, in connection to the point made on the role of the professional 
regime and the national legal culture, this study nuances conventional ideas 
about the lawyer’s role in different legal systems. Traditionally, a distinction in 
                                                        
9  Sarat & Scheingold (1998). 
10  E.g. Levin & Mather (2012), p. 18. However, this may still hold true – in the context in 
which this claim is made – when studying lawyer conduct within one country as the pro-
fessional and institutional context would be largely similar within one country. 
11  To which the UK, and therefore England, opted in and were thus applicable at the time 
this research was carried out. There are, however, some differences on the national level 
regarding the implementation and carrying out of the international and European legal 
framework. 
12  E.g. Blumberg (1967, 1970); Martorano Van Cleve (2012). 
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legal ‘families’ is made between countries belonging to the common law (adver-
sarial) and the civil law (inquisitorial) tradition and the role of the lawyer within 
these legal systems.13 The so-called ‘standard conception’ of the lawyer’s role 
(also referred to as the ‘hired gun’ or the ‘adversarial advocate’) based on the 
core principles of partisanship, neutrality and non-accountability, has typically 
been associated with the adversarial legal systems of common law countries.14 
Through studying lawyers operating in two countries that are traditionally un-
derstood to be part of these different legal families, this study, in line with 
Boon’s observations, nuances or even supersedes this idea. Boon pointed out 
that in the codes of conduct for both solicitors and barristers in England and 
Wales an attenuated version of the standard conception is seen, as well as that 
earlier studies suggest that adversarial advocacy is also not seen in practice in 
England.15 This is also what this study has shown: a stronger adversarial stance 
both in theory (the professional rules) and in practice (in respondents’ accounts) 
in the Netherlands than in England. In other words, the standard conception of 
the lawyer’s role traditionally associated with lawyers’ operating within com-
mon law (adversarial) systems is in this study seen in the civil law country, the 
Netherlands, rather than in the common law country, England. It would be inter-
esting to investigate whether this is also seen among lawyers operating in other 
areas of law in order to determine whether these conclusions are pervasive. Fur-
ther research on the professional decision making of, for example, corporate 
lawyers in these countries could shed more light on the lawyer’s role in society 
within these different legal cultures, as these lawyers operate in an area of law 
with different characteristics: it involves two private parties rather than an indi-
vidual and a state party and the lawyer is paid by the client, not by the state. 
 
To conclude by returning to the debates discussed in the introduction: I found 
that asylum legal aid lawyers are neither solely leftist activists nor ‘fat cat’ law-
yers exclusively motivated by their own profit. Lawyers’ professional decision 
making involves a continuous balancing between morality and market and the 
actual decisions made depend on the particular circumstances of a case. In the 
debates about the way in which asylum legal aid lawyers do their work discus-
sions are often reduced to discussions about quality; the moral dimension – 
which is crucial to understanding lawyers’ decisions – is overlooked. In discuss-
                                                        
13  See e.g. Abel & Lewis (1988, vol. 1), p. 11 ff. Compare Sherr who points within the 
European context to a clear division between civil law countries and common law coun-
tries in respect of the approaches to the rules of the lawyer conduct and professional dis-
cipline. Sherr (1998), p. 342. 
14  E.g. Parker (2004); Luban (1988). 
15  Boon (2014), p. 23; p. 30 referring to D. Pannick (1992), Advocates, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 105. 
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ing what good quality entails moral views about the lawyer’s role in society are 
often left implicit. As these views constitute the basis for what providing high-
quality legal work requires and may differ amongst the different parties to the 
debate, these must be made explicit and play a more central role in the debate. 
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Summary 
 
Aim and Approach 
The way in which asylum lawyers do their work, especially when operating 
within a state’s legal aid system, is a topic of continuous debate.1 Legal aid law-
yers are criticised for not putting in sufficient time and effort in assisting their 
asylum-seeking clients and for ‘cherry picking’ profitable cases, as well as for 
undermining the law and ‘playing the system’ by starting procedure after proce-
dure in so-called ‘hopeless cases’. Doing so excessively burdens the administra-
tive and judicial system as well as the legal aid budget. The discussions and 
criticism about the ways in which asylum legal aid lawyers do their work are 
essentially about how these lawyers deal and should deal with the different (and 
at times competing) interests at stake when assisting their asylum seeking clients 
under the legal aid scheme: these are questions of lawyers’ professional ethics. 
The particulars of asylum seekers as a clientele, the politically sensitive, 
complex and sometimes ambiguous nature of asylum law combined with the 
organisational aspects of both the asylum and legal aid system (the institutional 
context) in which lawyers operate make the practice area of publicly funded 
asylum law ethically challenging. Previous research and contributions of law-
yers who engaged in discussions on the provision of legal aid in asylum cases 
have shown that this institutional context in which lawyers operate, may cause 
ethical pressures.2 Lawyers have described the difficulties in providing what 
they consider high quality legal assistance under the circumstances in which 
they have to work. 
 
The central aim of this study was to obtain a better understanding of asylum 
legal aid lawyers’ ‘professional ethics in practice’, i.e. how these lawyers as 
members of the legal profession balance the different interests at stake when 
assisting their asylum seeking clients under the state’s legal aid scheme, and to 
explore the role of the institutional context in that regard. In order to reach these 
aims, I examined the professional decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers 
in two different institutional contexts. 
                                                        
1  See e.g. ‘Asieladvocaten “strooien zand in de machine”’, NRC, 20 december, 2001; 
Laemers & De Groot-van Leeuwen (2004); Jacobs et al. (2006); Sillevis Smitt (2012); 
Butter, Laemers & Terlouw (2013); ‘Asylum seeker charities are just playing the system, 
says Woolas’, Guardian, 18 November, 2008; http://www.irr.org.uk/news/asylum-
seekers-wrongly-refused-legal-aid/; Sanderson & Sommerlad (2011), p. 185 ff.; Gibbs & 
Hughes-Roberts (2012), p. 20. 
2  E.g. James & Killick (2010; 2012); Terlouw (2011); Sommerlad (2008); Webber (2012); 
Bogaers (2009); Hoftijzer (2003); Koers (2001). 
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The central question to this research was: 
 
What does the professional decision making of asylum legal aid lawyers look 
like, how can this be understood and what role does the institutional context 
play in this regard? 
 
Professional decision making is defined in this study as the ways in which law-
yers go about making decisions on ethical issues, that is, what I understand to be 
in line with Moorhead et al., how they balance the client’s interest, the public 
interest in the administration of justice and the lawyer’s interests in profit or 
survival.3 
 
Professional Decision Making 
 
 
        Client interest  
 
       
                                                                            Decision 
 
          
 
 
Public interest                                                                Lawyer interest    
in the administration of justice                          in profit or survival 
 
I adopted an explorative approach in which theoretical notions and existing re-
search were used to gain more insight into the object of study and to direct the 
setup of this study, the selection of respondents and the analysis. I conducted a 
multiple case study and studied the professional decision making of lawyers 
operating in two different institutional contexts: the Netherlands and England. I 
studied both the contexts in which asylum legal aid lawyers operate as well as 
the professional decision making of these lawyers through interviewing them. In 
studying the contexts I examined, in addition to the institutional context, the 
professional context (i.e. the professional regime to which lawyers are subject), 
the key specifics of substantive asylum law within the different jurisdictions and 
the firm context within which asylum legal aid lawyers operate in the two coun-
tries under review. This investigation consisted of an examination of the legal 
                                                        
3 Following the definition of ‘ethical issue’ by Moorhead et al. (2012), p. 7.
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framework and policy documents underlying the asylum and legal aid systems 
and the professional regime to which bar-registered lawyers are subject; inter-
views with several relevant actors in the field (including employees of national 
legal aid authorities, individuals involved in the regulation of the legal profes-
sion, employees of not-for-profit organisations involved in asylum procedures 
and judges in asylum cases); attendance of a lawyer-client meeting, a gathering 
of asylum legal aid lawyers (NL) and court hearings at the Asylum and Immi-
gration Tribunal, both First Tier and Upper Tribunal (ENG). 
The core of the two case studies consisted of an examination of asylum legal 
aid lawyers’ professional decision making through semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews (22 per case, a total of 44). I selected varied groups of respondents 
(purposive sampling) and examined their professional decision making in re-
spect of two ethical issues: ‘time vs money’ and ‘hopeless cases’. The former 
primarily served as a preliminary issue in order to explore the morality versus 
market pressures legal aid lawyers are confronted with within the particular 
institutional context in which they operate and the running of a legal aid practice 
in this context; its purpose was to comprehend the lawyers’ interest in profit or 
survival in the context in which the balancing act takes place. The issue of the 
‘hopeless case’ constituted the central issue through which I examined the bal-
ancing act. Following an initial inductive analysis, I analysed and sought to 
interpret respondents’ decision making by employing an analytical framework 
consisting of four approaches to moral reasoning in legal practice that fore-
ground either the client’s interest or the public interest based on role morality or 
personal morality – adversarial advocacy, dutiful lawyering, moral activism and 
relational lawyering4 – (morality) and its relation to the lawyer’s interest in 
profit or survival (market). 
 
                                                        
4  Based on the work of Parker (2004). 
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Analytical Framework for Interpreting Professional Decision Making 
MORALITY 
 
 Role morality  
(conservative / procedure) 
Personal morality  
(progressive / outcome) 
Client interest Adversarial Advocacy Relational Lawyering 
Public interest in the 
administration of justice 
Dutiful Lawyering Moral Activism 
 
(vs) 
MARKET 
 
 
Lawyer’s interest in profit or survival 
   
Main Findings 
Drawing from the analyses of both cases I found that respondents’ actual deci-
sion making ultimately depends on the particular circumstances of the case; in 
one situation either the client or the public interest is given more weight and the 
arguments for doing so may differ, showing different lines of moral reasoning 
prioritising the client or the public interest based on role morality or personal 
morality. The particular aspects playing a role are the nature of the case (the 
nature of the client’s claim, the degree of hopelessness and whether it is a legal 
aid or a private case); the stage of the procedure (first instance, appeal, onward 
appeal); the nature of the client (the degree of vulnerability, whether there are 
distressing particularities to the client’s situation and whether the client is con-
sidered ‘a genuine refugee’).  
The circumstances that elicit a shift in focus from the client interest to the 
public interest are the improper nature of client’s claim (e.g. the wish to stall 
merely to retain reception without any other special circumstances; the client is 
lying and wants to maintain the lie), an extremely hopeless case, a case being a 
legal aid case rather than a private case and proceeding at the higher stages of 
the legal system. In contrast, the circumstances that trigger a shift in focus from 
the public interest to the client interest are related to the nature of the client, that 
is, the client being very vulnerable, there being other distressing particularities 
to his/her situation or the client being ‘a genuine refugee’. Furthermore, in addi-
tion to a shift in interest focus, the nature of the client (vulnerability, other dis-
tressing particularities to his/her situation) and the nature of the case (case in 
which it ‘really matters’ and can lead to a change in policy or case law) may 
lead personal morality (relational lawyering, moral activism) to override role 
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morality (adversarial advocacy, dutiful lawyering) – either while retaining the 
focus on the same interest or shifting between interests.  
Moreover, the uttering of lines of reasoning based on personal morality 
when justifying the strategies employed in assisting their clients is connected to 
lawyers’ view about the morality of the law and the legal (asylum) system. Dis-
content with the applicable legal framework and with the way in which asylum 
claims are assessed, may lead lawyers to start hopeless procedures which may 
nevertheless be in the interest of the individual client (relational lawyering) or in 
the interest of justice because the applicable legal framework is challenged with 
a view to making and the law and the legal system more substantively just 
(moral activism). In other words, if the lawyer considers that a strict or mere 
application of the law as it stands produces unjust outcomes, s/he is more likely 
to let personal morality prevail and operate possibly at the boundaries of what is 
professionally and legally acceptable. 
Even though the joint analysis shows that the circumstances of the case in 
combination with lawyers’ views of the morality of the law and the legal system 
in the area of asylum law are important in understanding their professional deci-
sion making in this particular area of law, the juxtaposition of both analyses, 
consisting of the examination of two groups of lawyers in different contexts, 
suggests that the role these aspects play in the actual balancing act is shaped, or 
at least limited, by both the institutional and professional context in which law-
yers operate.  
Overall, the professional decision making of Dutch respondents is character-
ised by a focus on the client’s interest and, in comparison, the public interest in 
the administration of justice (in the conservative sense) plays a more prominent 
role in the decision making of English respondents. Virtually all Dutch respon-
dents explain they are willing to and/or tell about situations in which they assist 
clients in pursuing certain, what can be termed, hopeless procedures – i.e. an 
application- or court procedure in which the lawyer considers the chance of 
obtaining legal success in that procedure and at that moment in time (close to) 
zero, whereas almost all English respondents explain that this is something they 
are not willing and/or able to do as a legal aid lawyer – depending, however, on 
the stage of the procedure. The arguments advanced by respondents to explain 
their decisions show different lines of legal moral reasoning – the adversarial 
advocate as well as the relational lawyer and moral activist line of reasoning are 
relatively more prominent amongst Dutch respondents and the dutiful lawyer 
line of reasoning is relatively more prominent in English respondents’ accounts5 
                                                        
5  Moreover, the adversarial advocacy – as well as the moral activism and relational law-
yering – seen amongst English respondents is more moderate than amongst Dutch re-
spondents.  
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– how ‘market’ considerations are at play as well as how both the institutional 
and professional context in which they operate shape or curtail their decision 
making. I found the following differences between the Dutch and the English 
institutional and professional context key to understanding this overall differ-
ence in focus observed in the professional decision making of Dutch respon-
dents (client ‘s interest) and English respondents (public interest – in the conser-
vative sense).  
First, the institutional position of asylum legal aid lawyers. Whereas lawyers 
providing legal aid to asylum seekers in the Netherlands are assigned the role of 
the client’s representative, English legal aid lawyers are given the role of gate-
keeper of the legal (aid) system. Within the joint setup of the asylum- and legal 
aid system, Dutch lawyers are appointed to the client with a view to assisting the 
client in the fixed, fast paced general asylum procedure and can (and are ex-
pected to) take non-asylum related aspects into account under legal aid. English 
legal aid lawyers are made responsible for determining asylum seekers’ eligibil-
ity for legal aid. They have to determine from the start whether a case is in scope 
– generally, legal aid is only available for asylum and deportation matters, not 
for any other immigration related matters – and conduct a means and merits test. 
English respondents explain how this sets the boundaries within which they can 
operate as well as how it encourages – especially the responsibility for applying 
the merits test – a certain attitude and conduct: it incites judging the client(’s 
case) instead of merely representing the client. The imposition of the gatekeeper 
role in the English context thus stimulates, or even requires, a focus on the law-
yer’s role as a guardian of the legal system to facilitate the public administration 
of justice based on the applicable legal framework (dutiful lawyering), rather 
than on the lawyer’s role as the client’s representative in the legal system (ad-
versarial advocacy). 
Second, the assignment of these different roles is connected to – and one 
could argue enhanced or enforced by – the way in which legal aid lawyers are 
remunerated. Within the way payment in the Dutch legal aid system is organ-
ised, the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival often coincides with the client’s 
interest (i.e. the client may want to try every possibility to have his or her claim 
accepted and the lawyer receives the legal aid fee when assisting the client to 
that end), whereas in the English system the lawyer’s interest in profit or sur-
vival is put on a par with the public interest in the administration of justice (in 
the conservative sense, i.e. having cases determined in line with the applicable 
legal framework and not burdening the legal system with cases in which the 
chances of success within this framework are (close to) zero – or less than 50%, 
i.e. do not meet the merits test). The fulfilment of the gatekeeping role is 
checked during audits (with the possibility of fee withdrawal) and preparing 
onward appeals and judicial reviews is ‘at risk’ of not obtaining payment if per-
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mission to appeal is not granted. In acting as a gatekeeper and being strict on the 
merits test, the lawyer thus runs the least financial risk: not spending time find-
ing arguments to meet the merits test and no risk of fee withdrawal – or receiv-
ing no fee at onward appeals and in judicial reviews – or damaging the relation-
ship with the Legal Aid Agency for wrongfully granting legal aid and the finan-
cial implications that might have for the solicitor’s business (e.g. ultimately 
termination of the legal aid contract). This difference in parallel interests is fur-
ther enhanced by the difference that there is no cap on the number of providers 
participating in the Dutch legal aid scheme (so increased competition), whereas 
within the English legal aid system there is a limit on the number of asylum 
legal aid lawyers. Only contracted providers can provide legal aid in a certain 
amount of cases. In both Dutch and English respondents’ accounts there are 
many instances in which the moral line of reasoning they adopt (for the Dutch: 
adversarial advocacy and/or relational lawyering – for the English: dutiful 
lawyering) coincides with the lawyer’s interest in profit or survival: morality 
and market are in line. However, there are also instances in which these are in 
tension; it is remarkable in this regard that reliance on these other lines of rea-
soning (in the Dutch context: dutiful lawyering – and, in some instances, moral 
activism6 – and in the English context: adversarial advocacy, relational lawyer-
ing and moral activism) seems to be connected to the firm context within which 
lawyers operate (i.e. whether one works in the (medium-) larger firms and/or in 
what could be considered the more well-established firms) and more in particu-
lar to having the financial room to actually let morality prevail over market. 
Especially in the English context – in which there are great differences in firm 
types and sizes – this seems to be at play. The precise role of the firm context 
was beyond the scope of this study, but it would be an interesting topic for fur-
ther research. 
Third, the difference in emphasis seen in the way the legal aid systems are 
set up, i.e. either on the client interest (the Dutch system) or on the public inter-
est – in the conservative sense – (the English system), is also seen in the profes-
sional regimes lawyers are subject to in the two countries. Whereas in the Dutch 
professional framework the principle of partisanship and acting in the client’s 
best interest are emphasised as being central to the lawyer’s role, the English 
professional rules prescribe a focus on the public interest in the proper admini-
stration of justice – the code of conduct explicitly prescribes that if two of the 
core principles come into conflict, the principle which best serves the public 
interest, especially the public interest in the proper administration of justice must 
take precedence – and has aspects which stimulate or enforce compliance with 
                                                        
6  E.g. challenging the law by preparing procedures with the ECtHR which take more time 
than legal aid funding covers. 
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the lawyer’s duties as an ‘officer of the court’. These include the institutional 
division between solicitors and barristers – with the barrister as an additional 
intermediary who assesses whether a case can be appealed on points of law pre-
venting the lodging of unmeritorious claims at the onward appeal stages – and 
the possibility of ordering wasted costs if there is an abuse of process.  
Finally, in line with this difference in professional regimes (‘book law’), the 
difference in focus is also at play within the national ‘legal culture’ (‘living 
law’) in which asylum legal aid lawyers operate in the two countries.7 In the 
Netherlands, we have seen acceptance of the focus on partisanship and acting in 
the client’s best interest, in particular, by part of asylum legal aid lawyers’ 
community of practice (peer review committee and judges), i.e. within the inter-
nal dimension of the legal culture in which lawyers operate.8 Within the English 
legal culture I found this to be less so. Both within its internal dimension 
(amongst legal professionals) as well as its external dimension (the views and 
attitudes of general population as projected in the media and through govern-
ment action) a focus on the public interest in the administration of justice and 
the ‘officer of the court’ ideal are held in high regard.  
Conclusion  
Having studied the professional decision making – i.e. the balancing of the pub-
lic interest in the administration of justice, the client’s interest and the lawyer’s 
interest in profit or survival – of asylum legal aid lawyers operating in two dif-
ferent institutional contexts and having analysed this by employing the analyti-
cal framework set out above, I found that the circumstances of the case (the 
nature of the case, the stage of the procedure and the nature of the client) in 
combination with lawyers’ views on the morality of the law and the legal system 
in the area of asylum law are important in understanding lawyers’ professional 
decision making in this particular area of law – that is, in how the balancing act 
ultimately plays out and whether the client’s interest or the public interest is 
given more weight based on role morality or personal morality. Yet, as the jux-
taposition of the analyses of the Dutch and the English cases suggests, the role 
played by these aspects in the actual balancing act is shaped, or at least limited, 
by both the institutional and professional contexts within which lawyers operate. 
Overall, the professional decision making of Dutch respondents is characterised 
by a focus on the client’s interest and, in comparison, the public interest in the 
administration of justice (in the conservative sense) plays a more prominent role 
in the decision making of English respondents and I found the differences be-
tween the Dutch and the English institutional context (the characteristics of the 
                                                        
7  Friedman (1997). 
8  Friedman distinguishes the internal from the external dimension (1975, p. 223). 
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asylum and the legal aid system, i.e. the lawyer’s institutional position and ac-
companying payment structures) and professional context (the professional re-
gime and the national legal culture) key to understanding this overall difference 
in focus. 
 
In line with previous research on lawyers practising in various areas of law, I 
found that asylum legal aid lawyers’ professional decision making involves a 
continuous balancing between morality and market and that the actual decisions 
made depend on the particular circumstances of a case and are shaped by the 
complex interplay of the professional regime, workplace settings, personal iden-
tities and values through the ‘communities of practice’ within which lawyers 
operate.9 In particular, this study has shown that the law’s morality and lawyers’ 
views thereof is a factor of relevance and how this plays a role in the decision 
making of lawyers practising in the field of asylum law. Levin and Mather ar-
gued that this factor, i.e. ‘the impact of law itself, the normative values and qual-
ity of justice embedded in it, and how lawyers think about the law and the sys-
tem in which they are working’ received insufficient attention in research.10 
Studying lawyers within the context of asylum law, as this research has done, in 
part, helps to fill that gap and shed more light on the role of the law’s morality 
and the extent to which the law and the legal system are considered just. Within 
the context of asylum and immigration law, the work of Appelqvist and Levin 
indicated the importance of how lawyers think about the law and the system 
within which they work for understanding their decision making.11 This research 
further supports this: we have seen how the law’s morality and the extent to 
which the law and the legal system are considered just plays a role in lawyers’ 
decision making, more in particular, how this is at play in personal morality 
overriding role morality. We have seen that if the law and legal processes as 
they stand do not coincide with the lawyer’s ideals of justice, respondents may 
not necessarily, depending on the circumstances of the case, find themselves 
confined by a duty to the law (not fully ‘play by the rules’), but rather use their 
professional skills as strategies of resistance to the injustice and unfairness they 
experience, either with a view to making the law and the legal institutions more 
substantively just in the public interest (moral activism or ‘cause lawyering’)12 
or to mean something in the life of one individual client, in other words, to 
achieve personal rather than social change (relational lawyering). 
                                                        
9  E.g. Parker (2004); De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998); Mather, Maiman & McEwen (2001); 
Levin & Mather (2012). 
10  Levin & Mather (2012), p. 365. 
11  Appelqvist (2000); Levin (2012). 
12  Sarat & Scheingold (1998). 
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Furthermore, this study nuances the claim, made in the context of studying 
lawyer decision making within one country, that one of the most significant in-
fluences on lawyers’ ethical decision making is the practice area in which law-
yers work.13 Studying the decision making of lawyers practising in the same 
area of law in two different countries suggests that other aspects are more im-
portant. The groups of lawyers under review in this study both practise in the 
field of asylum law – and the same international and European legal frameworks 
apply: the Refugee Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the EU Directives on Asylum – but we have seen important differences in their 
professional decision making. As argued above, the differences in institutional 
context (the characteristics of the asylum and the legal aid system, i.e. the law-
yer’s institutional position and accompanying payment structures) as well as in 
professional context (the professional regime and the national legal culture) 
between the two countries are key to understanding these differences. This re-
search thus substantiates in the asylum law context what has been found in the 
criminal law context: the importance of the lawyer’s place in the legal system, 
i.e. his or her institutional position and the dependent relationships stemming 
therefrom.14 
In addition, in connection to the point made on the role of the professional 
regime and the national legal culture, this study nuances conventional ideas 
about the lawyer’s role in different legal systems. Traditionally, a distinction in 
legal ‘families’ is made between countries belonging to the common law (adver-
sarial) and the civil law (inquisitorial) tradition and the role of the lawyer within 
these legal systems.15 The so-called ‘standard conception’ of the lawyer’s role 
(also referred to as the ‘hired gun’ or the ‘adversarial advocate’) based on the 
core principles of partisanship, neutrality and non-accountability, has typically 
been associated with the adversarial legal systems of common law countries.16 
Through studying lawyers operating in two countries that are traditionally un-
derstood to be part of these different legal families, this study, in line with 
Boon’s observations, nuances or even supersedes this idea. Boon pointed out 
that in the codes of conduct for both solicitors and barristers in England and 
Wales an attenuated version of the standard conception is seen, as well as that 
                                                        
13  E.g. Levin & Mather (2012), p. 18. However, this may still hold true – in the context in 
which this claim is made – when studying lawyer conduct within one country as the pro-
fessional and institutional context would be largely similar within one country. 
14  E.g. Blumberg (1967, 1970); Martorano Van Cleve (2012). 
15  See e.g. Abel & Lewis (1988, vol. 1), p. 11 ff. Compare Sherr who points within the 
European context to a clear division between civil law countries and common law coun-
tries in respect of the approaches to the rules of the lawyer conduct and professional dis-
cipline. Sherr (1998), p. 342. 
16  E.g. Parker (2004); Luban (1988). 
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earlier studies suggest that adversarial advocacy is also not seen in practice in 
England.17 This is also what this study has shown: a stronger adversarial stance 
both in theory (the professional rules) and in practice (in respondents’ accounts) 
in the Netherlands than in England. In other words, the standard conception of 
the lawyer’s role traditionally associated with lawyers’ operating within com-
mon law (adversarial) systems is in this study seen in the civil law country, the 
Netherlands, rather than in the common law country, England. It would be inter-
esting to investigate whether this is also seen among lawyers operating in other 
areas of law in order to determine whether these conclusions are pervasive. Fur-
ther research on the professional decision making of, for example, corporate 
lawyers in these countries could shed more light on the lawyer’s role in society 
within these different legal cultures, as these lawyers operate in an area of law 
with different characteristics: it involves two private parties rather than an indi-
vidual and a state party and the lawyer is paid by the client, not by the state. 
 
To conclude, in the debates about the ways in which asylum legal aid lawyers do 
their work, they are often portrayed either as leftist activists or as ‘fat cat’ law-
yers exclusively motivated by their own profit. I found that neither one of those 
images corresponds to the complex and difficult practice of those providing 
legal aid to asylum seekers. Lawyers’ professional decision making involves a 
continuous balancing between morality and market and the actual decisions 
made depend on the particular circumstances of a case. In the debates about the 
way in which asylum legal aid lawyers do their work discussions are often re-
duced to discussions about quality; the moral dimension – which is crucial to 
understanding lawyers’ decisions – is overlooked. In discussing what good qual-
ity entails moral views about the lawyer’s role in society are often left implicit. 
As these views constitute the basis for what providing high-quality legal work 
requires and may differ amongst the different parties to the debate, these must be 
made explicit and play a more central role in the debate. 
 
 
                                                        
17  Boon (2014), p. 23; p. 30 referring to D. Pannick (1992), Advocates, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 105. 
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Samenvatting  
 
Probleemstelling en aanpak van het onderzoek 
De manier waarop asieladvocaten hun werk doen, is al gedurende lange tijd 
onderwerp van debat. Dit debat betreft vooral asieladvocaten die publiek gefi-
nancierde rechtsbijstand verlenen.1 Advocaten die rechtsbijstand verlenen wor-
den enerzijds bekritiseerd omdat ze niet genoeg tijd en moeite zouden investeren 
in het bijstaan van hun cliënten en omdat ze aan ‘cherry picking’ zouden doen, 
dat wil zeggen dat ze alleen de meest lucratieve zaken zouden aannemen. An-
derzijds luidt de kritiek dat ze het rechtssysteem ondermijnen en ‘zand in de 
machine strooien’ door procedure na procedure te starten in zogenaamde ‘kans-
loze zaken’, wat zorgt voor een buitensporige en onnodige belasting van zowel 
het rechtssysteem als het systeem van gefinancierde rechtsbijstand. De discus-
sies over en de kritiek op de manier waarop asieladvocaten hun werk doen, gaan 
in essentie over hoe deze advocaten omgaan en zouden moeten omgaan met de 
verschillende en soms conflicterende belangen waarmee zij te maken hebben bij 
het verlenen van publiek gefinancierde rechtsbijstand aan asielzoekers. Dit is 
een vraagstuk van beroepsethiek. 
De speciale kenmerken van asielzoekers als clientèle en de politiek gevoeli-
ge, complexe en soms ambigue aard van het asielrecht, gecombineerd met de 
organisatorische aspecten van zowel het asiel- als het rechtsbijstand systeem (de 
institutionele context) waarin advocaten opereren, maken het verlenen van pu-
bliek gefinancierde rechtsbijstand aan asielzoekers vanuit beroepsethisch oog-
punt lastig. Eerder onderzoek en bijdragen van advocaten aan het debat over 
gefinancierde rechtsbijstand in asielzaken hebben laten zien dat de institutionele 
context waarbinnen advocaten hun werk moeten doen hen voor ethische dilem-
ma’s plaatst; advocaten beschrijven de moeilijkheden (o.a. geld en tijdsdruk) die 
zij ervaren bij het verlenen van goede rechtsbijstand binnen deze institutionele 
context.2  
 
Door dit onderzoek wilde ik een beter begrip krijgen van de beroepsethiek van 
asieladvocaten in de praktijk, dat wil zeggen: hoe deze advocaten de verschil-
                                                        
1  Zie bijv. ‘Asieladvocaten “strooien zand in de machine”’, NRC, 20 december 2001; 
Laemers & De Groot-van Leeuwen (2004); Jacobs et al. (2006); Sillevis Smitt (2012); 
Butter, Laemers & Terlouw (2013); ‘Asylum seeker charities are just playing the system, 
says Woolas’, Guardian, 18 November, 2008; http://www.irr.org.uk/news/asylum-
seekers-wrongly-refused-legal-aid/; Sanderson & Sommerlad (2011), p. 185 e.v.; Gibbs 
& Hughes-Roberts (2012), p. 20. 
2  O.a. James & Killick (2010; 2012); Terlouw (2011); Sommerlad (2008); Webber (2012); 
Bogaers (2009); Hoftijzer (2003); Koers (2001). 
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lende belangen afwegen waarmee zij bij het bijstaan van asielzoekers binnen een 
systeem van gefinancierde rechtsbijstand geconfronteerd worden en onderzoe-
ken welke rol de institutionele context hierbij speelt. Hiertoe heb ik de professi-
onele besluitvorming van advocaten onderzocht in twee verschillende institutio-
nele contexten: Nederland en Engeland. 
 
De hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek luidde: 
 
Hoe ziet de professionele besluitvorming van asieladvocaten eruit, hoe kan dit 
worden begrepen en welke rol speelt de institutionele context hierbij? 
 
‘Professionele besluitvorming’ is in dit onderzoek gedefinieerd als de manier 
waarop advocaten omgaan met ethische kwesties, dat wil zeggen: de belangen-
afweging tussen het cliëntbelang, het publieke belang van de goede rechtsbede-
ling en het financiële belang van de advocaat.3 
 
Professionele besluitvorming 
     Cliënt belang  
      
Beslissing 
        
Publiek belang                                                             Advocaat belang  
van een goede rechtsbedeling                                              (financieel)  
 
In dit onderzoek heb ik een exploratieve aanpak gehanteerd waarin theoretische 
begrippen en bestaand onderzoek zijn gebruikt om meer inzicht te krijgen in het 
onderwerp van onderzoek en als basis dienen voor de opbouw en aanpak van het 
onderzoek, de selectie van respondenten en de analyse. Ik heb een meervoudige 
case study uitgevoerd en de professionele besluitvorming van advocaten in twee 
verschillende contexten bestudeerd: in Nederland en in Engeland. Ik heb zowel 
de contexten waarin de advocaten werken onderzocht als hun professionele 
besluitvorming. In het onderzoek naar de contexten heb ik, naast de institutione-
le context (het asiel- en rechtsbijstandsysteem), gekeken naar de kernaspecten 
                                                        
3 Ik sluit hier aan bij de definitie van ‘ethical issue’ van Moorhead et al. (2012), p. 7.
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van het asielrecht en de kantoorcontext waarbinnen advocaten werken in de 
twee landen. Dit deel van het onderzoek bestond uit het bestuderen van het juri-
dische en het beleidskader die de basis vormen voor het asiel- en rechtsbijstand-
systeem en het professionele regime (o.a. de beroepsregels) dat geldt voor advo-
caten; interviews met verschillende actoren uit het veld (werknemers van de 
raden voor rechtsbijstand, personen betrokken bij de regulering van de advoca-
tuur, werknemers van ngo’s en rechters in asielzaken); het bijwonen van een 
advocaat-cliëntbespreking en een vergadering van asieladvocaten (NL) en 
rechtszaken van het Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (ENG).  
De kern van de twee case studies bestond uit het onderzoeken van de profes-
sionele besluitvorming van asieladvocaten door middel van semigestructureerde 
diepte-interviews (22 per case, 44 in totaal). Ik heb een gevarieerde groep res-
pondenten geselecteerd (purposive sampling) en heb professionele besluitvor-
ming (de belangenafweging) onderzocht aan de hand van twee ethische kwes-
ties: ‘tijd versus geld’ en ‘kansloze zaken’. De eerste kwestie diende er voorna-
melijk toe om de moraal versus markt spanningen te verkennen waarmee rechts-
bijstandadvocaten geconfronteerd worden binnen de institutionele context waar-
in zij werken. Het doel was om inzicht te krijgen in het financiële belang van de 
advocaat in de context waarbinnen de belangenafweging plaatsvindt. Het vraag-
stuk van de ‘kansloze zaak’ diende als centrale kwestie om de belangenafweging 
te onderzoeken. Na een eerste inductieve analyse, heb ik de professionele be-
sluitvorming van de respondenten geanalyseerd aan de hand van een analytisch 
kader bestaande uit vier manieren van moreel redeneren in de rechtspraktijk die 
ofwel het cliënt belang ofwel het publiek belang vooropstellen gebaseerd op rol 
moraal dan wel op de persoonlijke moraal (adversarial advocacy, dutiful lawye-
ring, moral activism en relational lawyering4) en de verhouding hiervan tot het 
financiële belang van de advocaat (markt).  
 
                                                        
4  Gebaseerd op het werk van Parker (2004). 
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MORAAL 
 
 Rol moraal  
(conservatief / procedure) 
Persoonlijke moraal  
(progressief / outcome) 
Cliënt belang Adversarial Advocacy Relational Lawyering 
Publiek belang van de 
goede rechtsbedeling 
Dutiful Lawyering Moral Activism 
(vs) 
MARKT 
 
 
Advocaat belang (financieel) 
   
Belangrijkste bevindingen  
Op basis van de gezamenlijke analyse van beide case studies kwam naar voren 
dat de beslissingen die respondenten nemen uiteindelijk afhangen van de speci-
fieke omstandigheden van de zaak; in de ene situatie wordt aan het cliënt belang 
meer gewicht toegekend en in de andere situatie aan het publiek belang. De 
argumenten daarvoor verschillen en in de argumenten zijn verschillende morele 
redeneerwijzen terug te zien: het cliënt belang of het publiek belang wordt voor-
opgesteld op basis van rol moraal of de persoonlijke moraal. De aspecten die 
hierbij een rol spelen zijn: aard van de zaak (de aard van claim van de cliënt, hoe 
gering de kansen op succes zijn en of het een publiek gefinancierde of een priva-
te zaak betreft); stadium van de procedure (eerste aanvraag, beroep, hoger be-
roep); aard van de cliënt (de mate van kwetsbaarheid, of er specifieke schrijnen-
de omstandigheden zijn en of de cliënt wordt gezien als ‘een echte vluchteling’). 
De omstandigheden die aanleiding geven voor een verschuiving van het cli-
ent belang naar het publiek belang zijn de ongepastheid van de claim van de 
cliënt (bijv. de wens om tijd te rekken door het starten van een procedure enkel 
om opvang te behouden en er geen andere speciale omstandigheden zijn, of de 
cliënt liegt en wil de leugen volhouden), een zaak die extreem kansloos is, een 
zaak die publiek gefinancierd wordt in plaats van betaald door de cliënt zelf en 
procederen bij de hogere beroepsinstanties. Omstandigheden die aanleiding 
geven voor een verschuiving van het publiek belang naar het cliënt belang heb-
ben te maken met de aard van de cliënt: de cliënt is extreem kwetsbaar, er is 
sprake van andere schrijnende omstandigheden of de cliënt is een ‘echte vluch-
teling’. Naast de verschuiving van de nadruk die op het ene dan wel het andere 
belang wordt gelegd, kan de aard van de cliënt (kwetsbaarheid, andere schrij-
nende omstandigheden) en de aard van de zaak (zaken die ‘er echt toe doen’ en 
kunnen leiden tot een wijziging van beleid of een doorbraak in de jurisprudentie) 
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er ook toe leiden dat de persoonlijke moraal (relational lawyering, moral acti-
vism) de rol moraal (adversarial advocacy, dutiful lawyering) overschrijdt – dit 
terwijl de advocaat de nadruk op hetzelfde belang blijft leggen of zijn of haar 
focus juist verlegt van het cliënt belang naar het publiek belang of andersom.  
Daarnaast zijn de morele redeneerwijzen gebaseerd op de persoonlijke mo-
raal die worden gebruikt om de strategieën die worden ingezet bij het bijstaan 
van cliënten te rechtvaardigen, verbonden met de ideeën die advocaten hebben 
over de moraliteit van de wet en het rechtssysteem in asielzaken. Ongenoegen 
met de manier waarop het rechtssysteem functioneert binnen het wettelijk kader 
en de manier waarop asielverzoeken worden beoordeeld, kunnen ertoe leiden dat 
advocaten kansloze procedures starten die wél in het belang van de individuele 
cliënt zijn (relational lawyering) of in het publiek belang van een goede rechts-
bedeling, omdat deze het wettelijk kader ter discussie stellen met als doel om de 
wet en het rechtssysteem rechtvaardiger te maken (moral activism). Met andere 
woorden: als een advocaat van mening is dat een strikte toepassing van de wet 
binnen het toepasbare wettelijk kader leidt tot onrechtvaardige uitkomsten, dan 
is hij of zij eerder geneigd om de persoonlijke moraal te laten prevaleren en de 
grenzen op te zoeken van wat beroepsethisch en wettelijk acceptabel is. 
Hoewel de gezamenlijke analyse van de cases laat zien dat de omstandighe-
den van de zaak in combinatie met de ideeën van advocaten over de moraliteit 
van de wet en de manier waarop het rechtssysteem functioneert op het gebied 
van het asielrecht (m.a.w. in hoeverre zij dit rechtvaardig vinden) belangrijk zijn 
voor het begrijpen van de keuzes die zij maken, laat het tegenover elkaar plaat-
sen van de analyses van de Nederlandse en Engelse cases zien dat de rol die 
deze aspecten spelen in de uiteindelijke belangenafweging wordt gevormd, of 
beperkt, door zowel de institutionele als de professionele context waarin advoca-
ten opereren. 
Over het algemeen heb ik gevonden dat in de besluitvorming van de Neder-
landse respondenten de nadruk ligt op het cliënt belang en dat, in vergelijking, 
de Engelse respondenten meer gewicht toekennen aan het publiek belang van 
een goede rechtsbedeling (in conservatieve zin). Vrijwel alle Nederlandse res-
pondenten vertellen dat ze bereid zijn om/ of geven voorbeelden van situaties 
waarin zij cliënten hebben bijgestaan in wat kan worden gezien als hopeloze 
procedures – dat wil zeggen, een aanvraag- of beroepsprocedure waarvan de ad-
vocaat de kans op succes in die procedure en op dat moment (vrijwel) nihil acht. 
Vrijwel alle Engelse respondenten stellen daarentegen dat, afhankelijk van het 
stadium van de procedure, dit iets is wat ze niet bereid zijn te doen en/of niet 
kunnen doen als rechtsbijstand advocaat. In de argumenten die de respondenten 
geven ter motivering van hun beslissingen zijn verschillende morele redeneer-
wijzen terug te zien (in vergelijking zijn de adversarial advocate evenals de 
relational lawyer en moral activist redeneringen prominenter aanwezig in de 
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uitleg van de Nederlandse respondenten en de dutiful lawyer redenering in de 
uitleg van de Engelse respondenten)5 evenals hoe financiële overwegingen mee-
spelen en de rol die institutionele en professionele context spelen in de besluit-
vorming. Het relatieve verschil in focus in de belangenafweging van de Neder-
landse respondenten (cliënt belang) en de Engelse respondenten (publiek belang 
– in conservatieve zin) laat zich verklaren door de volgende verschillen tussen 
de Nederlandse en de Engelse institutionele en professionele context.  
Allereerst de institutionele positie van advocaten die gefinancierde rechtsbij-
stand verlenen in asielzaken. In het Nederlandse systeem hebben advocaten de 
rol van belangenbehartiger en vertegenwoordiger van de cliënt, terwijl binnen 
het Engelse systeem advocaten de rol van poortwachter van het rechts(bijstand-) 
systeem toebedeeld hebben gekregen. Binnen de structuur van het Nederlandse 
asiel- en het rechtsbijstandsysteem worden advocaten toegewezen aan de cliënt 
met als doel om de cliënt bij te staan in het vaste stramien van de achtdaagse 
algemene asielprocedure en daarbinnen kunnen zij (en dit wordt ook van hen 
verwacht) niet asiel gerelateerde migratierechtelijke aspecten van de zaak van de 
cliënt meenemen. Binnen het Engelse rechtsbijstandsysteem zijn advocaten ver-
antwoordelijk voor het beoordelen of de asielzoekende cliënt in aanmerking 
komt voor gefinancierde rechtsbijstand. Hiertoe moeten advocaten beoordelen 
of de zaak valt binnen de rechtsgebieden waarvoor rechtsbijstand beschikbaar is 
(in het algemeen alleen voor asielzaken en uitzettingsprocedures, niet voor regu-
lier migratierecht), een inkomenstoets uitvoeren en de kansrijkheid van de zaak 
beoordelen (merits test). Engelse respondenten leggen uit hoe hun handelen 
hierdoor begrensd wordt en hoe de verantwoordelijkheid om de kansrijkheid van 
een zaak te beoordelen (het toepassen van de merits test) een bepaalde houding 
en manier van handelen stimuleert: in plaats van de cliënt te vertegenwoordigen 
als zijn of haar belangenbehartiger, moedigt het de advocaat aan om op de stoel 
van de rechter te gaan zitten. De rol van poortwachter die advocaten opgelegd 
krijgen in de Engelse context stimuleert, of vereist misschien zelfs, een focus op 
het faciliteren van de goede rechtsbedeling gebaseerd op het geldende wettelijke 
kader in het publiek belang (de advocaat als de hoeder van het rechtssysteem – 
dutiful lawyering) in plaats van een focus op de rol van advocaat als belangen-
behartiger van de cliënt binnen het rechtssysteem (adversarial advocacy). 
Ten tweede is de toekenning van deze verschillende rollen verbonden met – 
en wordt mogelijk versterkt door – de wijze van beloning van rechtsbijstandad-
vocaten. Binnen de financieringsstructuur van het Nederlandse rechtsbijstand-
systeem komt het financiële belang van de advocaat vaak overeen met het cliënt 
belang: de cliënt wil veelal elke mogelijkheid aangrijpen om een verblijfsrecht 
                                                        
5  Bovendien is de adversarial advocacy – evenals het moral activism en relational lawyer-
ing – van Engelse respondenten gematigder dan dat van Nederlandse respondenten.  
SAMENVATTING 
 
231 
 
te krijgen terwijl de advocaat een vergoeding ontvangt om de cliënt in deze pro-
cedures bij te staan. In het Engelse systeem daarentegen, is het financiële belang 
van de advocaat gelijkgesteld aan het publiek belang van de goede rechtsbede-
ling (in conservatieve zin) dat wil zeggen: zaken die worden beoordeeld en ge-
wezen volgens het geldend wettelijk kader en het rechtssysteem niet belasten 
met zaken waarvan de kansen op succes binnen dit geldend wettelijk kader (vrij-
wel) nihil zijn – of minder dan 50%, dat wil zeggen: de merits test niet halen. Of 
advocaten de rol van poortwachter correct vervullen, wordt gecontroleerd door 
middel van audits en de mogelijkheid bestaat dat de ontvangen vergoeding moet 
worden terugbetaald in geval van een incorrecte beoordeling. Verder is het 
voorbereiden van hoger beroepzaken en judicial reviews ook voor risico van de 
advocaat; advocaten krijgen pas betaald als de gerechtelijke instantie toestem-
ming verleent voor het instellen van beroep. Door de merits test streng toe te 
passen en te handelen als een poortwachter, loopt de advocaat dus het minste 
financiële risico: er hoeft dan minder tijd gespendeerd te worden aan het vinden 
van argumenten om de drempel van de merits test te halen en men loopt niet het 
risico dat de ontvangen vergoeding moet worden terugbetaald – of dat men he-
lemaal geen vergoeding ontvangt voor hoger beroepszaken en judicial reviews – 
of de verhouding met de Legal Aid Agency (Raad voor rechtsbijstand) wordt be-
schadigd door het ten onrechte verstrekken van rechtsbijstand en de financiële 
implicaties die daaruit kunnen volgen (bijv. beëindiging van het contract op ba-
sis waarvan het kantoor gefinancierde rechtsbijstand mag verlenen). Dit verschil 
in parallel lopende belangen wordt verder versterkt door het verschil dat er in 
het Nederlandse systeem geen limiet is aan het aantal advocaten dat gefinancier-
de rechtsbijstand mag verlenen en er dus sprake is van een verhoogde concur-
rentie om cliënten, terwijl er in het Engelse systeem wel een limiet is aan het 
aantal rechtsbijstand advocaten in asielzaken. Alleen gecontracteerde kantoren 
mogen gefinancierde rechtsbijstand verlenen in een vooraf bepaald aantal zaken. 
In de motivering van zowel de Nederlandse als de Engelse respondenten is het 
veelal zo dat de morele redenering die ze aanhangen (bij de Nederlandse res-
pondenten: adversarial advocacy en/of relational lawyering – bij de Engelse: 
dutiful lawyering) overeenkomt met het financiële belang van de advocaat: mo-
raal en markt vallen samen. Er zijn echter ook voorbeelden van situaties waarin 
deze op gespannen voet met elkaar staan. Hierbij is het opvallend dat het uiten 
van deze andere morele redeneringen (in de Nederlandse context: dutiful lawyer-
ing – en in sommige situaties moral activism6 – en in de Engelse context: ad-
versarial advocacy, relational lawyering en moral activism) verband lijken te 
                                                        
6  Bijv. door het wettelijk kader of de uitleg daarvan ter discussie te stellen door procedures 
aanhangig te maken bij het Europese Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens; de rechtsbij-
standvergoeding dekt niet altijd de tijd die hiermee gemoeid is.  
SAMENVATTING 
 
232 
 
houden met de kantoorcontext van waaruit de advocaat opereert (dat wil zeggen: 
of hij of zij werkt bij een (middel-)groot kantoor en/of in wat kan worden gezien 
als een gerenommeerd kantoor) en vooral of er de financiële ruimte is om mo-
raal te laten prevaleren over markt. Met name in de Engelse context waar grote 
verschillen zijn in kantoortype en -grootte lijkt dit een factor van belang. De 
precieze rol van de kantoorcontext viel buiten het onderwerp van deze studie, 
maar zou een interessant thema zijn voor verder onderzoek. 
Ten derde is het verschil in het belang waar de nadruk op ligt binnen het 
rechtsbijstandsysteem – op het cliënt belang (het Nederlandse systeem) dan wel 
op het publiek belang (in conservatieve zin – het Engelse systeem) – ook terug 
te zien in het professionele regime waar advocaten aan zijn onderworpen in de 
twee landen. Hoewel binnen het Nederlandse professionele regime partijdigheid 
en het handelen als belangenbehartiger benadrukt worden als essentieel voor het 
vervullen van de rol van advocaat, schrijven de Engelse beroepsregels voor dat 
de nadruk moet liggen op het publiek belang van de goede rechtsbedeling. De 
gedragsregels schrijven voor dat indien twee kernwaarden met elkaar in conflict 
komen, de kernwaarde die het publiek belang het beste dient, in het bijzonder 
het publiek belang van de goede rechtsbedeling, het zwaarst moet wegen. Daar-
naast kent het Engelse systeem aspecten die stimuleren of zelfs vereisen dat ad-
vocaten zich opstellen als een ‘officer of the court’. Deze aspecten zijn de insti-
tutionele verdeling tussen solicitors en barristers – waarbij de barrister fungeert 
als een extra tussenpersoon die een zaak beoordeeld op kans van slagen op juri-
dische punten, wat het starten van kansloze procedures (die misschien wel in het 
belang zijn van de cliënt) bij hogere beroepsinstanties voorkomt – en de moge-
lijkheid om in het geval van misbruik van procesrecht te veroordelen tot betaling 
van de proceskosten (‘wasted costs order’).  
Ten slotte: overeenkomstig dit verschil in de professionele regimes (‘book 
law’), is het verschil in focus ook te zien in de nationale rechtscultuur (‘living 
law’) waarbinnen asieladvocaten werken in de twee landen.7 In Nederland wordt 
de nadruk op partijdigheid en het handelen als belangenbehartiger geaccepteerd 
door een deel van de juridische gemeenschap in asielzaken (commissie intercol-
legiale toetsing en rechters), met andere woorden: binnen de interne dimensie 
van de rechtscultuur waarin asieladvocaten opereren.8 In Engeland leek dit min-
der het geval te zijn. Zowel binnen de interne dimensie (onder juridische profes-
sionals) als de externe dimensie van de rechtscultuur (de opinies en de houding 
van de bevolking zoals deze naar voren komen in de media en middels over-
heidsoptreden) lijkt de nadruk te liggen op het publiek belang van de goede 
                                                        
7  Friedman (1997). 
8  Friedman onderscheidt de interne dimensie van externe dimensie (1975, p. 223). 
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rechtsbedeling en wordt veel waarde toegekend aan het ‘officer of the court’ 
ideaal. 
Conclusie  
Op basis van het bestuderen van de professionele besluitvorming, dat wil zeg-
gen: de belangenafweging tussen het cliënt belang, het publiek belang en het 
financiële belang van de advocaat, van asieladvocaten werkzaam in verschillen-
de institutionele contexten (Nederland en Engeland) en het analyseren daarvan 
aan de hand van het analytisch kader zoals hierboven uiteengezet, heb ik gevon-
den dat de specifieke omstandigheden van de zaak (de aard van de zaak, het 
stadium van de procedure en de aard van de cliënt) in combinatie met de ideeën 
die advocaten hebben over de moraliteit van de wet en de manier waarop het 
rechtssysteem functioneert op het gebied van het asielrecht (m.a.w. in hoeverre 
zij dit rechtvaardig vinden) belangrijk is bij het begrijpen van hun professionele 
besluitvorming, dat wil zeggen bij hoe de belangenafweging uiteindelijk uitvalt. 
Het tegenover elkaar plaatsen van de analyses van de Nederlandse en de Engelse 
cases suggereert echter dat de rol die deze aspecten spelen in de uiteindelijke 
besluitvorming, gevormd – of beperkt – wordt door zowel de institutionele als 
de professionele context waarin deze advocaten werken. Over het algemeen ligt 
bij de besluitvorming van de Nederlandse respondenten de nadruk op het cliënt 
belang en weegt, in vergelijking, het publiek belang van een goede rechtsbede-
ling (in conservatieve zin) zwaarder bij de Engelse respondenten. Dit relatieve 
verschil in nadruk zich laat verklaren door de verschillen tussen de Nederlandse 
en de Engelse institutionele context (de kenmerken van het asiel- en het rechts-
bijstandsysteem, dat wil zeggen: de institutionele positie van de advocaat en de 
financieringstructuur die daarmee samenhangt) en de professionele context (het 
professionele regime en de nationale rechtscultuur). 
 
In lijn met eerder onderzoek gedaan naar de besluitvorming van advocaten 
werkzaam op andere rechtsgebieden, komt uit mijn onderzoek naar voren dat de 
professionele besluitvorming van asieladvocaten, die gefinancierde rechtsbij-
stand verlenen, bestaat uit een constant balanceren tussen moraal en markt en 
dat de daadwerkelijke beslissingen afhangen van de specifieke omstandigheden 
van de zaak en worden gevormd door een complex samenspel van het professio-
nele regime, de institutionele en kantoorsetting, persoonlijke kenmerken en 
waarden van advocaten, en de juridische gemeenschappen (communities of prac-
tice) waarbinnen advocaten werkzaam zijn.9 Levin en Mather hebben gesteld dat 
eerder onderzoek onvoldoende aandacht heeft besteed aan ‘the impact of law 
                                                        
9  O.a. Parker (2004); De Groot-van Leeuwen (1998); Mather, Maiman & McEwen (2001); 
Levin & Mather (2012). 
SAMENVATTING 
 
234 
 
itself, the normative values and quality of justice embedded in it, and how law-
yers think about the law and the system in which they are working’.10 Het bestu-
deren van advocaten in de context van het asielrecht, zoals in dit onderzoek, 
helpt om deze leemte op te vullen en meer inzicht te krijgen in de rol van de 
moraliteit van het wettelijk kader en in hoeverre dit als rechtvaardig wordt be-
schouwd. In lijn met het werk van Appelqvist en Levin, heeft dit onderzoek 
laten zien dat de moraliteit van de wet en de ideeën van advocaten hierover be-
langrijke factoren zijn in de besluitvorming van advocaten werkzaam op het 
gebied van het asielrecht, evenals hoe deze factoren een rol spelen: de rolmoraal 
wordt overschreden door de persoonlijke moraal.11 Als het geldend wettelijk 
kader niet overeenkomt met de ideeën van advocaten over rechtvaardigheid, dan 
zullen zij zichzelf niet per se, afhankelijk van omstandigheden van het geval, 
laten beperken door dit wettelijk kader, maar hun professionele vaardigheden 
inzetten voor een rechtvaardiger rechtssysteem in het publiek belang van een 
goede rechtsbedeling (moral activism of ‘cause lawyering’)12 of om iets te bete-
kenen in het leven van een individuele cliënt (persoonlijke verandering i.p.v. van 
sociale verandering – relational lawyering). 
Daarnaast nuanceert dit onderzoek de bewering, gedaan in de context van 
het bestuderen van de besluitvorming van advocaten binnen een land, dat het 
rechtsgebied waarin advocaten werkzaam zijn een van de meest invloedrijke 
factoren is in hun ethische besluitvorming.13 Het bestuderen van de besluitvor-
ming van advocaten werkzaam op hetzelfde rechtsgebied in twee verschillende 
landen suggereert dat andere aspecten belangrijker zijn. Beide groepen respon-
denten in dit onderzoek zijn werkzaam op het gebied van het asielrecht en de-
zelfde internationale en Europese wettelijke kaders zijn van toepassing (het 
Vluchtelingenverdrag, het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens, en 
de EU asielrichtlijnen), maar deze studie heeft laten zien dat er belangrijke ver-
schillen zijn in de professionele besluitvorming van deze twee groepen advoca-
ten. Zoals hierboven beargumenteerd, laat dit verschil zich verklaren door de 
verschillen in de institutionele context (de kenmerken van het asiel- en het 
rechtsbijstandsysteem: de institutionele positie van de advocaat en de financie-
ringsstructuur die daarmee samenhangt) en de professionele context (het profes-
sionele regime en de nationale rechtscultuur). Dit onderzoek ondersteunt eerder 
onderzoek gedaan in de context van het strafrecht dat heeft laten zien dat de rol 
die de advocaat binnen een systeem toebedeeld krijgt, zijn of haar institutionele 
                                                        
10  Levin & Mather (2012), p. 365. 
11  Appelqvist (2000); Levin (2012). 
12  Sarat & Scheingold (1998). 
13  Bijv. Levin & Mather (2012), p. 18. Echter, deze bewering zou nog steeds stand kunnen 
houden wanneer het gaat om het handelen van advocaten binnen een land waarin zowel 
de institutionele als de professionele context gelijk is. 
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positie en de afhankelijkheidsrelaties die daaruit voortvloeien, een cruciale rol 
spelen.14 
Verder, en dit hangt samen met het punt ten aanzien van de rol van het pro-
fessionele regime en de nationale rechtscultuur, nuanceert deze studie gangbare 
ideeën over de rol van de advocaat in verschillende rechtssystemen. Van ouds-
her worden landen onderscheiden in verschillende ‘rechtsfamilies’ en ingedeeld 
als deel uitmakend van ofwel de common law (adversair systeem) of de civil law 
traditie (inquisitoir systeem) en de rol van advocaat wordt als verschillend ge-
zien binnen deze rechtssystemen.15 Het zogenaamde standaard beeld van de 
advocaat (ook bekend als de hired gun of de adversarial advocate) gebaseerd op 
de kernwaarden van partijdigheid, neutraliteit en niet-toerekenbaarheid, wordt 
gewoonlijk geassocieerd met het adversaire systeem van common law landen.16 
In lijn met Boons bevindingen nuanceert dit onderzoek dit beeld.17 Deze studie 
heeft laten zien dat adversarial advocacy in Nederland meer de norm is dan in 
Engeland, zowel in theorie (het professionele regime) als in de praktijk (in de 
verslagen van respondenten). Met andere woorden: het standaard beeld van de 
advocaat dat van oudsher geassocieerd wordt met advocaten die opereren in een 
common law (adversair) systeem, komt in deze studie sterker naar voren in het 
land met een civil law traditie: Nederland, in plaats van het land met een com-
mon law traditie: Engeland. Om na te gaan of deze conclusies breder getrokken 
kunnen worden, zou het interessant zijn om nader onderzoek te doen onder ad-
vocaten die werkzaam zijn in andere rechtsgebieden. Verder onderzoek naar de 
professionele besluitvorming van bijvoorbeeld ondernemingsrechtadvocaten in 
deze landen zou meer inzicht kunnen verschaffen in de maatschappelijke rol van 
de advocaat binnen deze twee verschillende rechtsculturen, aangezien dit rechts-
gebied hele verschillende kenmerken heeft: er staan twee private partijen tegen-
over elkaar in plaats van een individu tegenover de staat en de advocaat wordt 
betaald door de cliënt in plaats van door de staat. 
 
Tot slot: in het debat over de manier waarop asieladvocaten hun werk doen wor-
den ze veelal geportretteerd ofwel als linkse activisten ofwel als ‘fat cat lawyers’ 
enkel gemotiveerd door hun eigen financiële belang. Ik heb gevonden dat beide 
beelden niet overeenkomen met de complexe dagelijkse praktijk van degenen 
die gefinancierde rechtsbijstand verlenen aan asielzoekers. De professionele 
                                                        
14  O.a. Blumberg (1967, 1970); Martorano Van Cleve (2012). 
15  Zie bijv. Abel & Lewis (1988, vol. 1), p. 11 e.v. Vgl. Sherr (1998, p. 342) die binnen de 
Europese context een duidelijk verschil beschrijft tussen common law en civil law landen 
ten aanzien van de vormgeving van het professionele regime en de gedragsregels voor 
advocaten.  
16  Bijv. Parker (2004); Luban (1988). 
17  Boon (2014), p. 23. 
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besluitvorming van asieladvocaten die gefinancierde rechtsbijstand verlenen 
bestaat uit een constant balanceren tussen moraal en markt en de daadwerkelijke 
beslissingen hangen af van de specifieke omstandigheden van de zaak. In het 
debat over de manier waarop asieladvocaten die gefinancierde rechtsbijstand 
verlenen hun werk doen, wordt de discussie vaak gereduceerd tot een discussie 
over kwaliteit en wordt de morele dimensie, die cruciaal is voor het begrijpen 
van de keuzes die advocaten maken, veelal over het hoofd gezien. In de discus-
sie over wat goede kwaliteit inhoudt, blijven de morele ideeën over de rol van de 
advocaat in de maatschappij vaak impliciet. Er liggen morele redeneringen ten 
grondslag aan wat kwalitatief goede rechtsbijstandverlening inhoudt en de ver-
schillende partijen aan het debat kunnen hier uiteenlopende visies op hebben. 
Daarom zouden deze morele redeneringen expliciet gemaakt moeten worden en 
een meer centrale rol moeten vervullen in het debat. 
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Annex 1  
Sample of Asylum Legal Aid Lawyers 
 
Pre-selection 
NL 
- Lawyers who assist asylum seekers in the regular asylum procedure (ex-
cluding closed border procedure in application centre Schiphol) and who are 
registered to participate in the schedule for assisting asylum seekers during 
the general asylum procedure in inland application centres in Ter Apel, 
Zevenaar and Den Bosch (AC rota)1 
o Total on AC rota first half 2013: 337 
o 18 lawyers are only on Schiphol schedule, so excluded 
o Total group consists of 318 lawyers (337-19) 
ENG 
- Solicitors who assist asylum seekers in the regular asylum procedure (ex-
cluding detained fast track) working in law firms.2 
o Total number of contracted solicitor firms and other organisations pro-
viding legal aid in asylum cases in England and Wales: about 300 (500 
offices)3 
 
Selection criteria  
1. Geographical variation  
2. Size of the firm (based on the total number of lawyers in the firm) 
o Solo practitioner 
o Small firm (2-5) 
o Medium (6-40) 
o Large (> 40) 
3. Experience in asylum law  
o -3 years 
o 3-10 years 
o +10 years 
                                                        
1  A few respondents are on both the AC rota for Schiphol and the inland application cen-
tres. 
2  With the exception of one respondent, who works at a not-for-profit organisation. This 
solicitor was selected, because of this solicitors’ involvement in norm setting. Five re-
spondents also provide (or supervise) legal aid in the detained fast track procedure. There 
are only six firms that provide legal aid in the detained fast track procedures. (There are 
nine firms providing legal aid in the immigration removal centres, of which six have a 
contract to also provide legal aid in the detained fast track process.) The percentage of 
claims dealt with in these procedures was 17% in 2012.  
3  I was not able to obtain information about the total number of solicitors operating in 
solicitors’ firms that are allowed to provide legal aid. 
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4. Membership of specialised association  
o Yes 
o No 
5. Gender 
o Male 
o Female 
 
Sample-overview 
The tables below present an overview of the sample of respondents in the Neth-
erlands and England.4 In order to safeguard respondents’ anonymity, the geo-
graphical criterion is not linked to the respondents’ other characteristics and not 
depicted in the table. The variation is discussed separately below.  
 
Netherlands 
 Respondent 
 
 
Size of the Firm Experience Membership 
specialised  
association 
Gender 
1) p2 Medium +10 Yes M 
2) 1 Small (sp) +10 Yes M 
3) 2  Small (sp) +10 No F 
4) 3  Solo +10 No M 
5) 4  Small  +10 Yes F 
6) 5  Solo  3-10 No F 
7) 6  Solo +10 No M 
8) 7  Small  -3 No M 
9) 8  Small (sp) +10 Yes M 
10) 9  Small (sp) -3 No F 
11) 10  Solo +10 Yes F 
12) 11  Medium (sp) 3-10 Yes M 
13) 12  Medium  -3 No M 
14) 13  Solo +10 Yes F 
15) 14  Small (sp) -3 Yes F 
16) 15 Small (sp) 3-10 No M 
17) 16  Solo +10 Yes M 
18) 17  Medium (sp) -3 No F 
19) 18  Small (sp) +10 Yes M 
20) 19 Medium (sp) +10 Yes F 
21) 20 Medium +10 Yes M 
22) 21 Medium +10 Yes M 
 
                                                        
4  Most of the exploratory (or: pilot) interviews with lawyers were suitable for and included 
in the main sample for analysis. In the Netherlands this concerned one out of the two pi-
lot interviews with lawyers and in England three out of the four pilot interviews with so-
licitors. These are coded in the table as: p1, p2, etc. 
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England 
 Respondent 
 
 
Size of the Firm Experience Membership  
specialised 
association 
Gender 
1) p1 Small (sp) -3 Yes M 
2) p2 Medium (sp) +10 Yes F 
3) p3 Medium 3-10 Yes F 
4) 1  Large (sp) 3-10 Yes M 
5) 2 Medium (sp) +10 Yes F 
6) 3  Medium (sp) +10 Yes M 
7) 4 Large (sp) +10 Yes F 
8) 5 Solo  +10 Yes M 
9) 6 Small 3-10 Yes M 
10) 7  Medium (sp) +10 Yes F 
11) 8 Large (sp) 3-10 Yes F 
12) 9 Medium (sp) 3-10 Yes F 
13) 10 Small (sp) -3 Yes F 
14) 11 Small (sp) -3 Yes F 
15) 12 Small 3-10 No M 
16) 13 Small (sole practi-
tioner + case-
worker) 
+10 Yes M 
17) 14 Medium (sp) +10 Yes M 
18) 15 Medium (sp) -3 Yes M 
19) 16 Medium (sp) -3 No F 
20) 17 Medium (sp) 3-10 Yes M 
21) 18  Large (sp) +10 Yes F 
22) 19 Large (sp) -3 Yes F 
 
Explanation criteria 
 
Ad 1. Geographical variation 
In order to have a wide variation in respondent lawyers working in the more 
urbanised versus remote areas – which often has implications for office costs 
and thus for their economic situation (see also next criterion) – and working 
within different application centres/access points. In the Netherlands lawyers 
participating in the AC rota of all three different inland ACs are included, which 
generally also leads to a variation of lawyers working in the more urbanised 
versus remote areas. 
 
Inland Application Centres: 
AC Ter Apel: 6 respondents 
AC Zevenaar: 7 respondents 
AC Den Bosch: 9 respondents 
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In England, lawyers situated in London and lawyers working in offices outside 
the London region are included from the different Legal Aid Agency procure-
ment areas and access points.5 The majority of the interviews were held in the 
London region because the majority of the solicitors’ firms are based in London.  
 
Legal Aid Agency Procurement Areas and Access Points: 
1.  London and South East England 
Buckinghamshire 
Hampshire, Southampton, Portsmouth & Isle of Wight 
London  (14 respondents) 
Mid, South West and Coastal Kent (1 respondent) 
Oxfordshire & Berkshire 
Surrey & Sussex (1 respondent) 
2.  Midlands and East of England 
Bedfordshire & South Hertfordshire (1 respondent) 
Cambridgeshire & Northamptonshire 
City of Leicester 
City of Stoke-On-Trent 
Coventry 
Greater Nottingham, Derby & South Derbyshire 
South Staffordshire, Sandwell and Birmingham (1 respondent) 
3.  North East, Yorkshire and the Humber 
County Durham East, Teesside, Tyne & Wear and Gateshead 
South Yorkshire (1 respondent) 
West Yorkshire (1 respondent) 
4.  North West England 
East & West Lancashire 
Greater Manchester 
Merseyside (2 respondents) 
5.  South West England (no suitable respondents) 
City of Bristol, Gloucestershire and North Somerset 
City of Plymouth and Devon 
6.  (Wales: not in scope of research) 
Ad 2. Size of the firm 
In order to account for the differences in economic situation, the division of 
labour within the firm (support staff), the capacity to supervise and monitor 
beginning lawyers and the degree of collegial control, lawyers working in dif-
ferent firm sizes are included. The number of lawyers working in a firm is 
counted based on the total number of lawyers so including lawyers who practise 
                                                        
5  The majority of the interviews were held in the London region because the majority of 
the solicitors’ firms are based in London.  
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in other areas of law. When all or the majority of lawyers (or in the case of a 
medium/large firm three people or more) of a firm work in asylum/ immigration, 
this is considered a firm which specialises in this practice area and this is noted 
(‘sp’) In the Netherlands, there are no large firms that employ asylum legal aid 
lawyers and there are thus only respondents from the first three categories. For 
the definition of large firms The Law Society’s definition of large firms (41 or 
more solicitors) is used. When counting the number of lawyers in English firms 
trainee solicitors and caseworkers accredited to do asylum law are included.6 In 
England there are hardly any sole practitioners in the sense of one solicitor 
working solely without caseworkers; hence the small number of sole practitio-
ners in the selection. 
Ad 3. Experience in asylum law 
In order to have variation in lawyers’ knowledge and experience, respondents 
are selected amongst relative new-comers (up to three years), very experienced 
lawyers and those in between. In the Netherlands this is particularly relevant 
because the newcomers have only worked in the new general asylum procedure 
(as from July 2010) and thus within a different institutional context. Many asy-
lum lawyers have previously worked with the Stichting Rechtsbijstand Asiel 
(shut down in 2008), in which they performed practically the same tasks as they 
do now they are lawyers. Therefore, their SRA time is counted as experience as 
an asylum lawyer. This also explains, together with the fact that there is cur-
rently less work and thus also relatively few new entrants in the asylum law 
field, the larger number of lawyers interviewed with more than 10 years’ experi-
ence. In England, the experience is based on the years of working on asylum 
cases as a qualified solicitor. 
Ad 4. Membership of a specialised association 
As the membership of specialised associations, and the degree of collegial con-
trol related to such membership, is, arguably, important in the construction and 
understanding of acceptable norms of conduct I selected lawyers who are mem-
bers of such an association and those who are not.  
In the Netherlands, there are two professional associations for lawyers prac-
tising in asylum law. The Asylum Lawyers Association the Netherlands (Vereni-
ging asieladvocaten- en juristen Nederland, hereafter: VAJN) and the Specialist 
Association for Migration Lawyers (Specialistenvereniging migratierechtadvo-
caten, hereafter: SVMA) The VAJN is primarily an activist group concerned 
                                                        
6  These are included because they can also provide contract work for the LAA and do 
essentially the same work as solicitors. It is also important because in order to sustain the 
business financially, high volumes of work are important and this can be done by em-
ploying caseworkers. 
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with safeguarding the interests of asylum seekers and membership is not subject 
to special conditions. The SVMA was – partly at the request of the Dutch Bar 
Association – instituted with another aim, namely advancing the professional 
competence of migration lawyers. This is done primarily through organising 
courses and meetings and facilitating the exchange of information between 
members. Membership of the association is only open to lawyers who have been 
registered with the Bar for at least seven years, spent at least half of their prac-
tice time on asylum or migration law – or at least two-thirds of their time on a 
combination of the two – and have done so during the last three years. In addi-
tion, the SVMA board imposes yearly education requirements with which the 
members have to comply. Even though the association does not directly monitor 
the work of its members, the SVMA is seen by the Bar as a quality instrument 
because of the social control related to the membership and the mutual exchange 
of information it facilitates.7 Both the VAJN and the SVMA are thus important 
associations in the field of asylum law. Whereas requirements apply for SVMA 
membership, for VAJN membership this is not the case. I qualify membership of 
either one of those as membership of a specialised association. Restricting it 
only to SVMA would exclude practitioners with less than seven years of Bar 
membership of which half is spent on asylum/immigration law and this would 
not be desirable, since lawyers not yet meeting these requirements may consider 
themselves as specialist, act as such and be active (or activist) members of a 
specialised association and thus part of a certain community, which may lead to 
more collegial control. Membership of the Werkgroep Rechtshulp Vluchtelingen 
(WRV) is obligatory (it is a precondition for being allowed to provide legal aid 
in asylum cases) and this is thus not a distinguishing feature. Therefore, this is 
not seen as membership of a specialised association. 
In England, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) is an 
important organisation in the field of immigration and asylum law.8 ILPA is a 
professional association the majority of whose members are barristers, solicitors 
and advocates, but academics and NGOs are also members. The aim of the As-
sociation is to ‘promote and improve advice and representation in immigration, 
asylum and nationality law through an extensive programme of training and 
                                                        
7  Butter, Laemers & Terlouw (2013), p. 34. 
8  There are other organisations and networks that would not qualify as a specialised asso-
ciation in the way that ILPA does. The Legal Aid Practitioners Group is an organisation 
that represents and provides support for legal aid practitioners. It is a lobby group rather 
than an association which seeks to promote and improve legal advice and representation 
in a certain particular area of law. In addition, there are several email or Internet groups 
which are sources of information for legal aid providers: Asylum Aid has an e-mail 
group (not open to everyone) and there is the Electronic Immigration Network (EIN) 
which is a specialist provider of information on immigration and refugee law via the In-
ternet. 
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disseminating information and by providing research and opinion that draw on 
the experiences of members’.9 Membership is open to individuals and to organi-
sations. For solicitors and solicitors’ firms it holds that the individual or the 
organisation must be a member of a recognised professional body (TLS/SRA). I 
deem ILPA membership to be membership of a specialised association. Even 
though it is open not only to lawyers, solicitor membership of ILPA requires 
endorsement by two professional referees and one can be excluded from mem-
bership in cases of misconduct.10 It is relevant to make this a selection criterion 
because of the collegial control involved in membership of the association as a 
community of specialised asylum lawyers. It thus suggests a higher degree of 
specialisation and involvement in the asylum/immigration law field. However, 
in the course of selecting respondents I found that most firms that provide legal 
aid in asylum cases are members and that firm membership rather than individ-
ual membership is common. In the end, it thus seemed less of a distinguishing 
criterion than in the Netherlands. 
Ad 5. Gender 
I aimed for an equal distribution of men and women lawyers, because in the 
literature gender is mentioned as a personal characteristic affecting lawyers’ 
responses to ethical problems.  
                                                        
9  http://www.ilpa.org.uk/pages/about-us.html. 
10  In order to join ILPA, applicants are required to provide requested documents and the 
names of two professional referees. Once accepted, members must adhere to ILPA’s 
Guidelines for Members (including e.g. that they must give sound legal advice and that 
they must not deceive the immigration authorities or the courts or knowingly allow them-
selves to be used in any deception. Rule 1 a) and b) http://www.ilpa.org.uk/pages/ ilpa-
join-us-guidelines-for-ilpa-members-111.html). Disciplinary action (ultimately exclusion 
from membership) may be taken when a member is guilty of conduct injurious to the in-
terests of ILPA as set out in the Disciplinary Regulations for Members (http://www. 
ilpa.org.uk/resource/26062/disciplinary-regulations-and-guidance-18-march-2014). 
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Annex 2  
Additional Information Legal Aid Remuneration England11  
 
Annex 2a  
The Stage 1 Legal Help standard fee in asylum cases covers:12 
- Initial advice, drafting of statement and representations; 
- Consideration of HO decision, advice to the client about that decision and 
carrying out any necessary work; 
- Applying the merits test for appeal;  
- Grant of CLR or completion of an application for a review of refusal of 
CLR. 
 
The Stage 2a CLR standard fee in asylum cases concluded prior to a substantive 
hearing covers:13 
- Drafting and lodging an appeal; 
- Preparation of an appeal; 
- Re-application of the merits criteria; 
- Where CLR is withdrawn, if necessary the completion of an application for 
a review of the withdrawal of CLR; and 
- Any post appeal advice and assistance that does not constitute a separate 
matter start. 
 
The Stage 2b CLR standard fee in asylum cases leading to a substantive hearing 
covers:14 
- Drafting and lodging an appeal; 
- Preparation of an appeal; 
- Consideration of determination and advice to the client about the determina-
tion and carrying out any necessary work;  
- Re-application of the merits criteria for an appeal to the Upper Tribunal;  
- Where the appeal to the First Tier Tribunal is dismissed and an appeal to the 
Upper Tribunal is not being pursued, explaining the consequences of the de-
cision and carrying out necessary work; 
- Where the appeal is allowed, explaining the consequences of the decision 
including rights and entitlements;  
- Any post appeal advice and assistance that does not constitute a separate 
matter start. 
  
                                                        
11  The conditions applying at the time of the main part of the fieldwork (September-No-
vember 2014). 
12  Para. 8.62 2013 Standard Civil Contract Specification, Section 8 Immigration and Asy-
lum Specification (version 1 April 2013). 
13  Ibid. 
14  Ibid. 
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Stage 2 ends when CLR is granted or refused in relation to the lodging of an 
application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal or where the matter 
otherwise ends earlier. Payment additional to the standard fee is available for 
certain activities. These include representation at the Home Office interview, ad-
vocacy services at the end of stage 2.15 The table below presents an overview of 
the standard fees and additional payments. 
 
Controlled Work Standard Fee Payment in Asylum Cases16  
Standard fees 
Stage 1 (Legal Help) £413 
Stage 2a (Controlled Legal Representation) £227 
Stage 2b (Controlled Legal Representation) £567 
Additional Payments – Home Office Interview 
Representation at Home Office Interview £266 
Additional Payments for Advocacy Services 
Oral Case Management Review Hearing £166 
Telephone Case Management Review 
Hearing 
£90 
Substantive Hearing in the FTT £302 
Additional Day Substantive Hearing £161 
 
  
                                                        
15  Advocacy fees are inclusive of time for travel and waiting. Para. 8.67 2013 Standard 
Civil Contract Specification, Section 8 Immigration and Asylum Specification (version 1 
April 2013). 
16  Data taken from Table 4(a)-(c) Of Schedule 1, Part 1 of the The Civil Legal (Remunera-
tion) Regulations 2013, No. 422.  
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Annex 2b 
 
Controlled Work Hourly Rates Payment in Asylum Cases17 
Hourly Rates- Legal Help 
Escape Fee Cases – Activity London Rate / Non-London Rate 
Preparation, Attendance and Advocacy £52.65 per hour / £48.24 per hour 
Travel & Waiting Time £27.81 per hour / £27.00 per hour 
Routine Letters out and telephone calls £4.05 per item / £3.78 per item 
Hourly Rates Cases  
Preparation, Attendance and Advocacy £51.62 per hour / £47.30 per hour 
Travel & Waiting Time £27.27 per hour / £26.51 per hour 
Routine Letters out and telephone calls £3.69 per item / £3.69 per item 
 
Hourly Rates- CLR 
Escape Fee Cases – Activity London Rate / Non-London Rate 
Preparation, Attendance and Advocacy £57.83 per hour / £54.09 per hour 
Travel & Waiting Time £28.62 per hour / £27.81 per hour 
Routine Letters out and telephone calls £4.14 per item / £3.78 per item 
Advocacy £65.79 per hour / £65.79 per hour 
Hourly Rates Cases  
Preparation, Attendance and Advocacy £55.08 per hour / £51.53 per hour 
Travel & Waiting Time £27.27 per hour / £26.51 per hour 
Routine Letters out and telephone calls £3.69 per item / £3.69 per item 
Advocacy £62.64 per hour / £62.64 per hour 
 
                                                        
17  Data taken from Table 7(a) and (c) and Table 8(a) and (c) Of Schedule 1, Part 2 of the 
The Civil Legal (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, No. 422. 
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